The emerging shield : the Air Force and the evolution of continental air defense, 1945-1960

GENERAL HISTORIES

The Emerging Shield

The Air Force and the
Evolution of Continental Air Defense
1945-1960 -

Kenneth Schaffel

OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 1991

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Schaffel, Kenneth, 1953-1988.

The emerging shield: the Air Force and the evolution of continental air de-
fense, 1945-1960 / Kenneth Schaffel.

356p. 24|cm. — (General histories)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-912799-60-9. — ISBN 0-912799-61-7 (pbk.)

1. United States — Air defenses, Military — History. 2. United States, Air
Force. Air Defense Command — History. I. United States. Air Force. Office of
Air Force History. II. Title. III. Series.
UG733.S33 1990

358.4' 145'0973-dc20 90-347 CIP

United States Air Force
Historical Advisory Committee

As of Jull 2, 1990

John H. Morrovy
University

Charles G. Boyd
Lieutenant General, USAF
Commander, Air University

Duane H. Cassidy
^jeneral, USAF
Lketired

, Jr., Chairman
of Georgia

Ann C. Petersen

The General Counsel, USAF

Merritt Roe Smith
The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

Dominick Graham
University of New Brunswick,
Canada

Ira D. Gruber
Rice University

Charles R. Hamm
Lieutenant General, USAF
Superintendent, USAF Academy

Marc Trachtenberg
University of Pennsylvania

Frank E. Vandiver
Texas A&M University

Gerhard L. Weinberg
The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill

Foreword

American concerns over air defense of the continental United States
were at their most grave in the 1950s. The descent into cold war in the
late 1940s, the confrontation of two hostile political systems in distant
Korea, and the Soviet development of atomic weapons earlier than ex-
pected by American military experts came together to stimulate popular
pressures for a shield against manned bombers reaching the American
heartland from the North Pole. The effect on the newly independent Air
Force was significant— it required that the Air Force modify its weapons
inventory, just as the service had settled on a strong strategic nuclear of-
fensive force to deter an enemy attack. The new requirements for strate-
gic defense threatened to compete heavily for resources with the Strate-
gic Air Command, itself undergoing a buildup and the introduction of
new airplanes and a ballistic missile force.

The Air Force nevertheless soon realized that the prospect of an
attack by bombers armed with nuclear weapons was real. At least a rudi-
mentary defense system, one capable of growing in strength and sophisti-
cation as demands dictated, would be needed to persuade the Soviets
that an attack might not succeed. The postwar Air Defense Command,
an administrative and planning backwater compared to the Strategic Air
Command, suddenly assumed far greater significance, absorbing a larger
portion of the defense budget.

The expansion of the air defense effort after the mid-1950s had an
impact on service roles, forcing the Air Force to consider issues it had
not addressed in the past. An effective guided missile defense in the latter
part of the decade brought the U.S. Army into the Continental Air De-
fense Command. Continental implications of the defense problem went
beyond dividing responsibilities for tracking and destroying incoming at-
tackers. A wide range of international political issues attended the em-
placement of a defensive warning system, for much of its construction
had to be on Canadian soil. Even here, the Air Force willingly proceed-
ed, convinced that early warnings of an attack received from the net de-
ployed in arctic regions would improve the survivability of the SAC
force that would launch the counterblow.

The Office of Air Force History is proud to publish this history as a
memorial to a dear friend and valued colleague, the late Capt. Kenneth
Schaffel, USAF. Captain Schaffel joined the office in early 1982 as a
second lieutenant just out of the Officer Training and Air Weapons Con-
troller Schools. He took a manuscript that had been partially completed
by two other authors, reorganized it, rewrote sections, completed the re-
search, drafted new chapters, and put the whole of it into publishable

v

Foreword

form. He was indefatigable in his effort and succeeded magnificently in
providing, for the service whose uniform he wore, a comprehensive study
of the evolution of North American air defense. In 1985, he was assigned
to Headquarters Space Command as an intelligence officer. Tragically,
the Air Force lost a dedicated and talented officer when Captain Schaf-
fel died in an accident in August 1988. This volume is his legacy to the
historical profession, and to the nation he served so well.

RICHARD H. KOHN

Chief, Office of Air Force History

vi

Preface

In the 1950s, the United States Air Force led the way in building
continental air defenses to protect the nation against bomber attack. By
the end of that decade, the United States and Canada deployed a warn-
ing network of ground-based radars extending from the United States'
southern borders to the arctic tundra, a fleet of airborne early-warning
planes, naval radar picket ships, radar platforms (the Texas Towers) fas-
tened to the ocean floor in the Atlantic Ocean, and a civilian corps of
ground observers. Once warning of approaching enemy bombers had
been received, the military forces of the United States and Canada were
prepared to unleash against the invader an arsenal of weapons that in-
cluded fighter-interceptors equipped with lethal air-to-air missiles, antiair-
craft artillery, and short- and long-range surface-to-air missiles, some nu-
clear tipped. The whole system was coordinated through a technologi-
cally advanced, computer-oriented command and control system, the
first of its kind ever deployed.

The story of the rise of air defense in the United States after World
War II is complex, and this volume does not presume to be a complete
history of the subject. It focuses on the U.S. Air Force's predominant
role in defense of the continental United States against manned bomber
attacks. Although the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and the Canadian Air
Force contributed resources to the mission, the U.S. Air Force had pri-
mary responsibility for research, development, and deployment of most
of the systems and weapons. The outstanding exception was antiaircraft
artillery, the province of the U.S. Army. In some respects, the Army can
be said to have fielded a complementary air defense system separate from
that of the Air Force. This book, however, examines the Army's part in
the mission only as it concerns roles and missions controversies with the
Air Force.

The volume begins with the U.S. Army Air Service's involvement
with air defense in World War I and traces the story through to the late
1950s and early 1960s. At that time, the intercontinental ballistic missile sup-
planted the bomber as the most dangerous long-range threat to North
America, precipitating a dramatic decline in bomber defenses over the
next two decades. A number of important themes emerge: the develop-
ment of technology, particularly for command, control, and communica-
tions systems; roles and missions debates; interpretations and analysis of
the threat; and Air Force theories and approaches to offensive and de-
fensive strategic warfare. The last is by far the most pervasive theme.

In the period covered by this volume, the Air Force consistently
held true to its belief that "the best defense is a good offense," despite

vii

Preface

the rise of air defense as a national priority. For most of history, military
organizations have favored offensive strategies, for taking the offense is a
way of planning and structuring the battle. Assuming the initiative by
striking the first blow offers clear benefits as opposed to waiting and re-
acting' defensively. The offense is usually viewed by military organiza-
tions as a positive force to achieve victory, whereas defense seems to
seek only a negative goal — that of preservation.*

The characteristics of air warfare made an offensive strategy espe-
cially appealing to the Air Force. From the first aerial attacks in World
War I, most air theorists thought the airplane was the supreme offensive
weapon, particularly because of its speed and agility, t The benefits af-
forded the defense on the ground in the forms of terrain, fortifications,
and popular support seemed to lose all relevancy in the air battle. World
War I suggested that an effective air defense required coordination of a
wide array of antiaircraft elements. First, it would be necessary to re-
ceive early warning of approaching aircraft. Next, the enemy's planes
would have to be continuously tracked as they neared their target, with
some method to indicate the direction, height, speed, and size of the on-
coming force. Devices would be required to identify friend from foe and
to inform pilots of the enemy's whereabouts. Finally, a commander on
the ground would have to assess this information and control the inter-
ception of the attacking force by friendly fighters. If everything worked
as hoped, well-planned and organized bomber attacks would still prob-
ably achieve success by avoiding or breaking through the defenses and
by hitting their targets. As airmen viewed the situation, the best that
could realistically be expected for air defense was limited success, and it
was questionable if such success was worth the effort and expense in-
volved.

Advantages of the offense seemed plain to airmen from many na-
tions in World War I and in subsequent years. For U.S. air officers, the
offense also was compelling as part of the American legacy. Although a
new and distinct combat arm, the Air Force inherited a tradition advo-
cating the destruction of an enemy's armed forces by the most direct
means available. In his treatment, The American Way of War, military his-
torian Russell F. Weigley has argued convincingly that, although the
United States has usually followed a defensive grand national strategy, in

•Reasons why military organizations favor offensive strategies are explained in the fol-
lowing: Jack Snyder's "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and
1984" [International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984):120], George H. Quester's Offense and
Defense in the International System [(New York, 1977), pp 1-12], and Barry R. Posen's The
Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between Two Wars [(Ithaca, N.Y.,
1984), pp 47-51].

tThe characteristics setting the air battle apart from other forms of warfare are de-
scribed well in Bernard Brodie's still valuable Strategy in the Missile Age [(Princeton, N.J.,
1959), pp 177-80].

viii

Preface

wartime it has strived for complete victory. This policy allowed U.S.
combat forces, at least before the Korean War, to pursue total victory.
The postwar duality of the awesome strategic (atomic) power unleashed
by the Air Force's B-29s against Japan and of President Truman's
charge, made to Congress on December 9, 1945, that the United States
would maintain "in constant and immediate readiness" a strong deterrent
force could thus seem to epitomize the "American way of war" as de-
scribed by Weigley. This marriage of strategic power and of nuclear
readiness was unprecedented in twentieth century American military his-
tory.

In some respects, the Air Force doctrine for strategic warfare fol-
lowed the views of the great Prussian military philosopher, Carl von
Clausewitz. Clausewitz's masterwork, On War, held that parrying a blow
could serve a useful purpose, but that in itself such action went against
the very nature of warfare, which is not mere endurance. To be truly
effective, Clausewitz thought, defense must eventually revert to offense
for "the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made
up of well-directed blows." Also, after meeting an attack, Clausewitz ad-
vocated that a military force be prepared to launch a counterattack, as
unleashing the "Sword of Vengeance" was the "greatest moment of de-
fense." For the Air Force, the Strategic Air Command constituted its
"Sword of Vengeance."

In the following pages, the author will attempt to explain the dichot-
omy between the Air Force's reliance on the strategic offense as the cor-
nerstone of its strategy and its mandate to provide, for a time, an ade-
quate continental air defense. This volume describes the effort to create
such a system while still relying, for basic strategy, on deterrence and a
retaliatory force primed to assume the offensive.

Kenneth Schaffel

ix

Acknowledgments

The late Capt. Kenneth Schaffel, author of this fine work on conti-
nental air defense, was killed in an accident in Colorado Springs in
August 1988, prior to his having had the opportunity to write his ac-
knowledgments. Captain Schaffel, however, had made clear his debt to
the late Thomas A. Sturm, a historian in the Office of Air Force History,
who began the research and writing for this book in the 1970s. Before
retirement, Mr. Sturm had accomplished a great deal of research and
written a number of draft chapters. When Captain Schaffel was assigned
to the Office of Air Force History, he contacted Mr. Sturm, and the two
formed a fast friendship. Dr. H. O. Malone, formerly a historian in the
Office of Air Force History and now command historian for the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, also contributed to the project
before Captain Schaffel arrived at the history office. Also useful to Cap-
tain Schaffel was a monograph done by Mr. Clyde R. Littlefield, Office
of Air Force History, on the semiautomatic ground environment
(SAGE) system.

Captain Schaffel was indebted to the following members of the final
panel that reviewed the manuscript: Dr. Richard H. Kohn, Col. John F.
Shiner, Mr. Herman S. Wolk, Dr. B. F. Cooling, and Mr. Jacob Neufeld,
all of the Office of Air Force History; Prof. Allan R. Millett, The Ohio
State University; Prof. Joseph T. Jockel, St. Lawrence University, then
serving temporarily in the Office of Canadian Affairs, U.S. State Depart-
ment; Mr. DeWitt S. Copp, USAF Historical Advisory Committee; and
Maj. Owen Jensen, USAF. Dr. Haskell Monroe, University of Missouri-
Columbia, forwarded helpful comments.

Also helpful were these historians in the Office of Air Force History
who participated in Captain Schaffel's seminars: Maj. John Kreis, Dr.
Eduard Mark, Lt. Col. Vance Mitchell, Dr. Walton Moody, Mr. Bernard
Nalty, Col. John Schlight, Dr. Wayne Thompson, Mr. Warren Trest,
and Dr. George Watson.

Captain Schaffel would also have thanked the dedicated people at
the National Archives and the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
who helped him greatly with his research.

In the Editorial Branch, Office of Air Force History, Ms. Vanessa
D. Allen began the editing of the manuscript, and Mrs. Barbara Wittig
then took over the brunt of the editing, guiding the book to completion.
Dr. Alfred Beck, Chief, Editorial Branch, also helped the manuscript
through the editorial process.

xi

Acknowledgments

Contributing from the Graphics Branch, 1100th Resource Manage-
ment Group, Air Force District of Washington, were Mrs. Susan Linders,
who oversaw the graphics production; Mr. Bruce John, who prepared the
maps; and Mrs. Tracy Weeks Miller, who prepared the charts.

xii

Contents

Foreword v

Preface vii

Acknowledgments x i

Chapters

1. Genesis of the Air Defense Mission 1

The United States and Air Defense: The Early Years 6

Defining the Mission 8

Development of Air Defense Doctrine and Tactics 9

Gordon P. Saville 13

2. Air Defense in World War II 21

The First Air Defense Command, 1940-1941 24

Air Defense in Wartime 36

3. Planning for Air Defense in the Postwar Era 47

Establishment of the Air Defense Command 50

Early Planning Efforts 59

The Radar Fence Plan 67

Attempts to Come to Terms with the Mission 73

Active Operations Begin 76

4. Saville Takes Charge 83

Revision of the Radar Fence Plan 87

Establishment of the Continental Air Command 95

Taking the Case to Congress 97

Fighter Aircraft for Air Defense 98

Further Organizational Changes 102

5. Broadening Dimensions: Air Defense as a Public

Issue 107

The Revolt of the Admirals 108

Impact of the Soviet Atomic Bomb Ill

Roles and Missions Dilemmas 115

Air Defense Forces in the Field 122

xiii

6. Continental Air Defense in the Korean War Period .... 129

Reorganization and the Impact of the Chinese Interven-
tion 139

Confronting Realities 152

Status of the Fighter-Interceptor Forces 160

7. An Integrated, Efficient, Highly Potent Air Defense

System 169

Next to the Real Thing 169

East River 172

The Summer Study Group 174

The Decision to Proceed 191

8. Defensive Systems Become Operational 197

SAGE: A Command and Control Network for Air De-
fense 197

Warning Lines 209

Other Warning Systems 217

The Air Defense Weapons Force 224

BOMARC 235

9. Organizing to Meet the Threat 241

Continental Air Defense Command: A Joint Command

for Air Defense 241

North American Air Defense Command 246

10. Epilogue: Impact of a New Threat 255

Effects of the ICBM Threat on the Air Defenses 260

Aftermath: Deterioration of the Air Defenses 266

Appendices

1. Milestones in U.S. Air Defense to 1960 277

2. ADC Assigned Personnel Strength and Commanders, to
1960 286

3. ADC Commanders 287

Notes 289

Glossary 317

Bibliography 323

Index 335

xiv

Photographs

Capt. Gordon P. Saville 15

General George C. Marshall 24

Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney 25

Plotting board, Watertown maneuvers, August 1940 26

Information center and Air Defense Headquarters, Water-
town maneuvers 28

Filter board staffed by civilians, January 1941 31

Moored barrage balloon of the type used by the Antiaircraft

Artillery Command 34

Antiaircraft artillery searchlights, circa 1940 35

Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild 42

Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville 44

General of the Army, Henry H. Arnold 51

General Carl A. Spaatz 53

Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer 55

P-61 Black Widow 60

Brig. Gen. Earle E. Partridge 66

W. Stuart Symington becomes Secretary of the Air Force 70

P-82 Twin Mustang 78

Tu-4 Bull 85

P-80 Shooting Star and B-29 Superfortress 88

AN/CPS-5 search radar 94

F-89 Scorpion 100

F-86 Sabre 101

F-102 Delta Dagger 102

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg becomes Chief of Staff, U.S.

Air Force 108

Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead 123

F-86D Sabre 124

F-94Starfire 125

General Benjamin W. Chidlaw 149

Plexiglass plotting board, mid-1950s 151

Early computer patch panel and component parts 153

General Frederic H. Smith 154

Tu-95 Bear and Tu-16 Badger 182

General Nathan F. Twining accepting second tour as Chief

of Staff 192

SAGE 64X64 magnetic core memory 198

AN/FSQ-7 radar 205

xv

SAGE direction center, Stewart Air Force Base, New York.. 208

Pinetree Line 210

DEW Line module 213

DEW Line site 214

DEW Line tower 215

DEW Line post 216

Texas Tower 218

RC-121C 221

F-106A Delta Dart 228

F-101B Voodoo 232

GAR-1 Falcon 233

IM-99 BOM ARC 237

NORAD site and Cheyenne Mountain 262

NOR AD COC dining room 263

SAGE post, Syracuse, New York 265

Charts

Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons Assigned, December 1946-
June 1954 162

Fighter-Interceptor Aircraft on Hand, December 1950- June
1954 163

ADC Day Conventional Fighters (Jet) Interceptors Pos-
sessed, 1951-1954 165

Combat-Ready Aircraft and Aircrews 225

ADC Jet All-Weather Interceptors Possessed (Century
Series) 1956-1973 (as of December 31) 231

Maps

Air Defense Command Long-Term Plan 64

Areas of Responsibility for Air Defense, July 1948-March

1949 89

Deployment of Air Defense Radar, June 1948 91

Deployment of ADC Lashup Radar Network, December

1950 93

Air Defense Identification Zones, 1952 134

Areas of Responsibility for Air Defense, November 1950 139

Air Force Areas of Responsibility for Air Defense, July 1951 146

xvi

Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command Subdivisions and Bat-
talions Assigned, December 31, 1953 147

Ground Observer Corps Program, 1952 158

Fighter Forces Available for Air Defense in an Emergency,

December 15, 1952 164

The DEW Line 211

Texas Tower Stations 219

Operational Interceptor Force, December 31, 1959 230

NORAD Operational Missile/Gun Force, July 1, 1959 248

NORAD Operational Interceptor Force, July 1, 1959 249

Region Configuration, End of 1983 266

Tables

ADC Day Fighters (Jet) Possessed 166

Interceptor Squadrons Assigned ADC, by Type 166

Air Defense Aircraft 227

Comparison of Defense Department, Air Force, and ADC

Budgets 269

Air Defense Matrix 270

xvii

Chapter 1

Genesis of the Air Defense Mission

The history of air defense begins with the use of manned flight for
military purposes. On June 5, 1783, the Montgolfier brothers,
Jacques Etienne and Joseph-Michel, demonstrated the first public ascen-
sion of their hot-air balloon; less than eleven years later, the French con-
structed the first military balloon, L'Entreprenant. In April 1794 the
French Army formed a balloon company. The next month it began re-
connaissance operations over Austrian lines. General Jean Baptiste Jour-
dan, who had approved the formation of the balloon company, was im-
pressed with information he received concerning enemy movements.
Austrians, confused by this new element in warfare, took defensive
action on June 13, 1794. They used two seventeen-pound howitzers to
fire at the balloons. Although their shooting was ineffective, the Austri-
ans opened the first chapter in the history of air defense. 1

Ground forces tried to thwart reconnaissance balloons throughout
the nineteenth century. During the American Civil War, Union and Con-
federate batteries directed guns at balloons attempting free flight over
enemy lines. 2 During the 1870 Siege of Paris, Germans incorporated the
first modern antiballoon defenses, and Krupp, the great arms manufactur-
er, produced a twenty-five-millimeter rifle mounted on a pedestal and
light cart. These guns were only marginally successful by day, and the
French managed to neutralize them completely by launching their bal-
loons at night. The guns soon left service, and balloons became more or
less standard equipment in armies, mostly serving as experimental models
instead of as practical devices. 3

Early in the twentieth century, airplanes and airships began to re-
place balloons as the premier aeronautical instruments of war. By the be-
ginning of World War I in 1914, airplanes and airships had largely dis-
placed balloons as reconnaissance vehicles. Pilots and observers of the
newly formed national air services noted and reported the formations
and movements of mass armies and directed friendly fire upon enemy po-
sitions. They soon discovered that airplanes could be used for more
deadly missions than mere scouting and surveillance.

1

The Emerging Shield

The role of aircraft in battle became more sinister when airmen
armed their machines with guns and bombs, and used them to harass and
even to destroy enemy scouts. In the summer of 1915, the Germans in-
troduced the Fokker Eindecker, a monoplane equipped with a fixed gun.
Designed by the Dutchman Anthony Fokker, this gun was aimed by
pointing the aircraft itself. The pilot, using synchronized gearing of the
gun and the propeller, fired streams of machinegun bullets through the
propeller. With this advantage, the Fokker became "the hired killer of
the air with no secondary purpose." 4

On the ground, the machinegun helped establish the ascendancy of
defensive warfare; its use in airplanes promoted the ascendancy of offen-
sive warfare, in the opinion of some military commanders. To defeat the
Eindecker, Britain and France encouraged the development of even more
lethal aircraft, capable of penetrating enemy lines and attacking both air
and ground forces. Achieving a technical advantage in aircraft, they
planned to take the fight to the enemy. Maj. Gen. Hugh Trenchard,
Commander of the Royal Flying Corps squadrons stationed in France,
scorned the very notion of "standing on the defensive in the skies." In
three-dimensional warfare, he thought, there was little choice involved in
employing offensive or defensive tactics. With no place to hide and
unable to construct fortifications, pilots had to remain the aggressors or
face almost certain destruction. 5 In 1916, when Britain and France tem-
porarily assumed a technological edge in fighter aircraft, Trenchard
claimed that the principles of air power had not changed since the
Wright Brothers first flew thirteen years before: "The aeroplane is not a
defence against the aeroplane. But the opinion of those most competent
to judge is that the aeroplane as a weapon of attack cannot be too highly
estimated." 6

Despite Trenchard's strong words, he was at times forced to avoid
forays beyond Allied lines in order to parry thrusts by the enemy. The
Royal Flying Corps, flying aircraft inferior to German models, suffered
heavy losses in men and equipment when they ventured behind enemy
lines; the Allied air forces faced not only superior pursuit planes but fire
from antiaircraft artillery and machineguns on the ground as well. To
counter this situation, the British and French supplemented their fighters
with antiaircraft fire on those occasions when German air commanders
ordered missions over British and French-controlled territory.

The semantics of air combat, as World War I demonstrated, could
be extremely confusing. Labeling dogfights of the period as either offen-
sive or defensive can be deceptive. An aircraft could employ a set of
basic tactics for defensive purposes on one day and contribute to the air
offensive by using similar tactics the next. The tactical air war over the
Western Front was certainly a nebulous theater in which to separate of-
fensive and defensive strategies. In any case, the arena in which air de-

2

Genesis of the Mission

fenses were first pitted against a strategic attack* took place not on the
Western Front but in the so-called First Battle of Britain, when German
bombs tested the fledgling air defenses of Great Britain.

As early as 1908, parliamentary committees began investigating Brit-
ain's ability to resist attack from airplanes or airships. Although a general
awareness existed among politicians, defense officials, and military offi-
cers of the threat that Germany's growing fleet of Zeppelins posed to
Britain, no important action occurred before the war to provide air de-
fense. The danger posed by the new air weapon was still obscure, 7 and
most British, when they thought about air attack at all, equated it with
fantasies like those described in H. G. Wells's futuristic novels. 8

When the war began, Britain had no air units specially designated
for home defense, and the Army's entire Royal Flying Corps was posted
to France. Responsibility for air defense thus fell to the Admiralty,
which controlled seaplanes, while the Royal Garrison Artillery supplied
most of the heavy guns placed on British territory. On September 3,
1914, Winston Churchill, as State Secretary of the Admiralty, assumed
responsibility for the air defense of Britain, a task he performed with
characteristic force and energy. Churchill began by composing the first
carefully considered expression of air defense theory. In this memoran-
dum, he offered pragmatic suggestions for the combined employment of
pursuit planes, sound detectors, searchlights, observers, and antiaircraft
artillery. Most important, he emphasized that it would be imperative to
destroy an enemy's attacking aircraft or airships as far away from the
target as possible. 9 This could be performed by long-range interceptors
acting strictly in a defensive role or by bomb-loaded pursuit planes at-
tacking enemy airship sheds or airdromes. Shortly after Churchill issued
his memorandum, Royal Naval Air Service biplanes armed with four
twenty-pound bombs raided German airship bases. One Zeppelin was de-
stroyed. 10

German bomb-equipped airships began to attack Great Britain in
force beginning in 1915. Britain's first response, related to Churchill's
proposal for destroying enemy air vehicles far from their targets, was
known as forward air defense. This offensive form of defense used
friendly craft to destroy Zeppelin airships in their assembly plants or on
the ground before they could be launched from Belgian airfields. Attacks
by British naval planes, launched from established airfields near the
French port of Dunkirk, enjoyed some success, even forcing Germany to
abandon its own air fields in Belgium. Unfortunately, the British failed to
bring German airship construction to a halt: the Germans simply con-
structed more Zeppelin sheds in parts of occupied France that Allied air-
craft could not reach. When the airships continued raids against Britain,

* An operation designed to destroy an enemy's will to fight or its capacity for war.

3

The Emerging Shield

government and military authorities realized more and better means
would have to be invested in defeating airships in friendly skies. As his-
torian Barry D. Powers noted, "It proved not to be true that the best
defence was a strong offence with respect to the airship threat, even
though this was the position taken by the most outspoken air power ad-
vocates." 11 However, the philosophy that the best defense was a good
offense took root in the minds of airmen from all nations in World War
I. The concept of "forward air defense," although not always termed as
such, would continue to influence air power theorists long after the
war's end.

On June 7, 1915, a British naval pilot, Sublieutenant R. A. J. Warne-
ford, became the first aviator to destroy an airship in flight. Warneford
maneuvered his Morane-Saulnier Bullet monoplane, armed only with
gravity weapons, above the airship and dropped small firebombs, sending
the leviathan to the ground in flames over Ghent, Belgium. 12 To be ef-
fective against German airships — slow, vulnerable, and filled with thou-
sands of cubic feet of highly explosive gas — the British needed to devel-
op incendiary ammunitions. When British air defense units received ex-
plosive and incendiary bullets for their Lewis machineguns in spring
1916, the dirigible's days were numbered. 13 By midsummer the German
Army air service, after suffering heavy losses, discontinued airship raids.
Forays by lighter-than-air craft of the German Navy persisted until war's
end, but their destructive effect thereafter was negligible.

German airship raids took a toll on the British war effort. By the
end of 1916, Zeppelin attacks had killed 500 civilians and caused some
17,000 military personnel to be diverted to the air defense of Britain. The
failure of the airships to cause greater destruction apparently resulted less
from the effectiveness of British air defenses than from innate deficien-
cies in the Zeppelins. Pilots merely took advantage of these handicaps to
shoot down the craft. 14 No sooner had the airships been driven away
than a more serious threat appeared over Britain.

After 1916, the long-range bomber replaced the airship in the
German Army air arm. Although carrying a smaller bombload than the
Zeppelins, bombers were faster and more difficult to intercept than diri-
gibles. On the Eastern Front, Russia's Igor Sikorsky premiered the 4-
engine Ilya Mourometz, proving the durability of the heavily defended
bomber. Meanwhile, by 1916 Germany had ready powerful, twin-engine
bombers built by Gothaer Waggonfabrik. The more advanced models, as
fast as contemporary pursuit planes, could remain in the air up to 6
hours. Armed with 3 defensive machineguns and up to 1,100 pounds of
bombs, the Gothas later joined with larger bombers, the so-called Riesen-
flugzeug (Giant aircraft) in Germany's long-range arsenal. 15

The first intensive German bomber raid on Britain on May 25, 1917,
killed or wounded 286 people in Folkestone and Shorncliffe. A second

4

Genesis of the Mission

raid on London on June 13 killed or wounded 594 people. 16 The Ger-
mans planned to attack key industrial sites and airfields. Unfortunately,
poor weather and unsophisticated bombing methods forced them to scat-
ter their bombs over wide areas, causing civilian deaths and heavy prop-
erty damage.

Like the earlier Zeppelin raids, the German bomber campaign
forced the British to divert men and resources from the Western Front
to home defense, in response to a public outcry demanding protection in
the wake of the first destructive attacks. Trenchard and General Sir
Douglas Haig, British Army Commander on the Western Front, objected
strenuously. The war ministry, which had assumed responsibility for
air defense from the admiralty in 1916, however, transferred from
France experienced Royal Flying Corps squadrons equipped primarily
with Sopwith Camels and SE-5s. 17

The British at first seemed mesmerized by the large German bomb-
ers. Soon, however, the addition of quality pursuit planes, along with un-
seasonal storms and the coming of winter, enabled them to consolidate
and build upon the air defense system devised earlier in response to the
airship danger. 18 In July 1917, Great Britain established the London Air
Defense Area (LADA), under the command of Maj. Gen. Edward B.
Ashmore, an experienced artillery expert and pilot. By the summer of
1918 Ashmore had turned LADA into a centralized intelligence and
command network. All the various air defense components then at
hand — gun stations, searchlight batteries, pursuit units, barrage balloon
screens, inland and coastal observer posts, and fire and police units —
maintained contact with Ashmore's headquarters. Dispersed subcontrol
stations telephoned Ashmore's central control to warn of aircraft flying
over Britain. While the general watched from a raised gallery, plotters
traced the course of every plane identified by observers on a large-scale
map. Situated in the gallery directly in front of him were switches enab-
ing him to talk to any of his subordinates at the subcontrols. He needed
only to turn his head to speak with an air force commander who trans-
mitted messages to the pursuit planes' airfield at Biggin Hill by way of a
direct line. 19

Based on a sound general concept, in operation the LADA network
nevertheless experienced difficulties. For example, before takeoff, observ-
ers and plotters could supply pilots with only approximate indications of
a raider's location. This limited information appeared sufficient when the
enemy flew a slow-moving airship, but when the enemy flew a speedier,
elusive bomber, more accurate and timely information was required.
Though a ground-to-air wireless radio system would have been a god-
send, these devices were not ready for general use until a month after
the last bomber raid, in June 1918. In the meantime, several methods
tracked the enemy's location. One of these involved the laying out of

5

The Emerging Shield

white arrows pointing along the ground in the general direction of sight-
ed bombers. This expedient met with little success; airborne pilots virtu-
ally had to seek out the enemy on their own. 20

For all its technical difficulties, LADA functioned efficiently
enough to force the Germans to change their tactics. Coordinated efforts
allowed British antiaircraft artillery gunners to hold fire when their pur-
suit planes were in the area. Daytime combined operations took a rising
toll of Gothas and Giants. German losses in day operations caused them
to bomb almost exclusively at night. Still they had little success. These
World War I bombers lacked range, proper navigational aids, and suita-
ble bombsights. They could not fly under less than ideal weather condi-
tions. These factors as much as the British defenses eventually contribut-
ed to thwarting Germany's bombardment effort. 21

Overall, British air defenses performed credibly in opposing equally
unsophisticated German bombers. They developed a complex network
around London consisting of 266 antiaircraft artillery guns; 271 pursuit
aircraft, barrage balloons, and observer and listening posts; and a direct-
line communications net. In sum, this elementary system bore a striking
resemblance to the defenses the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command
would deploy in 1940, with the outstanding exception of radar. In their
postwar analyses of the First Battle of Britain, airpow'er theorists on both
sides of the Atlantic were more impressed with the German air offensive,
attributing its decline near the end of the war to the general collapse in
Germany's fortunes. (Trenchard, in fact, planned in the closing stages of
the war a similar, though more deadly, bomber offensive against Germa-
ny that was forestalled by the November 1918 armistice.) Especially im-
pressive, German bomber raids simply bypassed the bulk of Britain's pur-
suit plane strength on the Western Front, much as German submarines
avoided Britain's Grand Fleet in the North Sea. Trenchard and his ad-
herents also pointed out that air defense had proved a terribly expensive
operation in terms of tying down pursuit planes, antiaircraft artillery, and
other resources. Although the outcome of the first large-scale strategic
offensive/defensive air campaign had produced no clear-cut victor, advo-
cates for the bomber attributed this to technical inadequacies in the
bomber that could be easily overcome. The emergence of air defenses,
meanwhile, was usually played down or ignored, and the likelihood of
significant improvements was not seriously considered. 22

The United States and Air Defense: The Early Years

The American military experience in the Great War was shorter and
less instructive than most of the other major participants. Unlike Britain,
6

Genesis of the Mission

America never had to face the threat of air attack. Nevertheless, some
Americans recognized the danger airships and airplanes posed in the
hands of a foreign aggressor. The distinguished scientist Alexander
Graham Bell, in an April 1916 address before the Navy League of the
United States, warned that the nation might eventually be the victim of
airship raids. Bell vividly described the destruction and chaos that would
ensue as bombs rained down upon the nation's great cities. The famous
inventor argued that steps should be taken immediately to create a formi-
dable air force, capable of shooting invaders out of the sky. 23

Bell's warning failed to stimulate the establishment of home air de-
fense forces. Government officials, military officers, and the public as-
sumed that, protected by ocean barriers, the nation was virtually invul-
nerable to air bombardment. This judgment proved sound, and the need
for air defenses never became an issue. In Europe, meanwhile, American
airmen's experience with air defense was limited basically to theater op-
erations. For example, Brig. Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell employed ob-
servers and pursuit planes on alert at ground stations during the large-
scale offensive at St. Mihiel. 24 Such operations had little similarity with
the strategic defense of an entire nation.

After the war, military aviators came home to a nation whose
people and leaders desired a return to traditional American isolationism.
Congress reduced military and naval forces drastically from wartime
force levels to a peacetime force designed for defensive missions. The
Navy remained the first line of defense against foreign invaders, while
the Army protected territorial possessions serving as barriers against en-
emies who might elude the fleet and attempt to make coastal inroads.
The Air Service, organizationally a part of the Army,* did not have a
dominant mission, one that clearly determined the direction of war. It
assisted ground troops by conducting observation missions, fending off
enemy aircraft, and dropping bombs and strafing enemy positions. It
shared off-shore reconnaissance duties with the Navy (which, adding to
the confusion, had its own air branch and prescribed missions including,
for example, convoy operations and attacks on enemy submarines). Yet,
brash, war-experienced air officers struggled to gain greater autonomy,
eventually to become a separate service like the British Royal Air Force.
These airmen knew that to realize their goal they had to postulate an
airpower philosophy stressing the airplane's unique capabilities as a war-
winning weapon. 25

Billy Mitchell led the fight for a separate Air Service in the first half
of the 1920s. Like Hugh Trenchard, whom he had met during the war,
Mitchell believed the bomber was destined to become the dominant

* The Army air arm was administered originally by the Signal Corps. The Air Service
was organized as a branch of the Army Expeditionary Forces in 1917. It was not until June
4, 1920, that the Office of the Chief of the Air Service was established.

7

The Emerging Shield

force in warfare. Trenchard's trademark was the relentless air offensive.
He advocated using the morale effect of the airplane to defeat the
enemy — "this can only be done by attacking and continuing to attack." 26
Mitchell's fervent advocacy of air power gained him the reputation of a
stormy petrel, yet he could also be pragmatic. Before his court martial
and subsequent resignation from the Army in 1926, Mitchell usually at-
tempted to merge his theories into the framework of orthodox U.S. de-
fense policy. That policy concerned itself principally with the defense of
the continental United States and its possessions, such as the Philippines,
Hawaii, and the Panama Canal. Since sea power, including the newly de-
vised aircraft carrier, posed the greatest threat to the mainland and out-
lying territories, Mitchell agitated his opponents and inspired his disciples
when, during the early 1920s, he demonstrated in a series of tests that
aerial bombing could sink modern warships. 27

Mitchell and his adherents, officers such as William T. Sherman and
Thomas DeWitt Milling (theorists on the proper use of the air
weapon), 28 suggested how aircraft could be employed defensively to pro-
tect America's shores against troop-carrying warships and aircraft carri-
ers. The airplane could spot approaching battleships and carriers and sink
or cripple them before they could mount a threat. Moreover, U.S. air-
craft could also conceivably perform preemptive operations, annihilating
any hostile air bases that an enemy might establish in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Because airmen usually labeled such actions as air defense meas-
ures, confusion arose over what constituted offense rather than defense.

Convinced of the unique role of the airplane as a weapon against
warships in national defense, Mitchell and some of his more optimistic
supporters believed that the air force could function most effectively as a
separate service. Certainly, capability to defend the nation's coasts was
important and it dovetailed perfectly with the nation's defensive military
posture, but leading lawmakers, officers of the Navy and ground forces,
and even some airmen remained skeptical that the airplane's contribution
to coast defense warranted independence to the Air Service. Still, Mitch-
ell's bombing exhibitions sparked intense debate on the issue and helped
earn the air arm additional recognition in 1926 with the creation of the
Air Corps and the establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of War for Air under F. Trubee Davison. 29

Defining the Mission

The mission of defense as applied to military aircraft was a topic of
heated controversy. Throughout the 1920s and much of the next decade,
the Army air arm and the Navy argued over the terms of the coastal

8

Genesis of the Mission

defense mission. How far could the Army's planes venture over the
water before they trespassed into areas of naval responsibility? Similarly,
how far inshore could the Navy operate? In January 1931, Army Chief
of Staff General Douglas MacArthur and Chief of Naval Operations Ad-
miral William V. Pratt concluded an agreement prescribing distinct mis-
sions for the air arms of both services. Naval aviation would be based on
carriers used to help the fleet defeat a hostile force at sea. 30 The Navy
would remain the first line of defense, but, as MacArthur pointed out,
the Army and its air arm were responsible for "defending the coasts both
in the homelands and in the overseas possessions." 31

Early in 1933, following extensive studies by the War Department
General Staff and the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, a Chief of
Staff letter, "Employment of Army Aviation in Coast Defense," further
delineated intramural responsibilities. Army aviation's coastal defense
mission was defined as the "conduct of air operations over the sea in
direct defense of the coast." 32 Assigned a finite role in national defense,
many Air Corps officers pressed even harder for independence. MacAr-
thur was equally determined to deny complete independence to the Air
Corps, but he later endorsed an Air Corps reorganization reflecting the
coastal defense mission and approved the formation of General Head-
quarters (GHQ) Air Force, a combat arm capable of, among other
things, rapid concentration for coastal defense. 33

Simply defining the air defense mission was not sufficient to estab-
lish its importance. Two official committees convened to examine future
roles of military aviation. The Drum Board in October 1933 and the
Baker Board in July 1934 minimized the threat of air attack against the
United States. The Baker Board emphasized that defense of the nation
would require a joint effort among the service branches. 34 War Depart-
ment planning to protect the coasts against air attack was, therefore, not
an exclusive responsibility of the Air Corps. 35 In fact, a War Department
directive of May 1935 decreed that the principal role in the mission-
close-in defense— lay with the Coast Artillery's antiaircraft artillery
forces, supplemented as required by pursuit aviation and aircraft warning
services. 36

Development of Air Defense Doctrine and Tactics

The War Department directive of May 1935 limited the Army's air
arm in overall air defense planning. It specified that GHQ Air Force, es-
tablished in March 1935, would coordinate with field army commanders
to provide pursuit units for air defense. 37 GHQ Air Force had responsi-
bility not only for sending long-range aircraft to destroy approaching

9

The Emerging Shield

hostiles but also for considering the role of pursuit aircraft in air defense.
Army aviation had earlier had a similar focus, even if airmen preferred
to emphasize the offensive form of air defense.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, air doctrine governing the defense
of the United States took shape at the Air Corps Tactical School
(ACTS) on Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama. Most of the students
were lieutenants and captains. They studied the range of options for em-
ployment of air power, including the use of pursuit planes in air superior-
ity, ground support, and air defense. Most found particular interest in the
ideas of Billy Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard, and the Italian theorist, Giulio
Douhet, 38 who, to one degree or another, advocated the bomber as the
epitome of air power. Douhet, perhaps, presented the case for the
bomber most forcefully and in the most partisan style.

Douhet assumed that the airplane potentially possessed such great
advantages of speed and altitude that it could destroy targets on land or
sea while it remained unscathed. He foresaw the development of an in-
domitable battle plane, a bomber so heavily armed that it could fight its
way through swarms of defensive aircraft to reach its target. Douhet
could not predict that technical progress would strengthen air defenses
sufficiently to challenge his "Battle Plane." 39 The grandiose assessments
of the power of the bomber offered by Douhet, and to a lesser extent by
Mitchell and others, did not gain general acceptance in the 1920s. The
equipment of that era simply belied their claims.

A typical American bomber of the 1920s, the Martin MB-2, had
limited range, a service ceiling of a mere 7,000 feet, and a maximum
speed of only 98 miles per hour. Contemporary pursuit planes easily out-
performed it. But as the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, bombers began to
achieve new standards of proficiency. In the United States the Boeing B-
9, purchased in limited numbers, and the Martin B-10, the standard
Army bomber of the period, advanced bomber capability. The B-10 had
a service ceiling of 24,000 feet and a top speed of 213 miles per hour.
The aircraft could carry more than a ton of high explosives, twice the
bombload of the MB-2. 40

No longer could the pursuit plane outpace the bomber. Standard
pursuit aircraft like the Curtiss P-6 or the Boeing P-12 were no match
for the Martin in terms of speed and range. Indeed, except for the occa-
sional substitution of an air-cooled engine for the more common liquid-
cooled models, all the air arm's pursuit planes resembled the Curtiss
racer of 1922, a biplane that achieved an average speed of 205.8 miles
per hour. 41 The problem with pursuit aircraft was not the engine, for
horsepower and efficiency improved steadily; it was the failure to reduce
aerodynamic drag that slowed the craft. Whereas the bomber could re-
tract its landing gear into an engine nacelle, the pursuit plane was handi-
capped with a slim fuselage and wings that required external bracing.

10

Genesis of the Mission

Neither the fuselage nor the wings could accommodate the necessary
mechanism for retractable gear. As late as 1932 when Boeing developed
an all-metal monoplane, the P-26 Peashooter, the new pursuit plane re-
mained burdened with fixed landing gear, externally braced wings, and
an open cockpit. 42 As the bomber became more formidable, its presence
became dominant. In 1926 there had been one bomber to every four pur-
suit aircraft in the Air Corps aircraft inventory; by 1937 there were
eleven bombers to every nine pursuit planes, and the Air Corps had al-
ready taken possession of thirteen B-17 four-engine bombers. 43

The bomber gained a technological advantage over the pursuit plane
and began to dominate Air Corps doctrine, in part because of competi-
tion among the various aircraft companies. Douglas, Boeing, and Martin
in particular built long-range aircraft for commercial purposes. Many of
the technical developments used in these aircraft could be transferred to
bombers. Aircraft designers found it more difficult to incorporate these
innovations into pursuit aircraft primarily because a pursuit plane's small-
er size created engineering problems. 44

To defeat bombers, the smaller, more maneuverable pursuit planes
required a substantial speed advantage over their larger opponents. Air
Corps exercises conducted in the late 1920s and early 1930s indicated
that pursuit planes were no match for current bombers. In the Ohio ma-
neuvers of 1929, outclassed interceptors gave little or no trouble to pene-
trating bombers, inspiring Maj. Walter H. Frank, ACTS Assistant Com-
mandant, to declare "that an air force is principally an offensive weapon
rather than a defensive one." 45

Frank's view gained widespread acceptance in the Air Corps as the
1930s progressed. Young officers at ACTS, although willing to acknowl-
edge a debt to Mitchell, Trenchard, and Douhet, devised a concept of
warfare that dwarfed anything suggested by the early bomber apostles in
terms of theory and sophistication— strategic precision daylight bombing.
Among the outstanding airmen who contributed their talents to the de-
velopment of this concept were Donald Wilson, Laurence S. Kuter,
Haywood S. Hansell, Harold L. George, and Kenneth N. Walker.
Wilson and a brilliant major, Muir S. Fairchild, began research to identi-
fy those interdependent segments of a modern industrialized economy
that might be vulnerable to precision bombing, presaging the collapse of
an enemy's political structure. A watershed occurred in 1935 when
Boeing produced its model 299, the prototype of the B-17. For many
Air Corps officers, the B-17 could finally translate theory into reality. 46

It seemed to many airmen that precision bombing created the criti-
cal role that would justify an independent Air Force. Yet, as bombard-
ment theory and equipment developed and matured, the Air Corps also
examined other aspects of air combat, including the use of pursuit planes
in tactical air support and air defense operations. Although progress oc-

11

The Emerging Shield

curred faster for bomber development, aircraft companies cooperated
with the Air Corps to produce pursuit aircraft capable of performing
specialized missions. In addition, the Air Corps continually conceptual-
ized and developed tactics for pursuit planes in different combat roles.
One of these roles involved bomber defense.

In 1930 the Air Corps experimented with the use of an air defense
early-warning system in exercises conducted at Aberdeen, Maryland.
The rudimentary warning service consisted of ground observers who
used radios or telephones to relay aircraft sightings to a central control
unit. 47 Although inconclusive, the results of the war games seemed to
shed at least some doubt on Major Frank's completely gloomy assess-
ment of the value of defensive air forces made the previous year during
the Ohio exercises. Prospects for the development of the warning system
encouraged the Air Corps to continue testing it.

From May 15 to 27, 1933, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, joint air-ground
exercises tested antiaircraft artillery operating with and without the co-
operation of pursuit planes. The exercise further investigated the use of a
distant intelligence net working in tandem with Air Corps defense units.
Claire L. Chennault, an outspoken, grizzled forty-two-year-old captain
and outstanding pilot, the future leader of the renowned Flying Tigers,
participated in the exercise. A pursuit instructor in ACTS, his parochial
and uncompromising advocacy of pursuit planes matched that of those
who declared the bomber as the ultimate aerial weapon.

As at the Aberdeen exercises three years earlier, the deployment of
an early-warning system at Fort Knox produced mixed reviews. Chen-
nault, nevertheless, drew a number of important lessons from the tests
and came away convinced that efficient air defense could become a reali-
ty. He believed that pursuit aircraft could not be expected to maintain
defensive patrols during periods of possible attack, since these proce-
dures wasted fuel and drained the energy and morale of pilots. Instead,
machines and pilots should stand by on the ground, ready to take off
after previously established observation points had determined the alti-
tude, general course, and probable objective of an approaching enemy
formation. Advance warning would enable pursuit planes to meet the
enemy far from the intended targets and destroy him. Although Chen-
nault realized any system that relied primarily on ground observers to
relay information could not work fast enough to be fully efficient, he be-
lieved advances in technology, both in aircraft and communications,
would minimize delays and misunderstandings. 48

By the time of the Fort Knox exercises, pursuit aircraft engineering
and radio telephony were being improved. The Air Corps began to re-
spond to requests from commanders in the field, like the one from Lt.
Col. Henry H. Arnold, commander of March Field, California, to secure
equipment capable of satisfying other needs. 49 Though Arnold fervently

12

Genesis of the Mission

advocated the strategic bomber, he and other airmen remained disturbed
by years of neglect in the pursuit branch. Aircraft companies soon found
themselves being encouraged to use new technology to improve not only
bombers but all other types of military aircraft as well. Pursuit engines
increased in power, and, when equipped with superchargers, could de-
velop even greater power at high altitudes. The general adoption of the
monoplane configuration reduced drag, as did the presence of retractable
landing gear and enclosed cockpits. Simultaneously, radio communica-
tion improved enormously, permitting reliable air-to-air and ground-to-
air communication. The Consolidated P-30, ordered in 1934, featured a
controllable pitch propeller, retractable landing gear, and cockpit heat-
ing, essential for chasing bombers in sustained operations at high alti-
tudes.

When the Air Corps purchased 77 Seversky P-35s in June 1936,
standard features included retractable landing gear, all-metal construc-
tion, and enclosed cockpits. Before World War II, the United States de-
veloped several advanced pursuit planes, including the Curtiss P-36
Hawk and P-40 Warhawk, the Bell P-39 Airacobra, and the Lockheed
P-38 Lightning. Although only the Lightning was designed specifically
as an interceptor, all could function in air defense. 50 These superior air-
craft coupled with their advanced communications led to improved pur-
suit tactics, in which formation leaders could coordinate attacks even
when their formations were widely separated. In terms of air defense, di-
rectors on the ground were better prepared to receive information from
forward observers and to direct pursuit planes to an approaching
enemy. 51

Gordon P. Saville

Although most Air Corps members recognized a need to improve
pursuit performance as part of an early-warning defense system, theorists
in ACTS and their superiors throughout the Air Corps considered the
offensive clearly superior. Astute American airmen realized that invest-
ing every aviation resource in offensive means was impracticable; it
would represent a politically impossible position in a country that em-
phasized a grand national defensive strategy. Americans would certainly
demand defense, and not only the offensive type of air defense that the
Air Corps preferred. To earn credibility and advance its goal of inde-
pendence, the Air Corps would have to provide direct pursuit defense of
the continental United States.

Air Corps willingness to perform air defense was not motivated en-
tirely by selfish, political goals. Exercises seemed to indicate that defense

13

The Emerging Shield

could complicate an adversary's plans and achieve some limited success
in active operations. Also, the Air Corps and the Army's Coast Artillery
had become rivals for dominance in the mission. While it seemed obvious
to air officers that the pursuit plane's extensive range and mobility made
it the preeminent air defense weapon, not all artillery officers agreed.
One went so far as to suggest that the principal purpose of antiaircraft
artillery should be to release aviation from all defensive duties and to
concentrate on offensive action. 52

The concept of air defense, while far from completely neglected in
the Air Corps, failed to stimulate a level of intellectual curiosity in
ACTS students on a par with the more glamorous theory of precision
strategic bombardment. Chennault proved to be an exception, as shown
by his interest in the testing programs at Aberdeen and Fort Knox. His
major concern, however, was the use of the pursuit plane in the offen-
sive air superiority role. In 1935, he was replaced by the officer who
would, when permitted, devote almost all his thought and energies to air
defense — Capt. Gordon P. Saville. In the process, Saville would become
the Air Force's air defense authority, the driving force behind most of
the programs implemented until his retirement in 1951.

Saville, born in Macon, Georgia, in 1902, was the son of a Regular
Army officer. His older brother had graduated from West Point, but the
younger Saville rejected an appointment to the United States Naval
Academy because the discipline of a midshipman's life did not attract
him. He wished to fly airplanes and was willing to subject himself to
military life if given the chance to fly. Thus, after studying engineering
at Antioch College and the Universities of Washington and California, he
became a flying cadet in 1926. He graduated and received a regular com-
mission in the Air Corps the next year.

After commissioning, Saville served in a number of pursuit aircraft
units, where he developed his skills as a pilot. In one assignment, he
worked for Lt. Col. Benjamin D. Foulois, future Chief of the Air Corps,
as a squadron executive officer at Mitchel Field, New York. Foulois,
recognizing exceptional abilities in the young officer, helped him a few
years later gain entrance to ACTS; Saville graduated first in the class of
1933-1934.

During his tours at ACTS, first as a student and later as an instruc-
tor, Saville participated in the wide-ranging debates during which Air
Corps officers expressed and developed their ideas. As his knowledge of
pursuit aircraft increased, he became intrigued with air defense. He
became immersed in his work, yet he avoided the quarrels that had em-
broiled Chennault with the champions of the bomber. Unlike Chennault,
he did not dispute the dominance of the bomber as an offensive weapon.
He focused solely on the defensive functions of pursuit aircraft. After
pondering the results of several war games, Saville decided that air de-

14

Genesis of the Mission

Capt. Gordon Saville

fense in which pursuit planes played the primary role, possessed the po-
tential to disrupt seriously the bomber offensive, although some bombers
would always penetrate the defenses and hit their targets. 53

Warning and control, key words in air defense operations, were and
remain the core of a functioning system. Air Corps exercises beginning
in the late 1920s and early 1930s demonstrated the feasibility of an early-
warning network in defensive pursuit operations. In the same period,
airmen began testing methods to intercept enemy aircraft by using
ground radio to direct pursuit planes to their prey. The first extensive
test of the control element coupled with early warning did not occur
until December 1935 when the Army's combat air arm, GHQ Air Force,
assembled in Florida under its commander, Brig. Gen. Frank M. An-
drews. Offensive forces in the exercise included Martin B-10 and B-12
bombers and Curtiss A- 12 attack planes. Defensive forces, Boeing P-26
pursuit planes, were assigned to the 2d Wing, commanded by Brig. Gen.
Henry Conger Pratt.

Saville knew he was taking a risk. In his system, the ground control
officer commanded the pursuit formation from takeoff to interception, a
procedure that violated the current American air command and control
practices. Leaders routinely- led their pursuit formations when airborne,

15

The Emerging Shield

an arrangement originating in World War I when air combat formation
developed. At that time, the leader usually communicated with his for-
mation through prearranged signals. Later, radio advisories of sightings
of enemy aircraft by ground observers or by observation planes brought
no change to the formation leader's responsibility for finding and attack-
ing the enemy. Saville proposed to shift command from the cockpit to
the ground, a move likely to arouse strong opposition. 54

While testing Saville's proposal, Col. Ralph Royce, commander of a
pursuit squadron, became especially incensed after receiving orders from
the ground dividing his formation and sending aircraft off in different di-
rections to intercept approaching bombers. During the postmission cri-
tique, Royce persistently objected to orders from the ground and de-
manded to know who had invented this system that presumed to tell him
how to deploy his forces. Captain Saville, in charge of the ground oper-
ation, found himself in an uncomfortable position confronted by an angry
senior officer. General Pratt completely supported Saville. He informed
Royce that the orders were his, thus temporarily ending the argument.
For the remainder of the exercises, pursuit leaders understood that Gen-
eral Pratt sanctioned, though he did not directly transmit, any orders
that passed through their headsets. 55

In the overall postexercise critique, held December 12, Pratt insisted
that in the future, instructions radioed from the ground that aided pursuit
interception constituted commands rather than advice. Ground control-
lers would exercise air command, not air liaison. Controllers, Pratt rea-
soned, had information not available to the pursuit leaders and were
therefore in a superior position to direct aerial interceptions. "The entire
system," he concluded, "is predicated on ground control at all times.
When that command is interrupted or assumed by others — the system is
immediately susceptible to failure." 56

In the Florida exercises of 1935, Captain Saville helped advance
American air defense procedures a major step beyond the simple concept
of early warning. Without electronic aids, Saville's methods resembled
those used by General Ashmore in LADA during World War I. While
Saville benefited from quicker communications and two-way radio, the
ground controller still played something of a guessing game in calculat-
ing an approaching bomber's height, speed, and destination on the basis
of reports transmitted by ground observers and observation aircraft. An-
other element was needed before so-called ground-controlled intercep-
tion (GCI) would become a reliable command and control system.
Radar, the missing piece in the puzzle, had just then been tested in air
operations in Great Britain, but it would not become known to most Air
Corps officers for years to come. In the meantime, although the World
War I mindset of some pilots caused them to resist GCI, the record sup-
ports Saville's view that those Air Corps leaders who attended the 1935

16

Genesis of the Mission

maneuvers, including acting Brig. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, were im-
pressed by GCI and encouraged its development in succeeding years. 57

Warning and control exercises further proved their worth in joint
exercises conducted by GHQ Air Force and Army Coast Artillery be-
tween 1936 and 1938. In May 1937, during an exercise at Muroc Lake,
California, the military prevailed upon the Southern California Edison
Company, as well as the San Joaquin Light and Power Company, to co-
operate in early-warning portions of the exercises by donating communi-
cations and electrical equipment and by allowing their civilian employees
to volunteer as observers. 58

Another operation, the joint antiaircraft artillery-Air Corps exer-
cises conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1938, performed the
most intensive testing of U.S. early-warning and combined air defense
forces held before the outbreak of World War II. The exercise used the
new 4-engine B-17, the less fearsome B-10 and B-18 bombers, and, as
principal interceptor, the P-35. The Army's standard antiaircraft equip-
ment included searchlights, sound detectors, communications devices,
and guns. The 3-inch gun could hit targets at 20,000 feet, firing 25 aimed
shots per minute. An intermediate 37-mm gun and a short-range .50-cali-
ber machinegun supplemented the 3-inch piece.

At the time of the Fort Bragg maneuvers, the Coast Artillery was
undergoing important changes. Its traditional harbor defense mission was
being rapidly superseded by antiaircraft responsibilities, but it was, as
yet, as unprepared as the Air Corps to offer substantial protection for the
American mainland. In fact, the Army sent all regular antiaircraft units
east of the Mississippi to Fort Bragg, and they could not protect a circu-
lar area one mile in diameter. 59 The Coast Artillery, like the Air Corps
and all other branches of the U.S. military, suffered to a degree from
parsimonious peacetime defense spending.

The relatively meager resources available did not prevent air and
ground commanders from studying new ways to use their defense forces
when under attack. Most airmen viewed the pursuit plane as the princi-
pal agent of active defense. Interceptors guided by radio communications
could disperse quickly and defend multiple objectives. While these air-
craft provided the first line of defense, antiaircraft batteries stationed
around key targets supplied a type of last-ditch defense. One of the key
advantages of antiaircraft artillery included the capability to fire on short
notice (five minutes or less), forcing attacking aircraft to drop their
bombs at higher altitudes, thus decreasing bombing accuracy.

In public statements, Air Corps and Coast Artillery commanders
graciously admitted that air defense would only work as a combined op-
eration. The Fort Bragg maneuvers, however, indicated problems in
joint operations, especially in the effective coordination of guns and
planes in air defense. During the maneuvers, some artillerists complained

17

The Emerging Shield

about strict hold-fire orders when friendly aircraft operated in their vi-
cinity. The gunners also claimed that the period between sighting the
enemy and launching fighters had been too long for successful GCI.
Some airmen interpreted this as pointing up the futility of pursuit defense
and the value of artillery. Speaking for the Air Corps, Muir Fairchild
protested that it served little purpose to defend fixed military installa-
tions, the basic use for antiaircraft artillery, while "leaving the whole of
our country from Miami, Florida, to Portland, Maine, and from New
York to Chicago . . . the barest shadow of a defense." 60 Fairchild's case
seemed obvious to airmen: the pursuit plane's flexibility rendered it the
most potent weapon in the air defense arsenal. At Fort Bragg, civilians
once again manned the aircraft warning systems. As at Lake Muroc the
previous year, the military commanders generally liked their perform-
ance. Nonetheless, closer cooperation between primary air defense ele-
ments — pursuit planes, early-warning observers, ground control stations,
and antiaircraft artillery — was plainly required. The Air Corps believed
that all air defense components should come under one commander, pref-
erably an airman operating from a control center. Unconvinced of the
total dominance of pursuit planes in air defense, or the superior capabili-
ties of air officers for running a total system, the Coast Artillery refused
to acquiesce to the arrangement suggested by the Air Corps. 61

By the late 1930s, even the most diehard bomber zealot realized pur-
suit planes could serve important offensive and defensive functions.
ACTS devised limited objectives for air defense. By imposing even mini-
mum limitations on the bomber, air defense became "economical." The
presence of an air defense network meant that bombers would at least
have to sacrifice range and bombload to carry guns, ammunition, armor,
and self-sealing fuel tanks. Moreover, the attackers would be forced to
fly at high altitudes, not only decreasing bombing accuracy but requiring
supercharged engines with a resulting weight penalty. Indeed, an air de-
fense system might be successful enough in daylight to force the enemy
to bomb by night, taxing navigational skills and further decreasing accu-
racy. 62

Air Corps leaders supported the limited air defense objectives. Gen-
eral Andrews, skeptical at first, came to believe that pursuit planes could
intercept hostile aircraft if supplied timely warning. 63 Lt. Col. Carl A.
Spaatz, Chief of the Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of the Air
Corps and a future Air Force Chief of Staff, recommended to General
Arnold that doctrine be modified to read that it was "impossible to stop
a determined air offensive, but defensive pursuit could inflict heavy
damage on the attackers and make their success expensive." 64 Arnold
himself told Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, Andrews's replacement as
head of GHQ Air Force, that he believed pursuit planes could, at times,
shoot down bombers flying in formation. 65

18

Genesis of the Mission

On the eve of the Second World War, key Air Corps doctrine
stressed the employment of strategic bombers launching precision attacks
in daylight, aimed at an enemy's vital military and economic strong-
points. Although they would have liked the assurance of escort pursuit
planes, most American airmen thought the bombers could successfully
perform their missions deploying in defensive formations. Exercises
seemed to indicate that not all the attacking bombers would be able to
penetrate the defenses and that casualties would not be prohibitive.

As for air defense, Air Corps leaders staunchly agreed with Capt.
Harold L. George who, in congressional testimony in 1935, declared,
"The best defense against air attack is an offensive against the places
from which the attack originates. . . ." 66 Though the Air Corps blurred
the distinction between what constituted air defense and what constituted
preemptive attack, practical considerations necessitated preparations to
defend mainland targets with pursuit planes coordinating with antiair-
craft artillery. Most air arm leaders believed that such an approach could
provide limited defenses, although they had little confidence it would re-
pulse a well-organized bomber attack; thus they refused to adjust Air
Corps offensive plans. Unfortunately, American airmen knew little about
the developing technology that would soon transform air warfare and
dramatically improve prospects for successful air defense: radar.

19

Chapter 2

Air Defense in World War II

By the end of the 1930s, Arnold, Spaatz, Andrews, and others ac-
knowledged that limited air defense was economical and could
hinder, if not defeat, a determined air offensive. Most U.S. bombers
could evade or fight their way through enemy defenses, even if unac-
companied by escort pursuit planes, and could bomb their targets. As
long as commanders accepted some losses, Air Corps planners believed
that the clear advantage remained with offensive forces. However, the
tactics and strategies of air combat constantly changed as technology
rapidly advanced. Because the Air Corps failed to understand how to
apply radar to military purposes, U.S. strategic offensive and defensive
capabilities were not fully operational on the eve of World War II.

In the late 1930s, scientists from around the world, including the
United States, knew that radio energy of very high frequency is reflected
instead of absorbed by an object in its path. 1 In uncomplicated terms,
radar, by means of reflected radio waves, detects with the speed of light
distant objects in the sky, on the land, or on the sea. It can "see" in
much the same manner as the eye sees by means of light waves. More-
over, radar can determine an object's range, since the speed of its radio
waves is a constant factor. 2 To use this technology for operational pur-
poses, scientists had to develop and refine several crucial components. 3 *
Although no nation monopolized radar developments before World
War II, the British first adapted them to military operations. The inde-
pendent Royal Air Force emphasized strategic bombing as ardently as
the U.S. Army Air Corps; yet, for many reasons, British politicians took
the lead to supply the nation with a radar-oriented air defense system.

* To use radar in practical operations, scientists had to develop a transmitter to emit
pulses of energy in a sharply defined directional beam. Because this allowed lapses between
emissions, the receiver could register the energy reflected from the target. Scientists had to
develop further a device known as a cathode ray tube, already in existence in experimental
television sets, and an oscilloscope, which could show on the tube the shadow images, or
blips, created as the aircraft reflected back to the source the radio energy beamed out.
Measuring the time lapse between the emitted pulse and the return signal (echo) would
give a good estimate of the altitude and range of the aircraft. Finally, the cavity magnetron
tube, capable of developing great power at very short wavelengths, would make the whole
instrument feasible as a military device.

21

The Emerging Shield

Unlike the United States, Britain faced the menace of the German
Luftwaffe, which grew by leaps and bounds in the mid- 1930s under Nazi
control. Because of geography, Britain could not afford to procrastinate
over ways to meet the threat. Despite the protests of most Royal Air
Force commanders (with the notable exception of Air Chief Marshal Sir
Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command), the nation's civilian leader-
ship made air defense a major priority. This system concept fit in well
with Britain's overall national defensive strategy, which was based on
the conviction of scientists and their supporters in government that radar
technology could provide the mainstay in an efficient air defense
system. 4

In the United States, no perception of a distinct threat existed.
Therefore, no urgency was associated with the development of radar for
military purposes. This did not mean that military applications were
completely unknown or ignored. Both the Army and Navy had been
testing radar techniques since the early 1920s. By 1935 scientists at the
Naval Research Laboratory had used radio-pulse ranging to explore the
ionosphere. In 1938 the Air Corps believed it possible for the Signal
Corps to devise, in the near future, an early-warning radar with a range
of 120 miles. Still, U.S. military and political officials did not make air
defense a priority, and insufficient funding for research and poor meth-
ods of technical interchange between the services resulted. When the
Battle of Britain began in the summer of 1940, American radar had just
emerged from its developmental stage. 5

At ACTS, the fountainhead of American air theory and doctrine, in-
structors and students knew little about radar's implications for air war-
fare. The concept was rarely mentioned in lectures, and, when it was dis-
cussed, details were almost nonexistent. For example, in early 1940 an
instructor, lecturing on important foreign developments in air defense,
only vaguely referred to the rumor of detection stations being construct-
ed in Britain. 6 Arnold and his chief assistants in Washington apparently
kept radar a closely guarded secret, disseminating little important infor-
mation to the field.

After the war, Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., an outspoken ad-
vocate of the strategic bomber, remarked that the "Air Corps ignorance
of radar development was probably a fortunate ignorance." He reasoned
that if American air planners had understood the full significance of
radar for strengthening air defenses, they might have decided that losses
in planes and lives would outweigh the damage to enemy industry. This
would have been unfortunate, Hansell concluded, because ACTS confi-
dence in strategic bombing subsequently proved correct, despite radar. 7
A postwar comment by Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild addressed the same
topic from a different perspective:

22

Air Defense — World War II

The one place where we were badly off the track was in
our conception of the effectiveness of the defensive force.
At that time radar was so secret that even the [ACTS] in-
structors were unaware of what it could accomplish and we
were forbidden to mention its existence or even to intimate
that any such thing as radar was possible. This secrecy, of
course, resulted in a distortion of our instruction because of
the great effect that radar has in permitting interceptions to
be made. Without radar or early warning systems the effec-
tiveness of the air defense presents a completely different
picture. 8

Suffering from this glaring gap in its technological arsenal as the
European powers moved toward war in the summer of 1939, the Air
Corps nevertheless benefited with the increased funding of the late 1930s
and hurried to improve its readiness for combat. Continental air defense
received increased attention as part of the overall effort. One small,
though important, indication of the heightened focus on air defense took
place in July when Captain Saville, recently graduated from the Army's
Command and Staff College and building a reputation for air defense ex-
pertise, joined the Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of the Air
Corps. 9

The start of war in Europe in September 1939 stimulated Maj. Gen.
Henry H. Arnold's staff to discuss the possibility of giving the Air Corps
unchallenged dominance in coastal defense. Saville and other staff mem-
bers perceived the Luftwaffe as a potential threat to American security; it
was not impossible that the Germans could attack with small aircraft car-
ried by submarines. 10 These officers also thought Germany might estab-
lish bases close enough to launch one-way bombardment missions against
the continental United States. 11 A Japanese attack from the Pacific
seemed less likely at this time.

General Arnold agreed with his staff's general conviction that the
development of defensive aviation in the United States had been permit-
ted to lag. In November 1939, on the recommendation of Saville, he sug-
gested that the War Department set up a general air defense test sector
in Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum's First Army Area in the east. The sector,
under Air Corps command, would set the precedent for expansion into
the other three Army areas if it became necessary. 12

On September 1, 1939, the day war began, General George C. Mar-
shall, an officer on good terms with Arnold (they had served together in
the Philippines in 1914) and considered to be friendly to Air Corps inter-
ests, became Army Chief of Staff. Among other things, Marshall would
decide which Army component would be responsible for air defense. He
agreed to create an air defense organization headed by an Air Corps offi-
cer; however, he did not place the new command under unequivocal Air
Corps control. He specifically assigned the organization to First Army in

23

The Emerging Shield

General George C. Marshall

order to retain "unity of command" for all Army defense preparations in
the field army areas. He insisted that the command remain small and be
restricted to studying and field testing air defense techniques and equip-
ment. 13

The First Air Defense Command, 1940-1941

Brig. Gen. James E. Chaney, a former Executive Officer and Chief
of Plans for the Chief of the Air Corps from July 1934 to July 1938, led
the new Air Defense Command (ADC) activated February 26, 1940, at
Mitchel Field, New York. The command's mission was to employ and
test various air defense systems. It also formulated air defense doctrine
and submitted its recommendations to the Office of the Chief of the Air
Corps. ADC headquarters consisted of six officers and thirteen enlisted
men with Lt. Col. William E. Kepner as Executive Officer. A former
Marine, World War I National Guard infantryman, and record-setting
balloonist, Kepner had been commander of all defensive aviation in the
1938 Fort Bragg exercises. Captain Saville transferred to the command
to serve as Plans and Training Officer.

General Chaney, who had little background in air defense, made Sa-
ville his unofficial air defense coordinator. For Saville the task was a
dream come true. At last, he could develop, refine, and put into practice

24

Air Defense— World War II

Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney

the principles of coordinated air defense he had worked out in ACTS
and as a member of the Air Corps Board. 14 *

Saville and the other overworked individuals who launched ADC
faced a number of inconveniences. They were expected to map out an
air defense system for the northeastern part of the United States, while
toiling in cramped, cold offices heated by kerosene stoves. Housing for
enlisted personnel was extremely poor, and morale was low. It was a
credit to the few assigned to ADC that so much important work was
accomplished. 15

The small command had two subordinate Army Signal Corps units
assigned directly, created by Chief Signal Officer Maj. Gen. Joseph O.
Mauborgne. ADC controlled neither pursuit nor antiaircraft artillery
units — none could be spared because of steadily increasing Army war
emergency authorizations. It could only test the Army's ability to furnish
fixed air defenses without interfering with the primary goal of maintain-
ing utmost mobility in aH combat arms. As a result, ADC used civilian
volunteers to act as aircraft observers and to operate telephone and plot-
ting tables in information centers. It trained its volunteers and then tested
their ability to put the warning service into operation during an emer-
gency. Only after months of such preparatory work were pursuit planes

* Saville served full time on the Air Corps Board during his assignment in ACTS. The
board considered wide-ranging doctrinal issues and made recommendations to the Chief of
the Air Corps.

25

The Emerging Shield

Plotting board used in Watertown maneuvers, August 1940

and mobile artillery placed under ADC control. Laying the foundation,
ADC arranged for suitably located air and artillery stations, for pilots
trained in controller techniques, and for enlisted airmen to install and op-
erate radio for GCI. 16

By 1940, the Signal Corps had assumed a major air defense role. At
the urging of General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, personnel at the
Signal Corps research and development facility at Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey, had worked on the development and production of the so-called
SCR-270 and SCR-271 mobile and fixed early-warning detectors. Both
had major weaknesses. They possessed only crude early-warning capabil-
ity and could only approximate the direction and distance of approach-
ing planes. Furthermore, they could not report altitude nor could they
detect low-flying objects. They were hard to adjust, often showed blind
lanes, and were subject to enemy jamming (using countertransmissions or
confusion reflectors). 17

General Mauborgne organized signal units in early 1940 to handle
communications throughout aircraft warning services. More significantly,
he established information centers to supervise collection and processing
of aircraft warning data. By May of that year, each commanding general
of the four continental field armies had been tasked with setting up an
aircraft warning service. These units were not designed to be stationary.
In fact, the urgency for early warning of air attack in the Panama Canal
Zone prompted General Marshall to send the first such signal units
there. 18

ADC planned to bring its test sector into operation by January 1941.
While a pursuit instructor in ACTS, Saville had proposed setting up an
air defense laboratory on the coastal frontier section of First Army Area.
Because he considered ■ the east coast the most vulnerable part of the

26

Air Defense — World War II

nation, Saville reasoned that a successful test of the system would justify
permanently integrating the region's air defenses under a single com-
mander. The experiment would serve as a training ground for the cadres
required to institute identical systems in the other three army areas. 19

Plans for the test sector exercise were interrupted when General
Drum directed Chaney and his staff to provide air defense support
during First Army maneuvers in northern New York state. Chaney,
Kepner, and Saville jumped at this opportunity to prove the command's
worth. They established a combined information and control center in
the Watertown National Guard Armory and called some twenty Reserve
officers to active duty to assist with controller and other duties. The air-
craft warning service now had two new components — two SCR-270
radar stations and a large group of volunteer observers. Civilian employ-
ees of telephone companies and government agencies had participated in
previous early-warning exercises, notably those at Lake Muroc and Fort
Bragg, but this exercise represented the first use of local civilians recruit-
ed from all walks of life. Pursuit planes from Selfridge Field, Michigan,
and Langley Field, Virginia, deployed onto air fields in Syracuse and
Utica, New York. Air defense preparations for the maneuvers were final-
ly completed when the Coast Artillery furnished three regiments of anti-
aircraft artillery under the command of Brig. Gen. William Ottman, who
established his headquarters in Richville, New York. 20

The Army maneuvers lasted from August 19 to 23, 1940. Aircraft
warning data flowed efficiently into the Watertown center, enabling Air
Corps personnel to launch pursuit aircraft on ground alert and to direct
them to the interception points. Though the use of radar made the
system more sophisticated than Saville's 1935 GCI experiment in Florida,
observers still made low-level sightings and supplemented the unreliable
American radar sets. To coordinate pursuit and antiaircraft artillery op-
erations, Generals Chaney and Ottman exchanged liaison officers and
formulated rules of engagement. For example, pursuit pilots could not
enter areas covered by antiaircraft artillery defenses except on orders
from the Watertown command center. When access was needed, the ar-
tillery liaison officer at Watertown advised the Richville center. In this
way Chaney and Ottman sought to prevent the guns from firing on
friendly aircraft while allowing artillerymen maximum freedom to fire.
All subsequent air defense exercises and operations followed these
rules. 21

During the exercise, pursuit planes intercepted attackers long before
they reached their targets. This unified air defense pleased Drum,
Chaney, and Ottman. Chaney reported that his success "astonished" the
maneuver umpires, but he cautioned against complacency. The raids, he
said, were limited by ADC rules and took place in a relatively small geo-
graphical area. The ADC staff also believed it had insufficient resources,

27

The Emerging Shield

Information center (above) and Air Defense Headquarters (below),
Syracuse, New York, during Watertown maneuvers, August 1940

in either personnel or equipment, for use in the exercise. Nevertheless,
the generals returned in high spirits to Mitchel Field to resume work on
the test-sector exercise set for January 1941. 22

The Battle of Britain entered its most crucial stages during the
weeks following the First Army war games. The Royal Air Force victo-
ry was attributable* to a number of factors, among them the success of
British radar and GCI systems and procedures. In early September 1940,
as the battle entered its final phase, the British shared highly classified
information with the United States. The renowned scientist Sir Henry
Tizard and his delegation introduced American Army officers to the
mysteries of British electronic equipment. 23 At the same time, American
officers observed British defense procedures first-hand. General Arnold
traveled to England and was especially impressed with British scientific

28

Air Defense— World War II

accomplishments. In just one afternoon he received "detailed inside in-
formation about what air defense really meant— something we in the
United States had been getting piecemeal." 24

In October 1940, Chaney and Saville flew to England to study
Fighter Command's techniques and equipment. Like Arnold, they under-
stood that radar was crucial to Britain's ability to retain control of the
air. Saville also knew that, while an air defense net similar to Britain's
had been devised and tested in the United States, the necessary electron-
ic equipment required to make America's defense system truly workable
was not yet available. 25

Based on their observations in Britain, Chaney and Saville offered a
number of important recommendations for improving air defenses.
Backed by General Arnold, they requested installation of fixed early-
warning radars of the British type as well as installation of airborne
intercept radar. With airborne radar, although still rudimentary, Royal
Air Force interceptor pilots could pinpoint attacking aircraft at night and
during adverse weather conditions, after ground controllers had directed
them to the general vicinity of the raiders. Chaney and Saville also asked
for an improved version of British IFF (identification, friend or foe)
equipment, which was installed on Royal Air Force aircraft and respond-
ed automatically to queries from ground radar stations. They wanted to
install the same VHF (very high frequency) radio communication in
American air defenses as that employed by the Royal Air Force's Fight-
er Command to scramble, control, and recover its interceptors. The
Signal Corps was urged to duplicate GCI radar that Britain had begun to
develop and which displayed on a scope the position of an aircraft. Fi-
nally, Chaney and Saville asked for lightweight radar, similar to British
equipment, for use by mobile air defense task forces. 26

Although the Chief Signal Officer resented the Air Corps implica-
tion that all British radar achievements transcended those of the Signal
Corps, Mauborgne and his staff went to work to obtain British equip-
ment and to contract it to American and Canadian firms for copy and
manufacture. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), destined
to play a critical role in future air defense developments, established the
soon to be famous Radiation Laboratory to design and develop micro-
wave (very short electromagnetic wave) radar equipment, expected to
give long-range coverage and high resolution. The Signal Corps also
pressed ahead with the refinement and manufacture of its own designs. 27
In January 1941 ADC brought its test sector into operation on
schedule. Just as the December 1935 GHQ Air Force exercise in Florida
had marked the beginning of the use of GCI in the United States, the
test sector signaled the start of meaningful large-scale air defense oper-
ations.

29

The Emerging Shield

The ADC staff divided the sector into two parts for effective com-
mand and control. A temporary information center set up in a National
Guard Armory in Boston controlled the northern area; the southern area
included the ADC information center housed in leased space in the Bell
Telephone Company in downtown New York. This facility became the
first permanent information center. The Army engaged an architectural
engineering firm to design it according to ADC specifications. Capt.
William Talbot, Commander of ADC 2d Operations Company (Aircraft
Warning), supervised construction and the installation of equipment. The
center quickly became Drum's and Chaney's showplace, serving as the
prototype for all future centers. 28

Testing lasted from January 21 to 24. The ADC staff hoped to de-
velop doctrine rather than to organize permanently any or all of the
northeast area. The two information centers received data from 700 ob-
server posts staffed by more than 10,000 civilian volunteers. Recruited
by the ADC staff with the assistance of patriotic and civic organizations,
volunteers were deployed with the help of the Bell Telephone Company.
In another innovation, ADC used filter centers between ground observ-
ers and the information centers to winnow out duplicate aircraft sighting
reports. Throughout the exercise, Chaney gave his plans officer, Saville,
a free hand to test all aspects of the air defense procedures Saville had
developed in ACTS. 29

The tests proved generally satisfactory, despite some problems. Al-
though civilian observers performed with a fair degree of efficiency,
ADC concluded that a visual and audio observer system, no matter how
well organized and trained, remained inadequate to supply information
for interception at night and under poor visibility. The power of the
three available SCR-270 radar sets was insufficient to cover the seaward
approaches to the test sector, underscoring Chaney's and Saville's con-
tention that American electronic equipment was not well enough devel-
oped to serve as an integral element in air defense systems. 30

In fall 1940, several organizational developments also occurred that
affected the Air Corps. Initial studies in the Office of the Chief of the
Air Corps indicated that the air defense of the United States should be
based on strategic air areas instead of on a single command agency or
army and corps area. In January 1941 four subordinate Air Districts
commenced operations under GHQ Air Force— Northeast, Northwest,
Southeast, and Southwest— to decentralize training. Previously, in No-
vember 1940, an Army General Headquarters/GHQ had activated, and
GHQ Air Force moved from control by the Chief of the Air Corps,
General Arnold. As a component of the field forces, GHQ Air Force
came now under the direct command of the Chief of Staff, General Mar-
shall. This move did not undermine Arnold's authority over GHQ Air
Force, for late in October 1940 Marshall had designated Arnold to be
30

Air Defense— World War II

Filter board staffed by civilians in New York City during the January
1941 Air Defense Command tests

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. 31 In his new role, Arnold pro-
posed during Army General Staff discussions on War Department reor-
ganization in the winter of 1940-1941 that the Air Corps assume sole re-
sponsibility for planning air defenses and begin installing the equipment
and assigning the units in all four air districts. His recommendation was
accepted as part of a broader War Department reorganization. 32

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, GHQ Army Chief of
Staff, advocated the division of the United States into four regional com-
mands, distinct from the field armies. 33 On March 17, 1941, the War De-
partment accepted most of McNair's ideas and divided the continental
United States into four defense commands — Northeastern, Central,
Southern, and Western— with the field army commanders serving as uni-
fied defense commanders. 34 The March 17 order also replaced the four
air districts with four air forces, subordinate to GHQ Air Force. Instead
of establishing an air defense command within each air district, as the
Air Corps proposed, each numbered air force received an interceptor
command. The defense commands had no authority over the four air
forces, and responsibility for the awkwardly expressed "aviation and air
defense portions of defense plans for the Defense Commands" remained
with the Commanding General of GHQ Air Force, Lt. Gen. Delos C.

31

The Emerging Shield

Emmons. 35 This ensued because on February 28, 1941, Marshall had ap-
proved Arnold's request to let the air arm assume responsibility for
peacetime air defense of the United States. 36 Air Corps officers mistaken-
ly believed that the same arrangement would prevail in wartime.

Major differences characterized the projected interceptor commands
from ADC. Whereas ADC was a small planning and test headquarters
with only two signal units assigned, interceptor commands would have
their own organic pursuit units and mobile aircraft warning services. The
interceptor commands also had operational control of antiaircraft artil-
lery, barrage balloons, and searchlight units attached by Army GHQ.
Each of the four regional air defense organizations would develop plans
for aircraft warning services in their respective areas, following doctrine
and practices developed largely by Saville and the ADC staff. 37

Planning for the regional commands began during a training course
that Saville organized from March 25 to April 12, 1941, on Mitchel Field
for some sixty officers selected to hold key command or staff positions in
the new interceptor commands. He and the teaching staff gave detailed
briefings on the experiences and techniques of ADC, after which the stu-
dents drew up plans for air defense in each interceptor command area. In
each area there would be an interceptor command center to supervise
the operations of regional information centers. These regions, in turn,
would run GCI operations through pursuit aircraft control centers, facili-
ties similar to those employed in Britain by Fighter Command. These
pursuit aircraft control centers would be provided with new electronic
equipment run by pursuit aircraft control squadrons (modern weapons
controllers). During previous exercises, pilots on loan from pursuit
squadrons (or pilot reservists) had performed controller duties. Now, the
pursuit aircraft control squadrons would provide most of the officers
needed for that operation. Chaney had concluded that, provided the
chief controller was a rated (flying) officer, nonpilots could perform the
controller function. Plans to create controller squadrons did not, there-
fore, threaten to diminish the already seriously restricted number of pur-
suit pilots. 38

As the officer now responsible for the air defense of the United
States, General Emmons established in his headquarters at Boiling Field
in Washington, D.C., an air defense section under the direction of Col.
David McL. Crawford. In Emmons's view, the first goal of the four air
forces and their interceptor commands was to prepare for air defense of
the coastal areas. Planning and installing aircraft warning services were
important components of that task and, as a Signal Corps officer, Craw-
ford could make a significant contribution. 39

In spring 1941, a target date of August 1 was set for achieving air
defense readiness, only a short interval for locating and installing radar
stations along both coasts to provide early warning of approaching

32

Air Defense— World War II

enemy aircraft. Thousands of civilian observers had to be recruited and
trained for tracking the movement of aircraft over land areas, informa-
tion and filter centers had to be readied to receive and screen sighting
reports from observer and radar stations, and provisions had to be made
to enable pursuit controllers to communicate with interceptor and artil-
lery units. With so much to accomplish in such little time, achieving a
completely operational system proved impossible by the target date. 40

Meanwhile, more organizational changes involving the Air Corps
were under way. On June 20, 1941, the Army Air Forces (AAF) was
created with Arnold, as Major General, becoming Chief, AAF, directly
under the Army Chief of Staff. Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, made Chief
of the Air Corps, was subordinate to Arnold. GHQ Air Force, under
Emmons, as Lieutenant General, was redesignated as Air Force Combat
Command and realigned to a position under Arnold's jurisdiction, an un-
usual situation that lasted until the attack on Pearl Harbor. 41

Peacetime air defense of the United States now rested in the AAF.
Although the question of who would command air defenses in wartime
remained unsettled, the AAF proceeded to create an integrated oper-
ational air defense system. The success of that undertaking occurred only
through the hard work and cooperation of the many Coast Artillery and
Signal Corps officers assigned to the staffs of the interceptor commands,
numbered air forces, and Air Force Combat Command. 42

Despite the formation of interceptor commands in each of the num-
bered air forces, EmmonsNaad at first planned to keep ADC intact as a
planning, inspection, and test agency, but the shortage of trained person-
nel made his designs impractical. ADC was inactivated on June 2, 1941,
and its staff and signal companies were assigned to I Interceptor Com-
mand located with its parent First Air Force on Mitchel Field. 43

As the international situation became increasingly critical for the
United States during summer and fall 1941, severe shortages of equip-
ment required for a unified air defense persisted. These included pursuit
aircraft, antiaircraft artillery, barrage balloons,* radar and radio equip-
ment, and trained personnel. Air defense commanders agreed that first
priority should be given to acquiring early-warning radar and to training
men to maintain it, as well as to recruiting civilians to staff filter and in-
formation centers. When Marshall decided that Chief Signal Officer

* Barrage balloons had been deployed in the First World War and were still consid-
ered by some commanders as useful supplementary air defense resources. Balloons denied
air space to hostile aircraft both by physical obstruction and by their psychological effect
on pilots. The balloons lessened the danger of dive bombing, forcing pilots to stay at higher
altitudes where they could be more easily detected. Also, the balloons were especially ef-
fective under conditions of poor visibility. On the other hand, the balloons tended to break
away in storms, creating a hazard by trailing their still-attached cables; used dangerous hy-
drogen gas; could menace friendly pilots; and could advertise the location of targets they
were supposed to defend.

33

The Emerging Shield

Moored barrage balloon of tbe type used by the 4th Antiaircraft Artil-
lery Command on the U.S. west coast

Mauborgne was not moving fast enough to provide American air defense
equipment equal to that of the British, he replaced him with Deputy
Chief Signal Officer Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead. 44

Olmstead took immediate action. The Fort Monmouth Signal Center
expanded its aircraft warning training program and prepared to open a
similar large facility in Florida. The AAF also set out to open a "finish-
ing school" for radar operators at Drew Field, Florida. In addition, both
MIT and Harvard University began special courses in electronics for air,
signal, and artillery officers. Finally, the Signal Corps commissioned
nearly 300 young engineers and physicists from civilian life, made them
members of the Electronics Training Group, and sent them to Britain to
study radar operations in Fighter Command. 45 This and other related
programs gave the AAF the communications-electronics expertise it
needed for the air defense system, but not until many months after
America entered the war.

Pursuit-interception preparation also proceeded slowly. New aircraft
capable of fair-weather interception arrived in increasing numbers, but
they had many maintenance and flight problems. As for night and all-
weather interceptors, the AAF made little progress. Engineers and
draftsmen began work on the design of a night fighter, eventually pro-
duced as the Northrop P-61. Until this plane appeared, the AAF fit rudi-
mentary airborne intercept radar into Douglas A-20 attack bombers,
converting them to P-70s for interim use as night fighters. Until radar-
equipped night fighters appeared, pilots had to seek out nocturnal raiders
by silhouetting them against the sky or by using moonlight or the illumi-
nation of antiaircraft searchlights. 46

34

Air Defense— World War II

Antiaircraft artillery searchlights in the Los Angeles region, circa

1940

In each interceptor group, pursuit aircraft control squadrons provid-
ed interceptor directors and supplied communication specialists. Person-
nel, equipment, and training facilities for these new units, like almost ev-
erything else, remained scarce. Through prodigious effort, three inter-
ceptor commands exercised their defense systems in fall 1941; another,
the IV Interceptor Command responsible for the California coastal area,
had its stations and forces in place for exercises by December 7, 1941. In
the absence of proposed pursuit aircraft control centers, whose designs
and locations remained to be decided, regional information centers per-
formed GCI, as had been done under the old ADC. Pursuit aircraft
group commanders took charge of the information centers during exer-
cises, with mixed results. The exercises revealed that the new interceptor
commands understood how they were to perform their missions even if,
for the moment, they lacked the means to do it well. 47

After the inactivation of ADC, Maj. Gordon Saville served as exec-
utive officer to Brig. Gen. John C. McDonnell, head of I Interceptor
Command, the focal point of U.S. air defense operations during summer
and fall 1941. In that period, Saville prepared a manuscript titled "Air
Defense Doctrine" in which he outlined the fundamental principles of air
defense, organizational structure of interceptor units, and techniques for
making air defense estimates and plans. This draft manual soon became
the authoritative air defense handbook of the AAF. 48

A year before Saville composed his study, a group of AAF officers
led by Col. William Kepner, ADC Executive Officer, studied and report-
ed on various air defense problems. Kepner admitted that the term air
defense had never been defined adequately. He and his group concluded

35

The Emerging Shield

that air defense "excludes counter air force and similar offensive [empha-
sis added] operations which contribute to security rather than air de-
fense." 49

This definition was a beginning. By October 1941 Saville could
define air defense more precisely as the direct defense against enemy air
operations. Counter-air force operations, including the bombing of
enemy airdromes and ground and naval forces to deny an opponent air
bases, were not within the scope of his definition. He considered active
air defense, in broad terms, as "the organization and the action designed
to interdict enemy air movement within a predetermined air space." 50
Active air defense, as opposed to passive air defense (i.e., civil defense
measures), could be divided into two categories: local and general. Local
air defense provided active defense for a specific objective or narrowly
defined locality. Local defense used antiaircraft artillery and barrage bal-
loons, with pursuit planes less frequently used as basic weapons. Pursuit
aircraft became the principal weapon in general air defense when a
larger area embracing a greater number of potential targets was defend-
ed. Local defenses such as antiaircraft artillery were used only as auxilia-
ries in general air defense. 51

When Saville prepared his air defense manual in 1941, most of the
terms and theories he presented were known since the time of the
German bombing of Britain in World War I. Saville had, in fact, promul-
gated many of the same themes during his years in ACTS. "Air Defense
Doctrine" was nevertheless significant because it codified all the major
principles of active air defense, unambiguously, into one clear, concise
manual.

By the end of 1941, the old ADC cadre at Mitchel Field had broken
up to form the nuclei of new regional aircraft warning units and to oper-
ate early-warning units for task forces sent to Newfoundland and Ice-
land. General Chaney headed the U.S. Army delegation observer team in
London; Colonel Kepner commanded one of the new tactical air support
organizations; and Major Saville returned to Britain to get the most
recent information on late technological developments that might benefit
American air defense. Soon, Saville could use that information.

Air Defense in Wartime

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941, Maj. Kenneth P.
Bergquist, Operations Officer for the 14th Pursuit Wing in Hawaii,
awoke to the crash of exploding bombs. Once he realized the islands
were actually under attack, he quickly dressed and, after a series of ad-
ventures evading machinegun bullets from strafing Japanese airplanes,
drove past burning Pearl Harbor, the great naval base on Oahu. He ar-

36

Air Defense— World War II

rived at the Fighter Control Center located at Fort Shatter, east of Pearl
Harbor, the information and weapons direction locus for the air defense
of Hawaii. 52

Unfortunately, Bergquist could not take effective action. Procedures
for coordinating radar, pursuit planes, and antiaircraft artillery in the air
defense battle were only being worked out in the weeks before the
attack. In addition, actions taken earlier on the orders of Lt. Gen. Walter
C. Short, Army Commander in Hawaii, had practically ensured that air
defense elements would be paralyzed in the event of air attack. Short's
major concern had been sabotage, so he ordered antiaircraft artillery am-
munition boxed and most of Hawaii's P-36 and P-40 defensive pursuit
planes concentrated on Wheeler Field, north of Pearl Harbor. Thus
when the Japanese attacked, Army antiaircraft artillery delayed its re-
sponse, and many of the rows of pursuit planes became sitting ducks.
Most of the pursuit aircraft that succeeded in becoming airborne (with
no direction from the control center) were destroyed before they could
reach altitude.

The first requirement for successful air defense — early warning— had
failed. The Navy, solely responsible for distant reconnaissance, was un-
derstrength in patrol craft and had failed to identify the approaching
naval armada. The Army had available 6 operational SCR-270 mobile
radars with ranges from 75 to 125 miles seaward, but a shortage of spare
parts and an inadequate power supply rendered them good only for sup-
plying 3 or 4 hours a day of training. On the morning of the attack, the
Opana Mobile Radar Station on the northern tip of Oahu was operating.
The two privates on duty picked up the blips representing the attacking
force on their radarscopes and called the information center. The only
officer on duty at the time, Navy Lt. Kermit Tyler, believed the blips
indicated a scheduled flight of B-17s flying from California to the Philip-
pines by way of Hawaii. Tyler had no way to verify his assumption be-
cause he did not have use of the desperately needed IFF equipment. He
failed to call Bergquist, whose first notice of attack was the bombing that
awakened him from a sound Sunday morning sleep. 53

Bergquist, who would later hold many important air defense posts
overseas and in the United States, was a West Point graduate originally
commissioned in the Field Artillery. After earning his wings and trans-
ferring to the Air Corps, he received an assignment to Langley Field,
Virginia. There he became one of the few officers actively involved in
early experiments in GCI techniques. He went to Hawaii in mid- 1939 for
duty as Operations and Intelligence Officer for the 18th Air Base and
Pursuit Group. In June 1940 he moved to the 14th Pursuit Wing, prede-
cessor of the VII Fighter Command. 54

Bergquist worked diligently in Hawaii, but not until he attended Sa-
ville's school on Mitchel Field in spring 1941 did he learn what air de-

37

The Emerging Shield

fense meant. The young major heard of developments in the Royal Air
Force's struggle against the Luftwaffe and for the first time discovered
how radar was revolutionizing air defense. He returned to the islands
eager to apply these lessons to the problem of coordinating Hawaii's air
defenses. According to Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson, Commander of
the 14th Pursuit Wing (the Hawaiian Air Force was commanded by Maj.
Gen. Frederick L. Martin), Bergquist tore into his work, building the
Control Center almost single-handedly. When the major returned to
Hawaii from Mitchel, said Davidson, "he was a great help to us [but] we
hardly knew what he was talking about." 55

Indeed, as events transpired, it was simply too late to disseminate
knowledge and fully integrate the technology and operational procedures
required to make air defense effective in Hawaii. Bergquist and his Army
and Navy counterparts responsible for air defense had tried valiantly to
implement twenty-four-hour-a-day air raid warning and control in the
months and weeks before December 7, apparently with little urging or
encouragement from their superiors. According to the most thorough
chronicler of the surprise attack, Gordon W. Prange:

No attitude on the part of Washington, no lack of equip-
ment or funds can explain or excuse the failure to establish
at least approach lanes or a reporting system to account for
planes in Hawaiian skies. All that such procedures required
was an appreciation of the value of incoming aircraft identi-
fication and fighter direction — abundantly demonstrated in
the Battle of Britain — plus a little initiative and cooperation.
But unfortunately those qualities, equally costless and price-
less, appear to have been missing. 56

Prange perhaps underestimates the difficulties involved, but the system
doubtlessly could have been built had Hawaii's commanders recognized
the requirement earlier. Thus, it would not be accurate to say the air de-
fense system failed because no coordinated plan of action existed. In the
words of the official Air Force historian, "In the circumstances, it was
virtually impossible to put up anything approaching an effective air de-
fense." 57

After World War II, the psychological backlash of Pearl Harbor left
Americans determined to deter a similar disaster. Instead of building
elaborate air defense systems, American military planning depended on
atomic monopoly. Spurred by the proliferation of strategic offensive
weapons, the developing military configuration became anchored on the
concept of deterrence. America would field sufficient air defenses to ride
out an attack, but the linchpin of the military arsenal would be the retali-
atory capability invested in the Strategic Air Command.

All that lay ahead. In the last days of 1941, Americans for the first
time seemed to have good reason to fear air attacks against the mainland.
Before Pearl Harbor, many believed the Navy strong enough to prevent

38

Air Defense — World War II

enemy aircraft carriers or plane-carrying submarines from staging air
raids against the east or the west coast. But the surprise attack in the
Pacific altered the public mood drastically, for the assault had served as
a model for future attacks in addition to destroying much of America's
naval strength there. Rumors soon circulated that German submarines
carrying light attack planes lurked off the east coast and that Germany
might seize the French aircraft carrier the Beam anchored in the West
Indies. The public's apprehension rose when President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt warned the nation on December 9 that an enemy air attack upon
either coast was a possibility. 58

The AAF responded quickly to the perceived challenge. In the first
hours after Pearl Harbor, the four interceptor commands in the continen-
tal United States activated their aircraft warning services. In one of his
last acts as Commander of Air Force Combat Command, General
Emmons deployed pursuit units to coastal airbases, and as in the exer-
cises conducted a few months earlier, pursuit aircraft group commanders
used regional information centers as their control centers. General
McNair, head of GHQ Army and later the Army Ground Forces (AGF)
commander, placed mobile antiaircraft artillery units under the direction
of interceptor commands. 59

Chaos prevailed initially on air defense stations, but soon the system
began to function as planned with a firmly established chain of com-
mand. General Arnold acted to prevent that chain from being interrupt-
ed. Pointing to the possibility of air attacks on either coast as the only
immediate threat to the mainland, Arnold proposed that the AAF be
awarded primary responsibility for guarding against this threat. He sug-
gested that the AAF receive command of shore-based Navy and Marine
aircraft for air defense to ensure unity of command. 60

Marshall did not agree with these requests although he did not
intend to deprive airmen of top command, as indicated by his appoint-
ments of General Andrews over all Army forces in Panama and of Gen-
eral Emmons in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor. For unity of command, as
the Chief of Staff interpreted it, Army combat commanders, including
AAF officers, had to take their orders exclusively from him and the
General Staff. The unity of command imposed therefore was not what
Arnold had intended. On December 11, 1941, Marshall activated an
Eastern Theater of Operations under General Drum and, on December
20, a Western Theater under Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt. The theater com-
manders reported to Army General Headquarters. First and Second Air
Forces were assigned to Drum while Third and Fourth Air Forces went
to DeWitt.

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Millard Harmon replaced General Emmons
as Commander of Air Force Combat Command. Harmon protested to
Arnold, newly promoted to lieutenant general, about the "dangerous ex-

39

The Emerging Shield

periment [that] nullifies a large portion of the output of the Air Force for
the past six years in preparation for war. . . ." 61 Arnold concurred, and
apparently persuaded Marshall and McNair that the current command
arrangements for the air forces were faulty. On December 31, 1941, Mar-
shall returned control of Second and Third Air Forces to Air Force
Combat Command, reduced Drum's theater to the geographical limits of
Eastern Defense Command, and exempted specified units in his theater
from his jurisdiction.

Before Marshall transferred Second Air Force back to the AAF,
General DeWitt made IV Interceptor Command responsible for all
Western Defense Command air defense regions from the borders of
Canada to Mexico. Five regional headquarters operated from information
centers in Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego.
Across the continent, Drum took similar action in February 1942, order-
ing I Interceptor Command to manage the control centers Third Air
Force had been installing in the southern Atlantic coastal regions. Thus I
Interceptor Command had nine information centers: Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, Wilmington, Norfolk, Charleston, Jacksonville, Tampa, and
Miami. 62

A significant feature of the wartime defense structure concerned the
deployment of antiaircraft artillery. The Coast Artillery Corps had resist-
ed all proposals to assign antiaircraft artillery forces to interceptor com-
mands. The AAF protested, but the issue remained unresolved when the
United States went to war. To meet the now staggering demands for
guns at home and abroad, Marshall formed the Antiaircraft Artillery
Command in March 1942 to create and train new units. Drum and
DeWitt, meanwhile, decided to keep their artillery units organizationally
separate from the interceptor commands. The artillery commanders on
the east and west coasts, Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman and Maj. Gen.
Fulton Q. C. Gardner, respectively, reported to Drum and DeWitt with
the same authority and rank as the interceptor commanders. At the same
time, Jarman and Gardner operated their own warning services consist-
ing of their own troops and civilian volunteers. In a very real sense,
therefore, two separate air defense systems operated during most of the
war. 63

Command and control for air defense was only one of many prob-
lems complicating the existence of Army GHQ. Arnold and the Air Staff
(which, with the AAF, had been formally established in June 1941),
meanwhile, led a campaign to reorganize the War Department. The re-
sultant major realignment in March 1942 abolished the Office of the
Chief of the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command. The AAF
became coequal to the Army Ground Forces (replacing Army GHQ)
and the Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces). Arnold became
Commanding General of the AAF. 64 These changes were expected to

40

Air Defense — World War II

provide the air arm with a greater degree of autonomy and a more deci-
sive role when it believed it could make important contributions on the
basis of its expertise, including contributions to air defense.

A few months before Pearl Harbor, Arnold had brought Brig. Gen.
Muir S. Fairchild from ACTS to Washington as Assistant Chief of the
Air Corps. In the March 1942 reorganization, Arnold made Fairchild Di-
rector of Military Requirements, an agency with subordinate directorates
that included Bombardment, Ground Support, and Air Defense. The Air
Defense Directorate, replacing the Air Defense Section of Headquarters
Air Force Combat Command, was designed to ensure balanced assign-
ments of men and materiel to air defense forces and to train key person-
nel. No sooner did Fairchild arrive in Washington than he decided he
needed his old friend from ACTS, Gordon Saville, close at hand for his
expertise in air defense. Fairchild arranged to have Saville brought home
from Britain where he was studying Royal Air Force air defense oper-
ations, promoted him to lieutenant colonel, and gave him a free hand to
coordinate home air defense matters. 65 Thus began a brilliant partnership
that would, in time, drive the air defense developments in the United
States.

Upon his return to the United States, Saville accompanied Sir
Robert Watson- Watt, noted British air defense technician, on an inspec-
tion of west coast air defenses. Watson- Watt found that the principal
mobile radar used for aircraft alert, the SCR-270, contained several
major defects. Most important it could not discriminate between friendly
and unfriendly aircraft. To alleviate this design problem in future air de-
fense components, Watson- Watt suggested giving civilians with outstand-
ing scientific credentials more responsibility for devising and implement-
ing air defense systems. Although the United States had already begun
doing this, Saville agreed to press the issue in Washington. He also ar-
ranged to use experienced air defense personnel as instructors in an oper-
ational training unit at Orlando, Florida, rather than sending them to
overseas stations to meet the demand for trained air defense personnel.
Saville took these actions because Fairchild, in the wake of the creation
of the new AAF, had selected him Director of Air Defense in his Mili-
tary Requirements Division. 66

Now a full colonel, Saville assembled a staff of highly competent of-
ficers from the AAF, antiaircraft artillery, and the Signal Corps for his
Washington office and, later, for the AAF School of Applied Tactics in
Orlando. War-experienced Royal Air Force officers also offered advice.
The prewar plan whereby interceptor commands furnished the training
to convert airmen, Signal Corps personnel, and artillerymen into mem-
bers of a unified air defense team fell casualty to the demands of war,
complicating Saville's job. It was the Directorate of Air Defense who
had to pick up the pieces and see that new plans were implemented. 67

41

The Emerging Shield

Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild

The defense structure that emerged in late 1941 and early 1942 dif-
fered extensively from that of the prewar period. Southern Defense
Command and Third Air Force committed considerable resources in the
early months of the war to institute a Gulf Coast warning system, but no
full-fledged air defenses ever developed there. The same was true with
the Central Defense Command in the Sault Ste. Marie area. Only the
two coastal areas, east and west, proceeded with defense preparations on
a large scale corresponding to the perceived threat. 68

By May 1942 the AAF began to deemphasize home air defense in
all areas. This became apparent when Arnold directed the two coastal air
defense forces to create pursuit aircraft units specifically for overseas
duty. In a related development, Arnold oficially changed the name of the
pursuit category of aircraft to that of fighter, symbolizing, among other
things, that AAF interceptor pilots would train to conduct multiple
duties. He also changed the name of the interceptor commands to fighter
commands for the same reason, and the Air Defense Operational Train-
ing Unit became the Fighter Command School. He and his staff now be-
lieved that the threat of air attack against the mainland had drastically
diminished. Requirements for fixed coastal air defenses became second-
ary to those for mobile ones, that is, defenses that could be sent to an
overseas theater. 69

42

Air Defense— World War II

Knowing the consequences of unpreparedness for the Army and
Navy at Pearl Harbor, defense commanders in the continental United
States wanted to avoid being caught by surprise and fought to obtain as
much manpower and equipment as they could. Military and civilian offi-
cials in Washington appreciated the consequences of even a small-scale
attack by enemy carriers or submarine-based aircraft against mainland
targets, but they had to weigh the possibility of this occurring against the
requirement to train units for warfare overseas. Consequently, as the per-
ception of the risk of air attack diminished in the latter half of 1942, an
unstated policy of calculated risk developed among Washington defense
planners with respect to American air defense. 70

In the first weeks after Pearl Harbor, Drum and DeWitt maintained
entire fighter groups on air defense alert, which crippled training for
other missions such as close air support of ground troops or the attain-
ment of air superiority. By spring 1942, Arnold and the numbered air
force commanders had lowered the alert requirement. Still, the newly
designated fighter groups needed more freedom from air defense respon-
sibilities to enhance their capabilities. 71

Saville, now a brigadier general, helped resolve this issue in Novem-
ber 1942 by consolidating air defense forces in so-called air defense
wings in key information centers on the east and west coasts. The wings,
each headed by a brigadier general, had a headquarters consisting of
AAF, Signal Corps, and Antiaircraft Artillery Command officers and en-
listed men. Subordinate to the wings were signal companies that operat-
ed radar stations and managed communications for wing aircraft and
warning services. The Fighter Commands, I and IV, commanded the
fighter wings while Drum's and DeWitt's antiaircraft artillery command-
ers remained in absolute control of their gun units, which they allocated
to the wings for air defense duty. Most important, fighter allocations
were kept to a minimum, allowing increased aircraft in overseas combat
theaters. In short, coastal air defense consisted of eight air defense wing
areas and six surveillance regions. This remained the basic air defense or-
ganization until 1944 when the AAF began to dissolve it. 72

By May 1943, Arnold strenuously called for additional decreases in
the air defense establishment despite Saville's belief that the force should
be maintained for at least psychological purposes. 73 In rejecting that ar-
gument, Arnold stated: "I can't see any excuse for maintaining these es-
tablishments just to meet the fears of a lot of people who are carried
away by a feeling that something may happen. We are hard at war now,
and the people of the United States have got to admit it." 74

Not surprisingly, Arnold's view prevailed, and by 1943 air defense
had lost its status as a directorate in the Air Staff. By the end of that
year, the Air Staff judged the possibility of an air attack against the con-
tinental United States negligible, and practice air raid alerts ceased. 75

43

The Emerging Shield

Brig. Gen. Gordon P. Saville

Arnold decided that Saville's talents would be better used in command
of the XII Tactical Air Command, preparing for the invasion of southern
France. Air defense of the United States after the immediate post-Pearl
Harbor shock had become, in the absence of imminent threat, the lowest
priority mission for the AAF.

The air defense system, built up in the wake of the outbreak of war
in Europe and reinforced after Pearl Harbor, was never tested in actual
combat operations. The Japanese launched bomb-carrying free-flight bal-
loons beginning in November 1944, but they did little damage. In all,
Japanese balloon bombs killed six members of a picnic group near Bly,
Oregon on May 5, 1945; ignited two small brushfires; and caused a mo-
mentary loss of power at the plutonium production plant in Hanford,
Oregon. 76

Various combat theaters around the world benefited from the air de-
fense doctrine, organization, and equipment developed to ensure Ameri-
ca's defense against air attack. Fighter Command School, activated in
Orlando, Florida in mid- 1942, trained officers designated for key air de-
fense duties at home and abroad in the use and maintenance of equip-
ment as well as in all aspects of air defense operations. The school, re-
designated the AAF. School of Applied Tactics in December 1942, under

44

Air Defense— World War II

Saville's command also drew up specifications for ground and airborne
radar devices needed for mobile air defense. Personnel in the three air
defense wings sent to North Africa in early 1943 and the three additional
wings sent to Britain later that year trained in the school or under offi-
cers who previously trained there. A steady flow of officers moving
from combat theaters through the school kept instructors abreast of fast-
changing overseas requirements. 77

The IX Air Defense Command, formed by the Commander of the
Ninth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, provided an outstand-
ing example of stateside air defense training proving beneficial to the
combat effort abroad. The organization performed superbly in furnishing
air defense of rear areas after the Normandy landings in 1944. 78 The air
defense system and doctrine established and developed in the prewar and
early wartime eras was thus put to good use, although not for the pur-
pose intended. The air defense net established in the United States also
formed the basis on which planning began during the middle of the war
for postwar defense. The likely emergence of a new and more powerful
threat gave a sense of importance to that task.

45

Chapter 3

Planning for Air Defense in the
Postwar Era

As the AAF dismantled the air defense systems built in the early years
x». of World War II, it lay the foundations for postwar air defense
planning. These preparations were part of the effort made by the Air
Staff in anticipating an independent air force. War Department Field
Service Regulation, Field Manual (FM) 100-20, "Command and Em-
ployment of Air Power," issued July 21, 1943, recognized the AAF as
coequal to the AGF in combat theaters, and specified three principal
air force missions: strategic, tactical, and air defense. 1

General Arnold established two major postwar planning offices in
AAF Headquarters, including the Special Projects Office, headed by
Col. F. Trubee Davison, the first Assistant Secretary of War for Air
from 1926 to 1932. Also created was the Post War Division, led briefly
by Brig. Gen. Pierpont M. Hamilton, a World War II Medal of Honor
recipient, who was soon replaced by Col. Reuben C. Moffat. Moffat
worked directly under Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of
Air Staff, Plans. An experienced test pilot, Moffat had served in numer-
ous operational assignments, and Kuter relied on his good judgment.
While the Special Projects Office was concerned largely with demobili-
zation planning, the Post War Division concentrated on postwar force
planning. 2

The planners assumed that the postwar air force, whether it re-
mained a part of the Army or became a separate service, would com-
mand all elements of air defense. The Chief of Staff, General George C.
Marshall, seemed to confirm this view in August 1944 when he reas-
signed responsibility for research and production of electronic equipment
used by the AAF from the Signal Corps to the air arm. Personnel and
resources from the Signal Corps transferred to the AAF late in 1944.
From then on, the AAF gradually assumed responsibility for electronic
equipment used in domestic and overseas air defense systems. 3 By July
1945, the Signal Corps had, with the concurrence of the War Depart-
ment, stepped out of the postwar air defense planning picture. The AAF
emerged with sole responsibility for training, deploying, equipping, and

47

The Emerging Shield

operating the fighter force and the radar on which it depended for warn-
ing and control. 4

Members of the postwar Air Staff were equally determined to con-
trol antiaircraft artillery for air defense operations. To ensure unity of
command in an attacked area, FM 100-20 specified that all elements of
an air defense system, including antiaircraft artillery, be under the overall
command of an AAF officer. 5 The assignment of the 4th Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery Command to Fourth Air Force on the west coast, and the success
of IX Air Defense Command in France, confirmed the validity of the
doctrine for the Kuter-Moffat planning group. Early in 1944, the plan-
ners proposed that postwar air defenses should include an antiaircraft ar-
tillery contingent of 140,000 men. Although the General Staff failed to
respond immediately, the planners felt confident the proposal would
eventually be accepted. Support for this position came from field com-
manders and General Henry H. Arnold's staff. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz,
Commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, ad-
vised Arnold in late 1944:

the development of all weapons for coordinated defense
should be pushed. Antiaircraft artillery is making strides in
effectiveness. . . . All measures for defense should be co-
ordinated under our control, including radar and counter
radar, interceptors ... as well as antiaircraft artillery in
order that we can get behind research and development in
the field. 6

Maj. Gen. Homer R. Oldfield, an artillery officer assigned temporar-
ily to the Air Staff, strongly advocated this view. He considered the
issue to be a command problem, pointing out that

to divorce antiaircraft artillery from the [air defense] team
and to place it on a cooperative basis not only violates the
principle of unity of effort and economy of force, but en-
dangers the success of the air defense mission. 7

Because of this stance, AAF leaders began to reconsider the status
of nonrated (nonflying) officers in the postwar Air Force. Before World
War II, Air Corps officers necessarily performed a wide variety of non-
flying duties, but the overwhelming majority considered themselves
pilots first and foremost. In fact, the Air Corps Act of 1926 codified this
way of thinking by limiting nonpilot permanent officer personnel to ten
percent of the Air Corps. Wartime contingencies, however, underscored
the need for capable officers with specialties in such fields as mainte-
nance and logistics, many of whom entered the AAF directly from civil-
ian occupations and would be lost to the service once the war ended.
Postwar planners realized that an independent air force required highly
qualified individuals possessing many technical skills in addition to the
ability to pilot airplanes and perform other flying-related duties. General

48

Air Defense— Postwar Era

Arnold was especially committed to integrating nonrated officers, such
as artillerymen, into the AAF. He insisted that his planners consider
steps to create career paths for these officers that would give them equal
opportunity to command air defense operations and to be promoted to
general officer rank. 8 Arnold's views were reflected in a memo from his
deputy, Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, a few months before the conclusion
of the war in Europe:

The phase during which exclusive pilot management was
essential is drawing to a close. . . . Regulations limiting the
responsibilities of non-rated personnel must be changed.
Every opportunity must be given to skills and abilities
needed for a well rounded, flexible organization if the
United States is to maintain its air leadership. 9

Wartime planning for integration of antiaircraft artillery into the
area air defense organizations culminated in a policy proposal drafted by
Oldfield and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Kuter's successor as Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Plans. Arnold signed the proposal and sent it to the
War Department General Staff shortly before the Japanese surrendered.
The AAF had proved in war its ability to "assume the responsibility for
large air defense operations, including the administration and employ-
ment of antiaircraft artillery," said Arnold. Accordingly, he believed it
essential to assign artillerymen at once to the AAF:

Air defense [will be] the first of several missions of the post-
war military establishment and the mechanism set up for air
defense will bear, initially, almost the entire burden of our
national safety. Defense against air attack, if it is to be effi-
cient and conform to the principles of economy of force in-
volves the security of vital areas rather than the protection
of individual objectives within these areas. Security of a
vital area requires the closest cooperation between the three
elements of air defense— fighter aviation, aircraft warning
service and antiaircraft artillery. This can only be assured
under a unified command. Harmonized operations, neces-
sary now while AAA [antiaircraft artillery] is of limited
range, will be doubly needed as the development of AA
[antiaircraft] guided missies greatly increases the range of
AA fire and the difficulty of coordinating it with the move-
ment of our own piloted aircraft. 10

By emphasizing vital areas instead of individual objectives, Arnold,
perhaps unconsciously, reflected the impact of Gordon Saville's thinking
on air defense doctrine. Significantly, Arnold also recognized the future
use of guided missiles in air defense operations and the importance of
their control by an air force commander in a unified defense setup.

Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Oper-
ations, Commitments and Requirements, one of the outstanding younger
wartime leaders, further clarified how nonrated officers would be regard-

49

The Emerging Shield

ed in the postwar air forces. Aware that ground forces officers were
concerned about the treatment they would receive should they become
part of the air forces, Partridge assured them that plans were being de-
veloped to make antiaircraft artillery units a cohesive part of the unified
air defense team and not a separate corps. Like Arnold, Partridge em-
phasized that artillery officers would be given opportunities to advance
to general officer grades. Although artillery officers would not have
direct command of flying units, they would be granted "adequate staff
position recognition," including a position on the Air Staff such as Gen-
eral Oldfield had during the war. 11 Despite Arnold's and Partridge's as-
surances, ground officers remained apprehensive about transferring to the
air forces. In any case, the General Staff did not immediately address the
issue, and the postwar status of antiaircraft artillery officers remained un-
certain.

Establishment of the Air Defense Command

In the last months of the war, General of the Army Henry H.
Arnold instituted in the AAF several important changes designed, in
part, to form a planning base for an independent postwar air force. 12
Foremost among these changes was the establishment of Headquarters
Continental Air Forces at Boiling Field, Washington, D.C., on Decem-
ber 15, 1944. 13 The four numbered air forces in the United States were
assigned to the new command. As with Twentieth Air Force in the Pa-
cific, Arnold reserved personal command of the Continental Air Forces,
appointing Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett as his deputy. From this time for-
ward, Arnold had three planning agencies for postwar planning — the
Post War Division and the Special Projects Office in the Air Staff, and
Streett's headquarters at Boiling Field — in addition to his own Personal
Advisory Council composed of the AAF's most promising young offi-
cers, who rotated between combat and staff duty. 14

While Streett and his staff recognized the need to plan and organize
continental air defense for the postwar period, they believed some prior-
ities were more urgent. They were determined to establish, without
delay, a strategic strike force capable of operating worldwide. Designat-
ed tactical units, moreover, were to train with ground forces and the
Navy, and combat units and crews were to prepare for deployment over-
seas. 15 In Streett's view, the urgency of these tasks overshadowed those
of air defense preparations.

The Continental Air Forces staff planned for a postwar air force
large enough to complete increasingly difficult and important missions.
But late in 1944, General Marshall, convinced that the American public

50

Air Defense— Postwar Era

General of the Army, Henry H.
Arnold

would not support peacetime forces anywhere near the size contemplat-
ed by Air Staff and General Staff planners, directed the staffs to consider
less ambitious estimates of postwar requirements. Following Marshall's
instructions, the General Staff concluded that the postwar Army could
not exceed 275,000 men. More concretely, the Army could afford to
maintain only 5 divisions and 16 air groups, 16 far from the Air Staffs
wish for 105 groups.

The General Staff added a new step to the postwar planning equa-
tion late in the spring of 1945. Army planning groups thereafter pro-
posed interim force levels and organizational structures for the first three
years after war's end and permanent plans for the period beyond. Mean-
while, General Kuter left the Air Staff for an assignment in the Pacific
and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker returned from his Mediterranean command to
become Chief of the Air Staff and deputy to Arnold. Eaker faced the
dilemma of clarifying what constituted interim rather than permanent
planning as the AAF began to lay the groundwork for a postwar air
force. He had to measure carefully the known mission requirements
against Marshall's standard of avoiding unrealistic demands. 17

Meanwhile, the General Staffs estimate of an interim postwar Army
had risen to 500,000. An interim plan designed by Eaker and his staff,
however, projected a need above that figure for the AAF alone. Before
the disparity between the two projections could be reconciled, the war
in the Pacific ended. President Harry S. Truman directed the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to decide on "the overall peacetime requirements of
the Armed Services" and to submit a well-developed plan for his consid-

51

The Emerging Shield

eration. 18 General Marshall immediately established a special committee
under Brig. Gen. William W. Bessell, Jr., to prepare a force plan based
on 500,000 men and another under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch to ex-
amine the organization of the War Department (neither Bessell nor Patch
was an airman). 19

By October 1945, Bessell had prepared a proposal to allocate
165,000 men to the postwar air forces, a level sufficient for about 22 air
groups. 20 In contrast, General Eaker and General Spaatz, who had begun
to act in Arnold's stead in September 1945 (he did not officially replace
Arnold until February 1946), believed the air forces could not operate
effectively with less than 400,000 men and 70 groups of reduced
strength. 21 The figure of 400,000 men did not include antiaircraft artillery
personnel. The Patch Board would decide whether that contingent of
the Army would come under control of the air forces.

Air planners advocated expanding the projected personnel alloca-
tions for air forces to include artillerymen. But the report of the Patch
Board, submitted in mid-October 1945, rejected the Air Staffs proposals.
While the board recognized the coequality of air and ground elements
within the War Department, it steadfastly upheld the continued subordi-
nation of both to one chief of staff, recommending that antiaircraft artil-
lery should remain with the ground forces. 22 Airmen, upset by Patch's
recommendations, protested only mildly rather than risk jeopardizing
current progress on the question of a separate air force. That restraint
paid dividends in December 1945 after General Dwight D. Eisenhower
succeeded Marshall as Army Chief of Staff. Sympathetic to the air arm's
aspirations, Eisenhower approved the 70-group, 400,000-man program. 23

Airmen hoped he would also reverse the unfavorable Patch Board
findings. Early in December 1945 the new Chief of Staff reconvened the
board under the chairmanship of the former Ninth Army Commander,
Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, who replaced the recently deceased
Patch. Released January 18, 1946, Simpson's report proved a major dis-
appointment to the airmen. Simpson endorsed Patch's recommendation
that antiaircraft artillery should remain an integral part of the ground
forces, 24 and Eisenhower refused to override the board's decision. In late
January, he directed War Department Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes to convene a meeting of General Staff, Air
Staff, and Army Ground Forces officers to convert the proposals of the
Simpson Board into a definite plan of action. 25

It is an understatement to say that the Air Staff planners were upset
with the results of the Simpson Board study and Eisenhower's subse-
quent approval of its provisions. Yet the Chief of Staff had not forsaken
the airmen; instead he encouraged them to prepare for the formation of a
separate air force, a goal he supported as ardently as they did. Eisenhow-
er enjoined the airmen to work cooperatively with the General Staff

52

Air Defense — Postwar Era

General Carl Spaatz

until legislation could be passed to realize their objective. Spaatz, whose
professional abilities Eisenhower respected tremendously as a result of
their wartime collaboration in North Africa and Europe, quietly accept-
ed the Chief of Staffs assurances. In the meantime, Eisenhower guaran-
teed Spaatz that he would continue to serve as a member of the JCS.
Further, the wartime post of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, filled in
January 1946 by W. Stuart Symington, would continue. 26 These steps
were designed to ensure adequate air force representation in military
councils.

With Eisenhower's backing, Spaatz and the AAF could proceed to
consider future mission requirements. In late March 1946, Spaatz reorga-
nized the AAF, disestablishing the Continental Air Forces and appor-
tioning its functions and resources among three new operational com-
mands. 27 Reflecting AAF traditions and wartime doctrinal lessons, Stra-
tegic Air Command, under General George C. Kenney, was headquar-
tered at Boiling Field; Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada commanded Tacti-
cal Air Command at Langley Field in Virginia; and Air Defense Com-
mand came under the command of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer,
with headquarters at Mitchel Field, New York (the home of the wartime
ADC). 28 Spaatz and other AAF spokesmen publicly referred to these
changes as functional, implying they had constructed a major AAF com-
mand to conduct each of the air missions recognized in FM 100-20. 29

The hardworking, genial Stratemeyer was Arnold's Chief Executive
Officer from April 1941 to January 1942 and subsequently served with

53

The Emerging Shield

distinction in the China-Burma-India theater. 30 Six numbered air forces
(First, Second, Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth) were assigned
to Stratemeyer's ADC. By July, the air forces had been given area re-
sponsibilities corresponding to those of six newly restructured continen-
tal armies under the command of General Jacob L. Devers. Stratemeyer
not only was concerned with air defense responsibilities but also was
burdened with organizing, operating, and maintaining the Air Reserve
and Air National Guard. 31 To perform these missions, Stratemeyer had
only two percent of the AAF's manpower.

From spring 1945 until mid- 1946, the 243-group AAF of World War
II dwindled to 54 understrength groups, 21 of which were fighter
groups. Eliminating intermediate headquarters and assigning a heavy
workload of missions to fighter groups allowed the AAF to meet its
overseas obligations with minimum manpower. At home the air forces
had few resources. All General Spaatz and his staff could do was to
decide how to apportion the planned 70 groups to each of the overseas
air forces and the stateside operational commands as the AAF rebuilt.
Kenney's Strategic Air Command (SAC) received the bombardment
groups of Second Air Force and two of the four fighter groups still
operational in the United States; Quesada's Tactical Air Command
(TAC) received the personnel and equipment of Third Air Force and the
other two fighter groups; and Stratemeyer's ADC received remnants of
First and Fourth Air Forces, their fighter groups having been assigned
to SAC. Plainly, the AAF gave priority to SAC and TAC at the expense
of ADC.

Spaatz's actions were carefully considered. Although he planned to
retire at war's end, he promised Arnold he would manage the AAF until
a separate air force could be established. He wanted to rebuild as quickly
as possible the combat-ready capability of the AAF, shattered by the
impact of rapid demobilization. 32

The creation of SAC and TAC offered Spaatz greater immediate
prospect of meeting his objective. The missions of these commands re-
quired and permitted the immediate development of a combat capability,
but ADC was another matter. During the war, General Arnold had
stated that air defense would be the most important priority for the post-
war military establishment because "the mechanism for air defense will
bear . . . almost the entire burden of our national safety." War Depart-
ment actions governing the creation of ADC had not granted it the
means, structure, or clear authority to begin air defense activity in any
meaningful sense. When Arnold expressed his views about the impor-
tance of the postwar air defense mission, he did not know that the
United States would possess an immediate postwar atomic monopoly.
Because of this capability, the risk of air attack seemed small, and Spaatz
and his staff believed they had time to deal with the problem of air de-

54

Air Defense— Postwar Era

Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer ■^^^^^^^^^^^■^H

fense should the need arise. So while Kenney and Quesada began to re-
build and develop operational capabilities in their respective strategic and
tactical spheres of responsibility, Stratemeyer went to work on his Air
Reserve and administrative functions. He also attempted to help the Air
Staff define more precisely his command's present and future duties. 33

Meanwhile, the Air Staff began the uncertain task of planning the
initial disposition of the 70 projected groups. Although the AAF had an
approved goal of 400,000- men, too few to support 70 groups, Spaatz ap-
proved activation of all of them. He believed that establishing the full
complement of groups, even if understrength, would improve prospects
of obtaining additional personnel in the future. 34

In this reallocation, the Air Staff assigned the 425th Night Fighter
Squadron to ADC. This unit, 1 of 7 wartime night-fighter squadrons
scheduled for retention in the peacetime air forces, still flew the P-61,
although plans called for it to reequip with P-82s in 1947. The squadron
would then assist in developing all-weather interception tactics in prepa-

55

The Emerging Shield

ration for receiving jet interceptors. Stratemeyer assigned the 425th to
March Field, California, where the Fourth Air Force retained some 300
radar and communication specialists. 35 In addition, Spaatz assured Strate-
meyer that ADC would receive reinforcements in manpower and equip-
ment as soon as possible. Plans called for ADC to activate one aircraft
control and warning group and to expand the night-fighter squadron to
an operational all-weather group. 36 Such promises of limited expansion
could hardly hope to satisfy ADC commanders. But for Spaatz and the
Air Staff, they accurately reflected the postwar military situation of air
defense having a low priority.

As was true at the end of World War I, at the conclusion of World
War II most Americans were anxious to forget about war and return to
normal life as quickly as possible. They could do this secure in the
knowledge that only the United States possessed atomic weapons. Sole
possession of "the bomb" also influenced the thinking of military plan-
ners who approached the issue of continental air defense with no sense
of urgency. Although the general agreement was that the Soviet Union
represented the most likely future adversary, a 1946 AAF intelligence
analysis predicted that the Soviets would, for the foreseeable future,
remain a land power, and their air forces would be "tactical in
design." 37

In fact, after World War II, the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin had as-
signed his military forces three major tasks. The most important was to
consolidate the Red Army's powerful position in eastern Europe and
keep alive the threat of a Soviet drive to the Atlantic. Thus began what
many western observers came to perceive as the Soviet Union's Hostage
Europe policy. The overwhelming strength of the Red Army would bal-
ance the U.S. atomic monopoly and deter America from attacking the
Soviet Union with atomic weapons. Stalin's second directive, also partly
in response to American nuclear superiority, was to build effective air
defenses as soon as possible. Finally, he wanted the Soviet Union to have
its own nuclear capability. 38

The successful completion of the last task would have required the
development of a long-range carrier vehicle, able to reach the United
States and, preferably, return to a base in the Soviet Union. Western ana-
lysts thought this would be difficult since the Soviets had emerged from
World War II with little experience in strategic air operations. Their ex-
perience was limited even though bomber development had achieved
some importance before the war. Then, the Soviets could boast of a
small but extremely talented group of bomber designers, led by the bril-
liant Andrei W. Tupolev who developed the four-engine TB-3, the
mainstay of Soviet bombers in the 1930s. Although the Soviets had
among their ranks proponents of independent bomber operations in the
tradition of Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, the dominant ground

56

Am Defense— Postwar Era

forces officers of the Red Army never permitted the bomber designers to
develop and disseminate their ideas. Furthermore, most advocates for in-
dependent strategic air operations were executed in Stalin's wholesale
purges of 1937-1938, as were most of the leading ground forces com-
manders (Stalin apparently did not take sides in a doctrinal dispute when
ordering who was to be murdered). 39

In World War II, although most Soviet bombers formed an inde-
pendent long-range aviation command {dal 'nebombardirovochnaya aviat-
siya, or DBA) under the direct control of the Supreme High Command
(Stavka), their most important mission supported the ground forces. Very
infrequently did DBA— composed mainly of TB-3s, some lend-lease
American B-25s, and twin-engined I l-4s— direct its strikes against targets
behind the frontlines, such as German industrial sites. Only 0.2 percent of
all Soviet Air Force sorties were in fact designated as independent air
operations. Probably because of its predominately tactical mission, DBA
lost its independent status in 1944, and most of its bombers were assigned
to tactical air units. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union could not
compare with the United States in terms of technology and experience in
strategic air operations. 40

After the war, in public pronouncements Stalin played down the
U.S. atomic monopoly and dominance in strategic aircraft. He asserted
that atomic bombs and long-range bombers did not mitigate the impor-
tance of "permanent operating factors," all of which he related to
ground warfare. Despite this sanguine facade, Stalin was actually deter-
mined to develop atomic weapons and wed them to long-range aircraft.
The Soviets had achieved what became a tremendous technological coup
in August and November 1944 when three U.S. B-29s force-landed in
Soviet territory after completing missions over Japan. Two of the B-29s
were eventually dismantled and reproduced by the Soviets as the Tu-4
medium-range bomber, expected to be able to reach the United States on
one-way missions. 41

When the Russians would pose a serious threat, however, was de-
batable. U.S. military and civilian authorities were well aware of Soviet
efforts to build a strategic bomber force because the Soviets had, not
very circumspectly, attempted to purchase B-29 tires, wheels, and brake
assemblies in the United States in 1946. 42 No matter how soon the Sovi-
ets perfected a bomber that could attack the United States, most military
and civilian intelligence estimates predicted that the Soviet Union would
not possess an atomic capability until at least 1952. Still, most military
leaders advocated preliminary investigations and preparations to meet
whatever threat eventually materialized. Accordingly, in the fall of 1945,
the JCS accepted the probability of future air operations occurring
across the North Atlantic and polar regions, the shortest distance be-
tween the two powers. 43 Accepting the concept of enemy bombers ap-

57

The Emerging Shield

proaching the American heartland by these routes, it seemed logical that
American retaliatory strikes would follow over the same air lanes. Based
on this reasoning, in February 1946 General Spaatz set as a priority the
deployment of the air defense portion of the seventy groups in "the areas
essential to the security of the polar approaches, namely the North At-
lantic and Alaska. . . ." 44

The so-called polar concept triggered a host of activities destined to
affect the future of air defense developments in North America. It led, for
example, to an agreement between the United States and Canada to retain
the wartime Permanent Joint Board on Defense. The two nations also
propitiated their close World War II defense ties by agreeing to establish,
under the Joint Board, a new Military Cooperation Committee. 45 By early
1946, the Committee had started work on an actual plan for defending the
United States and Canada against air attack across the polar regions. The
AAF planned, in cooperation with the Royal Canadian Air Force, to
establish bases and command channels for offensive and defensive oper-
ations along air routes that led across Newfoundland directly into the
critically important eastern Canada and northeastern U.S. industrial zones.
The United States also opened negotiations with Denmark for military
stations in Greenland and with Iceland for similar concessions in that
country. Finally, the polar concept induced General Spaatz to grant
priority to Alaska over the continental United States for air resources. In
fall 1946, he told his commanders that "development of the Arctic front is
our primary operational objective." 46 *

The huge materiel and personnel demands inherent in the polar con-
cept prevented Spaatz and Stratemeyer from proceeding seriously with
the limited domestic air defense preparations foreseen by the 1946 reor-
ganization. That reorganization, with six ADC numbered air forces cov-
ering the entire area of the United States, involved the dispersal of air
defense forces throughout the length and breadth of the country. The
polar concept, on the other hand, required that air defense means be con-
centrated largely outside the nation. As General Stratemeyer informed
his commanders in July 1946, it appeared as though the Royal Canadian
Air Force would garrison air defenses installed in Canada, and the AAF
would garrison those in Alaska, Greenland, Iceland, and the United

* The polar concept, of course, hardly applied only to AAF plans for air defense. Be-
cause the AAF's most powerful bomber at the time, the B-29, lacked the range to hit
Soviet targets from the continental United States, Spaatz envisioned forward basing areas
in the far north. But SAC encountered apparently insurmountable difficulties operating
under arctic conditions. In July 1947, SAC Deputy Commander Maj. Gen. Clements
McMullen remarked in frustration while attempting to find a suitable operating base in
northern Canada: "I have practically shed my polar concept." The AAF eventually opted
in the late 1940s to deploy most of its strategic strength on forward bases in Europe and
the Far East [Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment
Before Korea (Westport, Conn., 1982), pp 77-88].

58

Air Defense— Postwar Era

States. In time, ADC's role would probably be concentrated on vital
areas of the west coast and in the northeast. The air defense of Alaska,
Greenland, and adjacent areas would come under the jurisdiction of sep-
arate commands. 47

Early Planning Efforts

General Spaatz, had he been free to do so, would have combed the
AAF worldwide to locate and reassign to Alaskan Air Command the
skilled aircraft warning specialists needed there. However, JCS agree-
ments required the AAF to maintain operational air defense systems as
well in the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, Japan, Korea, and Germany. 48
The small number of specialists trained in air defense operations re-
mained therefore scattered throughout the world. Although a training
program for aircraft warning experts had been started, it was not expect-
ed to increase in manpower until 1948. In the interim, Spaatz turned to
ADC to provide trained personnel for Alaska. 49

In November 1946, acting on Spaatz's instructions, Stratemeyer de-
ployed his single P-61 night-fighter squadron from California to
McChord Field, near Tacoma, Washington. Spaatz also authorized Stra-
temeyer to activate the day interceptor fighter group assigned ADC in
the seventy-group program and base it at Dow Field, Maine. Strate-
meyer's orders were to establish an air defense training squadron at
McChord and a jet aircraft training operation at Dow. ADC was pro-
grammed to retrain the P-61 fighter unit into a two-squadron all-weather
group. By March 1947, more personnel and P-47 aircraft had been trans-
ferred to Dow, and preparations soon began for conversion to P-84
Thunderjets. 50 On the west coast, the 425th Night Fighter Squadron,
which had come to McChord with only one P-61 aircraft, soon received
additional planes and personnel to maintain them. 51 On both the east and
west coasts units strove to achieve operational capability. In the west an
aircraft control and warning group activated on May 21, 1947, and
airmen were given the chance to learn one or more of the many air de-
fense skills so sorely needed in Alaska and other commands worldwide. 52
ADC moved promptly to realize the training system advocated by
Spaatz for air defense requirements in Alaska. Simultaneously, Strate-
meyer and his staff of young, combat-experienced officers at Mitchel
Field continued planning the operational air defenses for the continental
United States. Strictly a paper exercise at the time, their plans proposed
a far different course and role for ADC from the one imposed by higher
headquarters. The ADC staff had begun its work with futile requests to

59

The Emerging Shield

P-61 Black Widow, the United States' first night fighter

the Air Staff for clarification on the command's mission. In March 1946,
Spaatz had hastily and informally issued SAC, TAC, and ADC interim
mission statements. Stratemeyer was charged with organizing and admin-
istering a thus far nonexisting entity, the integrated air defense system of
the continental United States. The program included training active duty
units as well as those of the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve in
the most advanced methods of air defense operations. 53

The interim mission statement said nothing about the extent of
ADC's responsibility in the event of an air attack against the United
States. Yet Spaatz, during congressional budget hearings in 1946, stated
that there must be only one commander responsible for the air defense of
the United States. This would provide unity of command and ensure
proper organization to prevent another surprise like the one at Pearl
Harbor. Spaatz also stated his intention that ADC should eventually staff
radar stations around the clock. 54 When the ADC staff pressed the Air
Staff to explain how, under the seventy-group limitation, the command
would obtain the means to install and maintain radar systems, the answer
emerged that fighter aircraft and aircraft control and warning units of
the Air National Guard would provide the "primary elements of this
system." 55

This news could hardly have been reassuring to ADC officers, for,
although the War Department had determined to develop the National
Guard into a combat-ready reserve, almost no action had been taken in
that direction so far. Spaatz, however, told Stratemeyer that he would
eventually have emergency command of all AAF resources with air de-
fense capabilities. In addition, Spaatz promised at the opportune moment
to unify ADC command responsibilities, not a simple task; he would

60

Air Defense— Postwar Era

have to solicit authority through the JCS for Stratemeyer to take charge
of Army antiaircraft artillery and Navy shore- and harbor-based fighter,
radar warning, and antiaircraft artillery forces in an emergency. 56

ADC was well aware that Spaatz's guarantees were based on a
weak foundation. In June 1946, the Army Ground Forces again made
clear its intention to maintain control of antiaircraft artillery operations.
The Navy was equally uncooperative in having its air defense forces
come under ADC control in an emergency. Meanwhile, the Air National
Guard had been only recently organized and remained understaffed and
inadequately equipped. The Air Reserve, for similar reasons, was unpre-
pared to assume air defense duties as well. 57

With the fluctuating air defense situation, some air defense staff be-
lieved, by early 1947, that AAF Headquarters' failure to delegate respon-
sibility clearly and to share the risk was an attempt to make ADC the
scapegoat should a surprise air attack occur. 58 The staff believed this,
though a bolt-from-the-blue air attack on the United States at the time
was extremely unlikely. Many of the air defense staff recalled their shock
and bewilderment after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They also
remembered that the Pearl Harbor attack destroyed the careers of the
principal commanders responsible for its defense. Subsequent events
proved, however, that the Air Staff, with its many pressing duties in a
period of reduced defense spending, ignored air defense less than it used
the limited means at its disposal to build up the strategic striking force,
considered by airmen the nation's most potent deterrent and war-waging
instrument. 59

Stratemeyer urged his staff to work to the best of their abilities with
the resources available to them. He fully realized the less than crucial
importance of his command, as interpreted by the Air Staff. He strove to
improve the capability of ADC and planned to provide the nation, even-
tually, with staunch air defenses. Working with an unclear charter, Stra-
temeyer and his staff and subordinate commanders began negotiations in
summer 1946 with other AAF commands, the Air National Guard, and
the Army antiaircraft artillery forces to use their personnel in an emer-
gency. The ADC staff also prepared and submitted to the Air Staff its
ideas on how to proceed with home air defense in the near and long
terms. Thus ADC plans conflicted with the Air Staffs intention of using
the command merely as a source of trained personnel for Alaskan and
overseas use. Stratemeyer's staff believed that if ADC was to be held re-
sponsible for the air defense of the United States, then specific programs
should be developed to provide it with the means to assume that duty;
otherwise, the command should be specifically reconstituted as an ad-
vanced training organization. 60

Stratemeyer issued his proposal to establish some air defense for the
United States on October 18, 1946. He planned to concentrate his forces,

61

The Emerging Shield

as they became available, in the northeast or the northwest United
States. This, he believed, would permit him to make the best use of the
forces available to him for training. ADC would also be in a position to
develop an air defense in being, that is, an operational system in at least
one of the areas most susceptible to air attack by way of the polar
routes. 61

Following the submission on October 18 of this so-called Air De-
fense Plan (Short Term) 1946-1947, Stratemeyer traveled to Washington
on October 23 to outline his requirements for air defense in a personal
presentation. His audience included Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Symington, Spaatz, and members of the Air Staff. During his presenta-
tion, the ADC chief emphasized the need for careful consideration by
government officials of continental air defense problems. It was urgent,
according to Stratemeyer, that a decision be made quickly regarding al-
location of funds and resources for air defense. All who listened to his
plea seemed concerned, and for a brief period after his visit a flurry of
activity occurred at AAF Headquarters on the air defense issue. This
soon dissipated, however, as Spaatz and the Air Staff focused on what
they considered more pressing matters, especially the drive for an inde-
pendent air force. 62

Although the response from the Pentagon was not encouraging,
Stratemeyer persisted in having his staff prepare and submit plans. In late
November 1946, he forwarded to Spaatz a plan for establishing an air
defense in being. Basically, the plan called for a gradual buildup in the
components of air defense networks and personnel to manage them. Stra-
temeyer believed such an expansion would produce, by mid- 1948, a de-
fense system that would "give a reasonable chance of interception and
destruction of minor air raids ... in the most vital areas of the coun-
try." These defenses, he said, "would prevent the unopposed destruction
by hostile forces on the opening of hostilities of those areas . . . most
necessary to the industrial and military mobilization." Further, such
forces could be eventually expanded to provide total air defense cover-
age for the United States. Stratemeyer's plan indicated the minimum
forces necessary to initiate an interim continental defense against nonnu-
clear attack. 63

ADC received no indication from AAF Headquarters that its short-
term, or air defense in being, plan was given careful consideration. The
air defense staff nonetheless began a five-month effort to produce a com-
prehensive long-range air defense plan under the direction of Strate-
meyer's plans chief, Col. John B. Carey, one of the AAF's most knowl-
edgeable officers in air defense. The air defense plan (long term), submit-
ted on April 8, 1947, outlined the ultimate requirements to provide air
defense against a "well prepared and major attack by air." On the basis
of Air Staff intelligence that predictably identified the Soviet Union as

62

Air Defense— Postwar Era

the only foreseeable enemy, Carey and his staff concluded that it would
be 1955 before the Soviets could develop the means (match a fleet of
long-range bombers with atomic weapons) to deliver an attack. They
warned that if the Air Staff and government authorities decided to build
an air defense system, at least two years would probably be required,
starting from the nucleus proposed in the plan of November 1946. 64

The long-term plan proposed that ADC have 38 control and warn-
ing groups, 34 all-weather fighter groups, about 300 antiaircraft artillery
battalions, and 83 guided-missile groups, requiring 700,000 people for im-
plementation. For more effective command of such a large organization,
the plan recommended moving ADC Headquarters from Mitchel Field
to a more central location, such as Kansas City, and accommodating it in
a protected command center. Carey also proposed reorganizing the com-
mand into four air forces with subordinate defense wings. Headquarters
at each echelon would operate from centers hardened to protect against
air attack. 65 Carey greatly overestimated the personnel needed to imple-
ment future air defense systems. Nevertheless, as an indication of the
richness and vision of his plan, many of his ideas for the command, con-
trol, and protection of air defense forces were implemented in much the
same form as he envisioned.

The long-term plan concentrated on air defense of the continental
United States. It noted that additional forces had to be arranged for an
Arctic theater to defend Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland, Greenland, and
Iceland. Some means had to be found to establish a peripheral early-
warning zone comprised of radar stations, Navy radar picket vessels, and
airborne search radar. These elements would be located across northern
Canada and Alaska, west to Hawaii, and from Greenland to Puerto
Rico. 66

Stratemeyer admitted to Spaatz that ADC's proposals might seem
large to "those of us who have been scratching to get the few people
required for the seventy group program," but he added they were very
small considering the vast area to be defended. Consequently, he hoped
to proceed along the lines of his November 1946 plan to create an air
defense in being. He would start with a small system in the northeastern
part of the United States and gradually install additional networks in
other critical areas if and when ADC received additional forces. This
would remain ADC's goal until 1953 when, if current threat estimates
proved valid, the long-range plan would be implemented. 67

Stratemeyer recognized that some alternative might emerge. Tech-
nological developments could conceivably result in a radar system capa-
ble of warning and control at ranges beyond 1,000 miles. The defender
would need only a few surveillance and control units, not an expensive
and widespread network. Given this advantage, plus an in-place defense
system based on an updated air defense doctrine, the air forces might

63

The Emerging Shield

^ \ U.S.S.R. and Satellites/'^ )/ ^ "^J^Cy

■Q 5 e^^J^y Air Defense Command Long-Term Plan ^>

"avoid the unending expenditures of present defense measures." In the
next eight years, progress in the tools of air defense and the methods of
their employment would render the expensive World War II systems, on
which ADC planning was based, unnecessary. Still, warned Stratemeyer,
the longer air defense research and development was delayed, the less
chance the United States would have for discovering and using advanced
technology. Before the new defensive array was operational, a potential
enemy's actions might necessitate large-scale air defense preparations on
the older World War II model. 68 Stratemeyer's ideas seemed perfectly
logical, but they brought to the fore what had become and continued to
be a grave dilemma: With only limited resources, how much could the
AAF afford to invest in air defense at the expense of what it considered
to be more urgent priorities?

Under the circumstances, the answer could not satisfy ADC. For
the moment, the Air Staff could not endorse the ideas championed by
Stratemeyer "with any implication that the means required for imple-
mentation [could] be provided." 69 The Air Staff sympathized with the
air defense chiefs contention that he was being held responsible for pre-
venting a surprise air attack on the United States without being supplied
the means to accomplish his mission.

Because ADC could perform only as a training and administrative
agent of the AAF, the Air .Staff considered revising its mission statement

64

Air Defense— Postwar Era

to include only air defense planning. But Air Staff officers agreed that
this would have been tantamount to announcing that the AAF was
unable to provide air defense, doubtlessly damaging prospects for an in-
dependent air force. Considerable controversy on overall policies and
programs affecting air defense thus prevailed from fall 1946 into summer
1947 in AAF Headquarters. 70

Some solace may have been provided to ADC staff members in
knowing that, while no positive action occurred regarding their propos-
als, air defense was at last becoming a subject of serious debate among
Air Staff officers. Stratemeyer's ideas had precipitated an exchange be-
tween the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans and the Assistant Chief
of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements, Maj. Gen.
Otto P. Weyland and General Partridge.

Partridge, a 1924 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, had brief-
ly commanded the New York Air Defense Wing in 1943. He was experi-
enced- in fighter and bomber operations and would greatly influence
future U.S. air defense activities. In spring 1947 he argued that the Sovi-
ets would soon possess "weapons greatly exceeding World War II types
in range, speed, and lethal attack." He denigrated ADC requests to the
Air Staff for establishing operational systems hinged on World War II-
type equipment. Complying with these requests would be, he believed,
"a diversion of our crumbling resources to sustain . . . bow and arrow
systems" and an indefensible waste of funds that should be targeted for
research and development of equipment needed to counter the future
threat. Partridge suggested all currently existing fixed operational sys-
tems be eliminated and only "nuclei aircraft control and warning sys-
tems" be supported for the foreseeable future. He believed enough air
defense equipment could be stockpiled to outfit small task force units
that might be needed to reinforce threatened areas. Further, new produc-
tion of present-generation radars should be confined to just that needed
for supporting such limited operations. Money saved in this process, he
concluded, could be channeled into research and development of future
systems. 71

General Weyland, Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, had earned
his reputation as head of the XIX Tactical Air Command, which gained
fame for its classic air support of General George Patton's Third Army
campaign in France in 1944. Weyland also was well versed in air defense
tactics, having commanded the 16th Pursuit Group in Panama shortly
after Pearl Harbor. He largely agreed with his colleague's logic, but he
posed other considerations he thought Partridge had overlooked. He fo-
cused particularly on the psychological and political implications of the
air defense issue. Stating he was as anxious as anyone on the Air Staff to
avoid wasting scarce funds, Weyland pointed out that the AAF was
trying to persuade the American people that one of its chief missions was

65

The Emerging Shield

Brig. Gen. Earle E. Partridge

the air defense of the United States. Since mere acceptance of this re-
sponsibility no longer seemed enough, he argued that the airmen actually
had to provide some visible measures of defense. Therefore, he believed
that at least a skeleton air defense system had to be maintained, even if it
meant using outdated equipment and scarce personnel. As plans director,
he was confident that new developments and techniques could be formu-
lated and tested within the interim skeleton system. At the very least,
claimed Weyland, these actions would assure the public that the AAF
was making every effort to establish and maintain a "practical and effec-
tive air defense system." 72 Weyland's views thus concurred more with
Stratemeyer's than with Partridge's. The ADC Commander and the Air
Staff plans chief agreed on the need both to begin research programs in
technologies applicable to future air defense systems, and to install tem-
porary systems using World War II equipment. Partridge, however,
agreed that development of future systems required research, but he be-
lieved that establishing temporary defenses using outdated equipment
made little sense.

A few months after this exchange of views, General Spaatz asked a
panel of officers to formulate a statement on AAF air defense policy.
This Air Staff group reported in August 1947 that the AAF certainly
could not plan to provide adequate air defense for the entire United
States. To do so, they believed, would endanger the national economy
and "leave little room for the air offensive," a move that "would be dis-
astrous since real security lay in offensive capability." They thus recom-

66

Air Defense — Postwar Era

mended air defense "be provided only around these areas vital to our
war effort . . . areas determined at the highest level [and which con-
tain] targets of political, economic, industrial, and military impor-
tance." 73 Examined carefully, this statement merely rephrased the posi-
tion Stratemeyer advocated over the past year. Almost everyone agreed,
therefore, that the AAF had to establish a minimum operational air de-
fense system in the United States, if not for strategic then for psychologi-
cal and political reasons. The big questions remained, When? and On
what scale?

The Radar Fence Plan

Late in 1946, General Partridge had pointed out that under the sev-
enty-group program the AAF would have insufficient forces to meet es-
sential air defense requirements; air defense needs had been projected not
only by ADC, but also by Alaskan Air Command and other commands
with air defense responsibilities. 74 This situation did not greatly disturb
Partridge because he believed the immediate threat of air attack against
the United States was minimal. Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart
Symington found that conclusion unacceptable. He knew some oppo-
nents of a separate air force argued that airmen were incapable of per-
forming the many nonoperational tasks necessary for raising, equipping,
and training forces or that they would not concern themselves with any
aspect of air power other than offensive operations. Symington, sensitive
to such criticism, was anxious to demonstrate that the AAF could
manage its affairs as well as the land and naval components. He asked
Spaatz, in drawing up the AAF budget requests, to "carefully consider
the military need for an adequate air defense system for the United
States, with an emphasis on our polar frontiers." 75

Spaatz turned for help to his scientific advisor, Dr. Theodore von
Karman. He asked the scientist, active since World War II in planning
future AAF scientific and technological requirements, to find a solution
to the problem of creating an air defense system that would be not only
adequate for immediate needs but also flexible enough to adapt to techni-
cal advances. 76 Von Karman believed this large order exceeded the ca-
pacity of the AAF Scientific Advisory Board. He suggested, and Spaatz
agreed, that the job be given to Douglas Aircraft Company's research
and development (RAND) * project. RAND officials put a group to

* The RAND project was established in May 1946 as a virtually autonomous depart-
ment of the Douglas Company. In 1948, the independent and nonprofit RAND Corpora-
tion came into being. Although the bulk of its funding came from the Air Force, RAND

67

The Emerging Shield

work on the problem in early 1947 and by July had issued a preliminary
report. Their appraisal recommended against a large investment of funds
in the near future for obsolete air defense equipment intended to protect
against the highly improbable prospect of an air attack. Such an invest-
ment might, RAND warned, foster a dangerous "Maginot Line" compla-
cency among the American people. Nevertheless, RAND agreed with
almost everyone who possessed any knowledge of the problem that it
was necessary to have a certain amount of air defense, although failing to
stipulate how much was enough. 77 In response to the RAND study, the
Air Staff urged that minimum requirements for air defense of the United
States be determined and that needed forces be brought into being. To
do so would enable the AAF to avoid dissipating its strength in the face
of multiple air attacks and hampering its ability to launch counterattacks
on a foe. Once a minimum air defense was established, other resources
could be dedicated exclusively to offensive action. 78

Spaatz was anxious to determine what that much talked-about con-
cept—minimum air defense— actually entailed. He asked the head of Air
Proving Ground Command, Maj. Gen. Carl A. Brandt, to develop a pro-
gram for establishing a test operation at Eglin Field, Florida. The pro-
gram would be designed "to estimate the air defense capabilities of
modern radar equipment against modern aircraft and air operations."
Spaatz informed Brandt that the development of an air defense system
for the United States would cost enormous sums of money for equip-
ment, construction, and manpower. The results of such a test, therefore,
could have a decisive influence on the nature and extent of the program
ultimately initiated. 79 Even before Spaatz decided on the test program,
the question of air defense requirements seemed to acquire new implica-
tions.

In mid- June 1947, newly appointed Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) Chairman David E. Lilienthal asked Secretary of War Robert
Patterson for a review of emergency military protection at vital facilities
of the AEC. The purpose of the review was to ensure that all precau-
tions had been taken to safeguard important installations against enemy
action or other incidents beyond the capability of civilian security forces
to handle. 80 Patterson agreed that it was crucial to provide protection for
AEC facilities, even more so than political or industrial centers. He
turned the matter over to the War Department General Staff for further
study. 81

As Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in the Air Staff, General
Norstad was assigned to study the problem. His previous assignment had
been Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Plans. An experienced staff offi-

was permitted a wide breadth of research independence while studying matters crucial to
the Air Force and national security.

68

Air Defense— Postwar Era

cer, from winter to spring 1947 he teamed with Admiral Forrest P. Sher-
man to draft legislation for what was to become the National Security
Act. Norstad was well informed concerning Stratemeyer's proposals for
current and future air defense requirements. Further, he possessed an in-
timate familiarity with overall available AAF resources. 82

Having solicited the concurrence of Spaatz and General Jacob
Devers, commander of the Army Ground Forces, Norstad advised the
War Department not to implement a crash program allocating scarce air
defense resources for the express purpose of guarding AEC facilities.
Norstad thought the War Department should postpone action until the
AAF had devised a comprehensive air defense plan for the nation. In
planning for active air defense of the United States, however, Norstad
promised that the AAF would pay particular attention to the protection
of AEC sites. 83

Less than a month later, on July 16, 1947, Congress passed the Na-
tional Security Act authorizing the establishment of an independent
United States Air Force. The Air Force was to "be organized, trained,
and equipped for prompt offensive and defensive air operations." Presi-
dent Truman's Executive Order of July 26 implementing the statute em-
phasized the Air Force's responsibility to "provide means for coordina-
tion of air defense among the services." 84 Meanwhile, on July 18,
Truman appointed the Air Policy Commission under the chairmanship of
Philadelphia attorney Thomas K. Finletter to develop an integrated na-
tional air policy. 85 Soon afterward, military and civilian leaders of the
Air Force were invited to appear before the Finletter Commission to ex-
plain what the Air Force would require to perform its duties and how
such resources should be employed.

The emergence of the Air Force as a separate service, together with
Secretary of the Air Force Symington's appeals and the upcoming Fin-
letter Commission hearings, finally persuaded Air Force leaders they
could no longer afford to delay preparing a plan to defend U.S. airspace.
Having at last achieved its dream of independence, the Air Force moved
to reevaluate its attitude toward air defense. Formerly, the Air Staff had
shared in the War Department's responsibility for guarding the nation
against air attack. The General Staff prescribed the air defense organiza-
tional structure and issued the basic mission directives. Now, at least in
terms of fighters and radar systems, the Air Force had to demonstrate its
resolve and ability to have operational air defenses in place.

A major obligation for developing an air defense plan devolved on
the Air Force Communications Directorate headed by Maj. Gen. Francis
L. Ankenbrandt. General Vandenberg, who had succeeded General
Eaker on his retirement as second in command of the air forces on Sep-
tember 1, invested Ankenbrandt with the task of preparing the aircraft
control and warning portion of the plan. While planning was the primary

69

The Emerging Shield

W. Stuart Symington, after serving as Assistant Secretary of War for
Air, becomes Secretary of the Air Force. Administering the oath is Chief
Justice Fred Vinson. Others in the photograph are, left to right, Secretary
of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of National Defense James V.
Forrestal, and Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan.

duty of the Air Staff directorate of plans and operations, the job at hand
called for the technical expertise that only Ankenbrandt's staff possessed.
The heart of the matter, as always in air defense operations, remained
warning and control. Ankenbrandt's staff was composed of officers well
qualified to deal with this problem. Skilled in electronics and communi-
cations, many had served under General Saville on the early wartime air
defense staff. These officers offered Vandenberg his best prospect for the
rapid development of a plan for radar control and warning. 86

Ankenbrandt's goal was to design a system that would "prove a
strong deterrent to enemy air attack with conventional bombers by pro-
viding the best air defense system available today." The system would
constitute tangible proof to the nation that the Air Force was serious
about defending the United States against air attack. 87 The report, pre-
pared by Ankenbrandt and his communications officers, was called the
Radar Fence Plan (code named Project Supremacy). If the Air Force
received funds to begin at once, the plan forecast a radar warning and
control system in operation by 1953. The system would consist of 411
radar stations and 18 control centers in the continental United States
serviced around the clock by 25,000 regular U.S. Air Force personnel
and nearly 14,000 Air National Guard radar specialists. The plan allowed
for a total expenditure of $600 million over a 5-year period. Construction
and purchase of radar and other equipment would account for $388 mil-

70

Air Defense — Postwar Era

lion, 88 while the remainder, as Vandenberg noted, would cover expan-
sion or modifications. 89

The Radar Fence Plan clashed markedly with the advice offered by
RAND. RAND had advised against investing heavily in a modern air
defense system, fearing such action could instill a Maginot Line tempera-
ment within the national consciousness and could take resources from
the strategic forces. Ankenbrandt and his staff, on the other hand, be-
lieved that the Air Force could best serve and win the confidence of the
nation by providing an air defense system that incorporated the most ad-
vanced methods and technology available.* Anxious to display its abili-
ties to perform a variety of missions, the new Air Force, temporarily at
least, supported Ankenbrandt's view.

A few weeks after the formal separation of the Air Force from the
Army, Ankenbrandt and his staff conducted extensive briefings on the
Radar Fence Plan for a wide audience of listeners from the Air Force,
the JCS, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (created by the Na-
tional Security Act as part of the National Military Establishment). The
briefings were well received. Stratemeyer and his staff in particular be-
lieved the plan provided the minimum coverage for strategic areas. 90 On
November 21, 1947, Air Force Chief of Staff Spaatz approved the Radar
Fence Plan and directed the Air Staff to seek funds for its implementa-
tion. 91 Accompanied by Lt. Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings, Air Comptroller,
Ankenbrandt met with Bureau of the Budget representatives to discuss
how to secure funds so that work on the first stage of the program could
begin at once. Officials in the Budget Bureau dashed Air Force hopes for
quick action by insisting that funds for construction could only come
from supplemental appropriations approved by Congress. Without such
enabling legislation and the concurrence of the two senior services, the
Budget Bureau could take no action on the plan. Rawlings therefore pre-
pared the necessary paperwork and submitted it in early 1948 to the
Army and Navy for review. 92 That put the plan in an indefinite "hold."
This cumbersome procedure was necessary because the Air Force had
yet to be invested with unambiguous primary responsibility for continen-
tal air defense.

♦Ankenbrandt generally opposed installing older equipment in the system. He de-
scribed the capabilities of World War II radar equipment as follows: "They have an opti-
mum coverage against conventional bombers of approximately 150 miles at 20,000 feet.
They provide inefficient coverage above 30,000 feet and zero coverage above 35,000 feet.
Their low angle coverage is limited by the horizon to approximately 35 miles at 1,000 feet
and correspondingly shorter ranges at lower altitudes. Their performance in controlling
friendly jet interceptors is poor. These deficiencies in World War II types are undoubtedly
known to all nations since basic techniques have been completely declassified and are
widely published. Specifically, Russian information on radar is considered completely
abreast of the art because of the acquisition of German radar scientists and equipment, and
their acquisition of allied lend lease radar equipment in quantity" [Memo, Ankenbrandt to
Spaatz, Oct 22, 1947, Spaatz Papers, Box 263, LC].

71

The Emerging Shield

Air defense operations consisted, as always, of four major compo-
nents: detection, identification, interception, and destruction. Radar sta-
tions and control systems figured prominently in detection, identification,
and interception, but they could not themselves cause destruction. An-
kenbrandt stressed in his briefings that the Radar Fence Plan did "not in
itself provide air defense." Air Force leaders preparing to appear before
the Finletter Commission had to become familiar with Stratemeyer's
ideas for a complete system incorporating the "trip wire" formed by the
Radar Fence. A total air defense network would only be complete with
advanced aircraft and weapons systems, operated and serviced by quali-
fied personnel. Although most of the potential witnesses had a reason-
ably good understanding of Stratemeyer's problems and his proposed so-
lutions, most realized that no subject was as obfuscated by semantic diffi-
culties as air defense. This posed a potential problem because both Sy-
mington and Spaatz were determined that every officer appearing before
the commission would speak with one voice on whatever aspects of Air
Force policy the panel members chose to probe. In Symington's view, if
Air Force officers underestimated the importance of the air defense mis-
sion, they would become subject to the criticism that the Air Force was
simply interested in "attempting to prove that the main way to win a
war is through strategic bombing." 93

The generals were anxious to prove to the Finletter Commission
that they were using all the limited means at their disposal to provide a
semblance of air defense. Under the circumstances, ADC suddenly
became subject to much attention from Headquarters USAF. In mid-Oc-
tober 1947, Vandenberg went to Mitchel Field to discuss the situation
with Stratemeyer, and then invited him to Washington where, on Octo-
ber 23, he briefed major Air Force leaders. His audience included Sy-
mington, Spaatz, and key members of the Air Staff, including Norstad,
just assigned as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations after his
tour on the War Department General Staff. This meeting proved an im-
portant event in the story of postwar air defense. Vandenberg achieved
success in clearing the way for Stratemeyer to initiate actual air defense
operations.

Stratemeyer emphasized in his briefings the proposals his operations
staff had made in their long-range plan. He believed that ADC Head-
quarters should be moved inland; the organizational structure should be
reduced to four, rather than six, numbered air forces; and these interme-
diate headquarters should be transferred to more suitable locations. At all
levels, headquarters needed to be provided command posts, situated near
administrative headquarters, and to be designed to withstand attack by
all foreseeable weapons. Of primary importance, Stratemeyer pleaded,
ADC should be freed of all missions not related directly to air defense
and the administration and training of Air Reserve forces. Symington

72

Air Defense— Postwar Era

and Spaatz agreed with Stratemeyer's proposals, and Vandenberg in-
formed Stratemeyer in November that the Air Staff was implementing
his proposals for reorganization. 94 At best, ADC had been a training,
planning, and administrative agency, but decisions emanating from the
Washington meeting paved the way for transforming Stratemeyer's orga-
nization into an operational command. 95 Experimental air defense groups
and systems soon appeared on the east and west coasts.

One casualty of the new plans for ADC was the air defense project
Spaatz had assigned to General Brandt at the Air Proving Ground.
Shortly after the Washington meeting, Spaatz rescinded his instructions
to Brandt. Since Spaatz first conceived of the test project, it was increas-
ingly apparent that worldwide shortages of trained aircraft control and
warning personnel would prevent "accomplishment of any but the most
vital air defense missions." 96 Spaatz nonetheless wanted to find a sound
basis for guiding systems planning, development, and procurement. One
alternative would have been to subject air defense problems to seminar-
type discussions in the Air War College. But as Spaatz realized, Air
Force officers were, for the most part, too limited in their knowledge of
strategic air defense to meet the rigorous demands of such an approach.
The only reasonable alternative, he believed, was to "establish a few tac-
tical systems whose primary function would be to defend certain vital
areas of the United States." These units would also act as an air defense
proving ground for carrying out a test program. 97

Attempts to Come to Terms with the Mission

In appearances before the Finletter Commission, Air Force leaders
stated the first mission of their service, in preparing for the defense of
the United States, was to meet a surprise attack with an instantaneous
counterthrust of both offensive and defensive forces. 98 Vandenberg ex-
plained in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee that
the Air Force's primary task was allotting sufficient long-range bomber
and reconnaissance forces to the "immediate counter air offensive." Just
as important was defending the United States and its outlying bases from
air attack. From these bases, the retaliatory attack would be launched.
For this purpose, Vandenberg estimated the Air Force would need to
deploy twenty-five fighter groups. 99 Vandenberg did not intend that
SAC and TAC be shorn of their fighter escort and fighter bomber
groups or that the forces be converted to air interceptor duty under
ADC. Instead, he meant that all fighter groups function effectively in de-
fensive as well as offensive roles. Spaatz elaborated on this theme in tes-
timony a few days later. Although it was necessary for fighter aircraft to

73

The Emerging Shield

be under one air defense commander, it was not essential that fighter
units be attached to air defense organizations at all times. During World
War II, Spaatz moved units from strategic to tactical operations, as long
as the various units were trained to perform different functions. 100

Stratemeyer presumably possessed, under provisions of his interim
mission statement, authority to call on the tactical forces of all Air Force
commands, or even other services, during an emergency. But when he
attempted to exercise his prerogative, he encountered unyielding opposi-
tion. Other military commanders simply refused to cooperate. Either
they believed their own forces too poorly manned and equipped to ac-
complish their primary missions, not to mention assuming secondary air
defense responsibilities, or they questioned Stratemeyer's authority. So
while Stratemeyer welcomed the new emphasis on placing all Air Force
fighter groups at the disposal of ADC in an emergency, he wanted assur-
ance that his fellow field commanders understood the concept. At the
end of 1947, Headquarters USAF complied. The Air Staff issued ADC
its first formal mission directive, replacing the interim statement of
March 1946. The new directive proclaimed unequivocally that Strate-
meyer was empowered to "train and direct operationally those units of
the regular national defense establishment assigned or attached as part of
a defense force in being." Additionally, the directive made clear what
should have been obvious: "the chief mission of the Air Defense Com-
mand is the preparation for and execution of defense operations against
air attack on the continental United States." 101

The Air Force also sought to clarify and strengthen ADC's author-
ity with respect to the use of Air National Guard units in an emergency.
In fall 1945, the War Department decided to establish and maintain the
Guard as a combat-ready force, capable of immediately expanding regu-
lar land and air forces whenever war threatened. 102 The Air National
Guard fighter units represented, as AAF Headquarters proclaimed,
ADC's most promising potential source of fighter-interceptors for emer-
gency air defense.

Stratemeyer, unfortunately, had endless problems, some of his own
making, with the Air National Guard program. 103 In 1946, he had made
several unsuccessful attempts to influence policy toward greater control
of the Air Guard by regular forces, particularly control by his own com-
mand. Before Stratemeyer's campaign to acquire these units, Air Force
leaders had assured the National Guard Bureau they had no intention of
assuming direct control of the Air Guard during peacetime. Spaatz now
admitted to Stratemeyer that he had been mistaken about employment of
all air reserve forces in permanent support of the air defense mission.
Such forces, said Spaatz, constituted a total Air Force reserve and were
to be used in an emergency to support the Air Force in a variety of mis-
sions. 104 Spaatz also amended the ADC mission statement. In April 1946,

74

Air Defense— Postwar Era

Stratemeyer had written the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to ex-
plain that, as air defense commander, his mandate involved ensuring the
effectiveness of the Air National Guard, and organizing and administer-
ing the Guard in its "federally reorganized status." 105 Air Guard officials
apparently interpreted this as an infringement on their autonomy. Spaatz
told Stratemeyer that, in the future, ADC would have to check with
higher headquarters before issuing declarations or instructions of any
type to National Guard officials. 106

After this episode, Stratemeyer carefully avoided embarrassing
Headquarters USAF on Air Guard matters. He continued, however, to
speak his mind in confidential letters to Spaatz when he felt state authori-
ties were hampering his attempts to organize units. 107 Many Air Force
leaders, especially General Partridge, who favored removing the Air
Guard from control by the National Guard Bureau gave him their sup-
port. 108 When he briefed the Air Force leadership in October 1947, he
claimed that for the Air Guard to be of any value to him, his command
would require first call on the services of all fighter and radar squadrons.
Once ADC's need for their services had passed, he agreed that the
squadrons could return to other duties. Furthermore, he wanted oper-
ational control of Air Guard forces in peacetime for training purposes. 109

By October 1947, Spaatz agreed it was time to support Stratemeyer
completely on this issue. Spaatz secured National Guard Bureau concur-
rence for ADC to train Air Guard tactical units and to "be prepared to
direct them operationally as part of a force in being." 110 In subsequent
correspondence, Spaatz told Stratemeyer the Air Guard would comprise
his primary source of air defense units. Also, in case of war or a national
emergency, all Air Guard units would initially be available to ADC. 111

These developments— the Radar Fence Plan, the decision to begin
operational air defense with existing means, and the authority for using
Air National Guard units— were greeted with enthusiasm on Mitchel
Field. For nearly two years, ADC had borne responsibility for air de-
fense, but without forces or clear authority to accomplish that task.
Now, at the end of 1947, Stratemeyer was gratified to perceive a change.
As he told his subordinate commanders, he was happy to report that at
Headquarters USAF an "ever-increasing importance [was] being placed
on requirements for air defense of the continental United States." 112

The Finletter Report, released on January 1, 1948, generally pleased
Symington, Spaatz, and Vandenberg. The commission's findings formed
the basis of the Air Force position during JCS discussions on roles and
missions in the national military establishment. The commission recom-
mended the nation adopt a new strategic policy built around air power.
It also proposed that the seventy-group program remain the goal of the
new, separate U.S. Air Force, attaching an urgency to its swift comple-
tion. The panel members warned that this minimum force had to be

75

The Emerging Shield

equipped with modern aircraft and staffed, trained, deployed, and other-
wise made ready to deal "with a possible atomic attack on the country
by January 1, 1953." After that date, the United States would require a
considerably stronger Air Force to ensure security, because intelligence
sources reported that Soviet long-range bomber programs were making
considerable progress. 113

Although the Finletter Commission left the decision on how to dis-
tribute the seventy groups to the Air Force, it insisted the Air Force by
1953 "possess the complicated defensive equipment of modern electron-
ics and modern defensive fighter planes and ground defensive weapons."
Commission members, while recognizing the need for a radar early-
warning system, cautioned against the extraordinary expense of such a
system, if constructed, to provide total coverage. The Finletter Commis-
sion, in this regard, expressed fears similar to those expressed by RAND.
A continuous coverage system, they believed, might tend to "divert us —
as the Maginot Line diverted France — from the best defense against an
atomic attack, the counter-offensive striking force in being. 114 Civilian
defense planners seemingly accepted the Air Force contention that the
best defense was a potent offense while almost everyone who studied the
matter agreed that some yet-to-be-defined minimal air defense was
needed to limit damage, assure the public, and provide the early warning
necessary to launch strategic bombers in a retaliatory response. The Air
Force, meanwhile, had proved its willingness to provide such a minimal
defense. Whether the Radar Fence Plan would supply satisfactory air de-
fense coverage or whether its scale would prove too costly remained un-
resolved.

Active Operations Begin

In the weeks before the release of the Finletter Report, ADC
worked hard to execute the decision made in Washington to begin oper-
ational air defense on the east and west coasts. In the west, Fourth Air
Force redeployed its single operational fighter unit from McChord Field,
Washington, to Hamilton Field, California, late in November 1947. The
squadron had over 300 officers and enlisted men as well as 13 Northrop
P-61 Black Widow aircraft. The Black Widow, the first American air-
craft designed for a night-fighting role, was rapidly becoming obsolete.
The Air Force was anxious to replace it with the North American P-82
(later redesignated the F-82) Twin Mustang, which was two P-51 fuse-
lages joined by single wing and stabilizer sections between them. Because
development on converting the P-82 into an all-weather interceptor

76

Air Defense— Postwar Era

lagged, at the end of 1947 the P-61 remained the Air Force's only night,
all-weather fighter aircraft. 115

P-61 aircrews trained in air defense procedures on McChord with
the 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group, which would become
instrumental in operational defense. As its training program expanded
and its technicians gained proficiency, the unit became an important
source of operational data for officers responsible for managing or imple-
menting the Radar Fence Plan. Visitors from throughout the Air Force
converged on McChord to observe and learn about the practical aspects
of aircraft control and warning procedures. Here airmen, who later rose
to key maintenance and controller positions in the worldwide air defense
operations, received introduction to their skills. 116

On the east coast, training proceeded similarly. As with Fourth Air
Force in the west, plans to replace the 52d All Weather Fighter Group's
P-61s with P-82s collapsed when the Twin Mustang production pro-
gram encountered engine problems. Stratemeyer had additional Black
Widows removed from storage and sent to the Air Force Depot Facility
in Mobile, Alabama, for restoration and modification. Then, early in
1948, P-61s began to be issued to the designated squadrons. 117

In the midst of initial efforts to begin operations, ADC officers in-
volved in these projects were summoned to the Pentagon in January
1948 to meet with Air Staff representatives. The meeting was called to
plan an air war game for May 1948, billed as the largest peacetime exer-
cise ever conducted by the Air Force. The exercise plan designated SAC
to furnish the Red, or strike, force, while ADC would deploy the Blue
force in defense of the eastern seaboard from Maine to Virginia. TAC
and Air National Guard units would also participate. Headquarters
USAF was uncertain if it could obtain sufficient funds to complete the
exercise on the scale desired. If so, ADC would be allowed to move the
505th Warning and Control Group to the east coast for the war games.
The 505th trained intensely throughout the first months of 1948 in antici-
pation of a move order. 118 The 505th's exceptional state of preparedness,
however, made it the most likely candidate for another assignment even
before it received orders to the east coast.

After moving from the west coast to participate in the war games,
the 505th was expected to remain in the east. ADC planned to concen-
trate its meager radar warning and control resources in the northeastern
United States pending approval and funding of the Radar Fence Plan,
but its plans were abruptly and drastically altered late in March 1948.
With no advance warning, Headquarters USAF directed that an emer-
gency air defense system be established to operate around the clock in
Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. Shortly after, First Air Force in the
east was ordered to put its fighter units on alert. The usefulness of this
move was uncertain since First Air Force did not yet control the serv-

77

The Emerging Shield

P-82 Twin Mustang, designed for tactical versatility

ices of the 505th and thus lacked any type of radar warning and control
capability. 119

These events began Thursday, March 25, when Spaatz suddenly in-
formed the Air Staff that he wanted Alaskan air defenses "augmented"
immediately. 120 The following day, a top secret message over his signa-
ture went to the Alaskan Air Command directing it to "place existing
radar warning [units] on continuously operating basis by 4 April." 121 On
March 27, a similar directive instructed Stratemeyer to activate immedi-
ately a functioning air defense system for the protection of Seattle and
the atomic energy plant in Hanford, Washington. 122 That same day, offi-
cers from Stratemeyer's staff met in the Pentagon with staff members
from SAC and TAC as well as with representatives of the Air Transport
Command. Arrangements were made to airlift radar teams from TAC's
only radar unit to Alaska for emergency duty. SAC simultaneously
began preparations to send one of its two P-51 Mustang fighter groups
to Alaska and the other to the Pacific Northwest for emergency air de-
fense duty. 123

Spaatz initiated emergency air defense measures in March 1948 for a
number of reasons. First, it is clear that, contrary to the views presented
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (established in 1947 under the
provisions of the National Security Act) and by the intelligence divisions
of the Army and Navy, Air Force intelligence believed the United States
in danger of a surprise attack from the Soviet Union. Warnings from
overseas commanders reinforced such feelings. Lt. Gen. Ennis C. White-

78

Air Defense— Postwar Era

head, Air Force Commander in the Far East, for example, began late in
1947 to report "strange incidents and excursions" over Japan. Correlat-
ing these suspicious flights with simultaneous bellicose actions of the
Soviet Union in Berlin and elsewhere, Whitehead told Spaatz of his con-
cern over the "grave danger of war with the USSR within a few
months." 124 In Berlin itself, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, American Military
Governor of Germany, submitted an equally bleak estimate of Soviet in-
tentions just two weeks after the Communist coup in Czechoslovokia.
Clay had believed earlier that war would not break out for at least ten
years, but now he sensed a change in Soviet attitude that led him to con-
clude war "could come with dramatic suddenness." 125 In the middle of
March, President Truman told Congress what the military already took
much for granted, that the Soviet Union was the enemy of the United
States.

In this crisis atmosphere Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal
and the JCS held their celebrated "roles and missions" conference in
Key West, Florida, from March 11 to 14, 1948. Though the conference
proved indecisive on many crucial issues, the decisions reached may
have provided further rationale for the Air Force directive on emergen-
cy deployment of air defense forces.

In Key West, the JCS confirmed the principle upon which the Air
Force already based its planning: continental air defense was primarily a
function of the U.S. Air Force. 126 The conferees also endorsed the Fin-
letter Commission's report emphasizing the need to begin installing air
defenses to ensure a minimum system that would be in place by 1953.
Although the system would incorporate the resources of all three serv-
ices in an emergency, the JCS gave the Air Force primary responsibility
and prerogative to write doctrine and make arrangements for such coop-
eration. 127 The JCS also established the Continental United States De-
fense Planning Group within the Joint Staff organization to explore the
question of who would command overall air defenses in case of war. 128
Whether the Key West participants discussed the Radar Fence Plan, in-
cluding the problem of acquiring personnel for duty in the proposed
radar systems, is uncertain. In any event, the JCS decided to lower the
requirement for Panama Canal Zone defenses to free radar specialists
posted there for duty in the United States. From these personnel, Head-
quarters USAF eventually gained the manpower needed to operate an
emergency air defense network in the First Air Force area. 129

In addition to the high-level concern over the possibility of a Soviet
air attack and the confirmation in Key West of the Air Force's primary
responsibility for the air defense mission, a third factor contributed to the
activation of an air defense emergency in March 1948. The Air Staff
viewed the initiation of emergency operations as a first step in the imple-
mentation of the Radar Fence Plan. Once established, much of the

79

The Emerging Shield

system created during the emergency would be retained; the Air Force
would then seek funds to expand and improve the system. As Strate-
meyer later expressed it, ADC was now authorized to establish, within
its means, "actual defenses." 130 He hoped that funding for both the sev-
enty-group Air Force and the Radar Fence Plan would soon increase
those means significantly.

In areas designated air defense emergency zones, personnel worked
around the clock to establish working systems. Despite the airmen's her-
culean efforts, obstacles proved overwhelming. On the west coast, for
example, when an echelon of SAC's 27th Fighter Group arrived on
McChord Field to operate in tandem with the 505th control and warning
group, it was discovered that the P-5 1 pilots had been trained exclusive-
ly in escort missions and had never before flown air intercepts. In vain,
the 505th began a crash training program in ground-controlled intercep-
tion procedures. 131

Countless difficulties of varying complexity arose in all the emergen-
cy defense areas. Commanders and their men were tireless in their ef-
forts, but air defense forces were generally disorganized and inadequately
manned, trained, and equipped. Fortunately, in mid-April, the Air Staff
informed Stratemeyer that the crisis had passed, and it ended the emer-
gency.

When the emergency operations had ceased, General Hoyt S. Van-
denberg had, for practical purposes, succeeded Spaatz as Chief of Staff
(he officially succeeded Spaatz on April 30, 1948). The nephew of Sena-
tor Arthur Vandenberg and a graduate of West Point, the new Air
Force Chief was handsome, suave, and intelligent. Prior to becoming
Vice Chief of Staff, under General Spaatz, Vandenberg in 1946 and 1947
had been head of the Central Intelligence Group of the War Department
General Staff and, subsequently, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in the Office of the Secretary of War. Vandenberg came to his
position with a broad background and knowledge in all aspects of air
force operations. Most of his energy would be initially directed, howev-
er, in making SAC the powerful deterrent force it was intended to be.
The new Vice Chief of Staff, General Muir S. Fairchild, would have to
decide precisely how to retrain and develop the limited air defense sys-
tems begun during the emergency. His problem would have been consid-
erably less had the Radar Fence Plan been fully approved and funded.
The draft legislation the Air Force submitted to the other services for
concurrence in February 1948 had been stalled; the Army had responded
promptly and favorably but the Navy, as of mid-April, had no deci-
sion. 132 As time was quickly running out in the funding deliberations for
fiscal year 1949, Stratemeyer pressed Headquarters USAF for detailed
instructions on how he should proceed to develop operational air de-
fenses.

80

Air Defense — Postwar Era

Assuming his post in the midst of this turmoil and uncertainty, Fair-
child vowed to provide a continuity of purpose for the Air Force's air
defense mission. Having just launched the Air Force's postwar military
education program as Air University commander, Fairchild's concern
was less with inculcating a Maginot Line consciousness among Ameri-
cans by establishing a too-strong air defense network than it was with
the fact that, at the moment, the nation had no effective air defenses.
After considering the situation, Fairchild decided to concentrate air de-
fense planning under a general officer experienced in all aspects of the
subject and unburdened with other duties. He knew exactly whom to
choose — Maj. Gen. Gordon Saville. 133

81

Chapter 4

Saville Takes Charge

Generals Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Muir S. Fairchild took the helm
during a testing period in the young history of the U.S. Air Force.
America's possession of the atomic bomb did not deter the Soviet Union
from its aggressive policy in Europe, highlighted by the Communist
coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. In a speech before Congress
on March 17, President Harry S. Truman castigated the "ruthless
course" pursued by the Soviets, stating, "There are times in world histo-
ry when it is far wiser to act than to hesitate." He suggested the tempo-
rary reinstitution of selective service and, without the public's knowl-
edge, advanced development of the hydrogen bomb. 1

As for the Air Force, it first looked to SAC to meet the threat
posed by the Soviet Union. Sadly, although the Air Force portrayed the
command as the nation's premier instrument of deterrence and war fight-
ing, SAC was at the time, according to a historian of the postwar period,
a hollow threat. Americans, generally unaware of SAC's unpreparedness
for war, would have been shocked, as was President Truman, to learn of
the meager stockpile in the atomic weapons arsenal. Worsening matters,
SAC crews were understaffed and ill prepared for combat missions,
bombers did not possess the range to attack the Soviet Union and to
return to the United States, and plans to attack key Soviet military and
industrial sites were sketchy at best because of inadequate intelligence
about the sites and the difficulties of including such widely scattered tar-
gets in a coherent targeting scheme. SAC's situation only began to im-
prove slowly when Vandenberg appointed General Curtis E. LeMay to
lead the command in October 1948. 2

Meanwhile, ADC was less ready than SAC for combat. The alert of
March 1948 found air defense forces totally unprepared. Radars and
fighter aircraft were few, and those available were obsolete. Trained
radar operators, ground controllers, and pilots were scarce, often poorly
trained in air defense operations. The result of the alert assumed as much
significance for ADC as it had for SAC, since the Soviets' actions indi-
cated they were not intimidated by the American atomic bomb. Air
Force intelligence reports now predicted the Soviets could have their

83

The Emerging Shield

bomb within a year. In addition, a Soviet defector, Col. G. A. Tokayev,
stated they were working to improve the performance of their B-29
copy, the Tu-4. 3 Although the Bull could not yet be refueled in flight
and thus could only undertake one-way missions against the continental
United States, Air Staff officers believed the Soviets would not hesitate
to sacrifice bomber crews in making such an attack. This information
worried Fairchild. He thought if war between the superpowers broke
out, the Soviets would likely launch the opening salvo, and Americans
would expect the Air Force to resist an attack before sending off retalia-
tory assaults.* Believing no time should be lost in creating a functioning
air defense system, Fairchild decided to call on Gordon Saville, the pre-
eminent Air Force air defense authority, to initiate the process.

"Thank God Santy is where he is!", Saville exclaimed on learning of
Fairchild's ascent to the office of Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. At this
time Saville served in Rio de Janeiro as Chief of the Air Section of the
Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission. Recently promoted to
major general, Saville had not been involved directly in air defense ac-
tivities since 1943 when the United States had started to dismantle the air
defense organizations and networks in place since the beginning of the
war. He then transferred to the Mediterranean theater, where he distin-
guished himself as the head of XII Tactical Air Command in the Allied
invasion of southern France. Saville served in other tactical air assign-
ments during and immediately after the war. He later became Deputy
Commander of the Air Transport Command and was assigned to Brazil.
He obtained valuable experience during these diverse and important as-
signments, although air defense remained his professional passion. That
the Air Force leadership believed it could spare him from air defense re-
sponsibilities reflects the meager importance awarded the concept at the
time. Fairchild decided to change all that. Almost seven years earlier,
after Pearl Harbor, as Director of Military Requirements, Fairchild had
brought Saville to the Pentagon to be responsible for air defense matters.
Now, in what he recognized as another crisis, Fairchild again ordered
Saville to Washington. Together they would establish the groundwork
for a modern continental air defense system. 4

The Vice Chief of Staff and his air defense expert made an unlikely
team. Saville was, simply, a maverick. Brash and brutally blunt, he
thought he understood more about air defense than anyone in the Air

* Striking the first blow in an atomic conflict had obvious advantages, and as historian
David A. Rosenberg has pointed out, the JCS believed in 1945 that the United States
should be prepared "to strike the first blow if necessary . . . when it becomes evident that
the forces of aggression are being arrayed against us." Such an attack would have to be
authorized by the President after consultations with his cabinet. The proposal was finally
dropped by the JCS on August 7, 1950, because it was "highly questionable as to constitu-
tionality" [David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1983): 17].

84

Saville Takes Charge

Tu-4 Bull, the Soviets' four-engine inlawing bomber, similar to the U.S.
Air Force's B-29 Superfortress.

Force, and he did not hesitate to inform his superiors of their ignorance
on the subject. Col. Bruce K. Holloway, who would later become Air
Force Vice Chief of Staff and Commander of SAC, served for a time as
Saville's deputy. Working with him was, as Holloway later recalled,

kind of like living with a bomb ... he was a real goer, a
dynamo, a tremendous salesman, three jumps ahead of most
other Air Force officers in operational and technical know-
how. ... He was a highly intelligent guy, innovative and
very articulate ... a lot of people didn't trust him, they
were jealous of him. 5

Like Saville, "Santy" Fairchild was short and rather heavyset; in
contrast to the flamboyant Saville, Fairchild's nature was quiet and cir-
cumspect. He flew combat missions in World War I, and after the war
he became a test pilot and served in several engineering assignments. He
also attended the various Army service schools, including ACTS where
he served as instructor. He spent World War II in Washington in various
staff jobs, notably the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. Composed of
three officers, one each from the Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces,
the committee advised the JCS on a wide range of military policy. As
one of the "elder statesmen," 6 Fairchild performed his duty admirably
although he would have preferred a combat assignment. To his disap-
pointment, however, poor health and his reputation as a superb staff offi-
cer conspired to keep him at his desk in the Pentagon. His successes
were not unnoticed by his superiors, nor did a lack of combat experience
hinder his career. In 1946 he became the first Commanding General of
Air University and, in May 1948, Vice Chief of Staff. 7

85

The Emerging Shield

Fairchild's most distinctive professional quality appeared to be his
penetrating, analytical intellect. In the words of Saville:

If there was a conference going on, and people [were] talk-
ing and debating, it was very probable that during that con-
ference sometime Santy would make a speech of about
twenty words, and that ended it. He was sitting there and
listening and making up his mind. . . . And when he spoke,
everybody listened. And when they got through listening
and thinking about it for just a minute . . . they kind of
looked at each other — like we are kind of stupid, aren't we. 8

Fairchild and Saville shared mutual respect, a strong belief in the
flexibility of air power, and the devotion to prepare the Air Force to
meet many contingencies. They did not dispute SAC's primacy but
argued for a more equitable distribution of resources. On these premises,
they resolved to move forward in homeland air defense. Assured of Fair-
child's support, the feisty Saville planned to forego working through
channels and to expedite an air defense buildup.

Saville arrived in Washington in June 1948, eager to learn the exact
nature of his duties and to go to work. His assignment, unique in Air
Force history, was to ADC Headquarters where he would act as Special
Projects Officer. He could have located in Washington, since he received
an appointment to the Air Staff, but he constantly shuttled between
Long Island, New York, and Washington. On Mitchel Field he formally
reported to Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, ADC Vice Commander; on
the Air Staff he served as head of a new Air Defense Division and re-
ported directly to Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Director of Plans and
Operations in Norstad's Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.
In practice, Saville had ready access to and only answered to Fairchild. 9

Saville quickly assembled a large staff on Mitchel Field and a small-
er staff in the Pentagon. In ADC Headquarters, air defense planners
moved from Stratemeyer's regular staff to Saville's office. The ADC
chief, selfless and determined to do whatever was necessary to improve
the nation's air defense position, acknowledged Saville's expertise and
cooperated completely in this new arrangement. Meanwhile, officers
who had been working for Ankenbrandt on the Radar Fence Plan now
joined Saville's department in the Air Staff. Saville filled both staffs with
officers who had worked for him on the wartime air defenses. With the
organizational shake-ups completed and the staffs assembled, he began to
make a complete survey of the postwar air defense situation and to
decide how to proceed.

For the moment, the situation remained bleak. Saville conducted his
survey against the background of war games held in the Pacific North-
west from April 28 to May 10, 1948. The exercise, the first large-scale
postwar test of U.S. Air Force offensive-defensive capabilities, had been

86

Saville Takes Charge

postponed in March because of the air defense emergency. When com-
pleted in May, the exercise confirmed Fairchild's worst fears.

The 505th Aircraft Control and Warning Group and F-61s de-
ployed to McChord from Mitchel and Hamilton air bases participated in
the exercise. TAC contributed to the defending forces by dispatching a
squadron of Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star jets to Spokane. SAC as-
sumed the attacking role with B-29 bombers. 10

When the war games ended, all agreed the air defenses were inad-
equate. In simple terms, had the B-29s been enemy aircraft, the north-
west would have been hard hit. The F-80 day fighters lacked range and
were not equipped with electronic equipment necessary to take off and
intercept B-29s when the Superfortresses attacked under cover of bad
weather. Black Widows fared no better. The World War II-vintage F-
61s, referred to as all-weather aircraft, did not have the speed to close
with the bombers (the B-29 was also considered obsolete by the Air
Force) or the deicing equipment required for bad weather operations.
Compounding the problems, a lack of qualified ground control intercept
officers forced enlisted personnel to act as controllers in addition to per-
forming their radio operation and maintenance duties. Too few radars
deployed and, moreover, those that did were out of date. 11

Revision of the Radar Fence Plan

After the inauspicious northwest exercises, Saville began his task by
examining the status of the Radar Fence Plan, devised largely by Anken-
brandt and his communications staff. If Congress approved funding, the
plan would provide within five to eight years an aircraft warning system
that relied to a great extent on World War II-type radars designed to
operate against slow, propeller-driven aircraft. The radars would doubt-
lessly have problems acquiring and tracking the contemporary jet air-
craft and jet bombers then being developed. The radars also would be of
little use in identifying jet or piston planes approaching from below 5,000
feet. 12

Despite all the Radar Fence Plan's drawbacks, Saville could have
accepted it because Ankenbrandt's scheme provided a trained cadre and
a basic radar net for future improvements and expansion. If and when
better radars became available, an air defense system framework would
be established and ready to accept them. Meanwhile, the older radars
could provide training and might be useful in detecting a conventional
bombing raid, the likeliest threat at the time.

The plan got no support in Congress. The bill's supporters had prob-
lems even getting it introduced. Bureau of the Budget officials recom-

87

The Emerging Shield

P-80 Shooting Star, the United States' first aircraft with a jet propul-
sion gas turbine engine (above). B-29, the United States' first aircraft with
a fire control system (below).

mended to Secretary of Defense Forrestal on May 24, 1948, that the ob-
jectives and costs of the bill be reconsidered. Budget officials considered
them too high in relation to other military requirements of equal or
greater priority. In arriving at this conclusion budget officials had been
influenced by Dr. Vannevar Bush and his Research and Development
Board (established in June 1946 by the Secretaries of War and the Navy
to coordinate military research and development programs), which con-
cluded construction of a radar system using obsolete equipment made
little sense. Pursuing this logic, the Bureau of the Budget claimed that
the Radar Fence Plan failed to coordinate all present and future air de-
fense requirements. Bureau officials questioned, for instance, the benefit
of the plan if Canada did not construct a complementary system to track
aircraft approaching over the polar routes, or if the Air Force proceeded
to build the radar fence and had no trained personnel to operate the sta-
tions. 13

88

Saville Takes Charge

These were valid concerns. Under Secretary of the Air Force
Arthur S. Barrows informed Forrestal that he agreed the Air Force had
not calculated the needs and total estimated cost of air defense for the
years ahead. He also spoke of unspecified actions under way that would
eventually clarify Air Force plans for continental air defense. Regardless,
Barrows believed the Air Force had to implement the "basic element"
(the radar fence) immediately to ensure the nation possessed an "effec-
tive defense system against such enemy air attack as could be launched
in the next five to eight years." 14

Despite intense opposition, Barrows and Secretary Symington con-
tinued to press sympathetic congressmen to sponsor the bill. Their efforts
were apparently rewarded when the bill was introduced in the Senate on
May 27 and in the House of Representatives on June 2. But on June 3,
President Truman directed Forrestal to "defer making heavy, forward
commitments until we have an opportunity to insure a balanced program
and to avoid building structures which cannot be supported on a sound
basis in subsequent years." 15

On July 1, Forrestal asked the JCS to reassess the Radar Fence Plan
in this new light. The study, he said, would involve

a fine sense of judgment. . . . On the one hand there are
questions of economy involved in spending a substantial

89

The Emerging Shield

amount of money on radar which now is not completely ef-
fective and which will probably be obsolete in a few years,
and on the other hand there is the obvious fact that the use
of the present types of radar would give us at least some
protection against a surprise attack during the years in
which superior types are being developed.

Forrestal asked the Chiefs to complete the study and provide their rec-
ommendations to him before October 1948. Specifically, he wanted the
report to evaluate the Radar Fence Plan by considering its role in the
overall defense program. Forrestal believed it particularly important to
investigate possible modifications in the plan that might achieve "the de-
sired objectives at lower cost." 16

As events developed, Fairchild and Saville were too hurried to
await the JCS final report. It appeared to them that final congressional
approval for the Radar Fence Plan would be too long in coming. Fur-
ther complicating the matter were indications that the Air Force would
not obtain the projected strength of seventy groups by 1950; it might be
forced to operate with less than the fifty-nine understrength groups it
possessed. Air defense would have fewer resources because Chief of
Staff Vandenberg decided that worsening relations with the Soviet
Union required the Air Force to bring SAC to peak efficiency as quickly
as possible. Fairchild and Saville did not dispute the Chiefs reasoning,
yet they recognized an urgent need to have an air defense system that
could be expanded and modernized. Therefore, Fairchild asked Saville to
prepare an Air Force position on air defense that Vandenberg could
present "with confidence and authority" to congressmen and government
officials. As Saville expressed it, Fairchild directed him to "do the job in
a sensible and economical way" and present a plan that "showed how
much of our resources that we have now can divert to air defense with-
out crippling us." So while the Radar Fence Plan was not officially
dead, Saville proceeded to develop a less expensive plan, more likely to
be approved. 17

Accordingly, Saville's staffs on Mitchel Field and in the Pentagon
reviewed everything the Air Force had accomplished, or failed to ac-
complish, with respect to air defense since World War II. Their studies
produced three general conclusions. Most obvious, the Air Force could
not discharge its air defense responsibilities by continued waiting.
Second, the Radar Fence Plan would have to be replaced in light of
delays already encountered, limited funding for fiscal year 1949, and an-
ticipated 1950 budget limitations. Despite these handicaps, they conclud-
ed that the establishment of a limited air defense in being required imme-
diate action, pending final approval of any overall program for air de-
fense. 18

In the course of the planning effort, officers chosen by Saville as-
sumed projects from General Stratemeyer's staff officers in ADC Head-

90

Saville Takes Charge

quarters. Although Stratemeyer cooperated with this arrangement, many
officers on the ADC staff were dismayed. They believed the Air Staff
was giving only cursory attention to their well-developed proposals.
Now, when the Air Staff appeared ready at last to devote more serious
attention to air defense, the ADC officers' services were not used. Sa-
ville made enemies not only on Mitchel Field but in the Pentagon as
well, where he upset higher-ranking officers by sending his plans and re-
ports straight to Fairchild and Vandenberg without going through the
chain of command. Despite leaving a trail of bruised egos in his wake,
Saville claimed, "I wasn't going to stand in line and wait. Time was
pressing here." He was only able to work in this unusual manner because
of Fairchild's sponsorship. 19

After working long hours for nearly two months, Saville presented
Vandenberg and Fairchild with a proposed solution to the radar control
and warning problem. Totally aware of the need for more trained per-
sonnel and a quantitative and qualitative improvement in air defense
fighter units, Saville initially concentrated all his energies on the radar
systems. Other air defense components could be added once the basic
element, the radars, functioned.

Saville recommended that the Air Force, at a cost of $116 million in
fiscal years 1949 and 1950, install 75 radar stations and 10 control centers

91

The Emerging Shield

in the continental United States, with 10 radar stations and 1 control
center in Alaska. Most stations would be equipped with World War II
microwave early-warning radars, old but usable. A few chosen in strate-
gically important areas would receive new and better radars, at a cost of
$30 million. Over half the $116 million would be spent on construction
of the radar sites. By comparison, the Radar Fence Plan would have
consisted of 411 radar stations and 18 control centers, staffed by 25,000
regulars at a cost of some $600 million over 5 years. Saville left open the
possibility that his interim plan would constitute the first phase of the
Radar Fence Plan or any other air defense plan that might finally be im-
plemented. 20

Vandenberg and Fairchild approved Saville's plan, and on Septem-
ber 9, 1948, Saville presented his ideas to Secretaries Forrestal and Sy-
mington. He stated that the few current radar installations were totally
inadequate; in fact, the overall picture for continental air defense was
"certainly shocking." The radar situation appeared particularly serious
because of the long delay involved in developing and constructing sta-
tions. While the interim program would, for the most part, use World
War II radars, these could at least provide high-level coverage against
propeller-driven bombers. For low-altitude sightings, Saville suggested
augmenting the civilian Ground Observer Corps until superior radars
could be developed. Saville admitted that his interim plan was not in-
tended to provide the United States with an invulnerable air defense
system; it would, however, afford the foundation for a stronger system
that could be reinforced and improved. It was, in any case, "a great deal
better than nothing." Summing up, Saville reminded Forrestal and Sy-
mington that "this matter is one of great urgency and requires immediate
action. Nothing can be found in the world situation, in the attitude of the
people, or in any other field which would justify continued delay. We
must get on with it." 21

During his presentation, Saville noted that the older radars he pro-
posed installing could serve in "model systems," where air defense theo-
ries and tactics could be tested. His military superiors and distinguished
and influential scientists, Dr. Vannevar Bush, for one, supported his
view. Although Bush favored pressing forward on future air defense
needs, "and not on any major procurement of current equipment that
would materially divert effort," he could understand the logic of model
air defenses. He recommended to Vandenberg that the Air Force estab-
lish a system "for the emergency and operational test evaluation of the
various elements" of air defense. 22

92

Saville Takes Charge

Charles A. Lindbergh, then an Air Force Reserve colonel, also sup-
ported the model air defense idea.* Lindbergh accepted Vandenberg's in-
vitation to serve an active duty tour as his special consultant, investigat-
ing technical and operational matters affecting the U.S. Air Force. In as-
sessing the needs of SAC, Lindbergh concluded that, for the bomber
force to develop into a truly powerful striking force, it needed to train
against adequate air defenses. (The Soviets had already begun efforts to
improve their air defenses.) He told Vandenberg that present Air Force
equipment and air defense forces were incapable of approximating war-
time conditions in the performance of training exercises. Lindbergh
therefore advocated model networks, stating that "the need for a training
area of this kind is so vital that immediate steps should be taken to set it
up." Forrestal conceded the requirement and approved the diversion of
funds. 23

In the meantime, the Air Force designated $554,000 to begin work
on permanent radar stations. As Saville pointed out, the first tasks would
be to select locations for 85 radar stations in the continental United

* Lindbergh made the first flight across the Atlantic in 1927. During World War II, he
served as a technical representative with Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney in the Pacific theater.
His tour as special consultant to Vandenberg was only one of a number of special assign-
ments he undertook for the post- World War II Air Force. Lindbergh was rewarded with a
reserve brigadier general commission in 1954.

93

The Emerging Shield

4M

. ■

AN/CPS-5 search radar,
the basic unit of the Lashup
system

States, lease property, prepare engineering blueprints, and arrange with
the Army Corps of Engineers to construct the stations. Approximately
$152,000 would remain for the immediate installation, on government-
owned property in the northeast, of a temporary radar system that might
be used as a model system. To differentiate this from the anticipated per-
manent system, planners described the model system as the Lashup
project. "Lashup" soon became synonymous with all temporary radar
systems established in the United States. As Saville explained, Lashup en-
abled the Air Force to "provide the best possible air defense for the least
possible cost, beginning immediately and lasting until our permanent
system can be implemented." 24

While Saville formulated his interim plan, the JCS evaluated the
Radar Fence Plan. In fall 1948 Forrestal had instructed the Chiefs to re-
examine the plan in light of the changes proposed by Saville. The Chiefs
were generally pleased with Saville's ideas, especially with the cost re-
ductions, and on October 20 they recommended to Forrestal that the in-
94

Saville Takes Charge

terim plan be submitted to Congress. In doing so, the Chiefs stated that it
was essential for the nation to have an effective air defense system in
place by 1953, and meeting that goal was "second only to the capability
to launch an immediate and effective counterattack." 25

On December 30, 1948, Maj. Gen. Samuel Anderson, Saville's im-
mediate superior on the Air Staff, formalized the goals for Lashup in a
letter to General Stratemeyer. While the permanent system was being
constructed, Anderson directed ADC to complete Lashup networks in
the northeast and the northwest and in the Albuquerque, New Mexico,
area. The systems would consist of a total of twenty-four radar stations
plus control centers. All stations would be equipped with World War II
heavy radars obtained from Air Force depots; they were tentatively
scheduled to be operational by March 15, 1949. To allow the stations
and control centers to achieve this status according to schedule, the Air
Force planned to divert funds from less pressing priorities. Additional
monies would be required, however, to implement the remaining provi-
sions in the interim plan. In that regard, Fairchild and Saville prepared
to take their case before Congress in spring 1949. 26

Establishment of the Continental Air Command

Fairchild's intention that Saville present details of the interim plan to
Congress before taking charge of the air defense buildup created a prob-
lem concerning Saville's future position and status. Saville temporarily
held positions on both the ADC staff and the Air Staff, but Fairchild
wanted a sharper definition of Saville's responsibilities before Saville
made his congressional appearance.

After numerous high-level Air Staff discussions, in most of which
Fairchild participated, the Air Force created the Continental Air Com-
mand (CONAC), combining the resources of ADC and TAC. Two de-
velopments contributed preponderantly to the reorganization. First,
President Truman decided in late 1948 to keep a sharp rein on defense
spending. For the Air Force this meant operating at a strength of forty-
eight groups for the foreseeable future. Under the circumstances, Van-
denberg and Fairchild agreed that SAC, still far below the minimum de-
sired combat capability, would receive priority for personnel, bases,
funds, and weapons. That decision was not expected to impede progress
in air defense too much because Saville's interim plan had substantially
reduced targeted funds; however, the decision meant that TAC would be
strapped for resources. The Air Force could not possibly reinforce TAC

95

The Emerging Shield

under the forty-eight-group restriction and still meet the requirements of
the strategic forces. All that could be done was to retain a nucleus for
future tactical air increases if and when the occasion demanded. 27

In the second development influencing the establishment of
CONAC, President Truman decided to strengthen the reserves to com-
pensate for the reduction in the Regular forces. Truman instructed the
JCS to provide adequate means for prompt and effective employment of
reserves in an emergency. This order presented a problem for the Air
Force because Stratemeyer had recently instituted a four-air force align-
ment he thought best for air defense procedures in the United States.
That alignment, unfortunately, was not conducive to coordination of re-
serve affairs with the six army areas in the nation, and another reorgani-
zation was required. 28

It was against this background that CONAC appeared. The Air
Force, determined to alleviate problems caused by decreased defense
spending, made the best use of the means at hand. Under provisions of
the reorganization, the air defense and tactical air missions combined
under one command. Reduced in status and made subordinate, ADC and
TAC had operational headquarters under CONAC and its new chief,
General Stratemeyer. The Air Force could now assign the combined re-
sources of both units to either ADC or TAC, according to need.

The creation of CONAC solved Fairchild's problem of finding a
suitable position for Saville, who assumed command of the new ADC
located on Mitchel Field and staffed largely by members of his former
planning groups. Meanwhile, TAC released its two air forces, with their
assigned combat and administrative units, to Stratemeyer's direct com-
mand. A former TAC fighter group assumed air defense as its primary
responsibility, as did three fighter groups transferred from SAC to Stra-
temeyer's command. 29

To solve the reserve forces problem, the Air Force reverted to a
six-air force arrangement in the United States, which helped to coordi-
nate affairs with an equal number of army areas and to improve overall
management. Saville received operational control of the individual air
forces' air defense groups, and he, not the appointed commanders of the
six continental air forces, became responsible for air defense in peacetime
and during actual attack. The air force commanders would be expected,
however, to organize, supply, and administer the groups. Thus Saville
could address operational and planning considerations, free of administra-
tive duties. While the origin of this unconventional arrangement is uncer-
tain, it appears to have been sponsored by Fairchild and influenced
strongly by Saville. The new setup for ADC resembled too closely that
of the 1940-1941 air defense headquarters to have been totally coinciden-
tal. To perform its tasks, the first ADC possessed no tactical forces; it
relied on the operational control of aircraft, equipment, and personnel

96

Saville Takes Charge

belonging to other organizations. The designers of the new ADC as-
sumed that the same procedure could work again. 30

The steps taken in December 1948 by the Air Force to establish a
functioning air defense network were important. Under Stratemeyer's su-
pervision, CONAC allowed Saville generous authority as head of ADC.
A logical command and control alignment for air defense now existed.
Further, the interim plan served as a realistic blueprint for the establish-
ment of radar systems, and the new organization increased the number of
interceptor units. The Headquarters USAF order of December 1948 that
Lashup systems be operational by mid-March 1949 set a clear first goal
for CONAC. The order allowed Stratemeyer and Saville to call for all
the support they considered necessary from other Air Force commands
to perform the air defense mission.

Taking the Case to Congress

The Air Force wanted to install radar control and warning systems
on the east and west coasts to serve as model systems as quickly as possi-
ble. In June 1949, the First Air Force tested the northeastern Lashup
system. Although commanders were troubled by inadequate radar and
aircraft and incompletely trained personnel, they were relieved to be
training, at last, under what approached realistic conditions. 31

The September 1949 exercises were more comprehensive in the
northeast. This time civilian observers participated in the warning
system. Officers planning the deployment of permanent radar stations
knew they would need civilians to provide unbroken coverage around
the areas selected for protection early in the program, during the First
Augmentation. Although the basic radar component projected in the
First Augmentation, the AN/CPS-6B, served both search and height-
finding functions, it could not identify enemy aircraft flying below ap-
proximately 5,000 feet. To compensate for this deficiency, Saville's inter-
im plan called for ground observers used "as local adjuncts to each radar
to provide a measure of low coverage." In time, if necessary and funds
permitted, unmanned low-altitude radars might be developed. They
would be placed between and forward of the permanent stations to sub-
stitute for or to complement civilian observers. For the present, Saville
viewed observers as "the only practicable low cover answer for any
system by 1952." 32

For the September exercises, state civil defense agencies, formed at
the request of Saville's staff, recruited successfully for the operation. The
Air Force selected the observer post locations and set up filter centers to
evaluate information received from the ground observers before reported

97

The Emerging Shield

enemy sightings were transmitted to the control center. As it had during
World War II, the Bell Telephone Company provided lines between ob-
server and filter centers and between Lashup stations and control cen-
ters. When the exercise ended, commanders agreed that the civilian ob-
servers performed as well as their brief training allowed. 33

Before the northeast exercises, Congress approved Saville's interim
program, and President Truman signed the bill on March 21, 1949. Testi-
mony presented before congressional armed services committees by Sa-
ville and Fairchild proved instrumental. Fairchild declared the early-
warning system essential to the nation's safety. He warned that without it
the country could face an attack that "could result in disaster on a
nation-wide scale and surely would result in unnecessary death and de-
struction throughout our country should we be attacked in the future." 34

Testifying before the armed services committees of both houses, Sa-
ville urged the installation of a radar system immediately, even though it
would not incorporate the most advanced equipment. Saville admitted
that "with respect to the future we cannot speak with certainty. We
know that we will require new and better radar equipment as it becomes
available— in much the same way we need new and modern aircraft. Our
equipment will develop and change." 35

Although Congress passed the measure without debate, the lawmak-
ers had not awakened to the pressing need for progressive air defense.
Saville's plan appealed to them because it reduced sharply the costs esti-
mated for completion of the original Radar Fence Plan. Saville had care-
fully followed Fairchild's instructions, devising a program "on the
cheap" and ordering his staff to adhere to the KISS ("keep it simple,
stupid") principle. 36 He presented to Congress an inexpensive plan, insuf-
ficient by itself but likely to be approved and to serve as a suitable foun-
dation for later expansion. His success meant that, although actual alloca-
tions for the program were delayed, a start had at last been made.

Fighter Aircraft for Air Defense

During the course of his congressional testimony, Saville noted that
the Air Force required more efficient aircraft to perform its air defense
mission effectively. From the moment Fairchild assigned him his task,
Saville concentrated on the radar problem, knowing any inadequate
component could ruin an air defense network. While Saville worked on
the radar systems, his deputy, Col. Bruce K. Holloway, an experienced
fighter pilot, examined the needs of the interceptor force. The foremost
need was for an all-weather night interceptor.

98

Saville Takes Charge

In 1949, the all-weather fighter groups on the east and west coasts
began to receive F-82 Twin Mustangs, expected to replace the F-61 and
serve as a stopgap all-weather fighter until a superior airplane could be
developed. It soon became obvious that the F-82s were no improvement
over the obsolete F-61s. The Twin Mustang performed miserably at
night and during inclement weather. Furthermore, the complex technolo-
gy required to produce a fast plane burdened by heavy electronic equip-
ment and carrying a pilot and a radar operator had not been developed
for the F-82. The aircraft experienced extreme difficulty attaining and
operating above 25,000 feet, below the ceiling of SAC's B-29s and B-50s
(an improved B-29) and, presumably, the Soviet Union's Tu-4, its most
advanced bomber. For the moment, Saville and his staff had no option
but to make do with the F-82 while stepping up the search for its re-
placement. 37

The F-82's dismal showing came as no surprise to Holloway as he
investigated the Air Force stance on fighter-interceptors, present and
future. The veteran fighter commander, Maj. Gen. William Kepner, head
of the Air Proving Ground on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, since
August 1948, had joined Holloway in his study, and, together, they insti-
tuted performance tests on currently available interceptors. They found
the "fighter element," in planning for a minimum air defense system, "in
the poorest shape." The Twin Mustangs along with the day jet fighter
F-80 and the F-84s currently in use were, according to Holloway,
"practically worthless" for air defense. Having concluded this, Holloway
had to determine the types of fighters required for air defense and
whether the Air Force had projects under way to provide them in a rea-
sonable time. 38

Holloway discussed this matter with Saville, and they decided that
the minimum requirement for an air defense fighter would be for the air-
craft to "take off on a runway when the ceiling was zero-zero [no visibil-
ity], go and make the interception and get back on the runway." They
thought that advancements in technology would produce an interceptor
"whose pilot only had to take the aircraft off, maintain proper tailpipe
temperatures, and land the aircraft." For other procedures, "the intercep-
tion will be controlled from the ground by radar which will automatical-
ly guide the aircraft to the target; the interceptor's radars and computers
will make the final interception, fire the weapons, and the aircraft will be
returned to the airdrome automatically." 39

When informed of these seemingly visionary ideas, Fairchild ap-
pointed several officers to study them further. Major Generals Kenneth
B. Wolfe and Franklin O. Carroll of the Air Materiel Command headed
the group that included Maj. Gen. Carl Brandt, former Chief of the Air
Proving Ground, and Colonel Holloway. They first studied the capabili-

99

The Emerging Shield

F-89 Scorpion. An •'interim" fighter, this model resulted from the Air
Force's request for a plane equipped with ground-controlled radar capable
of finding, intercepting, and attacking enemy targets.

ties of the large, heavily armed, two-place jet all-weather interceptors
then being developed: the Curtiss F-87 and the Northrop F-89. 40

Meeting on Muroc Field, California, in October 1948, the group
watched both aircraft perform. It decided that the Air Force should pur-
chase only the F-89. Brandt and Holloway, so disappointed with the
performance of both airplanes, suggested the service not accept either.
They agreed that the Air Force initiate a design competition for a com-
pletely new fighter that would be ready by 1954 and would feature tech-
nology to meet performance standards specified by Saville and
Holloway. Fairchild directed the Air Staff on October 14, 1948, to halt
manufacture of the F-87 and to put the "best of a poor lot," the F-89,
into production as soon as possible, along with the Lockheed two-seat,
radar-equipped F-94 (derived from the conversion of the Air Force's
first operational jet fighter, the P-80 Shooting Star, into a two-seat train-
er). The Air Force expected to receive these interim fighters no later
than mid- 1950. 41

Saville and Holloway soon proposed another solution to the interim
interceptor problem. The North American Company suggested their new
F-86 fighter could be modified into a one-man, all-weather interceptor.
Disagreeing with some Air Force officers who believed a pilot could not
simultaneously fly a plane and operate sophisticated electronic equip-
ment, Saville and Holloway advised the Air Force to support North
American's proposal. They argued their case before a board of officers,
directed by General Joseph T. McNarney, tasked to "review and make

100

Saville Takes Charge

F-86 Sabre. This fighter was modified into a one-man, all-weather in-
terceptor to serve as an "interim" fighter.

recommendations for changes, if necessary, in the composition of the 48
group program, Aircraft Production Program, and the Research and De-
velopment Program of the USAF." Saville and Holloway presented a
convincing argument, and in July 1949, acting on the board's recommen-
dation, Symington authorized the Air Materiel Command to spend $7
million to convert the F-86 into an interceptor. Development proceeded
so favorably that the next month the Air Force set aside funds for the
purchase of 124 of the aircraft, designated the F-86D. 42

For the long term, the board of senior officers, dissatisfied with in-
terceptor aircraft prospects, agreed that the Air Force needed a design
competition among aircraft companies to provide a modern, all-weather
interceptor. The board decided on 1954 as the probable operational date
for the new interceptor, referred to as the "1954 interceptor." 43

Unhappy with the results of previous efforts to design a reliable in-
terceptor, Fairchild and Saville supported a different approach in devel-
oping the 1954 model, an aircraft projected to meet high performance
challenges presented by future Soviet intercontinental jet bombers. In
May 1949 Fairchild asked leaders in the aircraft and electronics indus-
tries to come to Washington so he could explain the method to be used
in developing the new interceptor. The Vice Chief reminded the industry
leaders that in the past the Air Force had written rigid specifications for
designing aircraft. In his opinion, this method did not best utilize the sci-
entific and engineering talent available. Fairchild, therefore, proposed an
experiment. He would' have Saville brief industry leaders on the air de-

101

The Emerging Shield

F-102 Delta Dagger. The 1954 "interim" interceptor, this plane
became America's first operational delta-wing aircraft.

fense situation and outline general requirements for an advanced inter-
ceptor. Next, the designers and engineers would carefully consider the
problem and submit their evaluations to Fairchild. 44

Unfortunately, Fairchild received few of the thoughtful replies he
anticipated. Instead, he was deluged with letters from various aircraft
and electronics firms, intent on establishing themselves as prime contrac-
tors in air defense, submitting performance estimates that exceeded realis-
tic expectations. While industry response disappointed, the 1954 intercep-
tor marked an important milestone in aircraft development. Fairchild de-
cided to build the interceptor to conform to the hitherto untested weap-
ons systems approach to aircraft development. This method recognized
that the increasing sophistication of weapons demanded that their parts
not be manufactured as completely isolated components. The weapons
system concept ensured that each aircraft would be designed "as a whole
from the beginning so that all the characteristics of each component
were compatible with the others." 45 Ultimately, the 1954 interceptor, in
its first stage, became the Convair F-102, a delta wing, all-weather inter-
ceptor, but it was not operational until 1956.

Further Organizational Changes

In April 1949 further changes occurred in the continental air defense
command and organization structure. General Stratemeyer became Com-
manding General of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) while General
Whitehead assumed command of CONAC. An outstanding air com-
mander in the Pacific during World War II, Whitehead had operated di-
rectly under General George C. Kenney. Tagged "the Butcher of Mor-
esby" by the Japanese, Whitehead was an aggressive combat command-
102

Saville Takes Charge

er. He remained in the Pacific after the war as head of FEAF. When
world tensions were their greatest in 1948, he turned to air defense,
making the Fifth Air Force's aircraft warning service in Japan fully
operational and prepared for action. Upon appointment to lead CONAC
the following year, Whitehead made it clear that he would not be con-
tent to play second fiddle to Saville. The fiery general, determined to
take complete control of continental air defense, would not accept the air
defense organizational arrangements he inherited from Stratemeyer. 46

Fairchild wanted Whitehead in CONAC for his organizational abili-
ties as much as for his tactical and air defense operations expertise. When
Stratemeyer had transferred responsibility for operational air defense to
Saville in March 1948, radar and fighter units in the field received ad-
ministrative, personnel, and logistical support from the individual conti-
nental air forces. Under actual deployment, Saville would command the
units; however, Whitehead thought this arrangement lacked sufficient de-
centralized control. He decided to create two regional air defense oper-
ational forces, the Eastern Air Defense Force and the Western Air De-
fense Force, and to invest their commanders with suitable powers for
dealing with unforeseen conditions. Whitehead's staff now controlled air
defense planning, and Saville had no prime role in air defense. 47

Although Saville remained the obvious Air Force authority on air
defense, Fairchild probably never considered placing him at the head of
CONAC when Stratemeyer moved to FEAF. One reason was Saville's
relatively junior status among Air Force general officers. More impor-
tant, perhaps, Fairchild recognized that Whitehead's breadth of experi-
ence in all phases of tactical operations as well as his administrative skills
made him the choice for the major job at CONAC. Fairchild apparently
hoped to merge Whitehead's and Saville's talents. Unfortunately, these
two tough, volatile personalities had clashed during the war when Sa-
ville, preferring to fight in Europe, spurned Whitehead's offer of a staff
position in the Pacific theater. Bruised egos persisted between them, and
it was doubtful whether they could reconcile their differences and work
together harmoniously. 48

Just before Whitehead's reorganization was to become effective,
Col. Jacob E. Smart, an Assistant Deputy for Operations on the Air
Staff involved in air defense planning, prepared a summary of important
air defense accomplishments since the end of World War II. In his analy-
ses, Smart determined that Saville was primarily responsible for what-
ever progress had been made in air defense and advised Whitehead to
extend his tenure in ADC. Smart conceded that Saville's methods were
often unorthodox, as when he used his connection with Fairchild to
bypass the chain of command. This, along with a brusque manner, made
Saville a "thorn in the side to many people. Nevertheless," continued

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The Emerging Shield

Smart, "he has produced the only tangible results toward building an air de-
fense system that has [sic] been produced since the end of the war." Smart
emphasized Saville's role in obtaining congressional authorization for the
interim program. He concluded:

His [Saville's] actions, however unorthodox they may
appear, have been taken with the tacit consent of General
Vandenberg and General Fairchild. He has undoubtedly
had to "play by ear" in many instances and has irked many
important and would-be important people, but he has got
away with it all and has got things done.* 9

Smart need not have feared that Saville would be left out in the
cold. Although Whitehead and Saville would not work together, Fair-
child was still bound to put his air defense expert's talent to good use.
On September 1, 1949, Saville became Director of Military Require-
ments, a position Fairchild had held during the early months of World
War II. In re-creating the position for Saville on the peacetime Air Staff,
Fairchild urged his protege to approach Air Force combat force require-
ments in the same hard-driving, innovative spirit he displayed as head of
ADC. In fact, given his interest and capabilities, Saville's assignment to
Headquarters USAF would not restrict his role in air defense develop-
ments. 50

An internal debate resulted from the Air Force approach to postwar
air defense. In a period of defense budget cutbacks, President Truman
and the Congress were not inclined to spend the vast sums needed to
develop, equip, and staff advanced air defense systems, especially since
most military and civilian intelligence sources estimated that the Soviet
Union, the most probable future threat, would not acquire an atomic ca-
pability before 1952 at the earliest. (Air Force intelligence predicted an
earlier date.) Even if the Soviets possessed "the bomb," their first
bomber capable of one-way attacks against the continental United States,
the Tu-4 Bull, appearing in public for the first time in a 1948 air show
flyover, posed only a limited threat. The Soviets had 300 Tu-4s in pro-
duction by 1949, but the plane's range was insufficient to allow it to
attack the continental United States and return home, and the Soviets
had yet to demonstrate the capability to refuel the aircraft in flight.
Little sense of urgency existed regarding air defense among members of
Congress, government officials, and the public.

The Air Force was somewhat less complacent. Contrary to predic-
tions made by the other civilian and military intelligence agencies, Air
Force analysts believed a serious Soviet intercontinental threat would de-
velop rapidly and thought the best way to counter it would be with
SAC. Recognizing the service's responsibility for providing a minimum
air defense, in 1946 ADC staff officers began drawing up various short-
and long-range plans for U.S. air defense. These plans, generally too am-

104

Saville Takes Charge

bitious given the congressional and public mood at the time, seemed un-
likely to be funded. General Fairchild, disturbed at the lack of progress
when he became Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, called upon the service's
most knowledgeable air defense authority, General Saville, to develop a
cheap air defense plan. With a more realistic chance of being approved
by Congress, this plan would lay the foundation for future modernization
and expansion. While these steps seemed sufficient, events in the latter
half of 1949 motivated the public to question whether the Air Force was
doing all it could to provide air defense for the United States.

105

Chapter 5

Broadening Dimensions: Air Defense as a

Public Issue

rat public complacency about the nation's air defense status had
started to diminish became evident in August 1949. The Boeing
Company announced plans to shift production of its B-47 jet bomber
from Seattle, Washington, to a facility in Wichita, Kansas. Air Force
leaders apparently encouraged Boeing to make this move because Wich-
ita seemed less vulnerable to air attack than Seattle. Boeing employees
and Seattle businessmen, not surprisingly, were less than enthusiastic
about the planned move. They complained to their congressional repre-
sentatives who, in turn, brought the case to Secretary of the Air Force
Stuart Symington. 1

To explain the Air Force position, Symington agreed to attend a
meeting in Seattle arranged by the city's Chamber of Commerce. In
preparation he asked Chief of Staff Vandenberg why he sponsored the
move in the first place. Symington wanted to know, in particular, if the
Air Staff planned eventually to transfer all west coast production inland.
Vandenberg replied that no such plans were being developed. He
claimed, however, the case of B-47 production in Seattle was unique.
The B-47, with the Convair B-36, was one of the two advanced strate-
gic weapons the Air Force planned to deploy in the near future. The
Soviets might consider a heavy sacrifice in men and aircraft worthwhile
if they could slow or halt B-47 production in Seattle by launching one-
way attacks. 2

Ernest Gruening, Governor of Alaska, also attended the Chamber of
Commerce meeting. He believed he had a stake in the controversy be-
cause Soviet bombers on route to Seattle would probably travel over
Alaska and could attack targets there. Gruening became outraged after
listening to the Air Force's reasons for wanting to make the shift. He
told Symington:

I am shocked that it is the Air Force, supposedly the strik-
ing arm of the military establishment, that is initiating this
"turn tail and run" behind the Rockies policy. I am amazed
that the flying branch of our armed forces, instead of emu-

107

The Emerging Shield

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg becomes Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
Administering the oath is Chief Justice Fred Vinson. Others in the photo-
graph are, left to right, Secretary of National Defense, James V. Forrestal,
Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz, and Secretary of the Air
Force W. Stuart Symington.

lating the eagle, the American symbol of air power, should
follow the example of lesser birds and pursue a policy that
is both ostrich-headed and chicken-hearted.

Gruening went on to suggest that the Air Force pay more attention to
air defense and construct a radar screen along the northern and western
coasts of Alaska to warn of approaching bombers. In addition, to employ
large numbers of fighter-interceptors would assure "the Russians would
never be able to fly across Alaska heading this way. Their planes would
be shot down. They would have to fly . . . around the Aleutians . . .
and Puget Sound would be as far away as Wichita." The governor
charged, mistakenly, that his suggestion to construct a northern radar
screen was a completely new idea to Air Force planners. Although his
accusations belied Air Force air defense efforts, Gruening's views appar-
ently contributed to a compromise whereby the Air Force agreed to
build B-47s in both Wichita and Seattle. 3

The Revolt of the Admirals

In addition to the Boeing controversy, the Revolt of the Admirals in
the summer of 1949 tested Air Force willingness to perform its air de-
fense responsibilities. Naval officers objected to Air Force procurement

108

Air Defense as Public Issue

of the B-36 strategic bomber in light of Secretary of Defense Louis A.
Johnson's decision to cancel the aircraft carrier United States. The B-36
controversy brought to the forefront the failure of the services to coop-
erate on missions, including air defense.

Navy leaders feared the Air Force would attempt to consolidate all
air power into one branch of the military. Although some airmen doubt-
lessly harbored such a wish, the Air Force concerned itself more with its
establishment as the primary strategic force than with the unlikely possi-
bility of stripping the Navy of all its air resources. 4

The Air Force believed the 65,000-ton United States was designed to
carry aircraft capable of delivering atomic bombs, making the carrier a
threat to its monopoly of strategic aviation. Although the Navy denied
it, there was at least some truth in this view as the Navy had shown in-
terest in the development of carrier-based nuclear arms delivery since
1945, although the Key West roles and missions conference had delegat-
ed primary responsibility for strategic aerial operations to the Air Force.
Both services believed they had ample cause to distrust the other when
Johnson announced the cancellation of the United States. Many high-
ranking Navy officers interpreted this move as the first step by the De-
fense Department to eliminate the naval air arm. 5

Denied their aircraft carrier because of scarce funding and defense
officials who considered the B-36 a more important weapon, naval offi-
cers lashed out at Air Force mission prerogatives. One thrust of the
Navy's criticism stated that the Air Force neglected tactical air require-
ments and concentrated almost exclusively on the strategic mission. This
overlapped into an indictment of the Air Force approach to air defense.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, for instance, believed that Air Force dedi-
cation to the strategy of the "atomic blitz" had resulted in an absence of
suitable fighter aircraft that "may have grave consequences for future se-
curity of our bases and our homeland." Symington reported to President
Truman that the Navy charged that the Air Force "in the interest of
pushing the B-36 . . . had canceled fighters and other aircraft to the det-
riment of the air defense of the United States and the air support of the
Army." 6

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Syming-
ton and Vandenberg attempted to answer the Navy. Admitting the bulk
of Air Force resources was assigned to strategic forces, they nevertheless
convinced the congressmen that the Air Force was doing all it could
within budget limitations to provide air defense and support of ground
forces. The Air Force leadership favorably impressed Congress by pro-
viding a well-planned, informative, coordinated presentation. Navy offi-
cers, on the other hand, often spoke without the complete support of
their civilian chiefs. 7

109

The Emerging Shield

In the course of the hearings, the Navy criticized the performance
of the B-36, claiming its most advanced fighter, the McDonnell F2H
Banshee, could easily intercept and destroy the bomber. The Navy also
boasted that the Banshee was superior to contemporary Air Force inter-
ceptors. None of this meant that the Navy had an interest in assuming
primary responsibility for U.S. air defense from the Air Force— it
wanted to enhance its strategic role in national defense — but it did spot-
light the question of Air Force-Navy coordination in air defense mat-
ters. 8

As part of the Key West agreements, the Navy had agreed to coop-
erate with the Air Force by providing sea-based air defenses to help pro-
tect the coastlines against enemy bombers. But the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations soon stated that "a routine and continuing peacetime commitment
of naval forces to continental air defense is not intended." The Air Force
considered this attitude unhelpful, at the least, because of the increasing
realization that Navy radar picket ships and airborne early-warning
radars could make an important contribution to air defense. Carrier-
borne early-warning planes had a curious history. They were designed
by the Navy in response to Japanese suicide attacks in World War II.
Since the Navy had a head start in this field, the Air Force decided to
suspend research in 1948 to save funds and avoid duplication of effort.
Unfortunately, the Air Force failed to coordinate its actions adequately
with the Navy which also had other priorities— early warning for air de-
fense not being among them. For the moment, little if anything was done
to advance what appeared to be a promising concept. 9

Meanwhile, the final judgment of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee on the B-36 affair promised to salvage something from this un-
pleasant episode by calling for greater teamwork between the services.
For air defense, this implied joint Air Force-Navy training exercises and
the establishment of procedures whereby naval forces, particulary fight-
ers, would be used in an emergency. The new Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral Sherman, expressed special concern that the Navy do its
share in providing for the air defense of the United States. Joint maneu-
vers were held, and the Navy supplied more aircraft and picket ships for
air defense duty. Still, it remained clear that the Navy wished to win for
itself a more pronounced strategic role. Assisting the Air Force in its
continental defense mission hardly ranked among its priorities. Major re-
sponsibility for air defense rested foursquare with the Air Force and,
from all appearances, the Navy wished to keep it that way. 10

110

Air Defense as Public Issue

Impact of the Soviet Atomic Bomb

Public and congressional concern about air defense had surfaced for
the first time since the end of World War II during the Boeing contro-
versy and the B-36 hearings. However, the Soviet Union's atomic test
generated far more concern. On September 3, 1949, an Air Force B-29
reported unusually high radioactivity measurements over the North Pa-
cific near the Soviet Union's Kamchatka Peninsula. Soon after, the Air
Force collected enough evidence for the Atomic Energy Commission to
conclude that the Soviets had tested an atomic device. On September 19,
American and British scientists met with AEC and Pentagon officials to
assess the event more precisely. They agreed that the fission products the
Air Force bomber filtered from the air over the North Pacific had come
from an atomic bomb exploded on August 29. 11

President Truman announced the event to the American people on
September 23, calling it an "atomic explosion." He claimed not to be
particularly surprised the Soviets had accomplished the feat so soon, stat-
ing that such a "probability has always been taken into account by us."
Public statements of military leaders reinforced the President's view.
General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, acknowledged that
while the "explosion" was doubtlessly that of an atomic bomb, the occa-
sion did not call for hysteria. He said the fact that an industrially back-
ward nation could make an atomic bomb did not imply necessarily that
the same nation could produce bombs in quantity and launch nuclear at-
tacks. 12

Truman and his military leaders tended to play down the effect of
the Soviet atomic capability, but a number of people inside and outside
the government and defense establishments were disturbed. For the first
time since Pearl Harbor, civilians became especially anxious for im-
proved air defenses. According to the commander of the 25th Air Divi-
sion in the west, strong civilian pressure built to have air defenses in
place and functioning along the west coast. Senator Warren Magnuson
of Washington told Symington of his concern about the protection of his
state, home of the Hanford atomic energy plant. Magnuson vowed to do
everything in his power to assure that the west coast and Alaska were
defended adequately. 13

It would be largely up to General Fairchild to initiate and direct
studies of Air Force air defense requirements under the new circum-
stances. The new emergency could hardly have come at a worse
moment for the Vice Chief. Long plagued by heart and other health
problems, Fairchild, worn down, seriously considered retirement. Van-
denberg, fortunately, prevailed upon him to remain at his post during
this tense period. 14

111

The Emerging Shield

On September 30, 1949, Fairchild called an Air Staff conference to
discuss the impact on Air Force plans of the Soviet development of the
atomic bomb. Interestingly, even though many American airmen had
touted an atomic offensive as unstoppable when the United States had
possessed the only nuclear weapons, no high-ranking Air Staff member
present at the meeting suggested that the Soviet atomic capability ren-
dered air defense irrelevant. In fact, representatives from the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations suggested that the time had arrived for the
Air Force to promote air defense to the same priority as the strategic
retaliatory forces. That idea, however, got quickly shot down. Saville
made what most of the officers attending the meeting considered the
more practical suggestion of urging Congress to appropriate funds for
the completion of the radar screen. Fairchild and even Saville did not
dispute the status of SAC as the prime Air Force weapon and deter-
rent. 15

Thus, in forming its response to the enhanced Soviet threat, the Air
Force knew it would have to tread warily. Within the context of U.S.
overall strategy, no one questioned the requirement for air defenses. The
question that arose, as it would for the next ten years, was how much
could be devoted to the mission in light of what were, in the opinion of
the Air Force, more pressing requirements, especially those of SAC. The
Air Staff believed it had to ensure its views were not misinterpreted as
advocating air defense at the expense of the strategic forces. Following
this line of thought, Symington told Secretary of Defense Johnson in
November 1949 that the Soviets would only be deterred from attacking
the United States by the fear of a devastating retaliatory attack. But if
they did attack, he said the Air Force would have to be prepared with
the best air defenses affordable. 16

Fairchild followed Symington's lead in budget hearings held in early
1950 stating, "The period which we all realized must some day come
where intercontinental air warfare is possible is now at hand." He reiter-
ated Symington's belief that the Air Force now had to maintain both its
strategic and air defense forces in a state of immediate readiness. The Air
Force believed the strategic forces to be of primary importance in the
sense they provided the United States with its most formidable deterrent
to war. At the same time, said Fairchild, the responsibility of the Air
Force lay in providing "the greatest degree of air defense attainable
within the means available." The air defense forces had to be trained and
on alert continuously to meet a sudden enemy air attack. 17

The problem was funding. The Air Force could not escape the
Truman administration's decision to allow it only forty-eight groups. Sy-
mington told congressmen who advocated stronger air defenses that an
increase to seventy groups would solve many difficulties. For the
moment, the best way the Air Force could strengthen its air defenses

112

Air Defense as Public Issue

under the constraints of the budget lay in reducing greatly tactical forces
assigned to ground support operations. 18 That decision did not please the
Army, but the Air Force had to assign priorities under the changed cir-
cumstances.

Fairchild and his top Air Staff officers had decided that air defense
would remain less important than bombardment, even though the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic bomb. Although the American atomic
striking force would, as Fairchild told Symington and Vandenberg,
retain its primacy, Soviet possession of the bomb would, in the opinion
of the Air Staff, force acceleration of air defense plans and projects by
from one to three years. Vandenberg and Symington agreed with this
analysis. 19

Fairchild accordingly directed the Air Staff to review the Air Force
position within the framework of a seventy-group program; he thought
that, under the changed circumstances, the administration could conceiv-
ably allow the Air Force to expand to seventy groups if pressed. Thus
far the Air Force had only Saville's permanent radar program to show
for its long-range planning effort, and that continued to await final au-
thorization from Congress. Fairchild wanted the Air Staff to examine
means for completing the program. In addition, he asked for suggestions
on how to increase the effectiveness of Air National Guard units as-
signed to air defense duties. Finally, he called for more and better coop-
eration with the Army and Navy in deploying picket vessels and antiair-
craft artillery units. 20

Fairchild directed General Anderson, Director of Plans and Oper-
ations, to spearhead the review. Anderson and his staff worked tirelessly
for three months and then formed an air defense team under Col. T. J.
Dayharsh to refine their findings. On December 29, the JCS asked Van-
denberg to present proposals for using air defense means and for increas-
ing those already available. Vandenberg and Fairchild asked Dayharsh
and his air defense team to present their ideas at a JCS meeting held on
March 2, 1950, and at the second USAF Commanders' Conference held
the following month on Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico. 21

The meeting with the JCS focused on establishing goals for a mini-
mum air defense by 1952. At Ramey, planners familiarized commanders
with the thinking behind the plan as well as with its contents. Referred
to as the Blue Book plan, it stipulated that a minimum air defense could
be in place and operating by mid- 1952. Brig. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, the
Air Staff Intelligence Director, noted that the Air Force expected the
Soviets to have between 45 and 90 atom bombs by that time, and from
70 to 135 by mid-1953. Cabell said the Soviets already possessed suffi-
cient Tu-4 bombers, trained aircrews, and bases of operation to deliver
their complete stockpile of bombs. 22 Anderson estimated July 1, 1952, as
the critical date when the Soviets would pose a dangerous threat. Ander-

113

The Emerging Shield

son also explained that the same date marked the earliest time by which
the Air Force could set up, in an orderly manner, an operational air de-
fense system. 23

By the time the Blue Book plan was completed, funds had been
found to start construction on the 85 radar stations and 10 air division
control centers authorized for the United States and Canada under the
permanent radar program. Congress had permitted Department of De-
fense and Bureau of the Budget officials to reprogram $50 million of the
overall Department of the Air Force appropriation, at their discretion, to
initiate construction of the permanent program. Symington, disturbed
about "robbing" other projects in order to begin radar construction, nev-
ertheless approved the action, as did Secretary of Defense Johnson and
the Bureau of the Budget. The Air Force accordingly transferred $33
million from its maintenance and operations appropriation and $17 mil-
lion from the aircraft purchase appropriation. Soon after, General Joseph
T. McNarney, with Johnson's permission, reprogrammed $4 million from
family housing. 24

Despite the difficulties the Air Force had in funding the permanent
radar stations, Blue Book planners felt it necessary to add twenty-four
additional stations in the United States. As Anderson explained at
Ramey, the permanent program

was planned to meet a forecasted Russian capability in 1953
of sporadic, dispersed attacks against our resources. It did
not include a coverage of areas in which certain units of our
retaliatory forces are located and was intended only as the
basic framework for an ultimate aircraft control and warn-
ing system.

Now, said Anderson, the probability that the Soviets would control a
stockpile of forty-five to ninety bombs made it necessary for the Air
Force to provide protection for exposed SAC bases. The Air Staff had
considered two possibilities in meeting this problem. The first would in-
volve moving the bases inside the permanent radar system. The second
would extend the warning system to include the bases. Since it was ex-
pected to cost approximately $100 million to move the bases, the Blue
Book recommended adding additional radar stations. The plan suggested
sixteen stations, eleven in the immediate vicinity of the bases and five on
the southeastern coast of the United States, to "add needed warning for
inland targets and combat units." The eight remaining stations would be
located in Canada, three built by the United States and staffed by White-
head's CONAC units, with the Canadian government's agreement. 25

In the area of weapon strength, the Blue Book specified a need for
the Air Force to have sixty-seven all-weather squadrons operating by
1952. The planners agreed with Saville's recommendation that each
squadron possess at least twenty-five all-weather aircraft with an average

114

Air Defense as Public Issue

of two-and-a-half crews per aircraft. Thus could the squadrons stand
twenty-four-hour alert, train adequately, and have aircraft ready for duty
during emergencies. As for deployment, Blue Book planners called for the
squadrons to defend, in order of priority, the atomic weapons storage sites
of SAC; the Hanford, Washington, atomic energy facility; and major
American cities, with Washington and New York heading the list. 26

The Air Force asked the JCS to approve and act upon the Blue
Book plan without delay. Specifically, the Air Force asked that a joint
committee be formed to determine how much each service could con-
tribute to the system. The JCS turned the Blue Book over to the Joint
Strategic Plans Committee for further study. The committee members
agreed that current air defenses were inadequate and that July 1952 was
when an operational air defense system should be in place. They also
recommended that the Air Force provide the numbers of radar stations
and interceptor squadrons proposed in the Blue Book plan. Furthermore,
the committee suggested that the Navy furnish twenty-five radar picket
ships to man ten stations, and that the Army provide fifty-one battalions
of guns (each battalion to consist of three to twelve batteries), fifteen
more than the Air Force proposal. In conclusion, the committee believed
the plan "to be a sound approach, in principle, to the optimum (as op-
posed to the Air Force definition of the minimum) air defense system re-
quired." 27 Two formidable difficulties remained. First, the Air Force
had to persuade Congress to approve the funds needed to implement the
plan. Second, the Air Force had to persuade the Army and Navy to
donate their resources to air defense.

Roles and Missions Dilemmas

Blue Book planners had decided a minimum air defense system for
1952 required a seaward extension of radar warning. They recommended
the Navy establish ten picket ship stations to meet this need, six operat-
ing off the east coast and four off the west. The planners expected the
picket ships to assist in identifying inbound overwater flights while pro-
viding additional warning for air defenses in the coastal areas. 28

The Air Force needed Army and Navy cooperation. During World
War II and through the first two years of Air Force independence,
airmen had hoped to amalgamate into the Air Force air defense compo-
nents controlled by other services. Because the Army and Navy resisted,
the Air Force could only make agreements with the land and sea forces
to train together and make emergency air defense plans. Because the mis-
sion was primarily an Air Force one, air leaders worked to obtain cen-

115

The Emerging Shield

tralized control. But the Army and Navy both proved jealous of their
prerogatives in allowing their forces to become Air Force controlled,
even in an emergency.

The Blue Book plan considered the possibility that shore-based
Navy and Marine fighter squadrons would compose part of, or supple-
ment, squadrons assigned to defend the continental United States. As
noted, the Navy opposed this idea, stating it had "other use" for its air-
craft. As for the Army, the Air Force sought but did not receive an
Army estimate of antiaircraft artillery, so the Air Force proceeded to
make antiaircraft artillery estimates unilaterally. As the Air Staff per-
ceived the situation, Army guns would be most needed on SAC bases,
atomic installations, population centers, and industrial centers. 29

Before the Soviet atomic explosion, almost no Army antiaircraft ar-
tillery units were on air defense duty in the United States and Alaska.
The Army had worldwide antiaircraft responsibilities and believed its
guns could be better used if its units were abroad than if they were on
domestic alert against an improbable Soviet bomber attack. Airmen, who
took the Soviet intercontinental threat more seriously, became angered,
and quickly pointed out that the Army had fiercely resisted all Air Force
attempts to absorb artillery units but had done little if anything to pre-
pare its antiaircraft artillery units to assist in continental defense. The
irony in the Air Force protests was that many airmen had disparaged the
worth of antiaircraft artillery before World War II (as some ground offi-
cers had ridiculed the fighter). However, events in the war had removed
any doubts that antiaircraft artillery played an integral part of air de-
fense, and the Air Force now wanted the Army's guns on alert.

Immediately after President Truman announced the Soviet atomic
bomb, the Army finally received the motivation and funds to act, estab-
lishing gun defenses for the atomic energy plants. It soon created an
Antiaircraft Artillery Command. One of the purposes of the new com-
mand was better coordination with the Air Force, but disagreements be-
tween the services on how antiaircraft artillery fit into the overall air de-
fense organization remained unresolved. 30

One reason for Army unwillingness to give the Air Force control of
antiaircraft artillery was that, before World War II ended, the Army had
started to develop a surface-to-air missile, later called Nike. The missile
showed enough promise to make ground forces commanders question the
wartime concept of assigning air defenses to the area control of an Air
Force commander. Unlike most artillery, surface-to-air missiles are long-
range weapons and thus lessen the threat to friendly aircraft during joint
air defense operations. Army planners, believing little danger existed to
the interceptors, reasoned the missiles should be free to fire without the
consent of an Air Force director. Further, the Army view was that two
separate defense systems, one run by the Air Force and one by the

116

Air Defense as Public Issue

Army, should exist. In September 1946, however, the War Department
had upheld the Air Force belief that antiaircraft artillery units should be
controlled by the air commander. 31

The Army could not reconcile itself to that concept, and from the
end of the war until the establishment of the Antiaircraft Artillery Com-
mand, it claimed to be too hard pressed for resources to respond to Air
Force requests for antiaircraft artillery in continental air defense. During
these years another problem arose when the Air Force began to develop
an unmanned interception missile. The Air Force had been interested in
this concept since nearly the end of World War II when Germany dem-
onstrated the feasibility of the V-2, a liquid-fueled missile flying at an
altitude of about 60 to 70 miles and having a range of approximately 300
miles. After the war, the Air Force supported a number of surface-to-air
missile projects, finally settling on the so-called BOMARC (Boeing-
Michigan Aeronautical Research Center) unmanned interception missile.
When the Army forged ahead in developing Nike, the Air Force cited
duplication of effort as the reason for its attempt to assume control of all
guided missile development. The JCS decided in November 1949 to
assign missiles to the services according to function, with the Army re-
taining Nike as a successor to antiaircraft artillery and the Air Force
continuing development of BOMARC as an unmanned interceptor. The
Army considered the decision a guarantee of a continuing air defense
role and a factor in forming a separate antiaircraft artillery command. 32

After losing its battles to integrate antiaircraft artillery units into the
Air Force and to control all surface-to-air missile development, the Air
Force took solace in the fact that antiaircraft artillery units were now
deployed at the Hanford and Oak Ridge atomic energy plants, and its
leaders were optimistic that the units would shortly be stationed on SAC
bases as well. But if fighter and antiaircraft artillery components were
assigned to defend the same location, the controversy over rules of en-
gagement would almost certainly recur.

In this area the two services remained poles apart. The Air Force
continued to believe that the area air defense commander, usually an Air
Force officer, should decide when antiaircraft artillery units would open
fire. The Army maintained that "inner artillery zones" should be estab-
lished over critical targets like Hanford and Oak Ridge, where the anti-
aircraft artillery commander could override hold-fire orders placed by
the Air Force director. The Air Force countered that to permit this
would be to forego the concept that "air defense was an operation of
integrated components in which each . . . contributed to the total oper-
ation ... and each was employed in conjunction with the others." 33
For the moment the controversy remained unresolved, leaving the Air
Force and Army unable to work together effectively in air defense oper-
ations.

117

The Emerging Shield

Although Air Force hopes for amalgamating Army and Navy units
for air defense had vanished by fall 1949, airmen still wanted guarantees
of unambiguous control of all components in an emergency. The Air
Force would have had a better case had it worked out the mechanics of
such a situation. When still in ADC, Saville and his staff had attempted
to prepare for the JCS a detailed doctrinal statement on how and when
the Air Force would control Army and Navy forces in an emergency.
But Saville left ADC before the work was finished, and the services re-
mained far from agreement on the matter at the time of the Soviet
atomic test. 34

In November 1949, Vandenberg vigorously reminded his JCS coun-
terparts of their air defense responsibilities. He told the Chiefs that the
Air Force thought the Soviet Union might already possess a stockpile of
atomic bombs. In the face of this possibility, Vandenberg believed that
air defense had become "so urgent and vital to the security of the
nation" that drastic action was called for. As a first measure, he suggest-
ed the Chiefs act at once to pool the resources of the defense establish-
ment to provide for air defense. Secondly, he thought the situation de-
manded an urgency and priority similar to the Manhattan District
Project, responsible for developing the American atomic bomb in World
War II. Vandenberg said he realized that this would be expensive, but
the current situation cried for determined actions. 35

Vandenberg's case was buoyed by the State and Defense depart-
ment's joint study, "United States Objectives and Programs for National
Security," completed in spring 1950. This National Security Council
(NSC) policy paper, NSC 68, designed, in part, to outline the needs for
increased spending on defense, called present military plans and pro-
grams "dangerously inadequate in time and scope. . . ." This new con-
sensus required the JCS to examine all military programs in terms of cost
and requirements. In regard to air defense specifically, NSC 68 estimated
the Soviets could seriously damage U.S. vital centers in a surprise attack
in 1954 if opposed by America's programmed air defenses for that
period. The Army's Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations,
apparently influenced by NSC 68, agreed to keep their minds open on
the crash program suggested by Vandenberg. However, they decided to
postpone direct action on the crash program until new studies of overall
military requirements were completed. The JCS began immediately to
look for funds that could be taken from lesser priorities to improve cur-
rent air defenses. In this regard, the Chiefs obtained Johnson's support of
Air Force efforts to expedite installation of the permanent radar sta-
tions. 36

In attempting to persuade the Army and Navy to contribute more
willingly and substantially to home air defense, Vandenberg had a dilem-
ma. The other services believed they had enough to do supporting their

118

Air Defense as Public Issue

major responsibilities, without contributing more than was absolutely
necessary to a mission recognized to be primarily an Air Force concern.
This problem was not unique to the Air Force. Both the Army and
Navy were often frustrated when, for example, they asked for closer co-
operation from the Air Force in close air support and antishipping roles.
Nevertheless, Vandenberg recognized that after the Soviets gained an
atomic capability the time was right to pressure the other services into
increasing their home air defense outlays. After four years of sporadic
deliberations, the Army decided to establish an antiaircraft artillery com-
mand, and the Chief of Naval Operations directed fleet commanders in
February 1950 to cooperate with the Air Force for emergency deploy-
ment of Navy forces in air defense operations. Neither action guaranteed
Air Force control of the other services' forces in an emergency, but the
changes indicated that the Army and Navy took their air defense respon-
sibilities more seriously. Negotiations by the Air Force involved more
than those by the Army or the Navy, for the air defense concept had
wide implications. Canada also participated extensively and would
become even more important as time went on and the systems expanded.
For the present, the JCS supported preliminary talks between the U.S.
and the Royal Canadian air forces for installing air defenses in Canada.
In addition, the pace of negotiations quickened within the Permanent
Joint Board on Defense for setting up an American unified command to
provide air defense protection on leased bases in Newfoundland and Lab-
rador. 37

Pressure on the Air Force to increase the effectiveness of the air de-
fenses increased steadily from late 1949 through the first half of 1950.
The Chairman of the JCS, General Bradley, urged faster actions on the
radar stations. Without this, he warned, "an atomic attack on the indus-
trial heart of the nation is entirely possible." Time magazine reported that
the Air Force needed to speed work on the radar systems and needed
more and better interceptors. Representative Thor C. Tollefson of Wash-
ington, commenting on the B-47 production controversy in Seattle,
claimed that the people of the northwest were unhappy with the Air
Force's apparent inability to protect them from air attack. Dr. Vannevar
Bush, writing to Bradley, was "appalled" by the condition of U.S. air
defenses and wondered if the Air Force was doing all it could to provide
sufficient defense without overburdening the nation's economy and
taking funds from the strategic forces. By March 1950, private citizens
wrote also to Symington and Vandenberg to express their concern. The
letter writers, usually well informed, worried that the air defenses would
be inadequate in an emergency. 38

Public concern about air defense increased because the Soviets de-
veloped an atomic capability far sooner than most intelligence experts
had predicted. Although President Truman claimed not to be surprised,

119

The Emerging Shield

the administration had failed to warn the American people that their
atomic monopoly might be short-lived. As the department with the pri-
mary responsibility for air defense of the United States, the Air Force
had, at least since Fairchild and Saville intervened, tempered its emphasis
on the defense issue only by the overriding necessity of readying SAC.
At best the Air Force could only appeal to Congress and map various
plans, of which they had no dearth. The most detailed and farsighted
plans, however, would be worthless without funding.

Now that an air attack appeared possible, funding appeared more
likely because the public and Congress now showed some interest in air
defense. The most interested and influential supporters included Repre-
sentative Carl Vinson of Georgia. Vinson told Symington he meant to do
all he could to see that the Air Force received what it required in men,
radars, and interceptors to assure adequate continental air defense. En-
couraged by Vinson's support, Headquarters USAF advanced the com-
pletion date from July 1, 1951, to December 31, 1950, for the most essen-
tial radar stations. 39

In April 1950, the Air Force pledged to complete the entire perma-
nent radar system by mid- 1952. Even when completed, it would not
detect and track low-altitude air attacks any better than the Lashup sys-
tems currently in operation. As exercises held in early June 1950 in the
25th Air Division indicated, insufficient low-altitude coverage could, and
probably would, result in disaster during an actual attack. Saville, aware
of this problem when he devised the permanent system, had advised the
use of civilian ground observers until low-altitude coverage could be
provided by small, unmanned radars relaying data to the permanent sta-
tions. The Air Staff agreed that until such equipment was developed, in-
stalled, and operating, air defenses would have to rely on the eyes and
ears of ground observers for low-altitude sightings. 40

The Air Staff accordingly began organizing an Air Force-sponsored
GOC. General Whitehead formulated a plan and in February 1950 sub-
mitted his ideas for the use of observers in the northeast and west coast
defense areas. Whitehead called for a total of 160,000 civilian volunteers
to operate some 8,000 posts. They would report to 26 filter centers
staffed by air reservists and civilians under the guidance of small cadres
of Air Force enlisted personnel. Headquarters USAF and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense approved the plan, and by June 1950 CONAC
prepared to enforce it as soon as funds became available. 41

Meanwhile, talks between the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Canadi-
an Air Force took on a new sense of importance as a result of the Soviet
atom bomb. If the Soviets attacked, they would doubtlessly do so over
the shorter northern routes, and radar stations were needed in Canada to
provide early warning for both nations. 42 In June 1950, the U.S. and
Royal Canadian air forces agreed on the proposed Radar Extension Pro-

120

Air Defense as Public Issue

gram, including construction of thirty-one radar stations in Canada. The
U.S. Air Force would pay the cost of constructing and equipping at least
eighteen of these stations. Whitehead's forces would operate eight of
them, extending U.S. radar coverage north of the border. Further, emu-
lating the CONAC Lashup program, the Canadian Air Force assigned
additional forces to air defense and established a temporary air defense
system while awaiting final approval of the Radar Extension Program.
The Canadians soon had three temporary radar stations operating and
had assigned a second fighter squadron to air defense duty. Assisted by
the Bell Telephone Company of Canada, the Canadian Air Force also
initiated preparations for a Canadian GOC. The Canadians were encour-
aged to take this step when Whitehead's staff officers acquainted them
with CONAC's plans to form an observer corps. U.S.-Canadian negotia-
tions for joint air defense procedures were generally smooth and cor-
dial. 43

Vandenberg and Fairchild wanted to make optimum use of civilian
expertise in planning air defense systems. Like Spaatz and Arnold previ-
ously, they called upon the skills of Dr. Theodore von Karman, Chair-
man of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. Von Karman estab-
lished a committee to devise an appropriate Air Force position on air de-
fense for the immediate future. The members of this group would "try to
determine from the combined viewpoints of physical sciences, economic
and social aspects and the capabilities of the Air Force just how far the
nation could go toward an ideal perfect air defense, in view of other un-
avoidable requirements of National Security." Another group of board
members and other scientists would work closely with Whitehead's units
located in the northeast. They would try to develop techniques and
equipment that could "produce maximum effective air defense for a mini-
mum dollar investment." 44 The Air Force hoped to build a technologi-
cally advanced air defense at low cost, but the task would prove impossi-
ble.

Meanwhile, in January 1950, the Air Force established the Air Re-
search and Development Command (ARDC) and, on the Air Staff, the
new office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. These changes
were encouraged by a report submitted by a special Scientific Advisory
Board committee on research and development headed by Dr. Louis N.
Ridenour. Since the end of World War II, the research and development
function in the Air Force had been divided among different staff and
command agencies, often with overlapping responsibilities. The Air Staff,
by establishing ARDC and the staff position for development, was intent
on building a more cohesive, better organized, and clearly directed tech-
nology structure. 45

These events had to have a profound effect on the course of conti-
nental air defense. It was becoming exceedingly clear to Air Force plan-

121

The Emerging Shield

ners that, in the future, the Air Force would have to depend on technol-
ogy instead of on overwhelming resources to supply the advantage over
the Soviet Union. That technology would be applied to developing air
defense systems seemed almost certain, especially with the appointment
of General Saville to the new post of Deputy Chief of Staff for Develop-
ment. In this assignment Saville directed the leading edge of Air Force
efforts to optimally utilize current scientific research. On arriving at the
Pentagon, Saville began soliciting the opinions of prominent scientists on
how advanced technology could be used to improve air defense oper-
ations. As in his advocacy of the interceptor of the future, Saville intu-
itively believed that technology still on the drawing board or in the labo-
ratory could eventually be developed and incorporated in a modern air
defense system. Ivan A. Getting, one of the major scientists who worked
closely with him at this time, considered Saville "a very remarkable man.
He thoroughly believed in the application of modern science and tech-
nology to the problems of the Air Force and strongly felt the need of
bringing about much more positive thinking in combining military prob-
lems with advancing science and technology." 46 Saville consulted the
eminent scientist Dr. George E. Valley of MIT, who told him that the
technology might soon be available to support the production of more
effective radar and accurate data handling. The ability, Valley said, lay
with computer technology, still an elementary science. Valley believed
the Air Force could support development of this technology without en-
dangering the buildup and modernization of SAC. 47 With that assurance,
Saville advocated in the Pentagon that the Air Force support computer-
related research for air defense purposes.

Air Defense Forces in the Field

Whether or not the Air Force decided that computers were the
wave of the future in air defense, General Whitehead, as head of
CONAC, confronted problems concerning the present. As the officer di-
rectly in charge of most of the nation's forces for air defense, Whitehead
believed he could not afford to rest with intelligence estimates that the
Soviets would not be ready to launch an air attack against the United
States until 1952. For the CONAC commander, no time could be lost in
making his forces combat ready. According to his deputy, Brig. Gen.
Herbert B. Thatcher, Whitehead "was always seeing war around the
corner, always looking for it." 48

Interestingly, although Whitehead and Saville could not work to-
gether, they shared similar personal and professional qualities, both put-
ting everything into their work, tackling assignments relentlessly. As one

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Air Defense as Public Issue

Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead

of his subordinates later recalled, "General Whitehead, once he told you
something . . . you had better do it. There were no half-way measures
with him. He wanted a hundred percent, and if he could get a hundred
and two out of you, that's what he wanted." 49

General Fairchild had told Whitehead to consider air defense his
command's most important mission. Whitehead, because of his enthusi-
asm for the job, interpreted this to his commanders as signifying that the
Air Staff had come to regard air defense as "the most important mission
assigned to the USAF." Whitehead might have also reached this mistak-
en conclusion because Fairchild ordered the Air Staff to accord
CONAC air defense units, temporarily, the same priority for resources
reserved since late 1948 for SAC. 50

As one of its first actions under this provision, the Air Staff author-
ized an increase in the number of Lashup stations. This action permitted
Whitehead to install a temporary radar warning and control system in
the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas; provide radar coverage for the
atomic energy installation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; expand radar cover-
age over the Hanford, Washington, atomic energy plant; and increase
radar coverage over the southern and western approaches to the Seattle-
Hanford region. In addition, Whitehead received the additional officers
and enlisted men needed to initiate an air defense command structure in
the expanded Lashup system. The Air Staff also assisted him in his ef-
forts to maintain fighter-interceptors on air defense alert and to institute

123

The Emerging Shield

; HHHHBHHIHHHHHBHHIBH!

F-86D Sabre. This interceptor version of the Sabre did not become fully
operational until 1953.

air weapons control (ground control intercept) procedures. 51

Whitehead, pressing to achieve around-the-clock operations with the
forces at his disposal, put tremendous strain on the people in air defense
units, but the CONAC chief was not deterred. His commanders ac-
knowledged that he was "hardboiled," "tough," and "would brutally test
you." His methods, nevertheless, seemed to achieve positive results. By
June 1950 most of the additional Lashup stations and heavy radar equip-
ment authorized in fall 1949 were either operational or about to become
so. Fifteen additional stations were soon added, making the total forty-
three. 52

To use the expanded and improved radar coverage fully, Whitehead
sought permission to disperse his twenty-three fighter-interceptor squad-
rons from the eight bases they occupied to twenty bases. The Air Staff
approved the idea, but it could not implement the plan immediately be-
cause of insufficient funds. In another development, the stateside squad-
rons began to receive' F-86 Sabre jets. While the Sabre proved an out-
standing aircraft in wartime air superiority, it had not been designed spe-
cifically for air defense (squadrons did not start to receive the F-86D
modified for air defense until 1953). In the meantime, F-94As, the first
jet interceptors modified specially for air defense, became available and
were stationed on bases in the Pacific northwest. 53

As Lashup systems proliferated and the performance of pilots and
planes improved, Whitehead attempted to extend their periods of oper-

124

Air Defense as Public Issue

F-94 Starfire, the United States' first jet-powered, all-weather fighter.
This plane was the first to shoot down, with only a radar image, a target
drone.

ation. After a ten-day exercise in the northwest early in 1949 proved the
competence of weapons controllers and air crews to perform successful
intercepts, Whitehead authorized his area commanders to begin active air
defense to the limit of the capabilities of their forces. This was possible
because Saville had previously initiated arrangements with the Civil Aer-
onautics Administration and Military Flight Service to provide flight
plan data to the 25th Air Division in the northwest and the 26th on the
east coast. The respective control centers received prompt information
when bomber-type aircraft penetrated the divisions' active defense zones.
Now, under Whitehead's orders, the 25th and 26th air divisions attempt-
ed to intercept tracks that could not be identified positively by flight
plan correlation. The aircrews received orders to shoot down violators
of airspace over the atomic plants in Hanford, in Oak Ridge, and in Los
Alamos, New Mexico, if those violators committed a blatantly hostile act
such as dropping bombs or paratroopers, or firing on interceptors and
ground targets. 54

Headquarters USAF, however, concerned about possible errors,
such as the shooting down of civilian aircraft, decided that Whitehead
had moved too fast. On January 17, 1950, he received orders to cease all
interception operations. Arming the fighters and investing them with au-
thority to shoot down aircraft was, as the Air Staff expressed it, "a new
step in our concept of the air defense of the United States." 55

In discussions following the Air Force decision, Whitehead's staff

125

The Emerging Shield

proposed that all civil and military pilots be required to file flight plans
when their routes took them through sensitive, defended areas. As ex-
pected, much opposition to this suggestion arose because it promised to
complicate operations in flight control centers. Also, civilian airlines
feared passengers would be uneasy knowing their flights were subject to
interception. Despite their uncertainties, affected civilian and military
agencies agreed to file voluntary flight plans when traveling over de-
fended areas. In April 1950, Headquarters USAF authorized CONAC to
resume interceptions with armed fighters against aircraft off their flight
plans. Operations were at first limited to areas over the atomic energy
installations. In time, CONAC's authority to make interceptions in-
creased to include aircraft approaching the east coast of the United
States. Further, Canada agreed to provide flight plan data on aircraft ap-
proaching the United States from across the northern border. 56

By June 1950, the 25th Air Division in the northwest was the most
advanced Lashup sector. In February it had experimented by implement-
ing twenty-four-hour-a-day operations, apparently attaining Whitehead's
goal in at least one sector. But the 25th soon returned to an eight-hour-a-
day, five-day-a-week work schedule because of personnel shortages. In
subsequent months, the 25th received increasing numbers of enlisted
graduates of Air Training Command electronics schools. Still, its radar
and control stations remained desperately understaffed in several skills,
especially radar repair. 57

Despite its problems, the 25th Air Division conducted an air defense
exercise from June 18 to 24, 1950. SAC bombers launched sixty strikes in
that period aimed either on Seattle or the Hanford atomic plant. As part
of the defensive forces, Air National Guard fighter units and a Coast
Guard cutter assisted the 25th. According to Col. Clinton D. Vincent,
25th Air Division Commander, the radar-equipped cutter proved a valu-
able asset in extending early warning. Vincent reiterated the Blue Book
planners' recommendation that Navy picket vessels be an integral part of
the air defenses. 58 Notwithstanding Coast Guard and Air National Guard
assistance, the division's overall effectiveness was judged unsatisfactory.
If subjected to high-level attack (17,000 to 25,000 feet), Seattle would
have received sufficient warning for its population to take cover, al-
though the defenses would probably have been unable to prevent the
city from being bombed. Had the attack been staged from low altitude,
Seattle citizens would probably not have had time to seek shelter. As for
Hanford, the facility would have had an even chance of being fore-
warned of a high-altitude attack, but the odds were much less for a low-
level assault. 59

In the wake of the exercise, Col. George S. Brown, one of White-
head's most knowledgeable staff officers who would later become Air
126

Air Defense as Public Issue

Force Chief of Staff and Chairman of the JCS, evaluated the nation's air
defenses:

... we have a training establishment which, incidentally,
has some actual operational capability. We are, therefore,
not fulfilling our primary mission since, in effect, we are
still preparing to provide for the air defense of the continen-
tal United States and are not yet capable of providing a
minimum acceptable defense. 60

Although Brown's observations were accurate, the Boeing contro-
versy, the B-36 hearings, and, especially, the Soviet atomic explosion all
worked to raise public, and military, consciousness of air defense. Now,
in mid- 1950, the Air Force remained, as Brown noted, a long way from
providing adequate air defense. Fairchild and Saville led a drive to iden-
tify immediate and long-range goals and to construct a framework con-
ducive to further expansion. Increases in the number of radars and fight-
ers deployed, personnel assigned to air defense duties, and stepped-up
scientific research showed advancement; yet, more progress was needed.
Such was provided, but in a most unexpected fashion, on the other side
of the world — on June 25 North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel
into the Republic of Korea.

127

Chapter 6

Continental Air Defense in the Korean
War Period

As soon as word reached Headquarters USAF of the North Korean
xm. invasion of South Korea, General Vandenberg acted. Placing
air defense forces in the continental United States and Alaska on around-
the-clock alert, he directed his commanders to intercept and destroy all
unknown aircraft penetrating the identification zones around atomic
energy installations or heading inland from the sea or from the north
toward defended areas. 1 These precautions seemed necessary because
Vandenberg and the JCS thought that the Communist attack on Korea
could be the prelude to a Soviet-inspired general war. For the next sev-
eral months, Air Force air defense forces were on special alert against a
Soviet air attack. 2

If the Soviets attacked, the Air Force knew little about what tactics
they might use. As a RAND analyst summarized the predicament:

They [Soviet bombers] might come in at a high altitude or
low altitude. They might come in many different ways as
far as whether they exploit saturation tactics, or try to sneak
through the defenses or so on. And since we don't know
anything really about their doctrine of strategic air, we
have a tremendous gamut of possibilities to worry about
... we always have to look at the worst possibility. 3

As the RAND analysis made clear, a paucity of reliable intelligence
information caused the Air Force endless worry in preparing to meet a
Soviet strategic air offensive. Addressing the Air War College a few
weeks before the start of the Korean War, General Saville assessed the
optimally conceived air defense as able to destroy sixty percent of at-
tacking enemy bombers. A more likely success rate would be thirty per-
cent. In any case, said Saville, the percentages would not mean much
until the nature of the enemy threat could be determined more accurate-
ly. Saville emphasized the need for more accurate intelligence data to
gauge Soviet capabilities and Soviet plans for launching an intercontinen-
tal attack. 4

129

The Emerging Shield

To gather information on Soviet intercontinental capability and
bomber tactics, the Air Force used information from German and Japa-
nese ex-prisoners of war who had been forced to work in Soviet indus-
trial facilities from 1945 to 1949, information supplied by Soviet defec-
tors, current and wartime attache reports, and German intelligence mate-
rials captured at the end of World War II that included aerial photogra-
phy of the Soviet aircraft industry. 5 The Air Force and other military
and civilian intelligence agencies also used secret agents, decryption de-
vices, electronic eavesdropping, and balloon and aircraft reconnaissance
operations. But the nature of Soviet society and its obsession with secre-
cy precluded first-rate U.S. intelligence until very high-altitude surveil-
lance aircraft appeared later in the 1950s. 6

Largely ignorant of Soviet intentions, the Air Force believed it had
to prepare to face the worst. Stalin had proved since the beginning of
the Cold War that he was not intimidated by American or European
military power. In fact, Soviet provocations in eastern Europe and divid-
ed Berlin seemed evidence that "the threat posed to America's European
allies by the Red Army was probably greater than the threat America's
atomic monopoly posed to the Soviet Union's survival." 7 The communist
aggression in Korea — if it was, as strongly suspected in the United
States, orchestrated or approved by the Soviet Union— was consistent
with Soviet aggressiveness since the end of World War II and was more
dangerous because the American atomic monopoly had been broken.

Although the Soviets were attempting to make inroads in Europe
and probably in Asia, the question remained whether they would launch
an air attack against the United States if they could. The Air Force ad-
hered to the administration position outlined in NSC 68. The authors of
this important policy paper argued, in part, that the Soviet Union was
determined to achieve world domination and would use any means at its
disposal to obtain its goal: "There is no justification in Soviet theory or
practice for predicting that, should the Kremlin become convinced that
it would cause our downfall by one conclusive blow, it would not seek
that solution." 8

If the Soviets attacked, their long-range delivery vehicle would
almost certainly be the Tu-4 Bull, patterned after the Air Force B-29.
Not a true intercontinental bomber (neither was the B-29 nor its succes-
sor, the B-50), a Bull could reach every important government and in-
dustrial site in the United States on a one-way mission, and American
planners believed the Soviets would sacrifice airplanes and crews to
attack selected targets in the United States. Although intelligence sources
had identifed only 30 Bull bombers in operational units in early 1950, 415
were expected to be available by mid-year and 1,200 by mid- 1952. The
mid- 1952 date was when the Air Force expected the Soviet Union to be
ready to stage a decisive attack against the United States. By then,

130

Air Defense— Korean War Period

American bomber crews would be better trained and navigation and
radar equipment would be improved. Moreover, the Soviets were trying
to increase the Bull's range, develop an aerial refueling capability (the
United States had this capability in 1949), and produce and operate a
long-range bomber by mid-1952. The Air Force, incidentally, marked
1952 as the earliest date for completion of an operational air defense
system in the United States. 9

The threat of a Soviet intercontinental air strike seemed a real
danger. The probability that the United States would not strike first in a
future atomic war only further reinforced this perception. SAC officers
had identified as targets important industrial and military facilities in the
Soviet Union, but these would most likely be struck in retaliation. Some
officers in SAC and in the Air Staff advocated a preemptive offensive if
reliable intelligence indicated an imminent Soviet attack. Less likely, a
"preventive" war could start if the Soviets were preparing for a future
first strike, and the United States would have the moral right to intercept
it, thereby gaining the initiative. The general agreement in SAC and
Headquarters USAF was that neither preemptive nor preventive attacks
were realistic options for war plans. In the United States, the military
complied with government policy, and notwithstanding his tough rheto-
ric, President Truman believed "starting an atomic war is totally un-
thinkable for rational men." 10

The Air Force had to accept the probability that in a future war it
would have to meet the first strike before it could retaliate. If the Soviets
were to attack, they would have to use their entire stockpile of atomic
bombs, estimated at between ten and twenty. They would doubtlessly
strike at night, when the propeller-driven Tu-4 would have little if any-
thing to fear from the few American interceptors then on alert. SAC
preparations for retaliation could take days while sufficient bombers de-
ployed to forward bases and became armed with atomic weapons. Mean-
while, if the Soviet war plan was well conceived, it might include provi-
sions for evacuating people and industry to outlying areas. A Soviet first
strike could not be considered any more improbable or irrational than
Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, so the enhancement of air defense since
the outbreak of fighting in Korea seemed logical. 11

General Vandenberg was especially concerned with the air defense
of Alaska — an important military staging area in light of the polar con-
cept, and a possible target for enemy bombers approaching the U.S.
mainland. Air Force fighter forces in Alaska, undermanned and equipped
largely with obsolete F-82s, were plagued with frequent mechanical
breakdowns. Before hostilities began in Korea, the Air Force had decid-
ed to phase out the Twin Mustang. The aircraft performed so inefficient-
ly that it had not been marked for transfer to Air National Guard units,
as was the jet F-80; it was marked for disposal. In the meantime, no F-

131

The Emerging Shield

82 parts were being manufactured, nor were they normally interchange-
able. 12

Worsening matters in Alaska, ground-based radar equipment re-
mained extremely scarce. General Frank A. Armstrong, head of Alaskan
Air Command, implored Vandenberg to send additional equipment,
saying "any kind that will make a blip will do." In response, the Air
Staff supplied Armstrong with enough equipment and personnel for five
additional radar stations. 13 Equally important, one squadron received F-
94 all-weather interceptor jets as replacements for the F-82. Like the
Twin Mustang, the F-94 was to serve temporarily until the Air Force
could substitute the F-89. The F-94A, received by the squadron in
Alaska, was lightly armed with four .50-caliber machineguns. This gun
sufficed when combined with the Hughes APG-32 radar, the first Amer-
ican postwar intercept radar to become operational. A backseat radar op-
erator acquired the target on his scope and directed the aircraft until the
pilot could take aim with a radar image in his optical sight. In late 1949,
an F-94A pilot shot down (for the first time) a target drone without
having actually seen it. 14

In November 1950, Armstrong and Lt. Gen. William Kepner, now
head of the Alaskan unified command, conducted a two-day test of the
air defenses. Although the F-94s and additional radar equipment were
judged improvements, Kepner and Armstrong found numerous problems.
The radar coverage continued to show gaps, identification of aircraft re-
mained too slow, and communications were inadequate. Fighter base fa-
cilities were poor, and the Army did not provide nearly enough antiair-
craft artillery units, primarily because of requirements in Korea. The
final report concluded that had the exercise strike force consisted of Tu-
4 bombers, the raiders probably would have completed their missions
successfully. 15

Meanwhile, in CONAC, Whitehead directed his commanders to try
once again to institute twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week oper-
ations. The recall of Air Reserve controllers, radio technicians, and other
air control and warning specialists promised to make this possible. Unfor-
tunately, the Air Force lack of tactical air resources soon resulted in the
transfer of many of Whitehead's personnel to radar units in Korea. In
short, Whitehead found it as impractical as Kepner and Armstrong had
to begin around-the-clock operations in Alaska. Whitehead consequently
ordered the continental radar systems to operate at the peak efficiency of
individual units. 16

Fighter-interceptor units adopted similar procedures. During day-
light hours each squadron kept from two to eight aircraft on fifteen-
minute alert, depending on the number of aircraft available. In addition,
each squadron kept a third of its complement of operational aircraft on
132

Air Defense — Korean War Period

three-hour alert. Operational aircraft crews excused from alert duty per-
formed routine training. 17

These schedules meant that trained personnel in the Eastern and
Western air defense forces worked under intense pressure. The few
skilled people available had to put in seventy- to eighty-hour weeks and
had to be on call at all times. Leaves and passes were necessarily restrict-
ed. Such conditions could easily have undermined morale because the
direct threat posed to the United States as a result of the Korean War
appeared oblique at best. Air defense commanders, therefore, made spe-
cial efforts to explain the necessity of extended operations to their subor-
dinates. Members of the 26th Air Division in the east, for example,
learned that the Soviets possessed enough long-range aircraft to deliver
their entire stock of atom bombs in one strike, and they might do so! Be-
cause it seemed unlikely the United States would receive advance intelli-
gence of such an attack, the first indication would probably be radar de-
tection of a large wave of unidentified aircraft. The 26th Air Division
was reminded that its mission was to be ready to oppose and defeat such
a threat. 18

In the fighter-interceptor units, combat ready became a familiar term
after the start of the Korean War. The 52d Fighter Wing, based on
McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, provided a good example of what
this implied. One of the few wings able to assume full-time operations,
the 52d's combat crews rotated through 24-hour alert duty. Reflecting
the tenseness of the period, each crewmember carried a .45-caliber pistol
when on alert and on all air defense missions. Moreover, fearing sabo-
tage, the wing's F-82s remained under continuous armed guard in light-
ed areas. Recognizing the severe limitations of their aircraft, crewmem-
bers devised last-ditch ramming tactics whereby radar observers would
bail out and pilots would use the vacant starboard side of the fighter for
ramming enemy bombers. All in all, the crews were "brought to a keen
edge . . . ready for fighting when the order came." 19

The state of communications between Washington, the major com-
mands, and air defense divisions became a major concern of the Air
Force and all air defense components. The day the war began, the U.S.
Air Force Operations Staff set up an emergency command post on the
fourth floor of the Pentagon to serve as a reception point for radio mes-
sages between Vandenberg and his FEAF commanders during Air Staff
after-duty hours. In mid-July 1950, the installation of direct telephone
lines between Whitehead's headquarters and the 26th Air Division's
headquarters marked the beginning of the Air Force air raid warning
system. It became a rudimentary national warning network in August
when President Truman had a direct telephone line installed between the
Air Force Pentagon post and the White House. 20

133

The Emerging Shield

The emergence of an air defense command and control structure al-
lowed General Whitehead to expedite arrangements initiated as early as
1948 for alerting all military installations and state and national civil de-
fense authorities of an approaching air attack. By fall 1950, communica-
tions and procedures existed for this purpose. As in World War II, de-
grees of alert were designated by color codes. "Yellow," when transmit-
ted by air division centers to civilian and military key points, meant the
possibility of attack. "Red" signified an imminent air attack. "White-
meant all clear. The air defenses subsequently adopted the term "Air De-
fense Readiness" to use for alerting air defense and other specified mili-
tary forces when commanders suspected danger but were not convinced
of the necessity to alert the entire nation. 21

Other significant improvements in air defense procedures developed
during the first months after the start of the war, as in July when the
JCS agreed on the mandatory filing of flight plans for military pilots
flying through defended areas. The Air Force, with cooperation from
the Civil Aeronautics Administration, pressed for similar control of civil-
ian air traffic. In September, Congress empowered Truman to impose
such control whenever the safety of the nation seemed threatened. Mean-
while, the Air Force defined more precisely the areas in which mandato-
ry filing would be required. The restricted areas, since 1948 variously

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Air Defense — Korean War Period

named "active defense areas" or "defense zones," now became "air de-
fense identification zones." 22

To enhance air defense principles further, on August 24, 1950, Presi-
dent Truman concurred with a proposal initiated by Vandenberg for
clarifying conditions under which fighter-interceptors could open fire. At
the start of the Korean War, fighters could fire only after intruders had
committed a clearly hostile act. The new ruling permitted firing when
the intruder was "manifestly hostile in intent, or . . . bore the military
insignia of the U.S.S.R., unless properly cleared or obviously in distress."
(The ruling required not just radar contact, but that the intruder be visu-
ally sighted, before firing could commence.) 23

Another significant event in air defense was the August 1, 1950,
agreement on antiaircraft artillery procedures reached by Vandenberg
and Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins. Largely the product
of negotiations in April between Major Generals Frank F. Everest of the
Air Staff and Charles L. Bolte of the Army General Staff, this Collins-
Vandenberg agreement allowed air division commanders to exercise
operational control of all antiaircraft artillery units assigned to their sec-
tors. Division heads were expected to establish flexible conditions under
which the units would go into action. Everest and Bolte proposed that
while sector commanders would be authorized to issue hold fire orders
to antiaircraft artillery commanders, these orders would be imposed for
as short a period as practicable. Everest and Bolte agreed that the com-
manders had to be free to fire at aircraft that they determined hostile,
unless otherwise directed. 24

The Collins- Vandenberg agreement formalized the rules of engage-
ment described by Bolte and Everest in April. Just as important, it au-
thorized Whitehead and Brig. Gen. Willard W. Irvine, named to head
the new Antiaircraft Artillery Command, to establish an antiaircraft artil-
lery component at each echelon of the air defense forces. The officers in
charge of the artillery units were expected to serve as the principal ad-
visers to their respective air defense chiefs. Antiaircraft artillery com-
manders in the field, therefore, would be assured that the orders they re-
ceived had been confirmed by or, at the very least, coordinated through
their own services. This agreement was expected to alleviate interservice
conflicts. 25

General Irvine began to put into effect the organizational provisions
of the Collins-Vandenberg agreement in late August. He established the
Eastern Antiaircraft Artillery Command on Stewart Air Force Base,
New York, and the Western Antiaircraft Artillery Command on Hamil-
ton Air Force Base, California. He also moved his headquarters from the
Pentagon to Mitchel Air Force Base, a better location from which to co-
ordinate air defense matters with Whitehead. From all appearances the
Korean conflict served as the impetus that at long last moved the Army

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The Emerging Shield

and Air Force to seek compromises, put aside interservice jealousies, and
reach sensible agreements on the position of antiaircraft artillery in air
defense. 26 Unfortunately, time brought more problems.

The outbreak of the Korean War — following so closely on various
incidents of Cold War tension in Eastern Europe and Berlin, the Soviet
atomic explosion, and the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist government
by the Chinese Communists— obliterated the limit on military expendi-
tures imposed shortly after the end of World War II. The Air Force be-
lieved more money would be available not only for all its critical pro-
grams, especially those involving SAC, but also for air defense. Con-
gressman Carl Vinson reinforced this belief early in August 1950 when
he told Vandenberg that the House Armed Services Committee wanted
to help the Air Force achieve its goals. Still, said Vinson, the committee
was unhappy with the progress of certain Air Force programs, including
the permanent radar system. Vinson decided to establish a special radar
subcommittee to evaluate periodic Air Force progress reports on the
system. 27

The call for rapid improvements in air defense also appeared in the
media. Retired General Carl Spaatz, now a military analyst, offered his
opinion in Newsweek. Spaatz wrote that time was running out and the
United States could ill afford to postpone safeguarding the nation from
nuclear attack. He recommended immediately strengthening all compo-
nents of the air defenses. 28

New men now assumed the job of creating new air defense systems
and forces and of reassessing future needs. General Fairchild, who, al-
though seriously ill for some time, had remained at his post at Vanden-
berg's request, died three months before the start of the Korean War. His
death cost the Air Force the services of an outstanding planner and theo-
rist. It also adversely affected the fortunes of his protege, Gordon Sa-
ville. "When Santy died," Saville said later, "my heart went flat, I was
through." He felt that, as long as Fairchild was Vice Chief of Staff, "I
could survive, I was willing to fight. But when there wasn't any Santy
. . . there wasn't any place [to] go." Soon after Fairchild's death, Saville
planned his own retirement, in part because he feared the prospects for
improved air defense were diminished without Fairchild's backing. Sa-
ville thought no one was left on the Air Staff to deny the continuous
demand for resources made by SAC's strong-willed commander, General
Curtis E. LeMay. Of course, Saville realized his personal prospects had
also dimmed drastically by Fairchild's death. He had accumulated by
flaunting his connection with the Vice Chief, by his unconventional
style, and by his abrupt manners numerous enemies on the Air Staff in
the course of starting the air defense buildup. Although he remained at
his post as Deputy Chief of Staff for Development until June 1951 while

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Air Defense— Korean War Period

he completed ongoing projects and his successor was chosen, Fairchild's
death weakened Saville's influence in Air Staff councils. 29

Gordon Saville's contributions to the development of air defense in
the United States cannot be denied. He was an adept student, theorist,
practitioner, seer, and salesman of and for the concept. Blunt and outspo-
ken, a small, compact bundle of nervous energy and continually flowing
ideas, he never hesitated to present his views regardless of how unpopu-
lar they were to his superiors. In the process he gained a staunch admir-
er and backer in Fairchild, and many powerful adversaries able to
counter Fairchild's support. Perhaps a larger degree of tact and diploma-
cy would have permitted Saville to receive the accolades due him as the
progenitor of the sophisticated air defense networks that would emerge
in a few years after his retirement.

In selecting Fairchild's successor, Vandenberg had no dearth of
talent from which to choose. General Lauris Norstad filled the position
temporarily but deferred shortly to General Nathan F. Twining. Having
served with distinction in both the Pacific and European theaters in
World War II, recently Twining had briefly been Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel in the Air Staff and, before that, head of the Alaskan uni-
fied command. His dealings with the Army and Navy in Alaska proved
useful when he became involved with inevitable interservice disputes,
some involving air defense, as USAF Vice Chief of Staff and later as
Chief of Staff and Chairman of the JCS. 30

Another crucial change in the Air Force command occurred when
Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington left office in April 1950.
Although Symington resigned quietly, he was profoundly disturbed by
Secretary of Defense Johnson's belief that a forty-eight-group Air Force
was adequate in the face of the Soviet atomic threat. Thomas K. Finlet-
ter, Symington's successor, had served as head of President Truman's
Air Policy Commission in 1947 and, like his predecessor, was determined
to provide the Air Force with the best air defense capability possible — as
long as the offensive forces lost no funds in the process. Finletter chose
John A. McCone as his undersecretary and made him principally respon-
sible for expediting completion of the radar system. 31

The Korean War galvanized Congress into increasing defense ex-
penditures, benefiting air defense programs. Johnson permitted Finletter
to increase the priority of the radar programs, and Congress responded
in September 1950 with a supplemental appropriation of nearly $40 mil-
lion. The Air Force thus could now build the stations and purchase new
search and height-finder equipment more quickly. Now, apparently, the
Air Force had no excuses for not implementing rapidly the permanent
system as Representative Vinson expected. 32

On October 2, however, Deputy Chief of Staff (Comptroller) Lt.
Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings, advised Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

137

The Emerging Shield

Eugene M. Zuckert of scheduling problems. Shortages of building mate-
rials had caused construction delays, and a strike at the General Electric
plant in Syracuse, New York, in September (where the AN/CPS-6B
long-range radar was being manufactured) had impeded equipment deliv-
eries. 33 Zuckert passed the news on to McCone who, on October 30, car-
ried it to the House Armed Services Committee. At the same time,
McCone promised Vinson that the Air Force expected to have the first
twenty-four radar stations in operation no later than March 1, 1951, and
the remainder completed by the end of June 1952. For the moment,
Vinson was satisfied. 34

Soon after fighting began in Korea, the Air Force examined its
worldwide radar control and warning requirements. Twining, agreeing
that the permanent system was inadequate in the United States, author-
ized the mobile radar program. Whitehead was to receive twenty-four
radar stations, increased from an original sixteen, to protect SAC bases.
The new program also included twenty mobile radar stations to fill what
were perceived as gaps in the permanent system. To minimize costs, the
Air Force planned to select sites requiring "minimum access roads, grad-
ing, clearing, and construction of hardstands on which the mobile equip-
ment could be placed." The Air Force intended to operate the new radar
stations with tactical air control groups, units that could be housed on air
bases and moved to the stations for training, during alerts, and in actual
emergency, should one arise. Twining decided to support the program
with funds targeted for the tactical forces because units trained to oper-
ate the mobile radar stations could perform the same job in Korea, if
necessary. 35

As with the radar station programs, the Korean War also proved an
impetus to the buildup and improvement of the civilian Ground Observ-
er Corps (GOC). In July, Whitehead directed his commanders to make
every effort to improve all phases of the GOC program and to bring it
to maximum capability because low-altitude attacks still posed a danger.
He was anxious for the U.S. program to at least keep up with that of the
Canadians. By October 1950, the Royal Canadian Air Force had institut-
ed a ground observer system, the Long Range Air Raid Warning
System, capable of twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week operations.
Using radio communications, volunteer observers reported sightings to
the nearest Canadian Air Force radar of any aircraft they could recog-
nize with four or more engines. 36

By November the Air Force considered the American GOC system
to have a limited capability. Of the 26 filter centers planned, 19 were
being installed in the east and 7 in the west. Each filter center personnel
authorization included 1 officer, 3 airmen, and approximately 500 civilian
volunteers. Observation posts, which reported to filter centers, required
at least 25 volunteers to operate continuously. 37

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Air Defense — Korean War Period

In early November the Air Force conducted a ground observer test
in the east designed primarily "to revive interest of current members . . .
tired from lack of activity." The final report indicated that, while enthu-
siasm was generally high, the GOC, with its present manning and train-
ing, could provide continuous tracks to the radar system only in a few
areas. The exercise confirmed that recruitment and training remained the
most urgent immediate tasks. Station personnel frequently mishandled
ground observer information, failing to correlate it properly with infor-
mation from radars. The report recommended that radar station com-
manders encourage teamwork among Air Force members and civilian
volunteers. 38

Reorganization and the Impact of the Chinese
Intervention

A mid- 1950 reorganization assigned the tactical forces from
CONAC's numbered air forces to regional air defense and tactical air or-
ganizations, but almost immediately planning started for another, far
more extensive change. Before the Korean War, Vinson and the House

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The Emerging Shield

Armed Services Committee expressed displeasure with progress in air
defense. The Committee also questioned whether the Air Force was
making its best effort to provide sufficient air support for the Army. In
May 1950, Vinson told Maj. Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force congres-
sional liaison officer, that the Air Force had to increase the resources
and efficiency of its tactical forces or risk losing its mission to the Marine
Corps. 39 Although joking, Vinson made an important point that the Air
Force heeded.

The Air Staff began planning to reorganize CONAC in response to
Congress's and its own concerns about the strength of the tactical and air
defense forces. Staff members consulted Whitehead, who suggested es-
tablishing a separate air defense command so that air defense activities
could receive undivided attention and supervision. Reiterating a sugges-
tion Stratemeyer had made two years earlier, Whitehead asked that the
new headquarters be moved inland to make it less vulnerable, proposing
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, as a location. He also asked that a third
regional command be formed, a Central Air Defense Force. He reasoned
that when the Eastern and Western air defense forces became fully
staffed, logistical and administrative difficulties would arise. 40

On November 10, 1950, Vandenberg and Twining notified White-
head that the Air Force had approved activation of a separate Air De-
fense Command with headquarters on Ent. Whithead's other recommen-
dation that a third air defense region be formed remained undecided. 41

In addition to making air defense the sole mission of a major com-
mand, the Air Force reestablished TAC as a major command. As Van-
denberg explained to General John K. Cannon, then serving as head of
U.S. Air Forces in Europe:

Reduction of strength and the [postwar] economy program
necessitated consolidation of Air Defense Command and
Tactical Air Command into CONAC. Our increased
strength now indicates the reestablishedment of these com-
mands under these headquarters. I feel that this must be
done at once. I propose to assign Whitehead as Air Defense
commander and you to command the TAC with your head-
quarters at Langley. Your backing ... in the tactical field
and your standing with the Army . . . uniquely qualifies
[sic] you for this command.

The reorganization provided for an increase to three major Air Force
commands— a new Air Defense Command under Whitehead, a reestab-
lished Tactical Air Command under Cannon, and a restructured Conti-
nental Air Command— with jurisdiction over the air defense and tactical
forces, when before there had been just one. The primary task of
CONAC would be to administer and supervise the Air Reserve forces.
Headquarters USAF set December 1, 1950, as the effective date for the
reorganization. Whitehead began selecting who on his staff would ac-
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Air Defense — Korean War Period

company him to Ent and who would remain on Mitchel as a cadre for
the new CONAC to be established there. 42

Whitehead and the staff officers who accompanied him to Colorado
Springs were handicapped by the uncertainty of Air Force programs
that changed several times in the weeks immediately before and after
fighting started in Korea. When the war began, the Air Force expected
by mid- 1954 to have 69 wings (the Air Force described a wing as 2 or
more squadrons and support elements). In August 1950 Vandenberg told
the JCS that the Air Force required 130 wings to meet its commitments
in Korea while maintaining combat-ready forces in Europe and the con-
tinental United States. The Chiefs decided on a 95-wing program, and in
September President Truman agreed. 43

Neither the JCS nor the President clarified just when the Air Force
would actually attain 95 wings. From August until November 1950
budgetary pressures and the satisfactory progress of the war in Korea
postponed a decision on just when the Air Force would expand to meet
its new goals. This situation changed abruptly when the Chinese Com-
munists launched a massive counterattack against United Nations forces
on November 26. On December 15 in a radio and television report to the
American people, Truman declared a national emergency. The true sig-
nificance of the Chinese attack, he said, proved that the Communist lead-
ers were "willing to push the world to the brink of general war to get
what they want." Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Congress that
"the Russians [were] behind all these movements" and the United States
had "to face the possibility now that anything can happen anywhere at
any time." 44 In ordering his Air Force commanders to take whatever ac-
tions they deemed necessary to increase readiness and effectiveness in
their forces, Vandenberg noted that the JCS believed the Chinese attack
increased the chances for a general war. 45 The Chiefs recommended that
forces and equipment scheduled for 1954 be ready by 1952 or sooner,
and Acheson's successor as Secretary of Defense, George C. Marshall,
and President Truman approved their proposals. 46

Congress approved Truman's requests for supplemental funds to
meet the new goals set for 19 52. 47 For the Air Force this included a spe-
cial appropriation for the mobile radar program and increases in radar
and aircraft procurement. Congress also supported the President's impo-
sition of mandatory control over civilian air traffic in an emergency. As
of December 27, 1950, civilian and military aircraft operating within the
air defense identification zones had to file flight plans for air defense
identification purposes. 48 Truman and Marshall also increased the call to
active duty of Reservists and National Guardsmen to meet manpower re-
quirements engendered by the decision to move military programs ahead
two years, and the President decided the states would be primarily re-
sponsible for implementing civil defense measures, with the newly cre-

141

The Emerging Shield

ated federal Civil Defense Administration providing coordination and
guidance. 49

The Air Force intended to supply Whitehead with forty-five fighter-
interceptor squadrons (constituting approximately fifteen of the ninety-
five wings allocated) under the new 1952 program. 50 As head of ADC,
Whitehead hoped to upgrade his command's capabilities immediately.
Finletter assisted by ordering the federalization of fifteen Air National
Guard fighter squadrons in February 1951 (he was delegated to do so)
and of another six squadrons in March, and by assigning them to ADC. 51
Twining also earmarked an additional fifteen National Guard fighter
squadrons for the air defense mission and obtained Truman's permission
to authorize Whitehead to federalize them in an emergency. As Twining
told Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, Chief of the National Guard Bureau,
Whitehead could now use all Air Guard forces in an imminent or actual
enemy air attack. 52

With the additional funds contained in the 1952 budget, the Air
Force increased orders for all-weather interceptors (F-94s, F-89s, and
F-86Ds), and Air Training Command prepared to expand radar observer
and all-weather interceptor schools for pilots. If aircraft deliveries and
aircrew training progressed as anticipated, all forty-five of ADC's fight-
er-interceptor squadrons would be ready for all-weather operations by
mid-1953. 53

A potentially embarrassing situation developed when the Air Staff
informed Vandenberg that the permanent radar system could not be
completed according to the deadline Under Secretary McCone had
given to the House Armed Services Committee. McCone had told
Vinson that the first twenty-four stations would be operating by March
1, 1951, and the rest by the following July. Although construction had
proceeded smoothly, equipment deliveries had fallen behind schedule,
and installation of the new radars proved more difficult than expected. 54

The Air Force had initially planned to use older equipment of the
type deployed in the Lashup system on many of the permanent stations.
The basic Lashup radar, the long-range AN/CPS-5, could not provide
low-altitude coverage. Although funds became available to purchase new
equipment for all permanent stations after the start of the Korean War,
some on the Air Staff favored moving equipment from Lashup stations
onto permanent stations as soon as construction ended. Whitehead ob-
jected, and Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff for Oper-
ations in the Air Staff, supported him. Discussions, during a conference
in Edwards's office on December 6, 1950, assured Whitehead that
Lashup equipment would not be moved to the permanent sites or decom-
missioned until the new sites could receive the new radars. 55 However,
the older World War II-type radar, the CPS-5, at only 165 miles out-
ranged the first new radar deployed, the CPS-6B. Like its World War II
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Air Defense — Korean War Period

predecessors, the CPS-6B could not provide low-altitude coverage. Its
new moving-target indicator, expected to improve tracking coverage of
aircraft, also failed to live up to expectations. 66

Whitehead did not fully appreciate all this when he opposed moving
Lashup equipment onto permanent sites. The decision meant the Air
Force could not meet the deadline for completing the first-priority radar
stations nor the July 1951 deadline for completing the permanent system.
McCone reluctantly wrote Vinson that completion dates were based on
the plan to use older radars, operational on interim sites, in new sites
until improved radars could be produced and installed. Now, however,
because of the entry of the Chinese Communists into the Korean War,
the Air Force again believed the possibility of a general war existed.
Under the circumstances, the Air Force did not want to risk transferring
older radars to new sites and losing radar coverage temporarily. Comple-
tion of the permanent system would be delayed until at least November
1951, and McCone asked the House Armed Services Committee for pa-
tience and understanding. Worker strikes had interfered with equipment
delivery, and shortages of building materials had slowed construction
and installation. Still, said McCone, the Air Force intended to overcome
these difficulties and provide the nation with the best possible aircraft
control and warning service as soon as practicable. 57

Although McCone's explanation appeared to satisfy the Armed
Services Committee, not everyone in Congress thought the air defense
programs moved as fast as they should. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's
belief that "domestic air defenses are so feeble as almost to invite attack"
led him to propose expanding the Air Force to 150 groups and, appar-
ently, allocating far greater resources to air defense. 58

While Lodge's suggestion to expand the Air Force was greeted en-
thusiastically by Air Force leaders, they expressed concern that it might
precipitate an immediate overinvestment in air defense to the detriment
of the strategic forces. Their concern reflected the theme that prevailed
through the history of continental air defense. From the mid- 1930s, the
Air Force had advocated air defenses capable of exacting an extreme
price from any attacker of the American homeland, but few if any Air
Force leaders believed even the most potent air defense could, by itself,
ensure a favorable outcome in an intercontinental war. For that purpose,
strategic forces needed to be primed and ready for offensive action. As
air defense assumed more public significance, the Air Force became in-
creasingly disturbed when emphasis on air defense came at the expense
of SAC.

In early 1951 Vandenberg told the House Committee on Appropria-
tions that the Air Force believed "the most tenable means to prevent
large numbers of atomic bombs from dropping on this country is to re-
taliate by destroying these weapons and the means for their delivery at

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The Emerging Shield

their source." Strangely, the congressmen did not challenge this state-
ment. They might have questioned how, if the United States chose to
forgo the option of a first strike attack, the Air Force planned to "retali-
ate" by destroying bombers and bombs "at their source." The Air Force
had claimed repeatedly that the Soviet atomic threat was credible only if
the Soviets used their complete supply of bombers and weapons in at-
tacking the United States. 59

Vandenberg believed an adequate air defense system contributed to
deterrence.* But, in what became an oft-quoted statement, he announced
publicly in February 1951 that the most the American people could
expect from the air defense system was for it to destroy thirty percent of
attacking bombers before they reached their targets. He realized many
Americans would be shocked to find the nation so vulnerable to air
attack. Putting most of the Air Force budget into building static de-
fenses, however, was not the answer. "Even if we had many more inter-
ceptor planes and AA [antiaircraft] guns and a radar screen that blanket-
ed all approaches to our boundaries," he said, "a predictable 70 percent
of the enemy's planes would penetrate our defenses." Regardless, as
Chief of Staff he promised that the Air Force would do everything
within its power to make U.S. air defenses the best in the world. But he
wanted Americans to accept the fact that "the offensive always has a
crushing advantage in aerial warfare, and there is no prospect that the
balance will change in the foreseeable future." 60

Vandenberg based his estimate of maximum effectiveness of an air
defense system on the findings of a committee led by Dr. Valley. In
March 1950 the Valley Committee estimated that the system proposed in
the Blue Book plan would destroy about ten percent of enemy bombers.
The committee members' subsequent investigations led them to believe
the Air Force could raise this to thirty percent by bringing present
equipment and forces to peak efficiency. In the meantime, while the Air
Force attempted to reach this goal, Valley recommended that MIT es-
tablish an air defense laboratory. The laboratory would research and de-
velop new equipment, including computers, for automating data handling
and transmission which might eventually enable the defense systems to
destroy far more than thirty percent of an enemy bomber fleet attacking
the United States. 61

•Deterrence, which became a commonly used term in the Cold War period, had been
practiced in relations between contending parties throughout history. A good definition is
supplied by military analyst John M. Collins [Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (An-
napolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp 34-35]:

Deterrence aims at obviating war. It is a compound of threats, the
capability to carry them out, and the will to execute, if necessary.
Successful combinations preclude unwanted aggression by imposing
on deterees the prospect of exorbitant costs in relation to anticipat-
ed gains. The product is stability.

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Air Defense— Korean War Period

Using the skills of civilian scientists in projects of military signifi-
cance was not new to the Air Force, but the use of scientists for matters
of air defense soon became unprecedented. Some of the nation's out-
standing scientists devoted themselves to developing advanced air de-
fense systems; their efforts were crucial to the system that emerged in
the second half of the 1950s. However, when some scientists proposed to
the Air Force what seemed an optimal defense system, disagreements de-
veloped between the scientists and the airmen.

After the Chinese moved their forces into Korea in November 1950
and world tensions increased, the Air Force began to analyze the effec-
tiveness of various weapons systems suggested by Valley, as well as of
those suggested by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) or-
ganized by the Secretary of Defense and comprised of military officers
and civilians. The WSEG had been making an independent study of air
defense since early 1950. It had concluded that the existing system was
dangerously inadequate and that the one scheduled for operation in 1952
would be little improved. 62

On the basis of Valley's and the WSEG's evaluations and recom-
mendations, the Air Force moved to have leading scientists at MIT, over
the objections of some faculty members who objected to the university's
continued involvement in military research and development, work on
the air defense problem. MIT President James R. Killian, Jr., became
convinced that, if the university could improve the nation's defenses, it
should do so. 63 He insisted that a new study group be formed to confirm
the need for an air defense laboratory and to select the projects it should
investigate. Killian also insisted that, if the laboratory was established, its
resources and findings be made available to the Army and the Navy.
Thus could MIT research requirements for fleet defense operations and
defense of overseas military bases as well as those for continental air de-
fense. 64 The Air Force agreed with Killian's conditions, and a new study
group called Project Charles, led by Dr. F. Wheeler Loomis of the
University of Illinois, began to examine the feasibility of an air defense
laboratory. 65

Vandenberg wrote Killian about the major deficiencies in the air de-
fense system that the Air Force hoped the laboratory (if established)
would solve. Paramount among them, according to the Chief of Staff,
was that verbal and manual methods of communicating and displaying
aircraft position plots obtained by radar were too slow, used telephone
lines inefficiently, and could not deal with a high level of air traffic.
Vandenberg believed the Air Force needed "improved means for the
rapid collection, transmission, processing, and display of information on
the air situation. All these things should, as far as possible, be done auto-
matically and without human intervention." He was also disturbed by the
Air Force's inability to track low-flying aircraft on radar. He outlined

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The Emerging Shield

related needs as including airborne radar equipment that would afford
true all-weather capability and a method to detect aircraft approaching
the United States by overwater routes. This latter need presented a spe-
cial problem because of the curvature of the earth and the line-of-sight
radar beam. Radar could detect hostile aircraft flying at high altitudes
only about an hour before they reached the American coastlines. Low-
flying planes could be detected only a few minutes after they crossed the
coastlines. Radar picket ships and patrol aircraft could alleviate these
problems somewhat but, in the number needed for adequate coverage,
would be very expensive to operate. In summary, Vandenberg told Kil-
lian:

The foregoing problems by no means exhaust the list of
technical difficulties faced by the Air Force in connection
with its responsibility for air defense. Among others I might
mention the problem of bringing all-weather fighters safely
back to base under instrument conditions; the problem of
coordinating fighter interceptors, antiaircraft artillery,
ground-countermeasures; the problem of controlling friend-
ly air traffic in such a way that a minimum interference
with normal operations is produced, while the identification
of friendly aircraft is facilitated and so on. 66

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Air Defense— Korean War Period

The need for an air defense laboratory to investigate the myriad prob-
lems seemed obvious to Vandenberg. Clearly, the Air Force was deter-
mined at this stage to forge ahead with its laboratory approach to air
defense. From all indications, the Air Force had the utmost faith in the
scientists.

Content in the knowledge that some of the nation's best scientific
talent would soon be delving into the air defense problem, Whitehead
proceeded to organize his new command. Notwithstanding minimal fa-
cilities at Ent and scarce housing at Colorado Springs, Whitehead and
his staff remained optimistic. They were especially relieved, as was
Twining, that ADC Headquarters at last operated inland, a less appealing
target for enemy raiders. They were also pleased that the command was
far from the distractions offered by New York City, in contrast to the
situation at Mitchel Air Force Base. 67

General Irvine's Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command Headquar-
ters also left Mitchel to join ADC in Colorado Springs. Because of
crowding on Ent, Irvine and his staff worked in a hotel in downtown
Colorado Springs. There they prepared to take command on April 10,
1951, of forces consisting of 23 battalions — 6 of automatic weapons, 9 of
90-mm guns, and 8 of 120-mm guns. 68

147

The Emerging Shield

No sooner had ADC been activated than Whitehead reopened his
case for a third regional command to supplement the Eastern and West-
ern air defense forces. In late January 1951 Twining agreed; Central Air
Defense Force activated on March 1, 1951, with headquarters on Grand-
view Air Force Base (redesignated Richards-Gebaur AFB in 1957),
south of Kansas City. 69

For the next six months Whitehead concentrated on organizing and
readying his forces for any eventuality. Then, having done his best to
bring ADC to peak efficiency, he decided to retire because of ill health.
Although Headquarters USAF disappointed him with less support than
he believed his job required, he left gracefully. "Having had the privi-
lege," as he expressed it, "of guiding ADC through its first half-year of
separate existence," he told Vandenberg that it had been "a trying time
for all of us as we worked to organize this command during a period of
unparalleled peacetime expansion." Essentially, he said, it had been a
case of improvisation in many areas:

Our supply of skilled and experienced personnel has been
meager. We had to utilize our materiel sources to the limit.
In many cases, fighter squadrons which have just been
called to active duty remain on barely adequate bases be-
cause permanent ones . . . could not be made available eco-
nomically in a short time. All work done on the temporary
bases was limited to the rudiments of necessity. In most
cases the original squadron equipment was retained and
shepherded carefully. A similar program was followed for
the AC&W program .... Sites originally designed for
smaller numbers of personnel, are necessarily accommodat-
ing many. 70

General Benjamin W. Chidlaw, a graduate of West Point, replaced
Whitehead. Although he had commanded tactical air forces in World
War II, he earned his reputation in technical and engineering assign-
ments; he had directed the first Air Force jet engine and aircraft devel-
opment programs. As head of the Air Materiel Command, he had been
closely associated with air defense matters, especially those dealing with
acquisition and installation of equipment in radar stations. 71 Because air
defense appeared destined to become a concept imbued in sophisticated
technology, Chidlaw seemed the perfect officer to lead ADC.

Chidlaw examined closely the assets and capabilities of ADC against
the demands of the mission. He had been led by Vandenberg's public
statements to believe that under the ninety-five-wing buildup ADC
would be capable of stopping two or three of every ten attacking bomb-
ers. After looking more closely at the matter, he believed Vandenberg
had been too optimistic. That, exclaimed Chidlaw in an Air Force major
commanders' meeting, "scared the hell out of me but plenty!" He told
the conferees in November 1951:

148

Air Defense

; — Korean War Period

General Benjamin W. Chidlaw

I said to myself . . . how do you know you're right— how
do you know that your people have come up or even close
to being right? Well, the answer was call in the greybeards,
the scientists, the mathematicians . . . and let's see if the
odds are of such ... an order. This I did. First, I called
RAND. They have been studying this problem for many,
many months. Their figures coincided with mine almost on
the button. Now I got more scared than ever, so I thought I
had better check again. Get a checker to check the checker.
So, we did that. We talked with personnel of the Weapons
Systems Evaluation Group .... We got hold of Dr.
Valley and his crew ... at Cambridge .... All agreed
that this figure of ten percent could, even under certain
conditions generally adverse to the defense, be overly opti-
mistic. 72

In October 1951, RAND, which had been performing air defense
studies since early 1947, submitted a major study of requirements for
1952 to 1953. Concluding that the Soviets would possess from 100 to 500
Tu-4 bombers armed with 100 atomic bombs by the end of 1953, RAND
analysts warned that the air defenses would not be able, to cope with
such a threat. They recommended that ADC's data handling, aircraft
identification, and ability to guard against low-level attack be improved
rapidly. The WSEG concluded similarly. It emphasized low-level de-

149

The Emerging Shield

fense, warning that new intelligence revealed that Soviet long-range
forces were developing such tactics. 73

Evaluations made by RAND and WSEG supported the recommen-
dations and conclusions of the final Project Charles report. The report
surmised that technology existed for solving air defense problems and
suggested that MIT proceed to organize an air defense laboratory as pro-
posed by Valley and seconded by Vandenberg. Killian and MIT agreed,
and when the Air Force accepted the major cost of the venture, the
Army and Navy assented. By December 1951, MIT had instituted the
so-called Lincoln Project, predecessor of the Lincoln Laboratory. 74

Loomis, leader of Project Charles, agreed to serve as Lincoln's
first director. He continued work started by the Valley Committee to
find a "quick fix" for current air defense equipment and operational
problems, but the major Lincoln Project program was to develop a
centralized digital air defense system, as begun by the Valley Committee.
This decision marked a watershed in continental air defense. 75

Valley and his associates decided that, in the long run, the perma-
nent system then being deployed could best be characterized as "an
animal . . . lame, purblind, and idiot-like . . . , [and] of the compara-
tives, idiotic is the strongest." Valley thought that it made "little sense
for us to strengthen the muscles [weapons], sinew [communications], or
the eyes [radar], if there is no brain [a data-processing center]." 76

As Valley saw the problem, even after the permanent system was
fully established, air defense would remain a local operation, without
central control. Telephone and teletype communications remained far
too slow to permit an overall air defense commander rapid decisionmak-
ing as the air battle whirled around him. Even if the central commander
received all the timely information from the various radar stations, he
could not assimilate the voluminous incoming data quickly enough. At
the local level, targets identified on radar were recorded on plexiglass
with grease pencils. Moreover, radio communication between weapons
controllers and interceptor pilots lacked speed and precision. According
to the Valley Committee the entire air defense apparatus was woefully
sluggish. 77

Although these problems might have seemed insurmountable, Valley
believed he recognized an answer in automation — specifically the com-
puter. After World War II, industrial applications of automation had just
begun and military applications were only dimly perceived. This situa-
tion, however, would soon change.

In 1946 the first all-electronic digital calculator was tested and oper-
ated. The next year at MIT, Dr. Jay W. Forrester designed a computer
called Whirlwind. Its program, funded by the Office of Naval Re-
search, originally sought to analyze aircraft stability. Forrester envi-
sioned his machine as being equipped to accept radar pulses that "could

150

Air Defense— Korean War Period

Plexiglass plotting board
at the Combat Operations
Center, Ent Air Force Base

trigger the machine to calculate airplane speeds, directions, and dis-
tances, all within microseconds." Some Air Force officers in research
and development, Saville prominent among them, believed the computer
could eventually be used for air traffic control and air defense. In air
traffic control, the computer would be tasked with keeping planes apart;
in air defense, it could provide information allowing aircraft to come to-
gether, as with fighters intercepting enemy bombers. Largely through
the persuasive efforts of Saville, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Develop-
ment, the Air Force decided to share the costs of Whirlwind develop-
ment with the Navy. 78

By mid- 1952 the Lincoln Laboratory led the way in development of
the computerized air defense system. As Secretary of the Air Force Fin-
letter pointed out, the Air Force now had some of the most eminent sci-
entists of World War II and postwar years at work on the problem. He
was confident that "no other source . . . either in education or industry
possessed an air defense development potential to [equal] that of
MIT." 79

151

The Emerging Shield

Confronting Realities

Despite all of the Air Force's hopes for the computerized network
of the future, present air defense problems still needed solutions. Regard-
less of the best Air Force efforts to expedite completion of the perma-
nent radar system, it became operational at approximately the time
scheduled. When Chidlaw took over ADC, only one station functioned:
the 25th Air Division's station on McChord Air Force Base, Washing-
ton, equipped with new CPS-6B combination search and height-finding
radars. Fourteen more permanent stations came into operation by the end
of 1951, two equipped with the first AN/FPS-3 search radars, and the
others with CPS-6Bs. 80

Fortunately for the Air Force, pressure from the House Armed
Services Committee regarding progress on radar stations lessened as the
situation in Korea stabilized. Twining and his top Air Staff officers had
momentarily considered slowing work on other projects to speed com-
pletion of the radar stations, but reduced tensions influenced them not to
do so. The program therefore moved ahead, with the permanent system
nearly completed by late 1952. 81

To obtain the skilled personnel required for staffing radar stations,
the Air Staff agreed to let ADC hire civilian experts. By summer 1951,
about 300 electronic engineers from the Philco Corporation worked for
ADC. The program also included communications specialists from the
Radio Corporation of America. These technical representatives worked
closely with ADC personnel for many years. 82

With the establishment of Lincoln Laboratory, changes occurred in
the permanent system. By early 1953, Chidlaw commanded eleven divi-
sions whose sectors encompassed the whole nation. Chidlaw also com-
manded three regional centers and his own Combat Operations Center
on Ent, none of which had even been contemplated in the original pro-
gram. Now, the Air Force looked forward to the centralized system as
the best way to facilitate the changeover from manual to automated sys-
tems. The Combat Operations Center on Ent also reflected the pivotal
role Colorado Springs began to assume in all facets of air defense. 83

ADC had planned to add forty-four mobile radar stations to the
emerging permanent system: twenty-four to provide protection for six
SAC bases and twenty to serve as low-altitude "gap fillers." 84 On Janu-
ary 18, when the final site surveys for the forty-four stations were com-
plete and contracts for their construction were arranged, Chidlaw sus-
pended all activity on the mobile programs. His staff, along with RAND
and WSEG analysts, had decided that, for maximum efficiency, ADC
defenses had to be deployed in a double perimeter in the northeast, the

152

Air Defense— Korean War Period

Early computers. Patch
panel of an early IBM
computer (above) and com-
ponent parts of a UNIVAC
(below).

northwest, and California. These deployments would be supplemented by
island defenses around the SAC and Atomic Energy Commission instal-
lations located beyond the perimeter-protected areas. 85 As described by
Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, ADC Vice Commander, the goal would
be to encircle these "complexes of vital targets . . . [with] two lines of
radar, with the inner perimeter located approximately 70 miles from the
edge of the target area, and the outer line extended 120 miles." ADC
planned to base its interceptor forces within the perimeter lines to detect
and destroy, enemy bombers before they reached their targets. 86

153

The Emerging Shield

General Frederic H. Smith

Although the term "double perimeter" sounded innovative, the con-
cept merely reiterated the principle of selected, in-depth deployment Sa-
ville and his staff had called for in 1948. By reopening the case for the
concept, Chidlaw said, in effect, that the permanent radar system served
as the nucleus for in-depth air defenses around selected areas. As a first
step, Chidlaw asked Vandenberg to allow ADC to replan the location of
the forty-four mobile stations. Vandenberg, in turn, directed Twining to
have the Air Force Council* study the matter, assuring that it would be
considered within the context of overall Air Force requirements. A
major question asked whether SAC bases would receive adequate pro-
tection under the double perimeter system. The council answered yes,
and on February 13, 1952, Vandenberg recommended that the Air Force
proceed with the double perimeter plan. Vandenberg pledged Chidlaw
complete Air Staff support, but he warned the plan's implementation was
subject to available funds. 87

In October 1952 Chidlaw called for a second-phase mobile radar
program, and in mid-1953 he proposed a third phase. The resulting 104
stations were all to be operational by 1956. The Air Force approved

The Air Force Council was established by Vandenberg on April 26, 1951, to speed
the policy and decisionmaking process in the Air Staff. Chaired by Twining, the council
consisted by July 1951 of the five Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the Inspector General [Fu-
trell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p. 154]. An earlier Air Council had been formed in June
1941 with tlje establishment of the AAF.

154

Air Defense — Korean War Period

Chidlaw's recommendations, again pending the availability of funds. 88
Smith told the Air Staff that the addition of 104 stations would provide
ADC solid coverage at medium and high altitudes over the double pe-
rimeter zones. These radars would not, however, solve ADC's continu-
ing dilemma in detecting aircraft flying below 5,000 feet. Smith suggest-
ed that small automatic radars be developed to supply low-altitude data.
The Air Staff approved the requirement, contingent, as always, on fund-
ing. 89 Electronic detection of aircraft flying at low altitudes continued to
elude the Air Force, despite its best efforts to solve the problem, in the
years ahead.

The Air Force stepped up attempts to extend the outer fringes of
the double perimeter areas seaward. Every major air defense study since
1947 had urged that picket ships and early-warning and control aircraft
be developed and acquired. Unfortunately, progress had been thwarted
by lack of money and the inability of the Air Force and Navy to agree
on how and where the overwater detection forces would operate and,
most importantly, who would command them.

Shortly after the Korean War started, Whitehead requested that
Headquarters USAF ask the Navy to assign enough picket destroyers for
ten stations on the east and west coasts. 90 Vandenberg promptly passed
the request to Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, who died
before he could act on the issue. His successor, Admiral William M.
Fechteler, promised to make the ships available, but probably not before
1954. Vandenberg asked the Navy to provide the ships sooner, to no
avail. The Navy, believing that destroyer-type picket ships should be de-
veloped for both fleet and continental air defense, had begun to reequip
former destroyer escorts for air defense duty and had stationed one off
the east coast to work with ADC in determining radar, communication,
and procedural needs. The Air Force approved these developments, but
thought the sea service did not move fast enough in providing picket
ships for home air defense and in assigning them to stations on the
coasts. 91

Navy reluctance to commit to an expensive picket vessel program to
support the Air Force continental defense mission figured prominently in
the Air Force decision to procure early-warning and control aircraft.
The Navy had pioneered the use of early-warning aircraft in World War
II and had begun to modify its Lockheed Constellation for fleet defense
in 1950. 92 The ADC and Air Proving Ground kept abreast of the
projects, and by spring 1951 were impressed sufficiently to suggest that
the Air Force purchase forty of the aircraft. By mid- 1951, the Air Staff
had developed a program for Lockheed to deliver ten EC-121s (the Air
Force designation for early-warning versions of the plane) by spring
1953 and thirty-eight over the succeeding two years. The program grew
subsequently to include fifty -six planes. 93

155

The Emerging Shield

With approval of the double perimeter concept in early 1952, Chid-
law decided to locate the airborne early-warning force on two bases, one
on each coast. The forces were expected to extend the radar coverage
and to detect an approaching enemy aircraft in time for interceptors to
scramble and engage bombers as far seaward as possible. By mid- 195 3,
ADC radar operators and technicians trained at Navy airborne early-
warning schools in San Diego, California, and Patuxent, Maryland. Be-
cause of labor difficulties, however, Lockheed delayed the delivery date
for the EC-121s to February 1954. 94 The Air Force could only prepare
its personnel to accept the aircraft, and wait.

Without reliable low-altitude radar, the Air Force relied on the ci-
vilian GOC. As ADC commander, Whithead had done his best to insti-
tute around-the-clock operations for the GOC, but he never reached this
goal. His determined recruiting effort paid off, for in the period after the
start of the Korean War, large numbers of patriotic citizens volunteered
their services in providing for the nation's defense. 95

In June 1951 ADC employed 8,000 observation posts and 26 filter
centers staffed by 210,000 volunteers in the first nationwide exercise of
the GOC. The two-day test was not impressive. The average time for
data to pass from observation posts through filter centers to radar sta-
tions that directed interceptor operations exceeded eight minutes. By
then, many bombers would have completed their missions. 96

Soon after the tests, the Air Force realized it would have to make
the GOC more effective; it had no alternative for supplying adequate
low-altitude coverage. 97 During Childlaw's first ADC commanders' con-
ference, held in Colorado Springs in October 1951, Vice Commander
Smith proposed that the GOC operate continuously along the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts and along the Canadian-American border. At a mini-
mum, said Smith, the GOC should operate around the clock in those
areas from May through October, when long daylight periods prevailed
over most of the Soviet Union. American intelligence sources assumed
that, if the Soviets attacked, they would do so in daylight to give their
air defenses an advantage against SAC retaliatory assaults. 98

Smith increased his efforts to improve the GOC after the command-
ers' conference. A year after the Korean War began, the American
people perceived less of a threat of general war and their patriotic urge
to support observation posts subsided. To overcome this apathy, Smith
believed the Air Force had to demonstrate why the GOC was vital. 99
Accordingly, Smith put the GOC on twenty-four-hour-a-day oper-
ations and increased its training. A test on October 24, 1951, of Eastern
Air Defense Force's ability to assume its posts in an emergency intensi-
fied his commitment to continuous operations. An hour into the test,
only twenty-nine percent of the observation post personnel had reported
in; after three hours, only seventy-five percent of the posts were staffed
156

Air Defense— Korean War Period

and operating. These results supported Smith's contention that the GOC
served little purpose unless it could respond rapidly to an actual
attack. 100

Chidlaw agreed completely with Smith. He asked Maj. Gen. Roger
M. Ramey, Air Staff Director of Operations, to grant the GOC higher
priority for funds, materiel, and personnel support. Chidlaw hoped to
have at least a portion of the GOC on twenty-four-hour-a-day duty by
spring 1952. The ADC chief told Ramey he knew that continuous oper-
ations of the GOC could raise concerns about an imminent enemy air
attack; still he believed that he had to train and use all the forces avail-
able to him. Ramey soon afterward told Chidlaw that the Air Staff
agreed to increase its support of the GOC. 101

The news prompted Chidlaw's staff to plan to put 32 filter centers
and 8,483 observation posts on 24-hour duty in 27 of the 36 states where
the GOC would operate. 102 Subsequent exchanges between the Pentagon
and Colorado Springs determined that the plan would become effective
on May 17, 1952, and be called Operation Skywatch. 103 Vandenberg,
announcing its beginning on April 23, said, "we are fulfilling the require-
ment for low altitude surveillance throughout a vital part of the nation.
In so doing we are strengthening many of the weaknesses in the radar
network since visual observers are effective in many cases where radar is
of little or no aid." 104

To the astonishment of the Air Force, the Association of Civil De-
fense Directors criticized Skywatch because of a letter issued by the
Central Air Defense Force stating that Skywatch was not an emergen-
cy measure, only the next step in the orderly establishment of an air de-
fense system. Civil defense leaders, however, thought that if conditions
were so perilous as to demand placing the GOC on continuous oper-
ations, "this should be announced in unmistakable terms by appropriate
authority." 105

To help clarify the matter, the Air Force arranged a meeting in the
Pentagon among Defense Department personnel, state civil defense offi-
cials, and representatives from the Civil Defense Administration. Here,
Millard Caldwell, head of the Civil Defense Administration, supported
the view held by the state civil defense spokesmen. He said that the Air
Force had to be honest with the American people if it asked them to
make the sacrifices required by Skywatch. "The people on Main
Street," said Caldwell, "believe that the Air Force can keep the attack-
ing planes, or a very high percentage of them, from getting
through. . . ." Now, however, they heard they needed civil defense and
a GOC. 106 Caldwell and the state civil defense officials apparently
wanted the Air Force to emphasize the air defense threat, thereby calling
attention to the concurrent need for more and better civil defense pro-
grams.

157

The Emerging Shield

Air Force Secretary Finletter and Generals Twining, Chidlaw, and
Smith, the principal Air Force representatives at the meeting, agreed the
Air Force had failed to show the public the urgent need for the GOC.
According to Finletter, while the JCS thought the year "1954 will be the
most dangerous for the security of the United States," he referred to
General Bradley's view that "this does not mean Soviet Russia will not
precipitate World War III tomorrow." Therefore, stressed Finletter, the
twenty-four-hour watch was needed to guard against the present, not a
future, Soviet threat. Twining added that Skywatch would remain a
vital element in the air defense network until effective low-altitude
radars were developed and installed. 107

The Air Force argument persuaded state and federal civil defense
directors to support starting Skywatch in July 1952. The Air Force
proceeded to launch a massive publicity campaign for the GOC, assisted
by the Advertising Council Incorporated, a nonprofit organization spon-
sored by America's advertising agencies. President Truman pitched in by
making a personal appeal for Skywatch. In addition, the Air Force
public relations department composed pointed radio spot announcements,
for example, "Who will strike the first blow in the next war, if and when
it comes? America? Not very likely. No, the enemy will strike first. And
they can do it too — right now the Kremlin has about a thousand planes

158

Air Defense— Korean War Period

within striking distance of your home." Another spot announcement
heard was, "It may not be a very cheerful thought but the Reds right
now have about a thousand bombers that are quite capable of destroying
at least 89 American cities in one raid. . . . Won't you help protect your
country, your town, your children? Call your local Civil Defense Office
and join the Ground Observer Corps today." 108

On July 14th Skywatch began. Contrary to the original plan call-
ing for twenty-four-hour-a-day operation only from May through Octo-
ber, the Air Force decided to operate Skywatch year round. 109 The fa-
vorable response its publicity campaign elicited (by mid- 1953 the GOC
had about 305,000 volunteers) doubtlessly contributed to the Air Force
decision. Although the GOC required many procedural, equipment, and
facility improvements before it could be considered truly effective, the
citizenry now seemed convinced of the necessity for Skywatch.

As the Air Force planned Skywatch, airborne control and warn-
ing, and the double-perimeter radar programs, its leaders knew their ef-
forts would be worth little without Canadian assistance and cooperation.
The history of Canadian and American cooperation for North American
defense predated World War II, but like the Americans, the Canadians
had improved their air defenses little after the war. It took the Soviet
atomic explosion and the outbreak of the Korean War to galvanize them.
Although Canada had a separate air defense organization since Decem-
ber 1948, as late as December 1950 it had only three operating radar sta-
tions. The problem this represented for Canada, and for the United
States, was underscored by Whitehead's remark that "our highly indus-
trialized, highly populated border, which just so happens to be that
border facing the threat to our national security, is wide open and will
continue to be so until we extend our presently programmed radar net
northward." 110

The U.S. Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force had agreed on a
jointly financed Radar Extension Program in mid- 1950. In October 1950
the JCS established the U.S. Northeast Command as a unified command
designed to defend the United States through the area defined by Labra-
dor, Newfoundland, northeastern Canada, and Greenland, where the
United States had obtained or leased bases during World War II. 111

By November 1950 the United States and Canada agreed that the
Radar Extension Program would consist of thirty-three radar stations.
The United States would build and equip twenty-two and supply person-
nel for eighteen. The plan was submitted to the Permanent Joint Board
on Defense on February 6, 1951, and soon after, the JCS and Canadian
Combined Chiefs of Staff approved it. Secretary of Defense Marshall
wrote to Secretary of State Acheson urging expedition of a formal
agreement between the two countries so that U.S. and Canadian air
forces could complete the program as soon as possible. 112 Expecting

159

The Emerging Shield

early action, the Canadians established an Air Defence Command on
June 1, 1951. They also increased their fighter-interceptor force to six
squadrons (the Canadian Air Force expanded to a total of nine intercep-
tor squadrons during the Korean War) and expanded their temporary
radar control and warning system to five stations. 113

The urge to build up the air defenses, which was prevalent at the
start of the Korean War and which had resurfaced when the Chinese en-
tered the war, was beginning to fade. By April 1951 the United States
still had not contributed to the Radar Extension Program, and the Com-
mander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Air Marshal Wilfred A.
Curtis, was perturbed. Through the next decade, no group would advo-
cate as forcefully for closer Canadian-American relations in air defense
than the officers of the Canadian Air Force. Curtis wrote to Undersecre-
tary McCone, asking that funds be provided as quickly as possible so
that the Canadians could begin work on the stations. Quick action was
necessary because of the limited period available for construction at
many northern stations. McCone brought the matter to Finletter who
got the issue moving. President Truman approved, and on June 13, 1951,
the U.S. government released $20 million for construction of the radar
stations. Hume Wrong, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, and
Acheson formally concluded the agreement on August 1 in an exchange
of notes. Agreeing with Wrong's request, official announcements avoided
depicting the program as American military aid to Canada. They stated
that the accord provided for establishing radar systems in Canada as part
of the defense of North America. 114

By June 1952 the joint Canadian-American committee on the Radar
Extension Program was replaced with a greatly expanded agency that in-
cluded personnel from the Canadian Air Defence Command, the Ameri-
can Air Defense Command, the Northeast Air Command, Headquarters
USAF, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The agency, designated
"Project Pinetree Office," located in Ottawa, Ontario.* Stations con-
structed under its aegis would later become the Pinetree Line. 115

Status of the Fighter-Interceptor Forces

In May 1951 Headquarters USAF redesignated all fighter squadrons
assigned to air defense duty "fighter-interceptor" squadrons. This im-

* In related developments, the United States negotiated rights to base military person-
nel and to establish air defense forces in Greenland and Iceland. In both cases, precedents
had been set during World War II. As they had done with Canada, Denmark (which exer-
cised sovereignity over Greenland) and Iceland cooperated willingly with the United
States.

160

Air Defense— Korean War Period

plied, in part, that the squadrons were to be equipped and trained to fly
intercept missions in all weather. While a few squadrons possessed this
capability by mid- 1953, most continued to be restricted to fair-weather
operations. In ADC five squadrons still operated with F-51s, and fifteen
operated with F-80, F-84, and F-86 day jets. Six ADC squadrons and
all those assigned to the Alaskan Air Command and Northeast Air Com-
mand now had Lockheed F-94As and F-94Bs, welcome replacements
for the completely inadequate F-82s. The Starfire was not really an all-
weather interceptor; it lacked the deicing equipment needed to operate in
winter skies. 116 Lt. Gen. Arthur C. Agan, destined to command ADC in
the late 1960s, was a wing and air division commander when the F-94
was introduced. He described the Hughes radar as "fairly simple and
fairly effective against the kind of targets that we had then. If [we] had a
non-jamming target within the performance envelope that an F-94 could
deal with— the F-94 could do the job." 117

The F-94C model, an aircraft that included deicing equipment, was
scheduled to be the Air Force's first all-weather interceptor. It was not
flight tested until late June 1951 and not delivered to ADC until March
1953. 118 The Northrop F-89 Scorpion thus became the Air Force's first
operational all-weather fighter. Design and engine problems prevented
delivery to ADC of the first models, designated the F-89B, until June
1951. An improved "C" model debuted in January 1952, but shortly
after, three disintegrated in the air, killing the crews. Because structural
weaknesses in the aircraft apparently caused the accidents, Air Materiel
Command restricted the operational speed of the aircraft to 350 knots
pending correction of the problems. In the meantime, the Air Force
issued a hold order on the purchase of additional Scorpions while Nor-
throp worked to solve the problem. 119

In summer 1952, eight airmen died when four more F-89Cs fell
apart in the sky. Subsequently, the Air Force grounded all Scorpions
until their airframes could be strengthened. To compensate for this
action, the Air Staff temporarily transferred F-94As and F-94Bs from
the Air Training Command to ADC. By mid- 1953, the modified Scorpi-
ons went back into service, but hopes that the plane was finally reliable
were dashed by more accidents. Another year passed before Northrop
produced what was considered a trustworthy model, the F-89D, and the
Air Force could begin to purchase and use these aircraft in greater num-
bers. 120

In April 1953, ADC received the first North American F-86Ds.
The Air Force had been somewhat skeptical about the worth of the one-
man, all-weather version of the famed Sabre jet when General Saville
first recommended it in 1949. However, by this time the Air Force had
decided most ADC squadrons would be equipped with the "Dog," as
some pilots affectionately called it. The F-86D had a limited range be-

161

The Emerging Shield

Fighter-Interceptor Squadrons Assigned
December 1946 - June 1954

All-Weather Jet Day Jet

Conventional

15

Dec Dec Dec Dec Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun Dec Jun
46 47 48 49 50 51 51 52 52 53 53 54

cause pilots had to use its fuel-consuming afterburners to reach altitude.
The plane, bigger and heavier than the day Sabres, was less maneuver-
able. Still, problems with the F-86D did not approach the severity of
those the Air Force suffered with the F-94 and especially with the F-89.
By June 1953 fifteen ADC squadrons were changing to the F-86D, and
others were preparing to receive it. 121

All of the Air Force's interceptors in the 1950s were equipped with
more sophisticated and lethal weapons. Many aircraft carried up to 104
so-called folding-fin air-to-air rockets, more powerful as interceptor
weapons than machineguns or cannons. The rockets were conventional
weapons, although the Air Force explored the possibility of using nucle-
ar-tipped tactical rockets in future air defense. 122

During this period the Hughes Aircraft Company worked closely
with the Air Force to develop a revolutionary airborne radar. Beginning
with Saville's experiments in the Florida air exercises of 1935, the Air
Force had relied heavily on a GCI system to vector its aircraft onto the
trail of approaching enemies. The evolution of radar allowed the weap-
ons director on the ground to position an interceptor to conform with
the blip the controller viewed on a radarscope. After receiving position-
ing directions from the controller, the pilot would turn on his nose radar

162

Air Defense — Korean War Period

Fighter-Interceptor Aircraft on Hand
December 1950 - June 1954

and seek the target. If the pilot found the "bandit" (an unidentified in-
truder would be referred to as a "bogey"), he would usually attempt to
destroy him by attacking from behind, the so-called tail-on maneuver.

In the late 1940s, the Air Force and Hughes began developing an-
other technique, the lead collision course. This technique would require
a powerful fighter radar so that targets could be seen from much greater
distances than previously possible. Since interception of an enemy from
the side instead of from behind would enable an interceptor pilot to aim
at a larger target, an improved radar would allow detection of an enemy
from a greater distance, and the pilot could fire rockets at the side of the
opposing aircraft without having to maneuver for a dangerous close-in
tail attack. For this method to work, black box equipment had to be used
to determine when to fire the rockets at a target's future position, calcu-
lated on the basis of its speed. 123

The technology for the lead collision-course interceptor first ap-
peared in the F-89D in 1953. With an enlarged Hughes E-6 radar, the
system included an analog/digital computer interacting with an autopilot.
Complementing these components were the Scorpion's 104 folding-fin
air-to-air Mighty Mouse 2.75-inch rockets. Developed by Army Ord-
nance and first installed on the F-89B, the rockets could fire simulta-

163

The Emerging Shield

neously from wing pods to blanket "an area of sky bigger than a football
field." 124 Further improvements in the electronics of the lead collision-
course system were incorporated in the F-89H model and in the F-102,
which became the premier Air Force interceptor in 1956.

The development of new electronic technology leading to more ef-
fective tactics for air interception resulted largely from Fairchild's and
Saville's advocacy for the weapons systems approach — the development
of an airframe around its various weapons systems — in procurement. Al-
though synchronization in development and production was not all it
might have been, black box units (that could be mounted or removed
from aircraft in a single package) and other electronic components in-
stalled in aircraft were now recognized to be as important as the quality
of the airframe itself in the development of a potent military aircraft.

While the burgeoning sophisticated technology in the Korean War
period made continental air defense glamorous and exciting, crews and
maintenance personnel left to guard the homeland often suffered consid-
erable hardship. By December 1951 ADC regulations stipulated that four
aircraft be kept on alert on each stateside airbase during daylight hours —
two for takeoff in five minutes and two in fifteen minutes. The remaining
aircraft in each squadron had to be ready to operate within three hours.
When the all-weather F-94Cs began to arrive, night alert requirements

164

Air Defense— Korean War Period

ADC Day Conventional Fighters (Jet)
Interceptors Possessed
1951 - 1954

300

1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

increased. Alert aircraft parked at the end of a runway; their crews lived
alongside in trailers or a similar type of "ready shack." In 1952 alert
hangars for the aircraft and aircrews began to be provided. As Chidlaw
described life on the alert line:

Pilots ... in order to maintain the proper alert status spend
as much as 100-101 hours a week on the base. Add to this
the sleeping time and driving back-and-forth time required,
and you get a picture of just how little time they have left
for recreation or to spend with their families. This is an
acute morale problem, but one which we see no ready solu-
tion. . . , 125

Although the subsequent assignment of additional crewmembers and the
gradual improvement of alert facilities ameliorated the situation, on flight
lines and in radar stations long duty hours remained the norm in ADC.

The introduction of new, all-weather night fighters eliminated some
of the boredom of training and alert duty. After flying the new aircraft,
however, some pilots realized boredom had its advantages. General
Daniel "Chappie" James, ADC commander in the late 1970s, recalled:

From 1951 to 1956 I was intimately involved in the air de-
fense mission. I use the word intimately advisedly. I submit
there can be no greater intimacy between man and machine
than for the man to be strapped to a flaming hulk of hard-
ware over the ocean searching for an unknown on a stormy
New England night. In the six years that I drove all-weath-
er fighters there were many such occasions. I experienced
my fair share of those heralded moments of stark terror. 126

165

Table 1. ADC Day Fighters (Jet) Possessed

Aircraft %]'

Jun 30,
1951

Dec 31,
1951

Jun 30,
1952

Dec 31,
1952

Jun 30,
1953

Dec 31,
1953

Jun 30,
1954

Dec 31,
1954

F-80A/C

47

35

18

17

15

F-82F 26

F-84C/D/G 43

109

46

21

110

115

21

F-86A/E/F 236

241

145

154

263

229

177

64

53

Total 305

397

226

193

390

359

198

64

53

Table 2. Interceptor Squadrons Assigned ADC, by Type

Aircraft Jan ] - Jun 30 - Dec 31 - Jun 30 - Dec 31, Jun 30, Dec 31,

"ircraji mj /pj/ ;pj; m2 m2 mj

F-47D

3

3

1

1

F-47N

1

1

1

F-51D

9

9

7

7

F-51H

1

1

F-80A

1

1

F-80C

1

1

2

1

F-82F

3

F-84C

4

1

1

F-84D

3

3

1

F-84G

4

5

1

F-86A

15

11

10

8

6

6

4

F-86D

1

11

30

F-86E

3

1

2

1

1

F-86F

1

8

5

4

F-89B

2

2

1

F-89C

1

2

3

3

F-94A

5

5

3

3

2

2

F-94B

2

5

7

6

6

1

F-94C

4

8

Total

21

44

41

39

43

52

54

Squadrons not

equipped with

aircraft

1

0

0

1

3

4

3

Squadrons
possessing aircraft

20

44

41

38

40

48

51

Air Defense — Korean War Period

In the first half of the 1950s, ADC commanders believed that Headquar-
ters USAF did not appreciate fully the work, sacrifice, and difficulty air
defense personnel experienced. Chidlaw noted almost all ADC officers
received efficiency reports below comparable grades at other major com-
mands. He believed this was due to ADC's higher standards and suggest-
ed that excellence be gauged throughout the Air Force as it was in his
command. 127

Chidlaw's successor, General Earle E. Partridge, demanded equal
terms of recognition and promotion for ADC personnel. Low retention
rates for all-weather interceptor crews and weapons controllers particu-
larly distressed him. He blamed this on the fact that ADC was not per-
mitted to award promotions for excellence in bombing and navigation
competition, as SAC could. As he remonstrated to Twining:

There is something wrong with a system that permits one
command to promote its outstanding team members without
allowing other commands to do the same. Surely the air
crew who can consistently place their interceptor in a posi-
tion to deliver a knockout blow against a high speed, high
altitude enemy bomber or the controller who can consist-
ently guide the air crew to a successful interception in ad-
verse weather conditions deserve [sic] as much recognition
as their SAC counterparts. I believe the defense of Pitts-
burgh, Cleveland, and Detroit, not to mention the SAC
bases themselves, is as important to our interests as is the
timely destruction of key targets within the Soviet Union. 128

Spot promotions for ADC personnel, despite well-reasoned arguments
presented by Partridge and his predecessors, did not come. The Air
Force showed unequivocally where its priorities lay — in SAC.

Thus the Korean War had provided an impetus to air defense pre-
paredness. The threat of general war produced stepped-up programs to
improve all Air Force components for continental defense. Although
facts were few concerning Soviet intentions, intelligence sources indicat-
ed the Soviets continued to update the Tu-4, to plan for a true intercon-
tinental bomber, and to increase their atomic stockpile. In response, in-
creased funding for U.S. air defense (and all other programs) allowed the
Air Force to upgrade current components and investigate new technolo-
gy for future systems. Yet, important questions remained. Air defense
was necessary, but at what cost? Terms such as "no free ride," "mini-
mum" air defense, "optimum" air defense, and "damage limitation" were
bandied about in Air Force councils and among government officials and
scientists studying the concept. Before a decision was reached on the size
and scope of future air defense systems, these terms would have to be
defined more precisely, as would the nature of the threat posed by
Soviet bombers.

167

Chapter 7

An Integrated, Efficient, Highly Potent
Air Defense System

In 1954 the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower
supported the development of a large and sophisticated continental
air defense buildup. Air defense would undergo a technological transfor-
mation to match in importance the development of radar in the late
1930s. However, the automated systems that would eventually revolu-
tionize air defense operations were still being perfected in research lab-
oratories in the early 1950s. For the forces on alert in the field, comput-
erized systems remained years away. Field forces had to make the best
use of equipment at hand, regardless how inadequate, and hope to meet
the test if called upon. An incident during the spring of 1952 highlighted
the problems of the defenses.

Next to the Real Thing

On April 16, 1952, Col. Woodbury M. Burgess, General Chidlaw's
intelligence chief, received a "troublesome piece" of information from
Headquarters USAF. The information, categorized as an "indication,"
implied that it came from a clandestine source and concerned Soviet
military movements. Burgess and his intelligence staff remained in the
ADC Combat Operations Center. By late in the evening they had re-
ceived no further information to confirm the warning, so Burgess decid-
ed they could go home. Meanwhile, he informed Maj. Gen. Kenneth P.
Bergquist, ADC operations deputy, of the special intelligence, and Bur-
gess and Bergquist decided there was no reason at that time to inform
either General Frederic H. Smith, ADC Vice Commander, or Chidlaw
of the incident.

Shortly after midnight, the Western Air Defense Force operations
center on Hamilton Air Force Base, California, notified Colorado
Springs of four vapor trails sighted one hour and twenty-seven minutes

169

The Emerging Shield

earlier over Nunivak Island in the Bering Sea, heading east by southeast.
The information originated at the Elmendorf, Alaska, center and was
transmitted through McChord Air Force Base, Washington, which pro-
vided the only communications links between the two systems. A captain
on duty in the intelligence section on Ent received the news and prompt-
ly phoned Colonel Burgess, who hurriedly returned to the Combat Oper-
ations Center. Once there, he directed that the Royal Canadian Air
Force be informed of the sighting; he also notified General Bergquist
who rushed back to the center.

By 0220 Bergquist had alerted his counterparts in the Eastern, Cen-
tral, and Western air defense forces, and the various direction centers
had been instructed to direct northern and coastal radar stations to be
especially vigilant. Bergquist also attempted to confirm the sighting with
the Alaskan center, but before the call could be completed, the line be-
tween McChord and Elmendorf went dead, leaving all involved "simply
exasperated." Bergquist now phoned General Smith, saying "We have
something hot — I think you better come over."

When Smith arrived in the Operations Center, he and Bergquist
considered calling an Air Defense Readiness alert. This procedure, for-
mulated and instituted by Whitehead, allowed ADC to bring individual
sectors or the whole command onto full combat readiness. Smith and
Bergquist had a difficult decision, because calling an alert would mean
awakening hundreds of ADC and other Air Force personnel and order-
ing them to duty stations with no time for explanations. The result of
such an order was uncertain since the procedure had never been tested.

No sooner had Bergquist and Smith begun considering what to do
than the decision was, in effect, made for them. At 0310 the intelligence
duty officer came running to Smith with word that "Eastern [Air De-
fense Force] has just called in and reported five 'unknowns' coming in
over Presque Island [Maine]." One minute later Smith ordered ADC on
full Air Defense Readiness alert. At the same time, notification went out
to the air defense region commanders, to General LeMay of SAC, and
to the USAF Command Post in the Pentagon over hot lines, specially
installed for such emergency situations. At this time Smith also notified
Chidlaw who, like air defense personnel all over the country, quickly re-
ported for duty. Meanwhile, commanders of TAC, Air Research and
Development Command, Air Proving Ground, and Air Training Com-
mand, all pledged to commit radar and fighter units in an emergency,
were contacted by commercial toll calls. The Army Antiaircraft Artil-
lery Command did not receive the alert until 0341. Then, General Ir-
vine's staff ordered "all units on site to man their guns, and other units to
prepare to move."

Within fifteen minutes from the time the alert was called, Ent,
region, and division air defense centers began operating with full teams.

170

An Integrated System

Also within fifteen minutes, telephone and teletype lines throughout the
aircraft control and warning network were operating, an accomplishment
Chidlaw called "A miracle of dead-of-night efficiency." On fighter bases,
the number of aircraft in immediate readiness increased from 88 to 240
within the first hour.

Chidlaw canceled the operation at 0550. Communications had not
been reestablished with Elmendorf, nor had the mysterious contrails over
Nunivak been identified. In the east, sightings were narrowed to three
"unknowns," which interceptors identified as friendly. These were French,
British, and Pan American airliners that had drifted from their scheduled
courses on flight plans other than those reported to the Presque Isle site.
No one blamed the pilots; they had reported their changes in flight to
Canadian flight-monitor stations. Communications between the stations
and ADC's Presque Isle radar site had failed, and the course changes were
not identified in the Eastern Air Defense Force's identification logs.

No sooner had Chidlaw canceled the alert than the Pentagon called
the Operations Center. Air Staff officers believed that ADC had pan-
icked and taken more drastic measures than the situation required. Chid-
law, however, refused the call and told Bergquist, "Tell 'em if the situa-
tion occurs again, I'll do the same thing," and he went off to bed. 1

Later, when the incident could be seen in greater perspective, the
Air Staff acknowledged the "general misinterpretation of its meaning"
regarding the original intelligence of Soviet military movements. Even
more important, the Air Staff admitted that the alert pointed up many
weaknesses in operating procedures. Improvements needed to address a
broadened role for the USAF Command Post in future alerts, and the
installation of hot lines among all commands committed to furnishing
augmented forces for air defense in an emergency became urgent. The
thirteen to thirty-nine minutes it had taken ADC to alert cooperating
commands over commercial toll lines was unacceptable; SAC had been
alerted by hot line in eight seconds.

Chidlaw told Vandenberg that the alert had made "more of our top
Air Force people . . . aware of the very thin margin of evidence on
which we too frequently must base our decisions." 2 If that thin margin
was to be overcome, the nation would have to make a substantial invest-
ment in sophisticated technology applicable to air defense systems. The
debate over how much to invest in air defense, meanwhile, went on
during the Korean War period not only in Air Force councils but also in
specially formed, civilian-led committees and among influential scientists
and journalists. Their assessments would be crucial in deciding the future
of continental air defense.

171

The Emerging Shield

East River

The Air Force assumed a seemingly paradoxical approach toward
air defense. In late 1952, Generals Chidlaw and Smith of ADC joined
with Generals Vandenberg and Twining and the JCS in opposing a rec-
ommendation pending before the National Security Council for an exten-
sive air defense network.

Events leading to this paradox began in the summer of 1951 with a
study called East River, cosponsored by the Air Force and the National
Security Resources Board (established to advise the President on the co-
ordination of mobilization problems involving the military, industry, and
civilians). In the East River project, many of the nation's most distin-
guished scientists gathered to consider air defense from a civil defense
perspective.* After months of study, the project director, retired Army
Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., submitted an interim report to Secretary
of Defense Robert A. Lovett on April 7, 1952. The study group con-
cluded that civil defense could not be effective without a capable air de-
fense system. The project members assumed that "an adequate air de-
fense . . . must and will be provided." Specifically, they said, the air de-
fenses needed to provide warning to the civilian population and to oper-
ate so effectively that civil defense would only need to deal with limited
leakage through the defensive net. 3 Not surprisingly, Lovett told Nelson
that civil defense planning based on such a belief was naive. He said that
while "it would be highly desirable if we could have such protection
. . . in the foreseeable future it is unrealistic to expect such a high per-
centage of kills." Lovett suggested the East River members resume their
study with the assumption that, while an enemy could not launch a satu-
ration attack against all important targets, "crippling" attacks on some
would be likely. 4

After receiving Lovett's advice, East River's final report dealt more
with air defense deficiencies than with civil defense needs. The report
claimed that civil defense officials had to have at least an hour of early
warning of an impending air attack to take appropriate action. It also de-
voted, as one Chidlaw staff officer commented, excess time to proposing
ways for alleviating weaknesses that were already "well known to all re-
sponsible for providing the air defenses of the United States." 5 Although
the report did not discernibly affect the state of either the civil or air
defenses, the project proved important because its members concluded
that more could and should be done to improve air defenses, and they

* The Army, not the Air Force, was the military service invested with the greatest
civil defense responsibilities [B. Franklin Cooling, The Army Support of Civil Defense, 1945-
1966: Plans and Policy, 2 vols (Washington, D.C., The Office of the Chief of Military Histo-
ry, 1967)].

172

An Integrated System

with many of those who supported their views were influential enough
to carry their arguments to the highest levels of government.

Views presented in the East River report soon became public
knowledge through newspaper and magazine articles. For Americans
who relied on the press for information about the condition of their
country's air defenses, the messages could be confused or contradictory.
For example, in February 1952, at the same time the Air Force cam-
paigned to increase participation in the GOC with radio spot announce-
ments and billboard and newspaper advertisements, an article appeared in
the widely read Saturday Evening Post that threatened to negate Air
Force efforts. The article, "Night Fighters Over New York," exaggerat-
ed the prospects for air defense weapons and computerized command
and control systems of the future. According to the article, "Thousands
of these new supersonic terrors [jet interceptors] will soon be beating up
the airwaves in the country's incredible new air defense network." This
was hardly an accurate appraisal for short-term air defense prospects in
the early 1950s. Moreover, ADC feared it could foster undue complacen-
cy and hurt recruiting for the GOC. 6

Unhappy as it was with the Saturday Evening Post article that over-
stated prospects for air defense in the immediate future, the Air Force
was even more disturbed by the tone of articles written by the newspa-
per columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop. Starting in 1952 and for the
next three years, the Alsop brothers published several pieces accusing
the Air Force of being the major foe of air defense preparedness.

Joseph Alsop had served as an aide to Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chen-
nault in China during World War II, where he directly observed an ef-
fective early-warning and control network in operation. He also learned
the irascible general's view that U.S. airmen overemphasized strategic
bombing. 7 Although it is pure speculation how much, if at all, Joseph
Alsop's World War II experiences influenced his and his brother's subse-
quent reports on Air Force air defense programs, their articles could not
cover the complete story of the Air Force's plans, programs, and aspira-
tions for air defense since 1948. The ensuing exchanges between the col-
umnists and Air Force defenders frequently presented complicated tech-
nological and economic problems as a simple conflict between the Air
Force leadership and the scientific community. The scientists, some with
close connections to the Alsops, offered brighter prospects for air de-
fense than Air Force leaders believed practicable. Indeed, the Air Force
came to suspect that the scientists were giving the Alsops much of the
information for their articles.

The Alsops began their campaign by reiterating Vandenberg's esti-
mate that the existing air defense system could destroy only ten percent
of an enemy's attacking aircraft, at best. They pointed out that, in reality,
the "terrifyingly feeble" air defense system could not be expected to

173

The Emerging Shield

achieve even this kill ratio, except perhaps in daylight and good weather.
(Chidlaw agreed with this assessment.) Their dismal assessment could be
rectified with "new weapons . . . new techniques . . . heavy investment
and by great national effort." The columnists believed that in three or
four years the United States could have an essentially leakproof air de-
fense network. "This is a defense so strong," they said, "that even sui-
cide air missions to the most vital American targets will look like a waste
of men, machines, and atomic raw stuff." 8

The Alsops concluded the nation could not afford to lose time in
constructing such a "near-total air defense." As for cost, they proposed
that the defense budget be increased by approximately $4 billion a year
for several years for air defense alone. And, in a warning apparently di-
rected at the Air Force, the Alsops wrote, "If this great issue is not
faced, those who have refused to face it will carry an unbearable burden
of blame, when the time of danger is suddenly upon us and we find that
we are not defended in the air." 9

Unfortunately, the Alsops offered few specific proposals regarding
what the nation could do to achieve an airtight defense. While they men-
tioned the Army's Nike missiles and referred to other components, such
as radar equipment and all-weather fighter-interceptors, the article
seemed to suggest it was only necessary to produce and use these sys-
tems in quantity to accomplish the task. It soon became clear, however,
that some distinguished scientists who were investigating the air defense
situation, and whom the Air Force suspected of being the Alsops'
sources, had much more in mind than just increasing the quantity and
quality of current and programmed forces.

The Summer Study Group

The Summer Study Group, which James Killian of MIT described
as "an ad hoc undertaking of the [Lincoln] Laboratory," met from June
through August 1952 in MIT's Sloan Building in Cambridge. Dr. Jerrold
R. Zacharias, also of MIT, a highly esteemed physicist and a participant
in the Lincoln Laboratory and East River projects, organized and led
the group. The group consisted of about twenty full-time scientists and
engineers plus as many part-time consultants, all with some knowledge of
air defense. Although later misidentified as consisting primarily of Lin-
coln members, only six of the many hundreds of scientists and engineers
assigned to or in some manner associated with Lincoln participated in
the summer study. Among the former East River members on the study
group were Zacharias and Doctors Albert Hill, Lloyd Berkner, Isidor I.
Rabi, and J. Robert Oppenheimer. Hill headed the Lincoln project,

174

An Integrated System

Berkner was chief of Associated Universities and guided the completion
of the final East River report, and Rabi and Oppenheimer were major
contributors in the Manhattan District Project, which developed the first
atomic bomb. 10

The original purpose of the group seemed to differ among its mem-
bers. Killian said the project originated because of doubts as to whether
Lincoln's air defense study was exhaustive enough. Lt. Gen. Laurence C.
Craigie, Saville's successor as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for De-
velopment, thought the group's purpose was to define the nature of the
probable threat to North America from air attack between 1958 and
1964. This objective involved addressing various criteria, among which
were determining the feasibility of remote early-warning systems and de-
ciding when intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would pose a
danger to the United States. Craigie also wanted the scientists to explore
the question of whether defense against such missiles was possible. 11

Hill, in informing the Air Staff why Lincoln was sponsoring the
project, laid out the group's priorities. First, the scientists would concen-
trate on the possibility of devising an early-warning network capable of
providing three to six hours' warning against the approach of aircraft.
Second, said Hill, they would focus on the establishment of an intercep-
tor force to take best advantage of early warning. Finally, the scientists
would examine defenses against ICBMs. 12

As Hill promised, the group's final report emphasized the early-
warning problem. Accepting East River's conclusion that three to four
hours of early warning were essential to alert and disperse the intercep-
tor and bomber forces, Hill and his associates set out to specify how this
could be accomplished. Clearly, detection of approaching aircraft had to
be made in the far north as Stratemeyer's planners had pointed out as
early as 1947. The questions the Summer Study Group attempted to
answer were, Where should an early-warning network be installed? and
How could it be equipped, manned, and operated most economically?

The group knew that Canada had begun considering an early-warn-
ing plan of its own. Two Canadian agencies, the National Defence Coun-
cil and. the Defence Research Board, were assessing the possibility of
using inexpensive radar equipment developed in the McGill University
electronics laboratory for this purpose. Through new communications
devices, aircraft sightings made at unmanned radar stations in the north
could be relayed to small, manned area stations. These would pass infor-
mation to the main stations in the southern part of the country. The Ca-
nadians also considered installing a low-cost unmanned radar chain in
mid-Canada along approximately the 55th parallel (corresponding to the
Hudson Bay area in the east). 13

Summer Study Group members journeyed to Canada to observe the
McGill device in operation. They also attended briefings and demonstra-

175

The Emerging Shield

tions of radar and communications equipment that American manufactur-
ers were developing and that promised to perform in warning-line oper-
ations as well as and as inexpensively as the Canadian equipment. 14

The scientists ended their work in late August 1952, and Hill and
Zacharias convened a formal briefing to convey the group's conclusions
and recommendations. The full membership along with some hundred
persons from the Defense Department and from industry attended the
briefing. The thrust of the briefing was, as later expressed in the group's
written report, that not only was a distant early-warning line feasible, but
its installation would enhance significantly the status of continental air
defense. 15

As the scientists envisioned it, a distant early-warning network
would function as a 200- to 400-mile-wide zone stretching from Alaska
to Greenland just under the Arctic Circle. The zone would extend sea-
ward from Alaska to Hawaii and from Greenland to Scotland. Estimated
costs totaled approximately $370 million to install the zone and $106 mil-
lion per year to operate it. 16

The scientists moved that the Defense Department implement the
project immediately. From available intelligence estimates, the Summer
Group had concluded that, by the end of 1954, the Soviet Union would
possess enough atom bombs to seriously threaten North America. Ac-
cordingly, they suggested that the Defense Department complete the
northernmost portion of the warning line by that time. This could be
done if survey parties began work in early 1953 and construction started
that summer. In the meantime, plans and preparations for full develop-
ment of the warning line could go forward. 17

In the final, most provocative section of its report, the Summer
Study Group addressed the possible objection that its proposal for an in-
creased emphasis on air defense grew from a Maginot Line philosophy.
On this point, the scientists doubtlessly knew that since the end of World
War II the Air Force had repeatedly pointed to the historical example of
France's Maginot Line in making a case for powerful strategic forces.
The Air Force objected to relying primarily on a defensive strategy, a
virtual "Fortress America," as unwise. It believed grave dangers would
result for the United States. Although defenses could raise the threshold
of uncertainty for an attacker, limit damage to critical areas, and exact a
heavy price for an attacker, defenses could not in themselves deter or
win wars; winning wars was clearly the province of SAC, which had to
be given the men, planes, and equipment it needed to fulfill its mission.

Such were the Air Force arguments against a Maginot Line philoso-
phy. The scientists, however, had another definition of what this strategy
constituted:

The Maginot Line psychology is the psychology of a nation
that puts "all its eggs in one basket" in a military sense. The

176

An Integrated System

French put their entire effort in a single rigid defensive con-
cept, the Maginot Line, and failed to maintain the balance
of forces needed to meet any situation that the enemy might
pose. The antithesis of the Maginot Line is the balanced
military force. . . . The history of warfare is replete with
examples of failure because of "Maginot Line" psychology,
i.e., excessive reliance on a single weapon or weapons
system. The great emphasis placed in recent years on the
development of an effective "retaliatory force" in the belief
that this constitutes an adequate defense is another manifes-
tation of this psychology. Again, we put "all our eggs in
one basket. ..." We conclude, therefore, that continued
dependence on a retaliatory force as our sole defense repre-
sents the development of a dangerous Maginot Line psy-
chology. 18

The Summer Study Group's final report greatly disturbed the Air Force.
Since the end of World War II, the Air Force had been, for all practical
purposes, alone in calling for air defense improvements. Involving scien-
tists in postwar air defense was originally an Air Force attempt to mod-
ernize future systems. Now, airmen felt, in effect, accused of having con-
cern only for offensive retaliation.

Even before the Summer Group had started its investigations, the
Air Force apparently had misgivings regarding the scientists' intentions.
Finletter told Killian and Provost Julian Stratton of MIT that the Air
Force feared the project would "get out of hand." Killian, however, as-
sured Air Force leaders that the study would be "kept in bounds." He
believed the scientists' work would enhance the research in air defense
occurring in the Lincoln Laboratory and, by doing so, would benefit
both Lincoln and the Air Force. The final report seemed to confirm Air
Force apprehensions. The scientists misinterpreted the Air Force don't-
put-all-your-eggs-in-one-basket position because of the Air Force's order-
ly, less costly approach to creating air defenses. Although the Air Force
did not oppose the eventual construction of a warning line in the far
north, its first priority lay in strengthening the double perimeter system
and improving the forces and weapons that comprised it. 19

The Air Force believed the Summer Group recommendations con-
tradicted Killian's assurances that the study would not get out of hand.
Subsequent events validated the major Air Force concern (although not
stated specifically in the Summer Group's final report) that accelerating
the progress of air defense programs would have to occur only at the
expense of SAC. This fear increased when, after receiving the report,
President Truman directed Lovett on September 24, 1952, to determine
the cost and feasibility of building an early-warning line. 20

The Summer report received the President's attention, in part, be-
cause Secretary of State Acheson, influenced by Paul Nitze, head of the
State Department Policy Planning Staff, supported it. Nitze was closely

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The Emerging Shield

associated with the Summer Group and had sat in on many of its meet-
ings. 21 The eminent reputations of many members of the group, notably
of Robert Oppenheimer, also made Truman carefully consider the report.
According to Zacharias, Oppenheimer served as only one of many part-
time consultants to the group. Zacharias had expected, and was proved
correct, that Oppenheimer's name would influence other prominent sci-
entists to participate in the study project. 22 The Air Force, however, laid
more blame on Oppenheimer than he probably deserved for the report's
recommendations. The Air Force leadership considered Oppenheimer its
most renowned opponent to orderly air defense.

Events leading to this view preceded the Summer Study Group.
The Air Force's first impression of Oppenheimer appears to have come
from Project Vista. Conducted against the background of the Korean
War, when developments indicated Communist aggression could assume
dangerous forms other than a large-scale nuclear attack, Vista examined,
in part, how atomic weapons could be used in conventional warfare. Op-
penheimer contributed to the report, compiled by scientists in the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology at the request of the three services, by re-
viewing and revising a chapter dealing specifically with use of smaller
nuclear weapons on the tactical battlefield. 23

Oppenheimer addressed the question of allocation of fissionable ma-
terials for making atomic weapons. He suggested that these materials (in
short supply in the fall of 1951) be more equitably given to the tactical
and defensive air forces for nuclear tipped missiles. This notion had some
acceptance in the Air Force. General Lauris Norstad, commander of the
air forces in Europe, the main geographical focus of Vista, approved
Oppenheimer's ideas; hovever, the Air Force leadership in the Pentagon
took another view. In recommending more tactical nuclear weapons, Op-
penheimer seemed to suggest taking scarce material for the manufacture
of atom bombs from SAC. The Air Staff also took exception to his cam-
paign against establishing a second weapons laboratory to expedite devel-
opment of a fusion (hydrogen) bomb, a crucial Air Force priority.
During the Atomic Energy Commission's 1954 hearings held to investi-
gate whether Oppenheimer posed a security risk (more for his left-wing
connections than for his views on military matters) David T. Griggs, the
Air Force Chief Scientist from December 1952 to June 1953, testified:

It became apparent to us [Griggs, Vandenberg, and Finlet-
ter] . . . that there was a pattern of activities all of which
involved Dr. Oppenheimer. Of these one was the Vista
project. ... We were told in the late fall, I believe of 1951,
Oppenheimer and two other colleagues formed an informal
committee of three to work for world peace or some such
purpose as they saw it. We were told that in this effort they
considered that many things were more important than the

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An Integrated System

development of the thermonuclear weapon, specifically the
air defense of the United States. 24

Maj. Gen. Roscoe Charles Wilson, who described himself as "first
of, all a big-bomb man," was the only other Air Force representative to
testify at the Oppenheimer hearings. Wilson, Army Air Forces liaison
with the Manhattan District Project and, in postwar years, a member of
an atomic research committee, also claimed to be disturbed by a "pattern
of action on Oppenheimer's part beginning with his Vista activities." 25
Like Griggs, Wilson reported few specific facts, but Oppenheimer lost
his security clearance.

Joseph Alsop, a friend of Oppenheimer's, suspected Air Force com-
plicity in Oppenheimer's losing his security clearance. Shortly after the
hearings concluded, Alsop coauthored with his brother Stewart an arti-
cle for Harper's Magazine entitled "We Accuse." Their article, like Emile
Zola's work of the same name, an attack on the accusers of French Capt.
Emile Dreyfus in the 1890s, pulled no punches.

The Alsops argued that the unpopularity of the Vista findings
within the Air Force derived from the project participants' proposal to
divide the atomic stockpile: part to a reserve; part for tactical use, in-
cluding air defense; and part to SAC. According to the Alsops:

The Air Generals, no great believers in atomic plenty, have
been fighting tooth and claw for five years to keep the
entire atomic stockpile as the Strategic Air Command's mo-
nopoly asset. Compared to SAC, the Air Force Generals
cared very little about tactical air which was one of the rea-
sons for all the difficulty in Korea.

Oppenheimer's suggestion that there be a new distribution of atomic
weapons, said the Alsops, "reduced most of the leaders of the Air Staff
to a condition of apoplectic fury. . . . The Air Generals, who cared even
less about air defense than tactical air, had pooh-poohed the whole idea."
Moreover, the Alsops believed that the Air Force interpreted the
Summer Study Group's report "as nothing less than a sinister, insidious,
direct attack on strategic air power." 26

This vituperative article reflected the charges made by Air Force
critics over the past two years. Because the Alsops' columns and articles
received wide readership, the Air Force had early described in public
terms how its approach to air defense and tactical air power comple-
mented its other missions. As the former commander of the air defense
forces, retired General Ennis Whitehead, stated to newly appointed Vice
Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Thomas D. White, unless the Air Force could
prove that it was committed to depth and flexibility and to the needs of
SAC, a grave danger existed that "the Maginot Line boys from MIT"
would be able to persuade Congress and the public to support a "Great
Wall of China concept." 27

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The Emerging Shield

In fact, Vandenberg had personally reiterated the points described
by Whitehead soon after the Summer Study Group's report appeared.
Appearing on the nationally televised "See It Now" broadcast, Vanden-
berg claimed the Air Force was doing everything it could to provide the
nation with formidable air defenses. Still, he cautioned, it was important
to distinguish between defense in land warfare and air defense. On the
battlefield, defense principally required the ability to shoot back and hit
the sources of an enemy's fire. In air warfare, however, sources of
enemy fire were usually enemy air bases, and destroying them required
powerful offensive air action. 28

Early in 1953, Vandenberg presented his ideas to the Board of Di-
rectors of the Advertising Council of America. "Developments," he said,
have "given rise to a certain amount of wishful thinking. The hope has
appeared in some quarters that the vastness of the atmosphere can in
some miraculous way be sealed off with an automatic defense based upon
the wizardry of electronics." While the Air Force fully attempted to
provide the most up-to-date air defenses, said the Chief, it was important
to remember that even the most advanced technical systems could not
substitute for fighter aircraft, crews, and antiaircraft artillery. The Air
Force believed these forces needed to be fully manned and operating at
peak efficiency before a computerized air defense system and an early-
warning network were established. On the topic of air defense in general,
Vandenberg expressed these thoughts:

I have often wished that all preparations for war could be
safely confined to the making of a shield which could some-
how ward off all blows and leave an enemy exhausted. But
in all the long history of warfare this has never been possi-
ble. The shield is neither the strongest deterrent to aggres-
sion nor the surest guarantee against defeat. It is not the de-
fense that the aggressor fears most; it is the realization that
he may receive a harder blow in return. . . . Certainly it is
not the state of our defenses that has restrained our poten-
tial enemy in the recent past, and is continuing to restrain
him — instead he fears the risk of a retaliatory attack. 29

In his desire to restrain what he saw as an overemphasis on air de-
fense, the Chief of Staff was joined by no less an authority than retired
General Gordon Saville. Many years later, Saville recalled bitterly that
there had been a period "after I got out of the business when the air
defense of the United States was basically determined by MIT." It dis-
turbed him that the scientists could have suggested, as he believed they
had, that an impenetrable air defense could be constructed. As an outspo-
ken advocate for air defense, Saville had nevertheless maintained that
leakproof defense nets were impracticable. 30 In the March 1953 issue of
Air Force Magazine he suggested that in air defense both those who

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An Integrated System

would call for a perfect defense and those who would be content with
the most minimal system were equally mistaken:

In this endeavor as in all others, the extremists are wrong
and their councils are deadly. We must select the most suit-
able instruments of air defense and fit them together into a
weapons system which will economically and successfully
defend people, cities, factories and SAC bases. 31

Saville made an especially important point in mentioning the protec-
tion of SAC bases. Although interceptor units were on alert at SAC
bases and the Army contributed antiaircraft artillery components, wide-
spread destruction of bombers sitting on the ground would probably still
occur if the Soviets launched a surprise attack and prompt early warning
was not provided. The specter of Pearl Harbor still haunted military
commanders for, as Whitehead reminded Vice Chief of Staff General
White, the United States could not be expected to take the first "bite" in
a future conflict, and "we might be flattened by the first attack." 32

In this period, the Air Force began to worry seriously about the
vulnerability of its strategic forces. Intelligence sources predicted im-
provements in the quality and quantity of Soviet bombers. Stalin had or-
dered a new design bureau under V. M. Myasischev to develop a
bomber capable of a range of 9,940 miles, to reach the United States and
return home. But by 1953 only one prototype Mya-4 Bison had been
produced, though the Soviets were known to be working feverishly to
build more. Stalin had not invested all his hopes in Myasischev; he had
Tupolev working on a similar long-range bomber. Tupolev, like Myasis-
chev, had problems developing and outfitting suitably powerful engines.
He soon decided that a pure jet would not achieve enough range, so he
decided to concentrate on building a turboprop aircraft, eventually the
Tu-20 (Tu-95) Bear. As with the Bison, one prototype Bear was in pro-
duction by the end of 1953. 33

Near the end of 1953 the only threat the Soviets could muster with
even pretensions of intercontinental range remained the obsolete Tu-4
Bull, of which approximately 1,800 had been produced by the end of
1953 (about 1,000 were in service at the time, matched with 50 atom
bombs). The Air Force expected this situation to change within a few
years as work progressed on the Bear and Bison programs as well as on
a medium-range jet bomber, the Tu-16 Badger. While the Soviets im-
proved their bombers and produced more bombs, the Air Force worried
about the vulnerability of its SAC bases. Like the Soviets, but, as events
developed, with far more success, the Air Force was upgrading its inter-
continental bomber force. Concurrently, the number of bomber bases in
the continental United States increased. Because of greater bomber
range, bomber bases in England could be recalled to the United States,
resulting in the continental United States having 30 SAC bases in 1954

181

The Emerging Shield

Russian planes. Tu-95 Bear (above) and Tu-16 Badger (below).

compared to the 17 it had 6 years earlier. Vandenberg understood that
while it was, for the moment, safer to have B-36, B-47, and B-50 bomb-
ers stationed in the continental United States rather than in Britain, for
example, this situation would not necessarily continue if Soviet long-
range bomber programs progressed smoothly. He admitted that if the
enemy attacked, even using the Tu-4, he would aim some if not most of
his bombs at SAC bases, hoping to gain an immediate, stunning victory,
or at least cause confusion and lessen the ferocity of retaliation.

Hence this long-range striking force must be protected
against surprise. Viewed in this light the whole air defense

182

An Integrated System

program takes on new significance. It becomes more than a
means of merely reducing disaster and making an attack
more costly to the enemy. It is an additional safeguard for
the preservation of that force which has been the deterrent
to aggression and which remains the principal guarantee of
our survival as a nation. 34

Vandenberg's analysis marked a watershed in the Air Force approach to
air defense. "Merely reducing disaster and making an attack more costly
to the enemy," the task of active air defense forces, would remain an Air
Force responsibility. But by indissolubly linking early warning with SAC
integrity, Vandenberg assigned the warning aspect of the air defense mis-
sion preeminence over active defense measures, a situation that continued
in coming years.

None of this implied, however, that the Air Force immediately em-
braced the concept of distant early warning. A RAND report issued in
November 1952 strongly influenced Air Force views. RAND analysts
agreed that a distant early-warning line "may possess desirable features"
but that the best solution for protecting SAC bombers would be to
devise alternate basing modes, build bomb shelters, and maintain more
aircraft on alert. The analysts also considered the Air Force desire to
delay implementation of a warning system until an extensive test period
could be conducted in the far north. 35

Meanwhile, the Air Force continued to question the motives of the
most outspoken advocates of a highly developed air defense system, the
scientists of the Summer Study Group. In fact, within the corridors of
the Pentagon the rumor circulated that the scientists believed a leakproof
defense could be built that would obviate the need for a strategic striking
force. This idea, incredulously received by Air Force officers, became
public in May 1953 in a Fortune article by Charles J. V. Murphy, an Air
Force Reserve officer with close ties in the Air Staff. Murphy, who did
not sign the article, attributed the notion to an informal group that had
preceded the Summer Study team in the spring of 1952. The group, said
Murphy, called itself ZORC for the first letters of the names of its mem-
bers— Zacharias, Oppenheimer, Rabi, and Charles (Charles Lauritsen). 36

During the Oppenhemier hearings the following year, David Griggs
testified that Finletter and Vandenberg had heard that ZORC wanted to
eliminate SAC to ensure that the military budget could support an air
defense buildup. 37 Furthermore, in the July 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs,
Oppenheimer called for a greater emphasis on air defense and implied
that the Air Force had not met its responsibilities in this matter. He re-
counted that a "high officer in the Air Defense Command" had told him
it was not "really our policy" to provide air defense for Americans
against atomic attack. The unnamed officer's rationale for this statement
was the task "is so big a job that it would interfere with our retaliatory
capabilities." 38

183

The Emerging Shield

In truth, although Oppenheimer and the other scientists favored an
increased emphasis on air defense, no facts support the idea that they
conspired to disestablish SAC. The existence of ZORC, derived from
hearsay, cannot be taken seriously. It now appears that both the Air
Force and the scientists either misunderstood or distorted each other's
position. The scientists seem to have been motivated by an intense desire
to improve the status of continental air defense. They were, perhaps,
overoptimistic about how new technology could produce a perfect or
near-perfect system. Yet no tenable evidence exists that Oppenheimer
and his associates suggested building the optimal air defense by abolish-
ing SAC. That idea grew from Air Force fears and suspicions.

On the other hand, some of the scientists — and their supporters in
the media — erred in assuming the Air Force was only concerned with
the buildup of its strategic forces. Certainly the needs of SAC would
continue to demand priority, but other missions could hardly be neglect-
ed, especially in the wake of the Korean War, which reinforced the re-
quirement for effective air power in many guises. Regarding continental
air defense, the Air Force supported an approach whereby the forces
and warning networks composing the inner defenses would be developed
and perfected before the far northern warning line was implemented.
Statements by Air Force leaders indicated they knew the warning line
could serve not only for air defense purposes but also as a trip wire,
alerting bombers to disperse and prepare for retaliatory actions. The Air
Force, other than ADC, was dubious that a bolt from the blue would
occur without having a crisis develop and SAC bombers put on upgrad-
ed alert. The distant warning line was thus considered useful but not a
pressing need to be funded at the expense of more important programs. 39

While requirements for air defense were debated acrimoniously in
public view, the issue was also thrashed out less conspicuously in the
inner councils of government. On September 18, 1952, Jack Gorrie,
Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, received a briefing
from retired Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., and Dr. Lloyd Berkner on
problems involved in building a distant early-warning line. Gorrie left
the briefing convinced a warning line was needed and could be con-
structed, for purposes of civil defense. On September 24 he brought his
case before President Truman and the National Security Council. He
persuaded the President to request a Defense Department estimate on the
feasibility and cost of an early-warning line that could be activated early
enough to permit civil defense measures. 40

Truman forwarded Gorrie's request to Secretary of Defense Lovett,
who asked the Air Force to investigate the matter. This action might
have been considered incongruous since the Air Force position was well
known. Nevertheless, Lovett considered the Air Force the agency best
qualified to lead the preliminary investigation. The Air Force therefore

184

An Integrated System

assembled a working group of representatives of ADC, the Air Staff, the
Lincoln Laboratory, and RAND under Maj. Gen. James E. Briggs, As-
sistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. Briggs worked quickly
and, by October 14, presented his conclusions to members of the Nation-
al Security Council, the JCS, and other high government officials. Not
surprisingly, Briggs's ideas reflected the Air Force reaction to the
Summer Study Group's conclusions, namely, that a distant warning line
was

unwarranted at this time since it would involve correspond-
ing decreases in the same amount expended for our offen-
sive capability. Moreover, many of the equipments forming
the basis for such an Air Defense system [were] in the em-
bryonic stages of development, and without adequate test-
ing millions could be spent with little additional security. 41

In effect, Briggs did not reject outright the concept of distant early
warning (whether for civil defense, air defense, or bomber dispersal), but
he called for more analysis and research and development.

Truman approved Briggs's recommendations, and Lovett promptly
executed them. In mid-November 1952, a reallocation of 1953 Depart-
ment of Defense funds provided $20 million required for research and
development of new electronic communications equipment and for estab-
lishing experimental stations. 42 In addition, Lovett opened negotiations to
have Western Electric Company conduct the experimental project. He
convinced Mervin J. Kelly, President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, to
head an air defense study group consisting of military representatives, in-
dustrial leaders, scientists, and engineers. Kelly was charged with re-
viewing the need for a distant early-warning system as measured against
other air defense priorities. At the conclusion of his investigation, Kelly
was to recommend policies and programs to make continental air defense
more effective. 43

Earlier, RAND and ADC had given their support to the Air
Force's go-slow approach in regard to the warning line. According to
RAND analysts, a pressing need existed to concentrate funds on more
important air defense improvements in the near future. These included
low-altitude overland radar; implementation of airborne early-warning
and picket ship coverage; and more and better local-defense weapons
such as the Nike missile, to be deployed around coastal cities and SAC
bases. 44

Speaking for ADC, General Chidlaw warned of

the possibility that someone in high office, alarmed or excit-
ed by the enthusiasm or the genuine apprehension of the
scientific group [the Summer Study Group], might push the
panic button, thus causing a hysterical approach and an out-
of-balance approach to the air defense question.

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The Emerging Shield

The ADC staff and unit commanders, said Chidlaw, were more con-
cerned than anyone in acquiring the means to accomplish their mission.
They also believed there had to "be a definite spot, a peak, in our air
defense preparations . . . beyond which the returns do not justify the
means, a point of diminishing returns." 45 This view agreed with the
ideas of Air Force leaders in the Pentagon. As Brig. Gen. John K. Ger-
hart, Deputy Director of Operations in the Air Staff (and future com-
mander of NORAD), warned, the Air Force might be forced "by NSC
decision to program billions on defense gadgetry at the expense of our
deterrent strike and air superiority forces." 46

The JCS agreed with the Air Force's cautious approach to air de-
fense, a tactic also favored by the Department of Defense, even by
ADC. President Truman decided, nonetheless, to take immediate steps to
build the distant early-warning line. The arguments of his civilian advis-
ers, especially those of Acheson and Nitze, undoubtedly swayed him.
When informed of the President's decision, the JCS asked him not to
make a public announcement until Kelly's air defense study group com-
pleted its investigations. The Chiefs feared that the American people
would believe the military intended to focus undue attention on defense
rather than on offense. Truman honored the Chiefs' request; his decision
appeared in a classified document, NSC 139, issued on December 31,
1952. In this document, the President moved the "period of maximum
danger," set by the JCS in 1950 as 1954, back one year to 1955. By that
time, he said, it was crucial that an effective air defense system be in op-
eration. Although he did not define what an effective air defense might
be, or what one would cost, Truman identified early warning as a key
element. He believed the early-warning network should be operational
by December 31, 1954, and completed by the end of 1955. 47

Soon afterward, Lovett directed the JCS to plan for the establish-
ment and operation of the distant-warning system. He also made the Air
Force responsible for conducting in the last days of the Truman adminis-
tration the early warning-line experimental project. Before leaving office,
Lovett cleared the appointment of the Kelly Committee with Charles E.
Wilson, the new Secretary of Defense under President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower. Consequently, the work of the committee proceeded uninterrupt-
ed despite the change of administrations. 48

Wilson, the former President of General Motors, apparently agreed
to adhere to NSC 139. The Chiefs reinforced the urgency of air defense
planning when they briefed the new Secretary in early February 1953 on
the state of the air defenses. They told him that the threat to the United
States would become serious by 1954 or 1955 and that 65 to 85 percent
of the atom bombs launched by the Soviets (in 1953 they possessed ap-
proximately 200 bombs) could be delivered on targets in the United
States. 49

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An Integrated System

With Wilson's approval, General Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, in-
structed the service chiefs on March 11, 1953, to submit individual plans
and project forces available as of December 31, 1955, for the land, sea,
and air defense of the United States. Essentially, each service was to pre-
pare an estimate of the forces it could allocate from anticipated force
levels to defense and still meet the requirements of other missions. These
plans would eventually be submitted to the JCS as a plan for achieving
an effective continental air defense. 50

Contrary to the Alsop reportage, the Air Force took this increased
emphasis on air defense seriously. Although Air Force leaders used
every opportunity to make their case for not reinforcing the defense
forces at the expense of SAC — NSC 139 contained some assurances to
that effect — the Air Force hastened to meet the directives of the national
command authorities.

General Twining, successor to Vandenberg on June 30, 1953, as
Chief of Staff, and General White, new Vice Chief of Staff, personally
guided Air Staff work on the new defense plans. White cautioned the
Air Staff that "perhaps the Air Force would find that it had to reduce or
eliminate some of its lesser responsibilities" to meet its air defense com-
mitments. 51 Twining even said that the absolute primacy of SAC's mis-
sion might have to be reconsidered. He foresaw "the distinct possibility
that the future activities of the Air Force may well be primarily grouped
into two equally important functions, air defense and strategic air oper-
ations." 52

Twining wanted the Air Force to obtain ostensibly exclusive juris-
diction over all aspects of air defense planning. The Air Force would
submit a completely new plan for air defense against which the JCS
could measure proposed allocations received from the other services. 53
The USAF War Plans Division of the Directorate of Plans prepared the
proposal with the assistance of other Air Staff agencies and members of
Chidlaw's Colorado Springs staff. 54

In brief, the plan proposed to add 29 mobile and 135 low-altitude
stations to ADC's radar system. The plan noted the requirement for the
computerized system being developed in the Lincoln Laboratory, but it
did not attempt to predict when the system would be ready for installa-
tion. Four squadrons (40 aircraft) of control and warning planes would
be deployed under the plan, and the Navy would furnish 20 radar picket
ships. These, along with 5 Texas Towers, to be built off the Atlantic
coast, could extend radar coverage seaward. Texas Towers, which re-
sembled oil drilling platforms used in the Gulf of Mexico, were huge,
manned platforms to serve as radar sites. The Air Force hoped the
towers and other air defense improvements could be functioning by the
end of 1955. 55

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The Emerging Shield

The Air Force favored constructing a far northern warning line,
once its feasibility had been proved in tests. Many questions remained,
however, as to how personnel and equipment functioned in arctic envi-
ronments. In the meantime, the Air Force advocated U.S. support for a
Canadian project, the Mid-Canada Line. This line, if fully completed,
would extend from Newfoundland across Canada along approximately
the 54th parallel and would then run north along the Alaska highway
before connecting with the Alaska radar system. Further, the seaward
barriers would extend from Alaska to Hawaii and from Newfoundland to
the Azores. ADC would operationally control ninety Air Force airborne
early-warning aircraft and thirty Navy picket ships. 56

As for the weapons force, the Air Force hoped to have seventy-five
fighter-interceptor squadrons functioning by the end of 1955. Unfortu-
nately, development of the 1954 interceptor (initially the F-102A), Fair-
child and Saville's experiment in a weapons systems approach to aircraft
development, had lagged. The Air Force thus had to rely on the F-89
and F-86D for its frontline interceptors at least through 1955. Mean-
while, a project was under way to adapt an air-to-air guided missile, the
Falcon, designed for the 1954 interceptor, for use on the F-89. As with
so much else connected with home air defense, Saville influenced the
early development of the guided air-to-air missile. During his tour as
Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, he stimulated the Hughes Air-
craft Company to develop the prospectively potent weapon. 57 While
Hughes, under Saville's not so gentle prodding, made immense strides,
the missile would not be ready before the end of 1955. The Air Force's
only hope of achieving a substantial increase in the destructive power of
its interceptors before then lay in equipping them with rockets carrying
atomic warheads. This issue proved too sensitive and controversial to be
approved quickly. 58

The Air Force's BOMARC and the Army's Nike remained the only
surface-to-air missiles scheduled for use in the air defense network.
BOMARC was not expected to be ready for deployment until the end of
1955. As for Nike, the Air Force suggested that the Army Antiaircraft
Artillery Command be increased from 66 to 1 10 battalions and that 47 be
equipped with Nikes. In addition, the Air Force also considered using a
new air defense missile— the Talos. Developed for fleet defense by the
Navy, Talos could be converted to a ground-to-air point-defense role in
which it might be as good as or even better than the Nike. The Air
Force hoped to equip 20 squadrons with the Talos missile, permitting it
to participate actively in the ground-to-air defense mission. Airmen
trained to maintain and use Talos could then be employed later as cadres
for BOMARC. 59

Not surprisingly, the Army and the Navy did not share the Air
Force's views on how many and what kind of forces they should pro-

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An Integrated System

vide for air defense. The Army, for example, preferred sixty-one Nike
battalions by the end of 1955, not the forty-seven suggested by the Air
Force. 60 The Army did not see the Talos as a superior weapon to Nike,
nor did it intend to let the Air Force usurp its ground-to-air continental
defense role.

For its part, the Navy reiterated its long-held belief that it should be
solely responsible for and equipped to handle overwater surveillance and
warning. At one time, of course, the Air Force had been prepared to
concede the mission to the Navy, but when the Navy did not move as
quickly as the Air Force wanted, the Air Force ordered early-warning
aircraft and planned to deploy them on the east and west coasts. Now,
however, after the Air Force had prepared its own seaward warning
forces, the Navy appeared ready to act on the issue. According to the
new Navy concept, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet and his
counterpart in the Pacific would provide both continental air defense
warning and antisubmarine capabilities. To accomplish both missions, the
Navy wanted 3 wings (133 aircraft) of early-warning planes and 36 de-
stroyer-escort ships converted for use in picket vessel operations. With
these, the Navy claimed, it could place in the Atlantic and Pacific by the
end of 1955 barriers able to detect 95 percent of any enemy aircraft
flying from 500 to 30,000 feet and approaching the American coasts. Al-
though the Navy's estimate of early-warning aircraft requirements coin-
cided approximately with the Air Force's, each service believed it should
own and operate the aircraft. The respective estimates on the required
number of picket vessels also differed significantly: the Navy believed it
could do the job with 36; the Air Force believed the Navy should pro-
vide 50. 61

The JCS could do little to resolve the differences between the Navy
and the Air Force. Although most of the service chiefs preferred to
solve roles and missions questions through individual negotiations, a cen-
tralized air defense organization with authority to make decisions was
needed. 62

While the services struggled with their respective air defense re-
sponsibilities, the Kelly Committee completed its work and submitted to
Wilson a report, which included little specific guidance. Ambiguities
became apparent when the Alsops concluded that the report "fully con-
firmed" the findings of the Summer Study Group, 63 whereas Charles
Murphy, the Air Force Reserve officer-journalist, labeled it an "impres-
sive rebuttal of the Summer Study Group." 64

In most respects, the report merely confirmed the ideas and projects
instituted or under consideration for air defense. Discounting the possi-
bility of building a near-perfect defense, the report emphasized that
American military planning had to concentrate on offensive capabilities.
The committee supported construction of the Mid-Canada Line, pointing

189

The Emerging Shield

to the need for a far northern warning line if the new experimental pro-
gram to develop equipment and facilities succeeded. The committee also
approved the automated ground control system being developed in the
Lincoln Laboratory and, in a related matter, advocated a vigorous civil
defense program. 65

After five months of study and investigation, the Kelly Committee
approved the projects under way or close to implementation. One com-
mittee recommendation, prompted by interservice disputes on air defense
allocations and missions requirements, appeared to influence later devel-
opments: Kelly suggested to centralize "responsibility for air defense
under a single agency with broad authority." 66

Thorough as the report appeared, Wilson decided a more compre-
hensive study was needed. Another committee composed of, as Wilson
put it, our own people (the previous Democratic administration had ap-
pointed Kelly) therefore joined the plethora of past and present air de-
fense study groups. Retired Army Lt. Gen. Harold R. Bull, one of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's most valued staff officers in World War II, chaired
the new committee,* and General Smith, the ADC vice commander,
joined as the Defense Department's representative. Members of the
Office of Defense Mobilization, the federal Civil Defense Administration,
and the Interdepartmental Committee on Intelligence and Security
served to ensure the study would be conducted with a broad view. Bull
was asked to review Kelly's findings, study the present and future threat
of air attack, and examine air defense measures under way and pro-
grammed. He would then recommend physical and organizational im-
provements necessary in the immediate future and estimate the cost. 67

Soon after the Bull Committee convened, President Eisenhower's
new National Security Council issued its first major policy statement.
Initially, the Eisenhower administration discounted Truman's warning of
a Soviet threat to the United States by the end of 1955. Eisenhower's
long-range policy called for a steady, continuing analysis of the nation's
military needs and a calm, fiscally sound buildup. Consistent with this
approach, Eisenhower reduced Truman's proposed 1954 defense budget,
assuming it contained expenditures not mandatory for strengthening the
military. The new President believed the Soviet threat could be met
within a balanced budget by eliminating waste and unessential programs.
This strategy was to establish and maintain strategic offensive forces ca-
pable of damaging the Soviet Union sufficiently so that making war with
the United States, on any conceivable scale, presented an unacceptable
risk. A complementary goal was to institute a continental air defense

mi« * ft"? h n ad „ P i eVi °!! Sly bee " Ch ° sen by Eisenhower to lea <l * civil defense survey com-
pp n-ST DeCember 1946 [ Coolin g. A ™y Support of Civil Defense, Vol II,

190

An Integrated System

strong enough to prevent disaster "and to make secure the mobilization
base necessary to achieve . . . victory in the event of a general war." 68

The Decision to Proceed

Soon after he assumed office, Eisenhower made clear he intended to
rely heavily on the JCS, particularly on the chairman, to attain his mili-
tary objectives. In his mid- 1953 reorganization of the Defense Depart-
ment, the President selected Admiral Radford as Chairman of the JCS
and increased his authority. 69 Radford had been one of the Air Force's
most outspoken opponents in the late 1940s during the interservice dis-
putes culminating in the B-36 controversy. He was, however, completely
loyal to the President and could be expected to uphold Eisenhower's
views in JCS councils. In addition to Radford, Eisenhower appointed
Admiral Robert B. Carney as Chief of Naval Operations, and General
Twining replaced the ailing General Vandenberg as Air Force Chief of
Staff. General Matthew B. Ridgway, a hero in Korea as head of the
Eighth Army and Douglas MacArthur's successor in Japan, became
Army Chief of Staff. Ridgway, odd man out on the new JCS, believed
that Eisenhower's policies overemphasized long-range nuclear capabili-
ties and that the ground soldier remained a decisive factor in warfare.
The President instructed the chiefs to spend a month, beginning in mid-
July, reappraising the nation's military programs. 70 They were then to
confer with Secretary Wilson on ways to identify and reduce sources of
waste, inefficiency, duplication, and excessive cost in the Defense De-
partment budget. 71

On July 22, in the midst of these arrangements, General Bull submit-
ted his report, which the National Security Council circulated as NSC
159. Limited strictly to defense needs, Bull's report stated unequivocally
that the inadequacy of the current defenses constituted an "unacceptable
risk to our nation's survival." Bull recommended the United States con-
tinue to develop air defense measures as rapidly as possible even though
the Soviet threat could take years to materialize fully. 72

In many ways the Bull report agreed with Air Force plans for air
defense. Like the Air Force, Bull assigned top priority to completing the
Mid-Canada Line and its seaward extensions and to setting up contiguous
surveillance and warning systems off the coasts. The committee proposed
that the following be completed on a second-priority basis: the Lincoln
automated system, the gap-filler radar program, a fighter-interceptor
force of 75 squadrons (as the Air Force had proposed), an improved air-
craft identification system, and a far northern warning line if experimen-
tal tests proved it workable. Bull estimated a cost of $34 billion to com-

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The Emerging Shield

General Nathan F. Twining accepting a second tour as Chief of
Staff, United States Air Force. Administering the oath on June 30,
1955, is Secretary of the Air Force Harold D. Talbott.

plete these projects. Since the 1954 budget contained $4.3 billion for air
defense improvements, the buildup would require more than 8 years for
completion if expenditures for air defense remained unchanged. 73

On August 4 the outgoing Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Wilson
(and two days later told the National Security Council) that they favored
a stronger air defense. They urged, however, that improvements not be
undertaken at the expense of more important requirements. The chiefs
also questioned the priorities outlined the Bull report. Consequently, the
National Security Council postponed making a recommendation on the
Bull proposals until September 1, 1953, when the new service chiefs
were scheduled to meet with the council to present their ideas. 74

On August 12, 1953, Americans learned that the Soviets had ex-
ploded a thermonuclear device, less than a year after the United States
had demonstrated the feasibility of the fusion bomb. Not a superbomb — it
had a different configuration and lower yield — the Soviet weapon could
be carried in an aircraft, whereas the American one could not. Just as
four years earlier when the Soviet Union first exploded an atomic
device, a public cry immediately arose for better continental air defenses.

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An Integrated System

The Eisenhower administration minimized the event, much as President
Truman had done in response to the Soviet's atomic test in 1949. On
August 26 Admiral Radford told reporters the Soviet thermonuclear ex-
periment had been foreseen and would not severely alter America's basic
military plans. He acknowledged a need for the United States to
strengthen its air defenses. 75

While the JCS considered new defense goals in light of the en-
hanced Soviet threat, the National Security Council developed a more
definitive statement on defense policy. In terms of air defense, the Na-
tional Security Council recommended implementing the programs sug-
gested in the Bull report to the extent they did not detract from a bal-
anced budget. Eisenhower accepted this advice and directed Wilson to
solicit more concrete ideas from the JCS on various air defense mat-
ters. 76

National Security Council policy paper NSC 159/4, an amended
version of the Bull report, became a key document in the history of con-
tinental air defense. It was the first postwar air defense directive ap-
proved at every level of military command — at the presidential, at the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the JCS levels. The Air Force
could at last proceed to build a modern air defense system knowing it
had the complete backing of all elements in the national command struc-
ture.

Events moved fairly rapidly. Using NSC 159/4 as justification, the
Air Force Council on October 28, 1953, asked the Air Staff Budget Advi-
sory Committee to include funds in the 1955 budget to construct the
facilities required by ADC to convert to the Lincoln automated system. 77
On December 2, the council recommended approval of the ADC 323-
station low-altitude gap-filler radar program. 78 On the same date, the
council agreed to the ADC request for 29 additional stations under the
"third phase mobile radar program." Many of these stations would pro-
vide coverage along the U.S.-Mexican border and the Gulf of Mexico. 79
On January 11, 1954, the council recommended funds be added to the
1955 budget to construct five Texas Towers to complement the picket
ships and early-warning aircraft system that the Air Force, with Navy
support, hoped to establish off the east coast. 80

NSC 159/4 also facilitated closer cooperation between the United
States and Canada in air defense matters. The two nations formed a Mili-
tary Study Group and, under its direction, a Scientific Advisory Team.
American and Canadian scientists studied prospects for the Mid-Canada
and far northern warning lines. Concentrating first on the Canadian-in-
spired (and eventually built) Mid-Canada Line, the scientists agreed it
could and should be constructed. Erected generally along the 55th paral-
lel, it could detect penetration by hostile aircraft and could discriminate
between incoming and outgoing air traffic. 81 The Permanent Joint Board

193

The Emerging Shield

agreed the U.S. and Royal Canadian air forces should plan the line; on
December 8, 1953, the JCS authorized General Twining to contact his
Canadian counterpart to discuss the project. 82

Another, even more provocative, National Security Council paper,
NSC 162/2, followed NSC 159/4. Better known as New Look, NSC
162/2 warned of the determination of the United States to use its nuclear
striking force if attacked. The New Look, as one JCS summary stated,
was intended

to minimize the threat of Soviet aggression by maintaining a
strong security position with emphasis upon offensive retali-
atory strength and defensive strength— this to be based
upon a massive retaliatory capability ... an effective conti-
nental defense system, and by combat forces of the United
States and its allies suitably deployed to deter or counter
aggression and to discharge initial tasks in the event of a
general war. 83

The New Look program has often been interpreted as synonymous
with "massive retaliation," espoused publicly in January 1954 by Eisen-
hower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Described as "a revival
of the spirit of the offence in military strategy," 84 the New Look empha-
sized strategic air power. The United States would not compete with the
Soviet Union in a conventional arms buildup, and local wars, like the
war in Korea, would be fought primarily by allies with American help.
Perhaps the essential New Look strategy was to deter the Soviets from
engaging in or supporting large- or small-scale conflicts, understanding
the United States reserved the right to retaliate.

President Eisenhower and his chief civilian and military advisers
emphasized home air defense. Throughout his term in office, Eisenhower
addressed the United States' inability to launch a preventive or preemp-
tive attack on the Soviet Union. Such an attack was contrary to Ameri-
can democratic and moral ideals. Even if a month of advanced warning
allowed preparation, Eisenhower foresaw difficulties in obtaining secret
congressional approval and explaining his actions to the American
people. Despite all the advantages, the President finally concluded that
"it would appear impossible that any such thing would occur." 85 Under
the circumstances, Eisenhower realized the nation had to be capable of
sustaining the first blow in a future nuclear war, "a blow that would
almost certainly be a surprise attack and one that would make Pearl
Harbor, by comparison, look like a skirmish." 86

The President thus set as the military's first objective "the capability
to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes— by a
combination of effective retaliatory power and a continental defense
system of steadily increasing effectiveness." 87 The objective, said Eisen-
hower, demanded priority in all defense planning. The National Security
Council, in reviewing its air defense decisions of late 1953 and early

194

An Integrated System

1954, agreed completely with Eisenhower, although the council now be-
lieved the Soviet Union would not have a significant capability for
launching strategic nuclear attacks until July 1957. 88 Meanwhile, Admiral
Radford emphasized quality continental air defenses and offensive retalia-
tory power. 89 The Air Staff concluded from such statements that the two
most important Air Force missions in order of importance were to devel-
op and maintain a massive nuclear retaliatory capability and to develop
and maintain an integrated and effective continental defense system. 90

The new national emphasis on air defense enabled General Chidlaw,
his staff, and ADC commanders to speak forthrightly on air defense
needs. Since 1948 the ADC commander had been directed to develop
and operate a minimum air defense system. Chidlaw's statement in late
1952 that there was a limit, a point of no return, to an air defense buildup
exemplified the pressure this policy put on ADC. This view supported
the contention, consistently voiced by the Air Force as its primary mis-
sion, that it had to maintain a strategic air force capable of deterring or
winning a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Now, under Eisenhower's
New Look, the JCS charged the air defense chief with establishing an
effective system even though the Eisenhower cuts in the military budget
hit the Air Force hard. Forces to achieve an effective air defense system
were not to be acquired at the expense of SAC, which would fulfill the
primary objective.

Chidlaw's deputy, General Smith, had commanded pursuit squad-
rons before World War II and, after performing impressive combat serv-
ice in the Pacific during the war, headed the Eastern Air Defense Force
in 1950. Smith (who later became Air Force Vice Chief of Staff), stimu-
lated by the intricacies of air defense, approached the subject cerebrally,
much as Saville had. In March 1954, Smith indicated how ADC planned
to develop and use the "integrated, efficient, and highly potent air de-
fense system" the Eisenhower administration planned to install. Accord-
ing to Smith, a basic premise of New Look strategy was that in a future
war the United States would be attacked by "masses of thermonuclear
weapons." To meet this threat, he said, ADC required the most ad-
vanced weapons and warning systems. Moreover, highly trained and mo-
tivated personnel would be needed to work in the sophisticated air de-
fense command and control environment, made possible by computers.
In broad tactical terms, the purpose of active defenses would be to
engage and destroy an enemy as far away from his target as early warn-
ing and rapid reaction would permit. Smith described his scenario of a
future air battle after the defenses had been alerted to an approaching
attack:

Bombers will be met by extremely fast interceptors armed
with rockets and missiles, some with atomic warheads, fol-
lowed by unmanned supersonic interceptors homing to the

195

The Emerging Shield

targets by their own radar, and finally by short range mis-
siles. All of this complex network . . . will be knit together
by high speed computing machines capable of carrying
scores of tracks and controlling an equal number of inter-
ceptors by the automatic transmission of intercept data to
our fighter aircraft. 91

Most of the technology Smith described had been researched and was
being tested. Events in the next few years would determine whether the
new administration's decision to strive for an effective defense would
produce the sophisticated system he envisioned.

196

Chapter 8

Defensive Systems Become Operational

Wien the Eisenhower administration decided to build an effective
continental air defense, the Air Force planned to have its compo-
nents in place and functioning as soon as possible. The wide-ranging
postwar debate over the role and purpose of strategic air defense thus
culminated in an extensive buildup of radars, aircraft, missiles, and com-
mand and control networks designed to defend the United States against
attack from manned bombers. By the end of the 1950s, most of the com-
plicated and expensive apparatus was in place and functioning, although
a potentially more lethal weapon than the bomber had emerged — the
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

SAGE: A Command and Control Network for
Air Defense

In Kingston, New York, on August 7, 1958, an engineer pushed a
button activating one of the largest and most highly developed comput-
ers of the time. Moments later, a BOMARC surface-to-air missile rose
from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to intercept a simulated enemy bomber
over the Atlantic Ocean. 1 This marked the first time the SAGE (semi-
automatic ground environment) air defense system had, by remote con-
trol, guided the firing of a missile. SAGE, the heart of a network de-
signed to coordinate all air defense components in existence and the
world's first major command and control system, established a new tech-
nology with far-ranging military and nonmilitary applications. 2

The origin of SAGE can be traced to Air Force actions after the
Soviets exploded their atomic device in August 1949. In one of its most
important actions, the Air Force established an air defense study group
led by Dr. Valley in December 1949. Formally known as the Air De-
fense Systems Engineering Committee, its emergence coincided with the

197

The Emerging Shield

appointment of General Saville as Deputy Chief of Staff for Develop-
ment. The committee worked closely with Saville but reported to Chief
of Staff General Vandenberg through the Scientific Advisory Board. 3

Valley Committee members visited numerous air defense sites and
became discouraged by what they saw. The most striking problem in-
volved the use of primitive equipment and methods in ground-controlled
interception (GCI). Members were astounded and distressed by "the
completely inadequate and antiquated means provided for the control of
. . . interceptors." 4 Valley believed a solution to the problem might lie
in the use of new technology, especially that of computers. It was imper-
ative to devise a system that could gather data from radar stations and
relay and process the information as quickly as possible so that defensive
weapons could be unleashed in time to repulse a rapidly approaching in-
vader. Current manual systems, relying heavily on voice communica-
tions, could not be expected to assume this function fast enough in a
high-speed battle between jet bombers and fighters. According to Valley,
however, the Whirlwind computer, developed in the late 1940s by Jay
W. Forrester, might eventually provide a breakthrough in air defense. 5

Because of Valley's suggestions, the Air Force became the leading
supporter of MIT's Lincoln' Laboratory, established in 1951 to study air

198

Systems Become Operational

defense in depth. Yet, as late as fall 1952, the Air Force was studying
prospects for another air defense automation project, based on the British
Royal Navy's Comprehensive Display System (CDS). A centralized sur-
veillance scheme, the CDS used storage and retrieval of data from tele-
phone and teletype components. As CONAC commander, General
Whitehead had encouraged Headquarters USAF to adapt the system for
American air defense. Members of the Air Staff who traveled to Europe
to observe CDS agreed the system might be applied to American air de-
fense. Radars could be assigned to geographic areas, each under a central
combat center. With several radars feeding information to such a post,
perhaps a hundred planes could be tracked, ten times more than at an
individual site. Even after six years of development, CDS was not netta-
ble (it could not exchange data automatically among different combat
centers as the more advanced systems being developed by Lincoln prom-
ised to do). 6 Despite this drawback, the Air Force still had hopes for it.
On the basis of tests conducted by the U.S. Navy (interested in CDS for
fleet defense) and evaluated by Air Proving Ground technicians, Maj.
Gen. Morris R. Nelson, Air Force Director of Requirements, decided in
June 1952 that CDS was the only affordable system capable of improv-
ing existing air defenses. 7

CDS prospects in American air defense brightened considerably
when the University of Michigan Willow Run Research Center proposed
to correct deficiencies in CDS and to modify it for use in the Air De-
fense Integrated System (ADIS). ADIS would Americanize CDS by
making it possible to transfer data electronically between combat centers.
The Michigan proposal faced vigorous opposition by Lincoln Laborato-
ry members who feared ADIS would drain financial support and interest
from their laboratory. 8

Responding to the Michigan challenge, Lincoln officials, with the
concurrence of Maj. Gen. Earle Partridge, now head of Air Research
and Development Command, formulated a substitute program for ADIS.
They proposed to develop the Lincoln Transition System built around a
central digital computer receiving data from radar sites. Lincoln repre-
sentatives believed this operation could begin by 1955, one year earlier
than Michigan's estimates for ADIS. Conceivably, advanced radars and
Boeing's BOMARC interceptor missile could enable the Lincoln system
to defend against ballistic missiles. 9

General Chidlaw and his staff in ADC feared the Lincoln plans
might be too far-fetched. He favored assigning priority to the less com-
plicated Michigan system. Chidlaw told Vandenberg that ADIS ap-
peared to ADC

to be well thought out using known techniques and pro-
vides a high degree of flexibility with optimum application
of human judgment in concert with maximum automaticity.

199

The Emerging Shield

It also appears to be compatible with other service systems
now being developed and can readily integrate missile
weapons.

The Lincoln system, on the other hand, seemed "rather nebulous." Chid-
law recommended that it "be directed towards future threats such as the
intercontinental missile and not towards the present manned aircraft
threat." 10

General Twining told Chidlaw the Air Staff shared his belief that
the Michigan system showed the most immediate promise. However, said
Twining,

your view that the Lincoln system effort should be re-
aligned toward an intercontinental ballistic missile threat is
not shared by my staff. It is felt that the enemy threat from
manned bombers and air-breathing missiles to ballistic or
glide missiles will not be a sudden one, and that it will not
have been completed by 1960. Our air development pro-
gram should be accordingly shaped to meet the widely dif-
fering requirements of these threats through the period of
their probable co-existence. At each potential target, point
defense systems . . . appear to be required for defense
against the ballistic missile; a decentralized surveillance
system with centralized control of our area air weapons is
the goal for air-breathing missiles. 11

RAND analysts monitored the progress of the two systems. Al-
though they considered the Lincoln air defense system the most promis-
ing for the 1960s, they agreed with Chidlaw that the Michigan system
seemed more likely to meet short-term needs. RAND therefore recom-
mended the Air Force implement CDS in its original form, then improve
it after it was operating. 12

In the course of its investigation, RAND discovered "a basic atti-
tude of distrust of Lincoln in the Air Force and that relations between
Lincoln and the working level USAF people have frequently been un-
pleasant." RAND also determined that the Air Force often failed to un-
derstand what the Lincoln scientists were attempting and recommending,
though the Air Force was clear in its wish to ensure that the laboratory's
efforts not be "sporadic and erratic" by offering specific guidance. 13

Dr. James Killian, MIT President, pressed Lincoln's case against the
Michigan project. In January 1953 he asked Secretary of the Air Force
Finletter if Air Force sponsorship of both Lincoln and Michigan did not,
in effect, indicate a lack of faith in Lincoln. Killian proposed that the
Defense Department perform a "technical evaluation" of Lincoln, paying
"particular attention to the relationship of its program to air defense sys-
tems based upon centralized digital computation." If the evaluation
showed that an agency other than MIT was better qualified to lead the
way in air defense research, Killian said,

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Systems Become Operational

we stand to withdraw. Since the project involves real haz-
ards for the Institute, particularly financial hazards, and
since it is not the kind of project that the Institute as an
educational institution would normally wish to undertake,
we feel it is important that there be no question in regard to
our serving as contractor. 14

Killian's views disturbed the Air Force. Despite all the problems Air
Force leaders had and continued to experience with the scientists, they
acknowledged the MIT expertise and wanted to continue an affiliation
with the university. Two years earlier, Killian had to be induced even to
consider establishing Lincoln. He had just refused as being contrary to a
university's activities a request by the Navy to do classified work on
antisubmarine warfare. But General Saville, along with scientists Louis
Ridenour and I. A. Getting, had persuaded Killian that "the dangers to
the nation from attack by airplanes carrying A bombs was a different
order of magnitude than the dangers of the need of protecting ship-
ping." 15

Now, Finletter hastened to assure Killian that the Air Force valued
Lincoln's work and that a "technical evaluation" was not called for. The
Air Force, he said, continued to regard Lincoln as its best hope for de-
veloping a suitable ground environment for electronic defense. At the
same time, Finletter, defending Air Force support of the Michigan
project, said Michigan offered hope of suggesting improvements in air
defense to be "realized in the Air Defense Command after a few years,
perhaps before the revolutionary LINCOLN program materializes in its
entirety." It was, therefore, Air Force duty to support and capitalize on
Michigan's efforts. Finletter promised Killian this in no way lessened Air
Force support for Lincoln. 16

General Partridge also solicited Killian's approval of dual develop-
ment. He pointed out it would be impractical for the Air Force to accept
one system and completely exclude another "because of the limited avail-
able facts concerning the operational and technical capabilities, state of
development and cost of either system." He asked MIT and Michigan to
cooperate in resolving the problems involved in creating an automated
air defense system. 17 Partridge also asked Chidlaw and his staff to give
equal support to MIT and Michigan. 18

Only two months after Partridge pleaded for cooperation, the Air
Force decided to discard its dual-development approach to building the
air defense ground environment. On April 10, 1953, at a conference held
in Partridge's headquarters between his staff and members of the Air
Staff, the Air Research and Development Chief heard that Headquarters
USAF had decided to cancel its support of the Michigan system and that
the Air Research and Development Command planned to finalize a pro-
duction contract for the Lincoln Transition System 19 (the Lincoln Tran-
sition System was redesignated the SAGE System in 1954).

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The Emerging Shield

The Air Force decided to take this important step for a number of
reasons. Most important, Finletter's and Partridge's reassurances had
failed to mollify Killian. To allow MIT to withdraw from the air defense
program would mean a huge financial loss for the Air Force which had
already invested substantial sums in Lincoln. Another factor in the Air
Force decision to support Lincoln alone was the views of the new Secre-
tary of the Air Force in the Eisenhower administration, Harold E. Tal-
bott, and his Assistant for Research, Trevor Gardner. On March 28,
1953, Talbott and Gardner visited Dr. Albert G. Hill, Lincoln Director.
Hill told them the laboratory had serious financial problems and found it
difficult to attract topflight scientists. 20

Lincoln's power play proved successful when Talbott and Gardner
decided it was time for the Air Force to drop its dual-development
policy and to invest all its resources in one agency. Thus, a policy that
had earlier been called dual development was now denounced as a dupli-
cation of effort. Partridge and his Vice Commander, Maj. Gen. Donald
L. Putt, accordingly arranged a meeting with the University of Michi-
gan's President Dr. Harlan Hatcher to break the bad news. Hatcher con-
ceded that some of Michigan's objectives and many of its components
were similar to Lincoln's and agreed to withdraw from the project. 21
The Air Force investment with Lincoln was safe.

This action proved unpopular with the ADC staff in Colorado
Springs. ADC officers, responsible for the day-to-day air defense of the
United States, believed Michigan's plans were less ambitious than Lin-
coln's and offered better prospects for the near term. Vice Commander
Smith sent Headquarters USAF a list of air defense requirements needed
before the Lincoln system could be deployed, which most optimistically
was estimated to be 1955. The requirements included filling gaps in radar
coverage below 5,000 feet and identifying friend from foe more quickly
and reliably. 22 The Air Staff knew of these and other deficiencies in the
air defenses described by Smith. That Smith chose to reiterate them may
have been his way of warning that to await the outcome of the Lincoln
venture before investing in present air defense improvements might
prove tragic. Since 1946, officers directly responsible for air defense
worried about the present threat, while Headquarters USAF concerned
itself more with future needs.

Once Lincoln had been invested with the sole responsibility it had
so eagerly sought, the Air Force expected positive results. As Partridge
told Killian,

[N]ow that the Air Force is placing its entire dependence
and emphasis on the Transition system to the exclusion of
all other efforts in this field, the discharge of the associated
responsibility becomes . . . vital to the nation. . . . Full co-
operation and assistance on the part of the Lincoln Labora-
tory and MIT ... [is anticipated] for a period of years

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Systems Become Operational

through successful production, installation and operation of
the system. 23

Cooperation necessitated that the Air Force support the MIT scien-
tists wholeheartedly. Problems could still occur because Air Force rela-
tions with scientists working in air defense had been quarrelsome at best,
and often bitter. The Air Force position was that scientists should initiate
ideas and devise new technologies to make air defense more effective.
The general feeling was that Summer Study Group members had gone
beyond their mandate in advocating extensive air defense improvements
which, the Air Force feared, could overemphasize defense at the expense
of SAC. Eisenhower's decision to forge ahead in air defense and to build
up SAC would have seemed to end the argument. As the RAND ana-
lysts reported, however, animosity between the Air Force and the scien-
tists continued, and Air Force reluctance to make MIT solely responsible
for development of the air defense ground environment seemed to sup-
port their view. The Lincoln threat to withdraw completely from the
program could not have been expected to relieve tensions. The Air
Force decision to yield to MIT demands emphasized how the service
was placed in a distinctly uncomfortable position. Mistrustful of the sci-
entists, Air Force leaders still had to execute Eisenhower's dictum to
build an effective air defense. The Air Staff knew that MIT talent could,
eventually, meet that goal most effectively.

A change in attitude was required, and the Air Force set out to in-
still a mutually respectful relationship with the scientists, engineers, and
other technicians involved in SAGE. Lincoln received extremely wide
latitude in designing and developing the system, befitting the need for
creativity and productivity. The commanders of ADC, Air Research and
Development Command, and Air Materiel Command asked for and re-
ceived periodic briefings from Lincoln and the assigned project officers.
Generally, Lincoln and the other agencies involved in SAGE had com-
plete freedom to establish their own management structures and modes
of operation. Many years later, a participant in SAGE remembered that

those of us who were designing SAGE believed in it, and I
don't know how we could have done the job if we didn't.
But as the buyer of the thing you [the Air Force] had every
right to be terrified. I was amazed at the time and I'm still
amazed at the unflagging support of the Air Force. Truly
remarkable. 24

Indeed, the Air Force had every reason to be concerned, because
computer technology remained an unexplored discipline. The initial
work on the computer that eventually became SAGE began in the late
1940s in the MIT Digital Computer Laboratory. From Forrester's initial
work in designing the Whirlwind computer for the Navy, the Air
Force became aware that a similar machine could be applied in air de-

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The Emerging Shield

fense operations. Forrester and Lincoln later designed Whirlwind II
specifically for air defense use. The production version of Whirlwind
II — in Air Force nomenclature, the AN/FSQ-7 — resulted from a joint
effort among Lincoln Laboratory, Air Force Cambridge Research Labo-
ratory, and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) person-
nel.

The AN/FSQ-7 proved decidedly better than the manual system in
performing GCI functions. In the early 1950s, GCI methods resembled
those used in World War II, although in some systems improved radars
had been installed. Each site consisted of a search radar, a height-finding
radar, and devices for communicating with interceptor pilots. Radar op-
erators analyzed their scopes in darkened control centers where aircraft
appeared as blips on the scopes and target information was supplied by
telephone from adjacent GCI sites. In major control centers, large plex-
iglass boards depicted the local geography, and airmen used grease pen-
cils to mark the boards to show aircraft in the vicinity. 25 All in all, this
method would not suit the direction of a high-speed air battle fought in
ever changing positions.

The centralized command and control data-processing system,
SAGE, would improve this situation. Analog computer-equipped direc-
tion centers with interconnecting communications would process radar
signals and coordinate weapons used in an air battle. Radars and comput-
ers would combine to present a clear picture of the speed, location, and
direction of all planes within radar range. A single radar, the basic air
defense element, would be replaced by SAGE, now controlling several
radars in a single operations center by linking them to a computer
through telephone lines or ultrahigh frequency (UHF) radio waves. In
addition to receiving information from radars, SAGE computers would
be supplied with additional data from such sources as Texas Towers,
picket ships, early-warning aircraft, and the GOC. The SAGE computer
would create a composite picture of the air situation as it developed.
Generated radarscope displays would provide information so that con-
trollers could decide how to deploy the various weapons to destroy an
invader. The semiautomatic system required human judgment; it was de-
signed to combine "the talents of man with the best aptitudes of ma-
chines." 26

The key to automating air defense procedures lay in the Whirl-
wind computer. First tested in 1951 on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, the
automated network consisted of a control center in Cambridge where the
computer was housed, a long-range radar at South Truro, also in Massa-
chusetts, and numerous short-range gap-filler radars. By 1954 more
radars had been added, and the whole operation had become steadily
more realistic. The Air Force integrated an F-86D squadron in the Cape
Cod system and diverted SAC training flights into the area so intercep-

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Systems Become Operational

AN/FSQ-7 radar. Shown here is part of the maintenance control con-
sole of the central computer.

tors could train against B-47 jet bombers. By the time the Cape Cod
system evolved into an experimental SAGE sector in 1954, more than
5,000 sorties testing various components had been flown against it. Still
developmental, the computer generally performed well. Cape Cod did
much to validate the Lincoln efforts. 27

While Lincoln and IBM continued to build and refine the computer
to be used in SAGE, equally critical attention focused on computer pro-
gramming. Like the computers, computer programs were elementary in
the early 1950s. Progress in programming would prove crucial in deter-
mining success or failure for the automated environment. Changes in
radars, tactics, and weapons implied an enormous, continuing program-
ming effort. 28

Lincoln agreed to prepare the master programs, assisted by RAND
which employed a sizable number of programmers, considering how
young the discipline was. So many software designers became involved
in SAGE that RAND created a special entity for them, the Systems De-
velopment Corporation (SDC). Although technically a Lincoln unit,
SDC did much of its work at RAND Headquarters in Santa Monica,
California. RAND designers developed the Model I software that al-
lowed realistic training for technicians scheduled to operate the first di-
rection center, expected to debut on McGuire Air Force Base, New
Jersey. 29

RAND's and Lincoln's programming tasks included synchronizing
the SAGE data link with such diverse weapons as supersonic fighters,

205

The Emerging Shield

antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missiles. Planning for the control
of Army Nike missiles and antiaircraft guns within SAGE presented a
major challenge for the Air Force. Not only technical considerations but
also sensitive roles and missions questions were involved. After seven
years of discussion, the JCS in 1954 had finally authorized creation of
the joint-service command for continental air defense (CONAD). Com-
manding CONAD would be an Air Force officer, while the Army and
Navy would perform designated missions (the primary Army contribu-
tion would be antiaircraft artillery and missiles). The new organization
did little to change old perspectives; the Air Force continued to advo-
cate centralized control of all air defense weapons, and the Army contin-
ued to believe it needed extensive freedom to operate its guns and mis-
siles effectively. The Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command resisted sub-
ordinating itself to what it believed would be restrictive control in
SAGE. From the Air Force perspective, weapons systems functions
could overlap under attack. Army defense forces were designed basically
for point, or short-range, operations; in contrast to the longer range of
Air Force interceptors, considered area defense weapons. Interceptors in
pursuit of invading bombers could, during confusion of battle, enter the
airspace defended by Army guns and missiles. Aircrews feared finding
themselves in such a situation that could be more dangerous than facing
the enemy. They believed Army gunners prone to shoot at aircraft indis-
criminately, "sorting them out on the ground later." 30

Reflecting a desire for at least partial autonomy in air defense oper-
ations, the Army proceeded to develop its Missile Master control system,
a semiautomatic fire-direction system intended to improve coordination
of missile-firing units. Previously, an Army air defense command post
controlled units that manually plotted targets on a map. Missile Master
was expected to provide a "rapid, automatic, electronic system for trans-
mitting data and coordinating the target information and defensive
effort." 31

The Air Force considered Missile Master a blatant duplication of
effort; it wanted Army missiles and guns exclusively controlled by
SAGE. General Partridge, who replaced Chidlaw as CONAD com-
mander in 1954, argued "we cannot afford to waste any weapons once
the air battle starts, nor can we afford to waste any dollars through un-
necessary duplication of equipment and tasks in building our air defense
system." 32

No resolution of this dispute satisfied both the Air Force and the
Army. The services were as reluctant as ever to compromise in the
seemingly endless quarrel over control of antiaircraft guns and missiles
for air defense. After countless Air Force and Army proposals and sepa-
rate JCS studies on the fate of Missile Master, Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Wilson decided the matter in June 1956. He ruled that SAGE

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Systems Become Operational

control all weapons for air defense and the Army deploy Missile Master.
SAGE commands would be relayed to antiaircraft artillery batteries and
missiles through Missile Master. Although Wilson's decision did not ad-
dress Missile Master redundancy, it satisfied the Air Force by keeping
intact the principle of centralized control of air defense forces under an
Air Force commander. 33

The Air Force knew engineering and communications networks
would prove instrumental in determining SAGE efficiency. Early in the
program, Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories, selected as
engineering consultants, formed a group called Air Defense Engineering
Service (ADES). Burroughs Corporation Research Center also began to
develop special equipment for automatic processing and transmission of
radar data to computers. Like almost everything connected with air de-
fense, the work performed by ADES and Burroughs proved difficult and
expensive. Congress, it appeared, conforming with the post- World War
II pattern, would lose enthusiasm after the danger subsided and the in-
voices appeared for programs hastily authorized in periods of seemingly
dire peril. This proved true with SAGE, which in 1953 had been ap-
proved during the Korean War when world tension was high, but in
1956 the Air Force estimate of an annual communications expense of
$200 million produced congressional shock waves. (The Air Force suc-
cessfully solicited the American Telephone and Telegraph Company to
reduce its rates, but the Federal Communications Commission-approved
savings of about $14 million yearly were hardly noticeable. 34 ) By 1956
the very large investment in SAGE prohibited the withdrawal of gov-
ernment support.

Under SAGE the Air Force planned to divide the continental
United States into eight air defense regions with eight combat operations
centers, and into thirty-two air defense sectors with thirty-two SAGE di-
rection centers. Because of its strategic significance, the northeast would
receive the first SAGE installations, which, housed in concrete, shock-
resistant, aboveground buildings, would rely on air conditioners to pre-
vent the primitive computers inside from overheating and melting.

The SAGE system became nominally ready on June 26, 1958, when
the New York sector became operational. The ambitious Air Force plans
for SAGE deployment, however, were never realized. This failure was
due in large measure to the perception of many in Congress and in the
Eisenhower administration that by the late 1950s the Soviets had decided
to concentrate overwhelmingly on ICBMs (SAGE was solely an antiair-
craft system). Cuts in antibomber defense programs in the 1960s resulted.

The first intensive use of computers in air defense was not without
difficulties. Indeed, many problems arose, although some of the more se-
rious involved not the equipment but the adjustment process for people
working within the system. In the manual air defense network, personnel

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The Emerging Shield

SAGE direction center. This installation is located at Stewart Air Force
Base in New York state.

in control centers exercised substantial authority over their environment,
visually identifying blips on radarscopes, making calculations, and tele-
phoning sightings to other control centers. The information flowed
slowly enough to allow unhurried responses, though this method would
almost certainly fail under actual attack. As a RAND analyst judged the
situation, "the scene in an Air Defense Direction Center during a SAC
System test or major exercise was that of hurried conferences with many
people putting their heads together to make decisions." 35

In SAGE, information flowed into control centers at an unprece-
dented rate. Commanders and weapons directors had to assimilate infor-
mation and make quick decisions to vector interceptor pilots accurately
to their targets. Unfortunately, many people assigned to work in the first
SAGE installations were initially uncomfortable with the new system. A
RAND analysis found that

the first thing that can be said about the SAGE system
going newly into the field, and into operational use, is that
the experienced Air Defense crews attempted very quickly
to circumvent .the central computer. This was not done in

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Systems Become Operational

malice; rather, it was the response of Manual Air Defense
System operators to an extremely confusing, very different
way of operating. They had habits, ways of working, and
ways of thinking about Air Defense that no longer fit in the
SAGE environment. Therefore, they almost unconsciously
attempted to make the SAGE environment as much as pos-
sible like the Manual Air Defense system with which they
were somewhat experienced. . . . Men who are confronted
with a new system will almost always distrust it — complain
about the hardware — try to use the old ways.

As the analysis made clear, the air defense personnel were not modern-
day Luddites; they were merely confused by rapid changes confronting
them in their work place. RAND suggested they be taught more about
computer-based systems, the functions of a computer program, and the
importance of people to the system. 36

Despite its problems, SAGE proved an outstanding achievement.
Coordinating its efforts with multiple civilian and military agencies, and
working in a new and relatively untested technology, the Air Force pro-
duced the first prototype, large-scale command and control system for
air defense. Moreover, SAGE served as a major sponsor and testing
ground for the fledgling American computer industry. It played a semi-
nal role in the rapid advance of computer sciences in the years following
its implementation. It also substantiated the Air Force belief that comput-
ers deployed over a wide area could exchange large amounts of military
data rapidly and effectively. SAGE enabled the Air Force to acquire a
unique understanding and competence in the design, development, and
operation of computer systems that would eventually benefit such di-
verse operations as SAC target selection planning and personnel records
management. In fact, all components of the military, not only the Air
Force, gained in later years from Air Force experiences with computers
for air defense. Never tested during war, the Air Force air defense en-
deavor left its clearest legacy on the development and manufacture of
sophisticated technology.

Warning Lines

SAGE was designed to control and fight the air defense battle. To
do so effectively required prompt and accurate information of enemy
movements, not only flowing from sectors to combat operations centers
but also needed as soon as possible after the enemy left his bases. To
obtain such information, the United States and Canada constructed three
early-warning lines — the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada (McGill) Line,

209

The Emerging Shield

Pinetree Line. The domes of a Pinetree Line radar outpost dominate a
winter scene in Quebec, Canada.

and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line— built consecutively to
extend the warning network as far north as possible.

The first line completed, the Pinetree, performed warning and GCI
activities. Functioning in 1954, it extended on both sides of the Canadian-
American border and consisted of over thirty stations. The United States
absorbed two-thirds of its cost and provided most of its staff. Meanwhile,
Canada alone designed, constructed, paid for, and operated the Mid-
Canada Line. The Mid-Canada Line, not really a radar warning line, was
an unmanned microwave "fence" that signaled when something flew by
(even flocks of geese— it suffered from many false alarms). Although it
could not accurately gauge the altitude, number, speed, or direction of
an attacker, it served Canada's purpose by providing a rudimentary first
warning (or second warning if the DEW Line was built), a benefit the
Pinetree Line provided for the United States. Moreover, as many Cana-
dians viewed the situation, building and assuming responsibility for the
line absolved Canada from any financial obligation to support the far
more expensive DEW Line. 37

The far northern warning line had been the subject of bitter contro-
versy between the Air Force and its civilian proponents. When members
of the Summer Study Group investigated early work on the Mid-Canada
Line (then referred to as the McGill Device) in the summer of 1952,
they returned home convinced that if a warning fence was feasible under
the fierce weather conditions that prevailed along the 55th parallel in
mid-Canada, then another, potentially even more valuable, warning line

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Systems Become Operational

might be built in the frozen arctic wastes. The Air Force, meanwhile,
had been reluctant to support the project, suspecting it was part of a
scheme by the scientists to build an impenetrable air defense that would
drain funds from SAC. Also, though the DEW Line could offer early
warning for SAC bombers based in the United States, the Air Force be-
lieved the widely dispersed bases and bomb shelters provided no better
solution, an attitude endorsed by RAND. Despite Canadian experiments
in mid-Canada, the Air Force thought that building a vast and compli-
cated warning network in the frozen tundra might prove unworkable.

Notwithstanding its objections, the Air Force played a major role in
determining the feasibility of building the DEW Line. The first impor-
tant step occurred when the Lincoln Laboratory established an experi-
mental outpost on Barter Island, on the northeast coast of Alaska. To
decide what equipment was necessary under arctic conditions, Western
Electric Company personnel traveled to Barter in February 1953. The
Air Force furnished supplies and provided advisers. 38

Once the men and equipment had assembled on Barter, work pro-
ceeded rapidly. Lincoln scientists developed automated alarm circuits
that sounded an audio alert when the radars picked up a target. Oper-
ations center controllers were thus freed from constantly monitoring
their radarscopes. "Scatter." radio communications, which bounced radio

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The Emerging Shield

waves off the troposphere, avoided unpredictable arctic magnetic forces
and other ground interference. Scientists also adapted two new radars
for arctic use. Powered by nearby diesel generators, both functioned in
temperatures as low as minus 65 degrees fahrenheit and in winds up to
150 miles per hour. One conventional line-of-sight radar, the AN/FPS-
19, could detect aircraft as high as 65,000 feet and outward to 160 miles.
Like all line-of-sight radars, this one suffered from low-altitude short-
comings; an enemy flying lower than 5,000 feet could easily escape de-
tection. To compensate for this deficiency, scientists designed the low-
altitude AN/FPS-23 which could detect low-flying targets as low as 200
feet over land or 50 feet over water. So that neither would record flocks
of migratory birds, both were set to disregard objects flying slower than
125 miles per hour — a feature the Mid-Canada Line lacked. 39

Installation of an eighteen-site test line across northern Alaska and
into northwestern Canada began in July 1953 with a huge sealift of mate-
riel northward from Seattle and Portland in Washington state, through
the Bering Strait, to Point Barrow and Barter Island in Alaska. Western
Electric operated from a former World War II Navy base at Barrow,
where it designed and tested the twenty-eight-foot-long, sixteen-foot-
wide, ten-foot-high boxlike modules needed to house men and equipment
required to construct the DEW Line. The Air Force airlifted into
Barrow modules fabricated in the continental United States and then dis-
assembled into panels. The civilian contractor employed to construct the
sites reassembled the modules and, using tractors, towed them over the
tundra to sites on trails marked by air-dropped flags. By early 1954, the
experimental line was operating with a few preproduction AN/FPS-19
search radars and short-range AN/FPS-23 gap-filler radars. The line
consisted of two main stations (one on Barter Island and the other on
Point Barrow) and of seven auxiliary and nine intermediate stations. The
main and auxiliary stations, equipped for full surveillance and warning,
possessed both search and gap-filler radars. All information funneled
over scatter communications into sector control in main stations, where
controllers identified sightings as friendly or unknown. Data on un-
knowns then passed to Canadian and American air defenses to the
south. 40

By spring 1954 Air Staff concerns about the feasibility of building
the DEW Line had been largely resolved. One Air Staff report noted
that some problems remained with false alarms in the short-range radars,
which Lincoln scientists had confidence they could correct. Regardless,
the Air Force judged the overall experiment successful; the long-range
radars were ready for full production, and communications equipment
had performed satisfactorily. Most important, supplies could reach work-
ers and technicians performing difficult tasks in an inhospitable climate. 41

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Systems Become Operational

DEW Line. A module (above), airlifted in component parts from the
United States and now reconstructed and ready for installation on the
DEW Line, is towed from an assembly tent before its trip to its final desti-
nation in the far north. Men from a construction crew (below) head for
"home" after a day's work erecting a DEW Line site.

The United States still had to obtain Canada's permission and coop-
eration to build the DEW Line. The Air Staff predicted few problems
after Canada decided to construct, man, and operate the Mid-Canada
Line without financial or other U.S. aid. The Air Staff interpreted this as
a sign that Canada not only would agree to construction of the DEW
Line but also would press for its installation as soon as possible. 42 Indeed,
on September 2, 1954, Canada approved the DEW Line in principle in a
formal diplomatic note. This enabled the Royal Canadian and U.S. air
forces to begin site surveys and to assemble construction materials on
Canadian soil. Canada accrued two important benefits from construction
of the DEW Line.

213

The Emerging Shield

DEW Line. Workmen (left) prepare concrete foundations which have
their footings in natural rock as they begin construction at a DEW Line
post. Inspectors (right) view construction progress at a main station, where
a tower to house electronic equipment will be built.

Firstly, Canada secured what the United States had up to
that time assidiously endeavored to avoid, namely, an ex-
plicit recognition of Canadian claims to the exercise of sov-
ereignty in the far north. Secondly, it diminished the threat
of hostile encroachments into the Canadian Arctic by
making it clear that the region constituted a part of a securi-
ty zone of North America and NATO. 43

Canada, in fact, benefited in other ways from the DEW Line. All costs
for building the line were to be paid by the United States — a situation
Canadians could justify since Canada bore the total cost of the Mid-
Canada Line — and Canadian materiel and labor would be used for DEW
Line construction, a situation that would garner Canada significant eco-
nomic benefits. 44

To coordinate DEW Line matters more efficiently, the two air
forces formed the Military Characteristics Committee. The committee
and Western Electric both completed preliminary site surveys. Members
of the Location Study. Group, representing the navies and the air forces
of both nations, made some independent surveys to determine the re-
quired length and route of the line and on November 12, 1954, submitted
their recommendations. They proposed a route from a spot between the
Arctic Circle and latitude 70 degrees north on the west coast of Green-
land across Canada to join with the two sectors already operating from
Barter Island to Cape Lisburne, Alaska. 45 This generally conformed to
the final shape of the DEW Line, although modifications and extensions
occurred.

214

Systems Become Operational

DEW Line. A tower (left) for temporary communications goes up at
one of the DEW Line locations. A U.S. Air Force inspector (right) watches
as frozen ground is blasted in preparation for the erection of a radar anten-
na.

In December 1954, Secretary of Defense Wilson's office contracted
with General Electric to design, engineer, procure, construct, and install
the DEW Line. 46 By this time, according to Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force (Financial Management) Lyle S. Garlock, the DEW Line had
"the highest priority within the Air Force," and the service pushed for
the line to become fully operational as soon as possible. 47 This view re-
sulted less from the DEW Line being instrumental in allowing intercep-
tors to shoot down enemy bombers far from their targets, although that
was a consideration, than from the DEW Line implications for warning
and defending SAC. General Partridge succinctly expressed the Air
Force perception of its air defense mission:

As a matter of doctrine, we believe that the best defense is a
good offense, and we believe that our primary mission in
the Air Defense Command is to defend the bases from
which the Strategic Air Command is going to operate. We
believe also that we have to provide a reasonable, an equita-
ble protection for the key facilities, the population centers
and our industry. 48

In January 1955 the JCS approved installation of an initial, or basic,
segment of the DEW Line, to stretch from Cape Dyer on Baffin Island,
Canada, to Cape Lisburne, Alaska, and to consist of fifty-seven substa-
tions centering on six main stations. 49 Canada and the United States
signed a formal agreement to that effect in May 1955. Soon afterward,
Western Electric began construction with the goal of completing work

215

The Emerging Shield

DEW Line site to supply to the Strategic Air Command and the air
defense net early warning in response to the manned bomber threat

on the fifty-seven stations and having them ready for operational testing
by mid- 1957. 50

DEW Line construction, which started in spring 1955 and ended in
early 1957, has been described as

the most costly construction task ever accomplished in so
short a time. Meeting the engineering, construction, and lo-
gistical problems involved in maintaining the system every
minute or every hour of every day, week, and month,
throughout extraordinary achievement. Never before had
there been such a mammoth intrusion into the Canadian
Arctic. 51

Because extensive work could be accomplished only in brief periods
of the year in the far north and because most construction sites were iso-
lated, supply and transport became paramount. Whereas sea and land
routes moved supplies partway, many final sites could only be reached
by air transport. Advance construction parties, usually traveling by ski-
planes or snow tractors, built airfields by clearing a patch of earth large
enough to accommodate C-46 or C-47 transports carrying D-4 tractors.
The tractors then carved out landing strips at least 6,000 feet long for
use by relatively large C-124 Globemasters. 52

In 1956 land, water, and air transports (Air Force and commercial)
carried 167,183 short tons of supplies to DEW Line sites, at a cost of 25
military and civilian aircraft-related fatalities. Extraordinary efforts had
produced a nearly complete DEW Line by the end of 1957. Before

216

Systems Become Operational

giving the Air Force responsibility for the line, Western Electric per-
formed more than one million tests of electrical and communications
equipment. The date of July 31, 1957, when responsibility passed to the
Air Force, marked the better part of a decade that had been spent plan-
ning the line. During the remaining decade, operation and testing of sta-
tions, sorting of procedures and defining of tasks, and extension of the
line's boundaries east and west occurred. 53

Other Warning Systems

As the DEW, Mid-Canada, and Pinetree lines were being planned
and implemented, the Air Force began establishing other control and
warning systems. These systems not only supplemented the northern
early-warning lines, they also patrolled areas beyond the range of north-
ern radars. Navy picket ships performed that function aided to some
extent by airborne early-warning and control aircraft. In addition, Texas
Tower radar platforms, fastened to the ocean floor, extended east coast
radar coverage 300 to 500 miles seaward. The expected gain was at least
thirty critical minutes to prepare the air defenses for the anticipated
Soviet bomber threat.

The 5 planned Texas Towers, deployed about 100 miles off the
northeast Atlantic seaboard, could furnish advance warning for key
northeastern industrial sites, likely targets of Soviet bombers. In fact, the
towers could be placed only on this location because only on the conti-
nental shelf off the northeast coast was the water shallow enough to
build them. Here, the affixed towers could be equipped with large, long-
range radars resembling those used inland, a major advantage over much
smaller shipboard and airborne radar. The littoral towers were not re-
stricted by space and weight, as were ships and aircraft. Because of the
tower's supposedly fixed and stable locations, the data they provided
could be deciphered immediately and precisely. Towers were thus better
suited to perform weapons control functions than were radars located on
ships or planes. Coastal towers had the same capabilities as inland instal-
lations; early-warning aircraft and picket ships did not. 54

The Air Force originally intended to deploy five Texas Towers, but
the plan eventually called for three. Partly because Headquarters USAF
wanted to economize, it persuaded ADC that airborne control and warn-
ing aircraft could protect the areas where Texas Towers 1 and 5 were to
be installed. The three remaining towers did not meet Air Force expecta-
tions and, in one instance, caused a major tragedy.

When preparing to activate the towers, the Air Force estimated that
twenty-two men could maintain continuous operations. This number

217

The Emerging Shield

Texas Tower. One of four radar platforms placed on the continental
coast of the northeastern United States, this facility was part of a control
and warning system developed to defend the United States from overwater
attacks.

proved grossly inadequate; by 1957 usually six officers and forty-eight
airmen staffed each tower. Required were not only radar operators and
technicians but also personnel for plumbing, refrigeration, medical, and
cooking chores. Also unique specialists such as marine enginemen dealt
with maritime matters pertaining to tower operations. Totally unpre-
pared to fill these positions with qualified people, ADC, in frustration,
proposed transferring the whole operation to the Navy and Marine
Corps. Headquarters USAF, unwilling to turn the entire operation into
such a joint enterprise, turned down the ADC recommendation. 55

Personnel assigned to Texas Towers usually worked in shifts of one
month aboard a tower and one month ashore, their service time counting
as an overseas isolated tour. They spent much duty time trying to oper-
ate the radar and communications equipment used in this peculiar envi-
ronment, a difficult job at best. The Air Force occupied TT-2, 1 10 miles
east of Cape Cod, in December 1955. Tower and crew alike suffered the
effects of constant vibration from the rotation of the radar dish and the
operation of diesel generators and other equipment. Only when the AN/
FPS-20A broke down or needed service, all too frequent occurrences,
was there relative relief from the incessant and resonating buzz. The sur-
rounding water and the footings driven into the ocean floor even trans-

218

Systems Become Operational

mitted distant sounds up the steel legs to be amplified through the whole
structure. The tower stood

like a three-pronged tuning fork .... Matters were not im-
proved when, every half-minute or so during the frequent
fog days, the dismal sounding foghorn croaked out its for-
lorn message. 56

Their instability in the face of Atlantic storms eventually negated
whatever real advantage the towers had over ships and aircraft as early-
warning radar platforms. The worst example was TT-4, 84 miles south-
east of New York Harbor. Operational in early summer 1957, its design
and faulty construction made it an engineering nightmare. Anchored in
over 30 fathoms of water, a depth twice that beneath TT-2 and three
times the water under TT-3, TT-4 rocked ominously in even moderate
seas. Navy underwater survey teams identified and corrected some of the
problems with the supports, but nothing could offset the continual
damage below the surface. The crew abandoned the structure on Sep-
tember 10, 1960, in the face of Hurricane Donna. Two days later the
storm battered the tower with 132-mile-an-hour winds and waves in
excess of 50 feet, doing enough damage to force the Air Force and its
construction contractor to specify February 1, 1961, as the date to begin

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The Emerging Shield

completely renovating TT-4. A caretaker crew of 14 contractor mainte-
nance workers and 14 Air Force personnel stayed behind. On January
15, 1961, a fierce winter gale bore in on the hapless station and ripped
off all 3 of its legs in succession. Its 28 occupants sank with the platform
into the sea; none survived. 57 The Air Force decommissioned the last of
the towers, TT-3, on March 25, 1963, ending a less than glorious ven-
ture.

Airborne early-warning and control aircraft, another project meant
to extend advance warning seaward, proved more worthwhile than
Texas Towers. The Navy ended World War II as the only service devel-
oping airborne early-warning systems, and it continued tests by adapting
radars to Grumman TBM-3W torpedo bombers and PB-lWs (converted
B-17s). The Navy planned to use these planes in antisubmarine warfare
and in offshore early-warning and tracking roles. Interested in the
Navy's progress with early-warning aircraft, the Air Force participated
in various tests beginning in 1950, which involved Navy PB-lWs work-
ing with Air Force land-based radars and interceptors. These tests con-
vinced Air Force air defense commanders that early-warning planes
could compensate for low-altitude deficiencies in its line-of-sight ground
radars, then reasonably effective at ranges of about 150 miles against
medium and high-altitude targets and only half this distance against low-
altitude aircraft. 58

The Navy primarily promoted early warning not for continental de-
fense but for fleet defense and other missions applicable to naval oper-
ations. Accordingly, ADC urged Headquarters USAF to use naval hard-
ware and tactics and to take the lead in early-warning aircraft for home
defense. By November 1950, the Air Force carefully watched tests con-
ducted by the Navy on its PB-1W, equipped with an AN/APS-20B
search radar set and an AN/APS-45 height finder. In mid- 1951, the Air
Force chose a larger version of this aircraft, the Lockheed Super Con-
stellation, and equipped it with the same radars for airborne early warn-
ing. In November 1951, ten of these planes had been ordered from Lock-
heed, but first deliveries were delayed until 1953, largely because of in-
dustry strikes. 59

When the EC- 121 Warning Star arrived in the Air Force, its hump-
back and its crescent-shaped dish and antenna on top earned it the nick-
name "Pregnant Goose." Intended for early-warning and weapons con-
trol activities, the Warning Star had a combat radius of about 1,000 nau-
tical miles, could cruise at approximately 200 knots, and had a service
ceiling of less than 24,000 feet. More important, it possessed on-station
capabilities supplied by 4 radars. 60

The Air Force eventually based the EC- 12 Is on two permanent
sites, one at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, and the other at
McClellan Air Force Base, California. On the east coast, the planes origi-

220

Systems Become Operational

RC-121C. Bulging with electronic detection devices, the highly spe-
cialized search and communications equipment within this airplane was de-
signed to give the defense maximum warning against the approach of un-
identified air and surface ships.

nally patrolled an area between Texas Towers and Navy picket vessels,
stationed beyond the radius of the Warning Stars. Off the west coast,
only picket vessels supplemented the planes. Unfortunately, throughout
much of the 1950s troubles plagued the early-warning aircraft. Problems
with radar and communications equipment continued. Frequent malfunc-
tions in electronic systems often grounded planes over long periods for
repairs. Aircraft able to patrol usually missed crew members with key
specialties, especially weapons controllers. 61

Tests and exercises conducted by ADC in the late 1950s indicated
that Warning Stars did not perform their missions successfully, mainly
because of difficulties with the electronic equipment. Progress in ADC's
persistent attempts to fix quirks in the system seemed excrutiatingly slow,
and by 1959 ADC reacted similarly as it had after its experience with the
Texas Towers: it wanted to transfer the whole airborne early-warning
mission, planes included, to the Navy. Calmer heads prevailed at Head-
quarters USAF, and the transfer did not occur. 62

Time proved the Air Force decision to continue improving, refining,
and developing its airborne early-warning program to be correct. Posi-
tive results came slowly. In the latter 1960s, the EC-121's electronic and
radar systems improved substantially, its range increased, and it carried
automatic data links to the SAGE network. Airborne early warning
became especially compelling in the 1970s when Boeing produced the
Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AW ACS) aircraft. Specifi-
cally designated the Boeing E-3A, it incorporated detection, tracking,
and electronic countermeasure capabilities and interceptor-controller

221

The Emerging Shield

functions, and its performance far exceeded that of the first Warning
Stars.

The GOC remained the last warning against enemy bombers until
1959. When the Air Force began Operation Skywatch in 1952, ADC
and especially its deputy commander, General Smith, believed the GOC
indispensable to air defense. At the time, no better method existed for
detecting low-flying aircraft approaching or traveling over American ter-
ritory.

By 1957 the situation seemed to have changed. The medium-range
and distant-warning lines were functioning or soon would be. The same
was true for Texas Towers and airborne early warning. All were expect-
ed to provide low-altitude support. The Air Force expected these sys-
tems would lessen or obviate the need for the GOC. Regardless that
Texas Towers appeared a most inglorious failure and the EC-121 pro-
gram was experiencing prolonged growing pains, the Air Force decided
to deactivate the GOC.

Some officers in ADC argued that the GOC was needed until low-
altitude gap-filler radars and other surveillance systems became truly de-
pendable, but Headquarters USAF decided in the late 1950s that the in-
creased speed of modern jet bombers made the GOC obsolete. The GOC
had never performed efficiently and had become just another expense on
an already strained budget. In early 1958, the views of Maj. Gen. Hugh
Parker, head of Western Air Defense Force, reflected the disenchant-
ment of commanders in the field with the GOC. Parker told Lt. Gen.
Joseph H. Atkinson, head of ADC, that "surveillance information sub-
mitted by the GOC has not been timely, nor has it been accurate enough
to be acted upon by the air defense system. It is logical to assume that
this situation would not change during an actual war. . . ." 63

Parker's analysis prevailed in the Air Staff, and Headquarters USAF
abolished the GOC, even though difficult. Over the years many volun-
teers had come and gone, but a corps of experienced civilians remained
who consistently staffed GOC posts and frequently served in remote lo-
cations under considerable personal hardship. The Air Force would find
it difficult to tell these dedicated individuals that their services, once
thought essential, were no longer wanted.

The Air Force nevertheless proceeded to phase out the GOC,
ending twenty-four-hour-a-day operations in many observer posts on Jan-
uary 1, 1958. In July the GOC celebrated the sixth anniversary of
Skywatch. The Air Force had publicized previous anniversaries, but in
1958 military personnel in the GOC minimized the occasion. Soon, civil-
ian observers joined the Ready Reserve, and many military personnel
moved to other assignments. The GOC deactivated on January 31, 1959,
ending a noble experiment that, if nothing else, allowed concerned citi-

222

Systems Become Operational

zens to become informed about, and actively participate in, home air de-
fense operations. 64

Deciding the fate of the GOC was one of many problems the Air
Force had to confront in its surveillance and warning programs. Reflect-
ing the historic pattern of fluctuating allocations for U.S. defense, by
1956-1957 the money promised for air defense during the Korean War
now proved difficult to obtain. At the end of 1957, ADC operated 182
radar stations, which reported surveillance data to 17 control centers. Of
this number, 32 had been added during the last half of the year as low-
altitude, unmanned gap-filler radars. The total consisted of 47 gap-filler
stations, 75 Permanent System radars, 39 semimobile radars, 19 Pinetree
stations, and 1 Lashup station. The single Texas Tower in operation also
counted as a functioning continental radar station. 65

The Air Force instituted plans to obtain radars with greater height-
finding and range capabilities. A 1955 interservice study, Project Lamp-
light, had predicted that the existing and programmed search radars
were vulnerable to electronic countermeasures (ECMs) that might make
them useless in combat. As a possible solution, the Lamplight group
recommended the development of radars that could quickly be tuned to
different frequencies when they encountered jamming. Although fre-
quency agility could not eliminate the ECM threat, it was expected to
combat it as effectively as any other means available. ADC grew anxious
to have new radars available during the 1959-1962 period, but Headquar-
ters USAF warned that new technology generally meant delays in equip-
ment production. Moreover, it was expected to be difficult to obtain
funds for radars designed to counter the manned bomber after the Sovi-
ets launched Sputnik in October 1957, an indication of the potential for
ICBM attacks against the United States. 66

As anticipated, problems arose in funding and developing the new
technology. The Air Force decided to equip its operating search radars
with antijamming modifications, known as fixes. Exercises held between
ADC and SAC in October 1956 and January 1957 highlighted the need
for these modifications. In both exercises, SAC bombers, using the most
up-to-date ECM equipment, virtually blinded the defensive radars. Gen-
eral Partridge of CONAD and General Atkinson of ADC pleaded with
Headquarters USAF to expedite the antijamming fixes. 67

The promise of a new ICBM threat meant a series of financial disas-
ters for continental ground radar programs. Funds for frequency-agility
radars decreased by $29 million for fiscal year 1960, and the Air Force
projected a delay in the program until 1965. This decrease, combined
with an austere new design for SAGE station deployment (especially in
the south and southwest), indicated Congress's reluctance to allocate vast
sums for bomber defense in the 1960s as the threat of Soviet bomber

223

The Emerging Shield

attack appeared to decrease with the concomitant growth of the Soviet
Union's missile force. 68

The Air Defense Weapons Force

Scientists and other proponents of air defense in the early 1950s ad-
vocated a system whose primary function would be to save the lives of
North American citizens. The Air Force view was that the DEW Line
and other warning components offered a degree of insurance that the
American retaliatory capability would not be destroyed in a Soviet first
strike. Air Force spokesmen consistently stated it was a chimera to be-
lieve that a one hundred percent defense could ever be built. If an enemy
aimed his attacks on America's great cities, most bombers would get
through the defenses and cause widespread nuclear destruction. 69

Despite this gloomy prognosis, the Air Force believed it was re-
sponsible for doing everything it could to limit damage to American soil
if not to overseas installations while destroying as many enemy bombers
as possible. The Air Staff and the ADC remained convinced that the So-
viets could not believe they would be allowed to attack uncontestedly
American cities, important defense facilities, or, most important, SAC
bases. Notwithstanding its emphasis on retaliatory capabilities, the Air
Force in the 1950s took seriously the mission of direct defense against
bombardment.

Nowhere was the capability to destroy enemy bombers given more
consideration than in ADC. Chidlaw and his successors carefully noted
Soviet progress in bomber development; ADC's interest began to peak in
1954 with the onset of the bomber gap. The bomber gap first appeared in
the Soviets' 1954 May Day air show when one Bison jet bomber flew by
the reviewing stand. The following year, many more Bisons appeared
during the May Day parade. As events later indicated, the Soviets prob-
ably used multiple flyovers of the same aircraft to give observers the im-
pression they possessed more planes than they did. They successfully im-
pressed western military attaches and other spectators with the strength
of their military aircraft programs. In the wake of the apparently thriv-
ing Bison program and with the development of the Tu-95 Bear and the
1953 thermonuclear explosion, a 1955 CIA national intelligence estimate
(NIE) claimed that "the USSR is devoting a major aircraft production
effort to the development of massive intercontinental air attack capabil-
ity." The NIE predicted that if the current trend persisted, by 1959 the
Soviet long-range air force would be more powerful than SAC forces. 70

General LeMay, SAC Commander, agreed with the NIE during
1956 Senate Airpower Hearings:

224

Systems Become Operational
Combat-Ready Aircraft and Aircrews

The Soviets will enjoy a numerical advantage in long-range
bombers in the period 1958-1960. We would be fool-hardy
to assume they would not also provide the weapons, bases,
refueling capability, maintenance capacity, training, and
professional personnel to support this numerical superiority
in aircraft. ... I can only conclude that they will have
greater striking power than we will have in the time period
under our present plans and programs. 71

The bomber gap implications were far more decisive for strategic offen-
sive programs than for air defense. LeMay's prescription to counteract
the Soviet bomber threat was to expand the Air Force fleet of B-52
bombers, which became operational in 1955. Congress agreed. Shortly
after LeMay's ominous predictions of Soviet bomber strength, the gap
began to recede. Critical intelligence information gathered by CIA-con-
trolled U-2 surveillance planes dispelled the bomber gap myth (although
the Air Force, partly for parochial reasons, continued to insist that a
bomber gap existed even after the CIA and the other military intelli-
gence agencies had deduced otherwise).

In ADC, Chidlaw and his staff officers reacted to the bomber gap
scare with stepped-up measures to improve the air defense combat force,
the leading edge of which were fighter-interceptors. Since 1948 the Air
Force had tried unsuccessfully to develop a true all-weather jet intercep-
tor. The F-80, F-84, and F-86 day fighters had served as expedients, as
had the all-weather F-94Cs and F-86Ds. The F-94C was merely a
night-fighter version of the F-80, one of the Air Force's earliest jet air-
craft. As for the F-86D, it was largely the result of General Saville's
pressuring the Air Force to convert the F-86, the best Air Force fighter

225

The Emerging Shield

in the early 1950s, into a single-seat interceptor, which proved only an
interim solution because the Dog required frequent modifications. Fur-
thermore, many pilots thought that the equipment in all-weather inter-
ceptors demanded a two-seat aircraft. The F-86D was described by one
air defense commander as "a fine airplane for a two-headed fellow with
four arms." There remained, of course, the F-89, but the Scorpion, al-
though a two-seater, experienced endless structural and mechanical prob-
lems, making it the target of even more criticism from pilots than the F-
86D. 72

To perform the air defense mission adequately, the Air Force had
invested much of its hopes in the 1954 interceptor. Convair won the con-
tract for the aircraft in July 1951, but later that year the Air Force real-
ized the plane's specifications were too advanced for Convair to fulfill
the contract by 1954. Basically, ADC wanted a long-range, extremely
fast aircraft capable of operating at high altitudes. As Chidlaw viewed
the situation in August 1954, a few months after the lone Bison appeared
in the Moscow air day parade:

The picture as we see it now is grim. Intelligence experts
state that we could expect a Soviet capability by December
of 1955 of attacking our major industrial targets and key
SAC facilities with 200 heavy bombers at altitudes ap-
proaching 55,000 feet and at speeds of .8 Mach to .9 Mach
with the capability of delivering 1 to 5 megaton yield
bombs. If this is true, then frankly, the interceptors current-
ly considered for contract are of marginal value to us. In
the case of the F-102A, for example, we are fighting to
attain a maneuverable ceiling of 50,000 feet. 73

The F-102A Delta Dagger referred to by Chidlaw became the inter-
im model of the 1954 interceptor the Air Force encouraged Convair to
build while it continued its development of the ultimate interceptor, the
F-102B, which became the F-106 Delta Dart. In effect, the Air Force
approved a two-step production scheme for Convair: limited production
of the F-102A with the J-57 engine to precede mass production of the
F-102B with its more powerful J-67 engine and state-of-the-art Hughes
fire control (electronics and radar) system. Meanwhile, the fire control
system installed in the interim F-102A would include advanced features
such as an automatic flight control system, a semiautomatic armament se-
lection device, and a data link with SAGE. Hughes had difficulty deliv-
ering this sophisticated package, and when ADC began accepting the
aircraft in 1956, the system remained incomplete and some components
were virtually untested. In 1958, when Hughes had more time to perfect
the system, it spent three to four months making modifications. More
modifications occurred beginning in 1960 when the Air Force decided
most of its Delta Daggers would have to be equipped to meet the elec-

226

Table 3. Air Defense Aircraft

Dec

J 1951

Jiitl

uec

Jun

uec

Jun

Dec

Jun

u€C

Jun

Dec

Jun

Dec

Jun

Dec

Jun

Dec

Aircraft

1950

1951

1952

1952

1953

1953

1954

1954

1955

1955

1956

1956

1957

1957

1958

1958

1959

1959

F-82

26

19

4

F-94A&B

60

82

144

117

93

20

45

14

F-89B&C

4

25

51

60

31

62

40

F-80

41

37

17

15

15

F-84

43

103

38

16

41

115

21

r oo yuay f

236

£, J J

L 1 J

1 OU

OL

j 1

F-47

96

70

72

43

17

F-51

213

195

149

172

160

31

p rat*
r-oou

lyo

7G1

lOJ

l,UZO

1,U14

Tin
/ 1U

IAS

36

F-94C

103

187

265

201

196

199

172

164

116

52

20

16

F-89D

76

118

183

250

222

106

104

34

12

F-86L

56

393

576

419

327

188

133

F-89H

72

112

107

78

40

49

21

F-89J

15

124

242

286

264

260

207

F-102A

5

97

301

428

517

627

611

482

F-104A

51

100

86

90

F-101B

73

188

F-106A

18

97

Total

365

813

687

614

639

813

1,127

1,275

1,139

1,405

1,490

1,485

1,260

1,490

1,446

1,345

1,383

1,257

1,197

The Emerging Shield

F-106A Delta Dart. The "ultimate" interceptor, this airplane became
the last model to be devoted solely to air defense.

tronic countermeasure threat. New devices allowed the fire control
system to be "tuned automatically, change frequencies at random, rapidly
reestablish a broken 'lock' on a target and otherwise combat electronic
jamming." 74

Equally important as the Delta Dagger's fire control system was its
configuration. The delta wing, which had influenced the Air Force to
select Convair's design, was not a new idea. Its inception was in the
wind tunnels of Nazi Germany, and the British considered the wing best
for high-speed performance. The first successful delta wing aircraft, the
experimental XF-92A, had been developed by Convair and successfully
test-flew in September 1948. This experimental model later gave rise to
the Delta Dagger and the subsequent Delta Dart. Convair's first tests of
the delta wing F-102 showed the aircraft incapable of supersonic flight,
considered by ADC commanders absolutely necessary to catch Soviet
bombers. This inadequacy arose from a design problem of aerodynamic
drag on the wing. In the early 1950s, inadequate equipment and facilities
hampered supersonic wind tunnel tests. Test aircraft, often miniature
models, failed to correspond dimensionally to the actual product. Only in
December 1951 when Richard Whitcomb of the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) developed a new supersonic air-
craft design sharply reducing the fuselage cross section over the delta

228

Systems Become Operational

wing and subsequently lessening aerodynamic drag were these problems
overcome. Known as the area rule, Whitcomb's concept soon became a
standard feature of all high-performance aircraft; it gave their fuselages
the familiar Coke-bottle shape characteristic of future fighters. Amplify-
ing and expanding the area rule, Convair engineers installed a sharper
nose on the F-102A, added fairings to both sides of the plane's body,
and installed a more powerful engine. With these changes, the Delta
Dagger achieved supersonic speed, and 875 interim F-102As were even-
tually built. 75

An F-102A phase-out began in 1959 with the introduction of the
long-awaited F-106. Development of the F-106 had suffered unforeseen
delays with the J-75 engine and final cockpit design. By 1957, Headquar-
ters USAF seriously considered canceling it altogether, but ADC persist-
ed and this time won the debate. Problems with development of the air-
craft's intricate fire control system and powerful propulsion system
pushed its operational date forward to 1959. With these problems solved,
the plane received an electronic system that included a digital computer,
tying it into the SAGE network. Data links enabled pilots to receive in-
formation faster and to fire their weapons more accurately. The addition
of the Pratt and Whitney J-75— P- 17 afterburner-equipped engine gave
the F-106 a fifty percent increase in power over the F-102's engine. In
fact, the Delta Dart's top speed (Mach 2+) made it about twice as fast
as the Delta Dagger. The Dart remained durable enough to appear in
modified versions in Air National Guard units in the 1980s. Eventually,
340 F-106s were built. 76

Although satisfied with the eventual performance of the F-102 and
F-106 interceptors, the Air Force was dissatisfied with the many years it
took to develop and produce either one. During this period, ADC had
pressed for other century series aircraft for the defense forces, supple-
menting its fighter units even if it had to accept aircraft not specifically
designed for air defense. Such was the case with the Lockheed F-104
Starfighter, best suited for tactical air superiority. ADC staff officers
thought the Starfighter could have limited use as a day fighter, even
though too small to be equipped with data link equipment and thus dis-
qualified from operating in the SAGE system. Despite the Air Research
and Development Command's recommendation that the "limited capabil-
ity interceptor" should not be assigned to defense units, Headquarters
USAF acquiesced in ADC's requests for the F-104 to help fill the gap
between the F-102A and F-106. Accordingly, ADC received six F-104
squadrons in April 1956. The small fighters remained in test status
through 1957 and became operational the following year. At the end of
1958, ADC had one hundred F-104s but already planned their retirement
with the expected deployment of the Delta Dart. ADC's Starfighters

229

The Emerging Shield

therefore transferred to Air National Guard units in 1960, only to return
to ADC in 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the pre-
ceding year. The last F-104 air defense squadron did not deactivate until
1969. 77

A far better century series aircraft, produced to fill the gap in antici-
pation of the 1954 interceptor, was the McDonnell F-101B Voodoo. In
its early development as the XF-88, the aircraft was intended to perform
long-range penetration missions. But in the early 1950s, ADC realized
the plane could meet the standards for an interceptor. At the time, ADC
considered for service as stop-gap all-weather fighters the F-101, an ad-
vanced version of the F-89, and an interceptor model of the North
American F-100. The F-101 appeared the most promising of the three,
and Headquarters USAF agreed with the ADC choice in February 1955.
On the basis of its experiences with the 1954 interceptor, Headquarters
USAF insisted that all the "kinks be ironed out" before it accepted deliv-
ery of the plane. So, when the first Voodoos became operational in 1959,
the Air Force received a thoroughly tested machine, linkable with
SAGE. Surprisingly, the F-101B did not rate far behind the touted F-
106 in terms of performance, although its fire control system was mark-
edly inferior. With the Delta Dart, the Voodoo became the heart of the
fighter-interceptor force, in the 1960s and remained, modified and im-

230

Systems Become Operational

ADC Jet All-Weather Interceptors Possessed
(Century Series) 1956 - 1973
(as of 31 December)

700

600

500 j 1

F-102 / \

400 £ \

\ ... F-101B

1956 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

proved, in service with Air National Guard and Canadian units in the
1980s. 78

Air Force leadership of the 1960s would have been shocked by the
thought that the Delta Dart and Voodoo would remain first-line inter-
ceptors for more than 25 years. As early as April 1953, ADC asked the
Air Staff to consider the need for a long-range interceptor with a 1,000-
mile radius, a combat altitude of 60,000 feet, and a speed between Mach
1.5 and Mach 2. Staff officers in Colorado Springs thought such an air-
craft would be needed to exploit the improved surveillance coverage
that programmed early-warning systems would provide. An ideal inter-
ceptor would destroy enemy raiders as far as possible from their targets
in North America. The F-106 and F-101B could not meet ADC stand-
ards for long-range performance. 79

Headquarters USAF agreed with ADC that a long-range interceptor
was needed, but budget and specification problems delayed awarding the
contract until June 1957, when North American was chosen. Designated
the F-108, the aircraft would be a Mach 3, two-seat, twin-engine, stain-
less steel interceptor. Its range would permit it to reach the DEW Line,
but when there, its range would have exceeded that of ground control.

231

The Emerging Shield

F-101B Voodoo. Designed as a strategic penetration fighter, this
model of the Voodoo served as an all-weather fighter and, with the Delta
Dart, became the heart of the fighter-interceptor force in the 1960s.

This potentially fatal handicap could be overcome if an advanced air-
borne intercept radar would allow the plane to operate in tandem with
other F-108s. All these plans came to nought, however, in the 1959
budget crunch. Forced to choose between a projected Mach 3 bomber —
the B-70, also being built by North American — and the F-108, Air
Force Chief of Staff Thomas White decided to scrap the fighter and
keep the bomber in development. White readily conceded the require-
ment for an interceptor with the proposed characteristics of the F-108,
but he reasoned that the Air Force's greater need was for a weapon that
would constitute the most potent threat to the Soviets, and "hands down,
the B-70 wins that argument." 80

The effect of the looming ICBM threat eventually consigned the B-
70 to the F-108's fate. White's rationale for choosing the bomber over
the fighter reflected long-established Air Force doctrine favoring strate-
gic offensive forces in any consideration of weapons systems. White ex-
plained:

Of course, our philosophy is based on the fact that offense
is the best defense. ... I am perfectly certain that ... air
defense could absorb the national budget, and . . . still
could not guarantee 100-percent defense. So, in the final
analysis, it is a matter of judgment at what level you bal-
ance out between offense and a minimum adequate de-
fense. 81

232

Systems Become Operational

GAR-l Falcon. This infrared-seeking guided aircraft rocket is shown
fitted in its launching position under an aircraft's wing.

When the Korean War started in 1950, Air Force interceptors car-
ried machineguns as primary armament; by the end of 1954, F-86Ds,
F-94Cs, and F-89Ds carried 2.75-inch folding-fin air-to-air rockets
(FFARs). Because development on the radar-guided air-to-air Falcon
missile had lagged, this weapon did not enter the air defense inventory
until 1955. The first to arrive, the Guided Air Rocket-1 (GAR-l), came
in March 1956, two years later than expected (F-89H interceptors car-
ried the rockets). The GAR-2 radar-guided missile, relying on infrared
guidance, appeared soon after. In the next few years, Hughes improved
the missiles' accuracy as it developed more sophisticated models in both
radar and infrared categories. 82

As ADC viewed the situation, the Falcon, in its various guises, did
not provide a sufficiently lethal force because it required a direct hit on
its quarry or had to come extremely close to its quarry to be effective.
Compounding the problem were intelligence reports that indicated
Soviet bombers carried jamming devices capable of disrupting radar-
guided rockets. Part of the ADC solution to defeating such ploys lay in
the development of nuclear air-to-air missiles packing so much destruc-
tive power that their detonation in the vicinity of an enemy would
ensure his annihilation. 83

ADC first submitted a formal requirement for atomic weapons in
1952. Although sympathetic, Headquarters USAF could not do much at

233

The Emerging Shield

the time. Atomic materials were just becoming plentiful, and those avail-
able went to SAC, uncontestedly. Besides, the development of small
atomic warheads to fit inside an interceptor's air-to-air rockets was ex-
pected to be difficult. Protection of military and civilian personnel in
contact with the weapons would be a major task in itself. ADC, confi-
dent difficulties could be overcome, continued to argue for atomic capa-
bility. 84 In 1954 the JCS finally approved the ADC request. Douglas
Aircraft received a contract for development of an atomic rocket, and
the Atomic Energy Commission started to develop a suitable warhead.
The rocket, temporarily called Ding Dong and subsequently designated
the MB-1 Genie, flew on an F-89J, the aircraft judged most adaptable in
the shortest time. The JCS set January 1, 1957, as the target date for air
defense forces to become operational with nuclear weapons. To expedite
initial development, the first rockets had no guidance systems; this was
later corrected. 85

The target date for delivery of the MB-1 was technically met on
January 1, 1957. Inventories at Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan,
and Hamilton Air Force Base, California, included rockets and F-89J
aircraft. Not until July 1957 did the rocket and its warhead actually fire
in an atomic test in Nevada. Although the test involved no target, the
warhead detonated as required. To prove the weapon safe for air defense
over populated areas, several volunteers stood directly below the detona-
tion in the Nevada desert, marking the last firing of a nuclear air defense
weapon until 1962. In 1958 the Soviets announced a moratorium on at-
mospheric nuclear weapons testing, and the United States followed suit. 86
Ultimately, ADC hoped to equip its advanced century series interceptors
with nuclear armed guided rockets, but nuclear weapons proved to have
less impact on air defense forces than ADC had envisioned in the early
1950s. First, safety considerations severely restricted realistic training,
and second, reliability and sophistication of conventional weapons im-
proved substantially in the next two decades.

Concurrently, the Air Force better understood what its new weap-
ons and electronics systems implied for air defense fighter tactics. Before
the early 1950s, Air Force interceptors, armed with fixed guns, had to
train their weapons on a bomber for an appreciable time in order to
score a kill. To obtain the necessary lead angle for the guns, a fighter
had to fly slightly ahead of the target and turn with it. If all went as
planned, a curved course brought the interceptor closer on the bomber's
rear as the attack progressed. Because interceptors had to attack from
relatively short range and bombers were usually well armed in the rear,
the chance for a successful interception remained relatively low. The de-
velopment of rockets changed fighter tactics: a single shot could destroy
a bomber. Interceptors now had to be in firing position for just an in-

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Systems Become Operational

stant, eliminating the need to follow the bomber on a curved course and
allowing an attack from any direction. Increased rocket range also obvi-
ated the dangerously close range required by fighters to achieve kills. 87
Yet in the late 1950s rear attack tactics resurfaced with the use of infra-
red guidance systems that homed in on the heat emanating from a tar-
get's tail section. Thus rear attack methods, predominant in World War
II, remained in use.

No matter how the interceptor pilot approached his prey, he de-
pended on ground instructions, especially with establishment of the
SAGE network.

Gone were the days of the "heads-up" fighter pilot with his
few instruments to follow and the seat of his pants to fall
back on when something went wrong. The jet all-weather
pilot flew by the radar scope and the beam given him by his
co-partner, the radar director on the ground. An error on
the part of either member of the team and the enemy would
slip away unharmed into the night or fog. Perhaps never
before in the history of combat aviation was the success of
a mission so dependent on ground-air teamwork as it was in
air defense operations. 88

The controller, the team member on the ground, often became ex-
tremely dissatisfied with his job. Under the best of circumstances, air de-
fense alert duties could prove trying; the general routine consisted of
waiting and boredom. Air defense stations, often located in remote, iso-
lated areas, also fostered low morale. Judging by the high annual turnov-
er rate in their ranks, weapons controllers more than likely either left the
Air Force at the end of their tours or switched to other specialties. ADC
estimated in 1954 that, of the 988 officers assigned to weapons controller
duties, only about half were fully qualified. This statistic was attributed
largely to poorly selected personnel attending the controllers school at
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. In May 1954, ADC suggested that the
Air Force attempt to select better qualified, more highly motivated offi-
cers, offer them more effective training, and make a career in weapons
control more attractive. Although the Air Force increased staffing rates
significantly and many controllers enjoyed and took pride in their work,
morale problems continued. 89

BOMARC

In the 1950s, the Air Force strove to create a composite air defense
force. The philosophy of not relying on a single weapons system, such as
manned aircraft, could be stated: "Analysis of any one weapon system

235

The Emerging Shield

will reveal weaknesses which could be exploited; however, it is extreme-
ly difficult to find any one specific weakness which is common to a com-
posite weapon system." 90 This conviction partly explains the Air Force
attempts over a ten-year period to develop an unmanned interceptor to
complement and supplement its other defensive weapons.

As early as 1945 the Army Air Forces (AAF) had asked Boeing to
study prospects for developing a ground-to-air pilotless aircraft (GAPA).
AAF interest in this concept began during World War II when Germany
launched V-2 surface-to-surface liquid-fueled missiles against Britain.
The V-2, with a range of only 300 miles, was not particularly accurate.
It could, however, attain supersonic speeds, inviting prospects for simi-
lar, though more deadly, weapons in the postwar world. 91

Boeing's GAPA experiments envisioned a missile effective up to 35
miles. Although one test missile fired successfully and the Army and
Navy were testing various other short-range surface-to-air missiles, the
JCS decided to halt GAPA studies in 1949. The Air Force did not con-
test their decision; its concept of air defense called for striking an enemy
bomber as far from its target as possible. Accordingly, Air Materiel
Command asked Boeing to join with researchers at the University of
Michigan's Air Research Center in January 1950 to examine the feasibili-
ty of building an accurate, long-range, supersonic missile for air defense.
By June 1950 experts at Boeing and Michigan agreed that a missile could
be developed to fly at speeds from Mach .09 to Mach 3 at a ceiling of
80,000 feet and with a range of 200 miles. The missile, to be called
BOMARC ("BO" for Boeing and "MARC" for Michigan Air Research
Center), was expected to become operational by 1956. 92

Many Air Force technical specialists doubted that the 1956 oper-
ational date for BOMARC could be met. Time proved them correct.
The scientists' estimates proved too optimistic, and by the end of 1954
BOMARC's operational date had slipped to 1959. Strictly speaking, the
Air Force achieved operational readiness in December 1959 when one
missile was ready to be deployed at McGuire Air Force Base, New
Jersey. This accomplishment came after seven years of testing and at-
tempts to mate BOMARC with a nuclear warhead and integrate it into
SAGE. 93

Overall, BOMARC proved a major disappointment for the Air
Force. In the early 1950s, air defense commanders foresaw 4,800 missiles
deployed at 40 sites in the continental United States. In actuality, fewer
than 500 missiles deployed on 8 sites in the northeastern United States
and on 2 sites in Canada. Testing did not end with the activation of the
McGuire missile site; it continued until August 1963 when 215 missiles
had been expended in tests that usually failed to meet standards. By the
end of 1964, the inactivated BOMARC A was converted into a drone.

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Systems Become Operational

An IM-99 BOMARC missile
being launched at the Air Force
Missile Test Center, Patrick Air
Force Base, Florida, on April 15,
1960

The improved BOMARC B finally achieved a measure of reliability. It
could be equipped with a nuclear warhead and synchronized with
SAGE. This was an air-breathing, rocket-boosted missile with a range

237

The Emerging Shield

exceeding 400 miles in its advanced versions and with a speed of Mach
2.5. Powered by a ramjet engine, BOMARC B was guided to its quarry
by the SAGE system; it then homed in on the target by radar. It re-
mained in the air defense inventory until 1972. 94

When BOMARC developed into an efficient system, the Soviet
manned bomber threat was no longer a major public concern. As early
as 1959, funds for testing and deployment were declining. Congressional
enthusiasm for funding a weapon designed to defeat the bomber waned
as the ICBM appeared to be the more dangerous threat. By the early
1960s, air defense had been assigned a low priority in Congress. Require-
ments became far more compelling for antimissile defense and, to a
greater extent, for the burgeoning Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman offensive
ICBM programs. After the Air Force achieved its goal in attempting to
improve BOMARC, it did not want to deactivate the missile. It made a
case that the bomber threat had not disappeared completely, and Con-
gress allowed a relatively small deployment in the eastern United States
and Canada until the early 1970s.

It was in March 1954 that the Eisenhower administration decided to
install an "integrated, efficient, and highly potent air defense system." As
the decade ended, most components of this system were in place and
functioning. The far northern DEW Line constituted the earliest array of
warning radars. Approximately 1,000 miles south of the DEW Line lay
another radar screen, the Mid-Canada Line, built along the 55th parallel
and extending from coast to coast. The third radar chain, the Pinetree
Line, a joint enterprise of the United States and Canada, existed along
the border. Extending the radar screens were sea patrols consisting of
Navy picket ships, Texas Tower radar platforms, and earlywarning sur-
veillance aircraft. In addition, until 1959, the GOC supplied a last-resort
warning service. The system had the ingredient most important to de-
fense—depth. Because of the likelihood that one of the warning devices
would fail to function properly, suitable backup systems should also have
been available.

Theoretically, the DEW Line would detect unidentified planes ap-
proaching from the north during an actual attack. High-wave scatter
broadcasts would relay this news to the Combat Operations Center in
Colorado Springs. SAC bombers would be alerted while forward-based
interceptors obtained positive identification. If enemy aircraft were posi-
tively identified, friendly fighters would seek and destroy them while
other friendly fighters scrambled to assist. Immediate warning from the
far north would provide four to six hours for preparation, allowing the
air battle to be directed from Colorado Springs. If a far less likely (given
the range of Soviet bombers) flank attack from the sea routes occurred,
the preparation time would be less and the battle would probably be
238

Systems Become Operational

more decentralized, with sector commanders making more decisions at
the local level. Enemy aircraft evading defensive fighters, when practi-
cally upon their targets, would come under fire from Army antiaircraft
artillery and missiles and from additional interceptors directed by the
sector Air Force officer in charge. SAGE, on the basis of radar informa-
tion and with the use of digital computers to direct interceptors, missiles,
and antiaircraft artillery, would actually deploy the weapons. Thus the
whole air defense network responded to orders from Colorado Springs,
but the direction of individual battles depended largely on automatic sys-
tems and the judgment of commanders in the air defense sectors.

How this complex command and control system would have func-
tioned during the confusion of battle is difficult to determine in retro-
spect. Exercises between ADC and SAC predicted advantages for the
offensive forces; for example, defenses were easily deactivated electroni-
cally. Still, SAC was the preeminent force of its kind in the world, and
during the 1950s and early 1960s the inferior Soviet long-range bomber
force could not hope to match its power and capabilities. The primary
ADC objective remained to allow SAC sufficient warning for dispersing
its bombers and launching retaliatory raids, not to shoot down enemy
bombers. Countless communications tests among the warning lines; the
Colorado Springs Command Post; the SAC Command Post in Omaha,
Nebraska; and the Pentagon indicated the feasibility of such an approach.

239

Chapter 9

Organizing to Meet the Threat

In the second half of the 1950s, concurrent with Air Force efforts to
bring defense systems to operational status, restructuring of the air
defense organization occurred. Thorny debate among the three services
on roles and missions, as well as delicate negotiations between govern-
ment and military officials in Washington and Ottawa, produced a more
cohesive and sensibly organized command and control and planning net-
work for North American air defense.

Continental Air Defense Command:
A Joint Command for Air Defense

Since the 1948 Key West conference, disagreements among the serv-
ices over air defense roles and missions had prevailed. One decision
made at Key West was to invest the Air Force with primary responsibil-
ity for continental air defense. The Army's contribution was to be anti-
aircraft guns and missiles, and the Navy's, picket early-warning vessels
and limited numbers of ship- and land-based fighter squadrons.

In the first years after Key West, the Defense Department attempted
to achieve a measure of coordinated joint planning for air defense. This
was part of an overall Defense Department effort "to provide formal ma-
chinery for effecting essential interservice coordination in certain fields
of joint interest." In 1951 the JCS directed the services to revise the
Joint Action Army-Navy publication that had served as the basic authority
for interservice coordination in the pre- World War II years and to re-
issue it as the Joint Action Armed Forces. In the course of the project, the
Army proposed the establishment of joint training centers to oversee
training for air defense, air support of ground troops, and airborne and
amphibious operations. The training centers would report to the JCS
through service executive agents. Under the terms of the proposal, the
Army would oversee tactical air support and airborne centers; the Air
Force, the air defense center; and the Navy, the amphibious center. To

241

The Emerging Shield

the Air Force, how ever, the proposed arrangement seemed an encroach-
ment by the Army on Air Force missions, and the joint training centers
were never created. A revised plan, approved by the JCS in April 1951,
preserved Air Force control over tactical aviation as well as over air de-
fense and airborne operations. In addition, the JCS decided to implement
another Army recommendation that six joint boards be established. A
board chairman would report to the service chief with primary responsi-
bility in the respective mission and would be appointed by that service.
The Air Force would head three boards— air defense, tactical air, and air
transport; the Army would manage the airborne troop board; the Navy,
the amphibious board; and the Marine Corps, the landing force board. 1
The idea did not appeal to the Air Staff, which thought too many
boards and committees already existed for solving interservice problems.
General Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, preferred making person-
al accommodations with the other service chiefs, but the JCS decision
forced him to support the boards. In notifying General Chidlaw, head of
ADC, of the pending formation of the Air Defense Board, Vandenberg
acknowledged the need to compromise with the Army. Vandenberg told
Chidlaw that the Air Force would at least head the Air Defense Board
and would retain "full responsibility for its functions in this critical
area." 2

Vandenberg appointed Maj. Gen. Grandison Gardner to chair the
joint Air Defense Board, activated on July 7, 1951. Although he had no
special expertise in air defense, Gardner came to his post with a varied
background. He held a master of science degree from MIT, had headed
the Air Proving Ground, had been the first AAF Comptroller General,
and had served as deputy to the Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Survey. His first tasks were to develop doctrine and procedures for air
defense and "to evaluate tactics and techniques ... the adequacy of
equipment . . . [and] joint training, and make appropriate recommenda-
tions thereon." 3

Gardner could not have been pleased to know how Headquarters
USAF felt about the hoards. In early February 1953, when Secretary of
Defense Wilson ordered the services to eliminate nonessential functions,
the Air Force suggested abolishing all joint boards. The Air Staff contin-
ued to advocate deciding most interservice roles and missions questions
by consultations with the service chiefs. Despite Air Force opposition,
the JCS, Army, and Navy elected to keep the boards functioning. The
Air Force took consolation in the fact it headed three of the boards, so
its views were likely to predominate. 4

In a related matter, the Air Force also opposed creation of a unified
command for air defense, not a completely new idea but one that re-
ceived increased attention as air defense became an important issue in
late 1953. 5 When General Twining succeeded Vandenberg as Air Force

242

Organizing for the Threat

Chief of Staff in July 1953, he accepted the Air Staffs recommendation
against a unified command for air defense. Twining reiterated to Admiral
Radford, JCS Chairman, the Air Force preference for personal agree-
ments, such as those made between Vandenberg and Army Chief of Staff
General Collins on the employment of antiaircraft artillery, rather than
for boards or joint commands to solve air defense problems. 6 In practice,
personal agreements were usually cumbersome and subject to frequent
reexamination. The Collins- Vandenberg agreement, for example, did
little to end Army-Air Force disputes on coordination of antiaircraft ar-
tillery and interceptors in the air defense battle. Perhaps Twining, like
Vandenberg, opposed an air defense unified command because he feared
increased multiservice authority in a mission dominated hitherto by Air
Force concepts and doctrine.

Admiral Radford, however, had his own ideas on the subject.
Strong willed, he received President Eisenhower's complete support. On
January 15, 1954, he informed the service chiefs that "in an era when
enemy capabilities to inflict massive damage on the continental United
States by surprise attack are rapidly increasing, I consider that there is
no doubt whatsoever as to the duty of the Joint Chiefs to establish a suit-
able 'joint command' [for air defense]." 7

Though he did not heed Air Force arguments, Radford nevertheless
conceded to it the preeminent place in a future unified command. He
asked Twining to devise whatever organization was necessary, whether
it "fit the presently agreed definition of a unified command or not." Rad-
ford only requested that the command be composed of forces from all
the services and be able to coordinate air defense responsibilities. He
wanted the command led by an Air Force general officer, invested with
adequate control over forces assigned to the Air Force Air Defense
Command, the Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command, and the Navy off-
shore surveillance and warning systems. Navy commanders in chief in
the Pacific and Atlantic would command the early-warning and picket
vessels used in the sea barriers. Meanwhile, Air Force commanders in
the unified Northeast Canada and Alaska air commands would operate
with the same degree of autonomy as before. Radford concluded that all
unified commands were to respond, as much as possible, to the needs of
the unified air defense command. 8

After Radford and Twining had discussed the matter further, Twin-
ing instructed General Partridge, his Deputy Chief of Staff for Oper-
ations, "to reverse our previous position." In discharging this order, Par-
tridge told the Air Staff that, because the creation of a unified command
for air defense was now inevitable, the Air Force should establish a dom-
inant position by preparing to write the command's charter and direc-
tives. As events unfolded, Radford and the JCS elected to assign prelimi-
nary work to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, although this did not

243

The Emerging Shield

mean the Air Force was eliminated. By early March 1954, the committee
had drawn up "terms of reference" based on Radford's proposals, and it
submitted them to the JCS and Headquarters USAF, which forwarded
them to Chidlaw and his staff in Colorado Springs for comment. 9

Two months later, Chidlaw returned a complete plan for what he
called the United States Air Defense Command. The plan established at
each echelon an Air Force Air Defense Command headquarters and a
joint service air defense headquarters. It also established a naval com-
mand in Colorado Springs to have charge of picket ships and, possibly,
blimps in the offshore warning systems. When necessary, Navy repre-
sentatives would be assigned to lower echelon air defense forces, and
similar arrangements would be made with Army antiaircraft artillery
units. Chidlaw considered this plan the simplest and most effective
method devisable. He believed that relocating the three component com-
mands in Colorado Springs promised "intimate staff relations, mutual
trust, respect, and understanding, at the same time making possible the
maximum joint staff representation. 10

Under Chidlaw's plan, the Air Force retained the same operational
control over antiaircraft artillery units as specified in the 1950 Collins-
Vandenberg agreement. Similarly, it gave ADC control over Navy
forces in offshore warning systems. Chidlaw believed that, when the
joint command was established, the need for Gardner's Joint Air Defense
Board would be obviated. Chidlaw suggested that the JCS work for an
agreement with Canada for a combined North American air defense
command, reasoning the air defense of the United States involved
Canada too, "basically because it is impossible to defend vital Northern
U.S. targets without the fullest cooperation of the Canadians." 11 Al-
though the Canadians and Americans had been cooperating in air defense
since World War II, the two nations would soon seriously consider es-
tablishing the dual command Chidlaw suggested.

Chidlaw asked the JCS to review his ideas quickly so he could con-
tinue with more comprehensive plans for a joint command. 12 Before the
Chiefs could reply, the Army protested what it perceived as a high-
handed attempt by the Air Force to consolidate absolute control over
the air defense mission through the new command. Lt. Gen. John T.
Lewis, who led the Antiaircraft Artillery Command, believed the com-
mander of the new unified organization, designated by Radford to be an
Air Force officer, would be "placed in an intolerable position . . . find-
ing it almost impossible to command impartially and without preju-
dice." 13

To Lewis's dismay, the JCS adopted Chidlaw's proposal and most
of its provisions. Ignoring serious reservations on the part of the Army,
Secretary Wilson approved formation of the new command on July 30,
1954, and the JCS directed it be established on August 2. Designated

244

Organizing for the Threat

Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), the organization official-
ly came into being on September 1, 1954, commanded by Chidlaw and
headquartered in Colorado Springs. 14 General Lewis became deputy for
antiaircraft artillery matters, and Rear Adm. Albert K. Morehouse
became deputy for Navy forces in air defense.* Also on September 1,
responsibility for air defense of the United States passed from the Air
Force Air Defense Command to CONAD, and from the Air Force to
the JCS (although the Air Force served as executive agent of the new
command). 15 When he succeeded Chidlaw the following year, General
Partridge gave Congress a succinct description of CONAD. It was, he
said, the only "joint command." All other commands that came directly
under JCS jurisdiction consisted of forces from each of the services and

it is customary for the overall commander to operate his
forces through the component commanders by issuing his
orders to them and having them, in turn, pass the instruc-
tions to their subordinate units. The air defense procedures
are so vitally concerned with the time of reaction that in
Continental Air Defense operations, the units of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force are operated directly by me and my
subordinate commanders. In other words, the Army, Navy,
and Air Force provide the units for air defense purposes,
but the actual control of these units in the air battle is a re-
sponsibility which I must carry out as Commander-in-Chief
of the Continental Air Defense Command. 16

The CONAD Commander thus received enormous authority not
only over the Air Force but also over the Army and Navy forces desig-
nated for air defense. This situation disturbed the Army, which made an
especially important (some Army officers would say the most important)
contribution to the mission in the form of antiaircraft artillery and sur-
face-to-air missiles, which were increasing in range and accuracy. For
the moment, though, Army protests to the JCS went unheeded; Radford
maintained that the Air Force should be prominent in the command.
Meanwhile, the Air Staff pressed to abolish the Joint Air Defense Board
because it duplicated work being done in Headquarters CONAD. In De-
cember 1954, the JCS agreed and moved to eliminate it. 17

Although the Air Force had at first feared losing control of air de-
fense under terms of a joint command, CONAD's establishment seemed,
if anything, to strengthen the Air Force position. CONAD included the
Air Force Air Defense Command and Army and Navy forces as joint
command components, but all parts were not equal. ADC Headquarters
served as CONAD Headquarters, and Air Force officers occupied prac-

* Morehouse took command of the new Naval Forces for CONAD (NAVFOR-
CONAD) when that headquarters was established in Colorado Springs later in the year.
The Navy, with less of an investment than the Army in continental defense, usually did not
dispute the dominant position of the Air Force in the new command.

245

The Emerging Shield

tically all important positions throughout the command. Partridge justi-
fied this inequality by claiming only Air Force officers were qualified to
fill critical posts. He believed that competence as a staff officer in air de-
fense operations required "an intimate knowledge of offensive and defen-
sive aerial warfare"; Army and Navy officers, according to Partridge,
did not possess such knowledge. 18

The Army vigorously opposed the dual arrangement involving
ADC and CONAD. Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, Lewis's successor in
the Antiaircraft Artillery Command, strove to have more Army officers
at headquarters level, "in view of the major contribution that ARAA-
COM [Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command] is making in the CONUS
air defense effort." Mickelsen charged that "if USAF officers occupy all
or nearly all key positions ... it becomes obvious that the CONAD is
'joint' in name only . . . ." 19

The Army repeatedly took its case to the JCS and finally received a
positive response in June 1956. By then, Partridge had agreed to make
changes ensuring greater Army and Navy representation at headquarters
level. But the time for in-house reform had passed, and the Secretary of
Defense approved a JCS recommendation to separate the Headquarters
ADC staff from the Headquarters CONAD staff. This distinction meant
ADC would concentrate on Air Force combat-related activities while
CONAD had administrative responsibilities and joint-service planning.
The change allowed Army and Navy officers to fill numerous positions
m Headquarters CONAD. The replacement of Partridge as Commander
of ADC by Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson made Partridge's position in
CONAD more nonpartisan. 20

Tranquillity among the services remained elusive where air defense
was concerned. The Army, for example, continued to argue for greater
freedom in antiaircraft operational procedures from those offered in the
Collins- Vandenberg agreement. Partridge complained he had too little
authority to allocate Army and Navy forces effectively. While the three
services debated and feuded in CONAD, Canada joined the air defense
equation.

North American Air Defense Command

As domestic air defense organization changed, the Air Force and
JCS considered the need for a combined air defense command with
Canada. The notion was by no means novel. According to General
Charles Foulkes, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee
(the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. JCS), Canadian military officers had
identified the need as early as 1946. 21 Since 1951, when Royal Canadian
246

Organizing for the Threat

Air Force liaison officers began serving in Colorado Springs, the U.S.
and Canadian air forces had developed closer relations. Operationally,
agreements had evolved for allowing the JCS and Canadian Chiefs of
Staff Committee to order joint air defense procedures in an emergency.
Air commanders in Canada and the United States had extensive author-
ity to order interceptors to enter the other's air space in pursuit of identi-
fied hostile intruders. Deployment of the respective early-warning lines,
of course, made it imperative that both air staffs coordinate plans for
close tactical cooperation. American and Canadian airmen shared other
common goals and concerns; both air forces constantly battled to obtain
the greater share of their nations' military budgets. For the Royal Cana-
dian Air Force (RCAF), with no equivalent to SAC, air defense became
as important and compelling a mission as U.S. Air Force strategic bomb-
ing. 22

As early as 1948, the RCAF formed an autonomous air defense
fighter group equipped with De Havilland Vampire jets. In January
1950, flight tests had begun on the Canadian-made and -developed A. V.
Roe (Avro) CF-100, which became the mainstay of Canadian fighter
units in the 1950s. Canada's air defense squadrons also possessed the Ca-
nadian-manufactured Canadair F-86 Sabre, greatly improved by replace-
ment of the original engine with the 16,000-pound-thrust Orenda engine,
made by Avro for use in its CF-100. 23

Sadly, the Avro CF-105 Arrow all-weather fighter, the aircraft with
the potential to become Canada's most important contribution to North
American air defense, never became operational. Before the combined
U.S.-Canadian command received serious consideration, the Canadian
Air Staff had assessed the need for a replacement for the CF-100. It re-
ceived permission from the government to permit the superb Avro engi-
neering and design team to develop an advanced interceptor that would
operate in the harsh northern environment.

When the aircraft first flew in 1958 (after the establishment of the
combined command), the most knowledgeable observers, including Air
Force officers in both countries, judged it outstanding on the basis of its
rate of climb, speed, and weapons systems. In fact, the Arrow seemed
superior to all other interceptors, Canadian or American. But soon after
the plane debuted, a new Conservative-led government decided that
since the ICBM had become the most dangerous threat, Arrow-type air-
craft were unnecessary. The Arrow's escalating costs, largely resulting
from the Canadian Air Staffs decision to go "first class" and to invest in
expensive state-of-the-art fire control and air-to-air missile systems, rein-
forced this judgment. 24

Another factor led to the Arrow's early demise: the United States
would not, as the Canadians had hoped, purchase substantial numbers of
the aircraft. Although U.S. Air Force officers had encouraged Canadian

247

The Emerging Shield

production of the plane and had closely watched its progress, no Ameri-
cans committed themselves to buy Arrows. Former Liberal Prime Minis-
ter Lester Pearson offered a partial explanation in 1957, recalling his
travails in trying to sell the CF-100 to the U.S. Air Force:

I know also from my own experience in the past that when
we tried to get the United States interested in the CF-100,
some years ago, at a time when the CF-100 was admitted in
Washington to be certainly the best all-weather fighter on
the continent, we made no progress at all. The aircraft in-
dustry down there was not going to allow any interference
with its own right to produce its own aircraft for its own
government. I believe the minister [Conservative Prime
Minister John F. Diefenbaker] will be having the same trou-
ble with the CF-105. 25

Pearson correctly believed that U.S. officials preferred to avoid cre-
ating a brouhaha in the American aircraft industry. The Air Force
would have been forced to challenge existing restrictions on importing
foreign aircraft (rescinded for Canada after the fate of the Arrow had
been decided) had they tried to purchase either the CF-100 or the
CF-105. Furthermore, when the interceptor reached production, the
U.S. Air Force was reconsidering its antibomber programs in light of the
new Soviet ICBM threat. It had canceled its own advanced interceptor,

248

Organizing for the Threat

the F-108, and had dropped planned F-106 updates. No U.S. market ex-
isted at the time for an expensive, foreign-manufactured interceptor, re-
gardless of its capabilities. Thus, in the end, those Arrows that were built
were cut for scrap.

Canada opted to deploy the BOMARC surface-to-air interceptor
missile, a weapon slow to mature. Two BOMARC-B squadrons, at first
unarmed but equipped after the Cuban Missile Crisis with nuclear war-
heads, were installed in northeast Canada. In 1961, after their interceptor
force had become practically obsolete, the Canadians accepted delivery
of sixty -six F-101B Voodoos equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles
from the United States. 26

The rise and fall of the Arrow highlighted the tentative Canadian
approach to air defense and overall defense relations with the United
States in this period. On the one hand, Canada possessed a long and
proud military history. In the twentieth century, its soldiers, sailors, and
airmen had compiled distinguished records in both world wars and in
Korea. It had taken the lead in creating the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO), signaling its intention to continue to play a military
role in world affairs. Its air force, a small, highly professional organiza-
tion, enthusiastically worked to increase air defense ties with the United
States, and its aircraft engineers and designers were outstanding. On the

249

The Emerging Shield

other hand, Canadians valued their independence and sovereignty, and
no Canadian government could survive that appeared to be bullied into
making defense agreements with the United States.

The question of a joint Canadian-American command for air de-
fense, a minor political issue in the United States, was the focus of in-
tense debate in Canada. Consequently, the JCS and the Air Force pro-
ceeded slowly in approaching Canada for making an agreement. Ameri-
can military authorities realized the gap between the priorities of the Ca-
nadian Air Force and those of the Canadian government could be wide.
The JCS told Secretary Wilson that they and the Canadian Chiefs of
Staff Committee considered North America a "strategic entity for de-
fense purposes." They realized the Canadian government might prefer
the existing arrangement whereby the Permanent Joint Board, the Mili-
tary Cooperation Committee, and the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning
Group coordinated and negotiated defense plans and programs. These
and other committees, established during World War II and afterward,
dealt with various U.S.-Canadian defense needs. If the United States
pressed for a different system, the JCS feared it "might jeopardize the
current working arrangement . . . ." This JCS belief followed the posi-
tion the Chiefs took a year earlier when they told Wilson that Canadian
military planners were "unable to arrive at negotiated positions without
agreement on a governmental level. A combined U.S.-Canadian com-
mand would in all probability be equally restricted." The JCS did not
believe a joint command would be "sufficiently effective to warrant the
expense in money and personnel involved." The Chiefs maintained that
U.S. members of the Permanent Joint Board and the Military Coopera-
tion Committee* should remain alert to "any significant change in the
Canadian attitude" and inform American authorities immediately. 27

The JCS correctly perceived that Canada's political leadership
would consider the issue of a joint command to be a hot potato. Can-
ada's politicians were uneasy about close bilateral defense ties with the
United States, conceivably so strong it could dictate terms to Canada.
More appealing to Canada was linking North American defense with
NATO. For a great many reasons, the most important being a profound
determination to keep exclusive control over SAC, the United States op-
posed this step. In the words of the noted historian of North American
air defense, Joseph T. Jockel, "Letting the Europeans get closer, via
NATO, to North American defence, would bring them that much closer

* The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was established in 1940 to consider in the
broad sense the defense of the north half of the western hemisphere. Two civilians from
each nation and military personnel represented the board. Representatives from the foreign
offices of the United States and Canada, as well as military officers, made up the Military
Cooperation Committee, established in 1946.

250

Organizing for the Threat

to SAC's retaliatory power." 28 At the time, Europeans expressed little
interest in the defense of North America.

SAC itself was a touchy subject for Canadian politicians. Most Ca-
nadian authorities, military and political, believed that, like it or not, the
defense of North America would require Canadian participation. Soviet
bombers attacking the industrial northeastern United States would leave
radioactive fallout over major Canadian cities located close-by. Also
compelling was a moral imperative: without Canadian cooperation, air
defense of the United States was futile, just as air defense of Canada was
impossible without U.S. resources. Canadian geography offered critical
advantages of early warning and defense in depth. By the mid-1950s, it
was clear that the major purpose of air defense was not to shoot down
enemy bombers— it was to allow SAC sufficient warning to retaliate—
and Canadian leaders realized this. In 1956, a House of Commons
member assessed the real purpose of the warning lines as not to ready
forces to destroy bombers but rather

to give the [SAC] bombers a chance to get into the air so
that they will not be destroyed on the ground and in order
that they can launch a countermeasure of massive retaliation
.... Well, if that is the hope it does not hold out much
comfort for the rest of us because we are going to be burnt
to a crisp anyway. 29

Although racked by uncertainty, the Canadian Liberal government,
continuously in power for thirty-two years, allowed military and diplo-
matic discussions on a joint command to proceed in 1956 and 1957. Talks
continued between the U.S. and Canadian air forces; in addition, the
Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Group, a subgroup of the Military Coop-
eration Committee, examined the issue. At the end of 1956, the Military
Group recommended an integrated American-Canadian command for air
defense. The JCS approved the recommendation in February 1957, as
did the Secretary of Defense the next month. The Canadian Staff Com-
mittee also supported the plan and advised the new government under
John G. Diefenbaker, elected June 10, to do likewise. On August 1, 1957,
a joint communique released in both national capitals announced the ap-
proval of an integrated command for air defense. 30

The establishment of command headquarters occurred September
12, 1957, at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs. At that time no dip-
lomatic agreement existed between the United States and Canada. The
new Conservative government under Diefenbaker, which had won a
shocking upset victory over the Liberals in June, was, according to Gen-
eral Foulkes, "stampeded" by the General Staff Committee into accept-
ing the integrated command. 31 Diefenbaker apparently believed the cre-
ation of the command, as negotiated by the former Liberal government,
a foregone conclusion. He quickly discovered his error when Parliament

251

The Emerging Shield

asked why it had not been formally consulted in the matter. Diefenbaker,
backing away from a potential political scandal, tried unsuccessfully to
tie the new command to NATO, which only damaged his credibility
more at home and provoked a diplomatic row with Washington, where
the JCS remained adamantly opposed to any link between the new inte-
grated command and NATO. 32

Meanwhile, diplomatic notes were not exchanged until May 1958,
when the command had been operating for eight months. Terms of the
agreement, as signed by Canadian Ambassador Norman Robertson and
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, gave the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD) the mission of defending
the continental United States, Alaska, and Canada against air attack.
NORAD would include as component forces the U.S. Army Air De-
fense Command (formerly the Antiaircraft Artillery Command), U.S.
Naval Forces CONAD, the Air Force Air Defense Command, and the
Air Defence Command of Canada. The NORAD commander in chief
had assigned operational control over all component commands, air de-
fense forces in Alaska, and all other Canadian and U.S. air defense units
made available to him. CONAD, meanwhile, would address U.S. respon-
sibilities outside NORAD's jurisdiction, including American air defense
weapons employing atomic warheads. 33

General Partridge became the first NORAD commander, and Air
Marshal C. R. Slemon, a staunch advocate of American-Canadian coop-
eration in air defense, his deputy. The two nations agreed that an Ameri-
can would always command NORAD with a Canadian as his deputy.

RCAF officers in NORAD considered the air defense of North
America a single problem and agreed the command's primary purpose
would be to provide early warning and defense for SAC's retaliatory
forces. However, the Diefenbaker government came under pressure be-
cause of Parliament's apprehension that Canadian views would carry
little weight against the might of the American military machine. Air
Marshal Slemon received instructions from his government "to fight to
the last ditch to safeguard Canadian sovereignty . . . ." Much to his
relief and gratification, Slemon found that

although we were a little partner making a relatively small
contribution to the operational capability of the joint effort,
our views were considered in exactly the same light as our
partners, the Americans. I guess this is the most outstanding
reaction I had apart from the great friendliness that en-
gulfed we strange Northerners when we appeared on the
scene. 34

General Partridge, probably having learned some lessons from deal-
ing with the U.S. Army and Navy in CONAD, wasted no time in desig-
nating the Canadians as equal rather than as "little" partners. He proved

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Organizing for the Threat

this immediately by appointing a Canadian officer Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations in NORAD, the position Slemon considered "the guts of
our joint effort." Canadian political authorities monitored closely the
progress of the new command, and Partridge's attitude served to lessen
Canadian apprehensions and ensure NORAD's harmonious beginning. 35

Through the years, NORAD developed successfully. Although the
Canadians generally contributed only between eight and twelve percent
of the funds for the command, the United States used Canadian territory
for airbases and early-warning stations. Late in 1958, Canadian and U.S.
air force officers embarked on a program called Continental Air Defense
Integration, North (CADIN), to integrate the two nation's defenses in
the SAGE system. In the active defense forces, Canadian pilots and con-
trollers proved their expertise and professionalism in exercises with their
American counterparts. At the planning level, Canadians held critical
staff positions and participated in defining air defense concepts and doc-
trine for North America.

It would be wrong to assume that operations always ran smoothly in
NORAD. Besides questions of general policy, conflicts could arise on
the day-to-day operational level. For example, an American commander
might be absent from Colorado Springs and a U.S. President would have
to give orders to the Canadian deputy. Conceivably, the deputy might
not have time to consult with his government before executing orders
involving both U.S. and Canadian forces. Many authorities in both na-
tions believed that "there would be a coincidence of national interests in
such an emergency." As one Canadian historian pointed out, "The
United States has always been careful never to place any restrictions on
the authority of the Canadian deputy on the assumption, presumably,
that there could never be a conflict in authority." 36 Had the United
States, in truth, ever needed to take unilateral action, it could have done
so through CONAD, its specified command for air defense.

A unilateral response, in fact, occurred in the Cuban Missile Crisis
of October 1962. On October 22, as world tensions heightened, the
United States demanded removal of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in Cuba. American components in NORAD were put on a high
level of alert. Canadians, meanwhile, disagreed over the seriousness of
the situation. The Canadian government, annoyed at not being consulted
in advance (the United States had determined as early as October 16 that
missile sites were being constructed in Cuba, but it informed only Britain
among its allies), resolved that it would not be dictated to by the United
States. Accordingly, Canada kept its forces temporarily on normal status.
This created friction, not only between the two governments but also
wherever Canadian and American air force officers worked side by side
in NORAD. The situation grew especially stressful in the northern 30th
NORAD region, partly in Canadian territory, where Canadian officers

253

The Emerging Shield

served as Vice Commander, Director of the Combat Center, and Direc-
tor of Exercises and Systems Evaluation. When the Combat Center went
on advanced alert, its Canadian Director technically remained on normal
air defense status for two days longer. Full Canadian diplomatic support
did not come until October 25, when Canadian forces in NORAD joined
those of the United States at the highest readiness state. 37

The delayed response in the crisis led to harsh criticism in Canada
and the United States. It caused a review of Canadian defense policies in
Parliament and contributed at least partly to the fall of Diefenbaker's
Conservative government shortly thereafter. The new Liberal govern-
ment subsequently agreed to arm Canadian BOM ARC and CF-101B
squadrons with nuclear warheads (Canada had previously hesitated to
take this step) in confirmation of the nation's total commitment to North
American air defense. 38 The missile crisis inadvertently set the stage for
closer U.S.-Canadian defense relations that have since prevailed. It
proved to Canada that during an emergency, the United States would
respect its sovereignty. The crisis also showed that nations like the
United States and Canada with convergent interests would not always
agree in an emergency.

For the national leadership of the two countries, the establishment
of NORAD came not a moment too soon. Within weeks after the com-
bined command began functioning, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the
first orbiting Earth satellite, a feat that signaled Russian capabilities with
long-range rockets. Nothing could have made clearer the need for a mis-
sile defense. It is doubtful whether the United States or Canada would
have seen value even in an antibomber defense had not the Soviet ICBM
threat emerged as unequivocally as it did. Instead of having to justify its
existence, NORAD now turned to adapting its missions and functions to
a new and more dangerous threat, patent to all.

254

Chapter 10

Epilogue: Impact of a New Threat

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched into orbit an artificial
satellite called Sputnik. With a diameter of twenty-three inches
and weight of eighty-four pounds, Sputnik had a resounding effect on,
among other things, the course of future U.S. military priorities. Ameri-
can observers considered especially significant the capability of the bal-
listic missile that launched the satellite to carry a nuclear warhead. Nev-
ertheless, the Eisenhower administration took the news calmly. Supplied
with information from U-2 reconnaissance overflights and radar surveil-
lance of Soviet missile tests, the President claimed Soviet possession of
an ICBM before the Americans would not be catastrophic; the Soviet
Union did not yet maintain the forces or operational capability to launch
an ICBM attack against the United States. Eisenhower's nonalarmist
views, however, were not shared by many prominent officials, scientists,
journalists, and other informed citizens. Resulting controversies about the
U.S. technological decline and the possibility of a missile gap were to
have profound implications for the scope and composition of U.S. Air
Force bomber defense programs. 1

Sputnik did not catch the Air Force completely by surprise. Al-
though its post-World War II air defense programs logically concentrat-
ed against the manned bomber, the Air Force recognized a future need
to defend against ballistic missiles. As early as January 1946, the AAF
had explored defense concepts to be used against threats like the German
V-2, a liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The AAF foresaw a missile defense
system that included electronic jammers, automatic weapons control, and
computer devices for guiding surface-to-air countermissiles. The defen-
sive missiles were predicted to have to destroy ICBMs traveling as fast
as 5,000 miles per hour and at altitudes ranging from sea level to 100
miles above the earth. 2

The AAF Guided Missiles Division, established immediately after
World War II, examined the problem in broad perspective. It decided:

The advent of atomic explosives and energy made all previ-
ous defense planning obsolete. It is now considered techni-
cally feasible, as a result of extensive research, to send long

255

The Emerging Shield

range missiles carrying atomic warheads, at supersonic
speeds to any point of the earth's surface. As all nations
must be considered as being able to construct and use such
missiles, it becomes imperative that a defense system be es-
tablished to cover all approaches to the U.S No

nation can survive if the enemy's first blow is successful in
atomic warfare. 3

The Air Materiel Command's Engineering Division proceeded to make
some preliminary investigations into the characteristics of a missile de-
fense system. Their research showed little promise, and the Guided Mis-
siles Division admitted in December 1946 that "there is absolutely no ma-
teriel available today capable of detecting, identifying, intercepting, and
destroying such missiles [ICBMs] once they are launched." 4

Realizing the problem deserved a more exhaustive examination than
it could provide, the AAF late in 1946 turned to the University of
Michigan's Willow Run Research Center. Scientists there decided the
likelihood was nil that developments in technology might provide de-
fense against hostile missiles in the near future. 5

By April 1947, the AAF concluded that "scientists as a whole have
thrown up their hands at the problem of devising a defense against
ground missiles of the V-2 variety." 6 Although neither the Air Force
nor the scientists it employed gave up completely on the concept of
ICBM defense, little progress took place in the next few years. Strategic
defense became a secondary concern compared to the more immediate
need — for antibomber defense.

The Air Force took important action only in July 1953 when intelli-
gence sources indicated Soviet missile programs were progressing more
rapidly than anticipated. The Air Research and Development Command
asked the Lincoln Laboratory to study the ICBM defense problem. On
the basis of the Lincoln recommendations, the Air Force entered into
three study contracts with aircraft-electronics companies to develop
methods for detecting, identifying, and destroying ICBMs. Called collec-
tively Wizard 3, the study reports confirmed Michigan's view that exist-
ing technology would not solve the ICBM interception problem.
Wizard 3's suggestions led to production of a high-powered line-of-sight
radar with a 3,000-mile range. In combination with computers, this radar
calculated a missile's trajectory. Highly accurate, a Wizard 3 radar lo-
cated on a hill near Cambridge, Massachussetts, could detect missiles
fired from Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. 7

Meanwhile, the Air Force and the Army competed for control of
the ICBM defense mission, their rivalry predating Air Force independ-
ence. Army Ground Forces had contracted with the General Electric
Company in 1945 on Project Thumper, designed like similar AAF
projects to study defense prospects against V-2-type missiles. Also in
1945 the Army started research and development on its Project Nike

256

Epilogue

family of missiles, envisioned as potential antimissile weapons. Despite
these actions, the AAF believed that since it had major Army air defense
responsibilities, it would have the missile defense mission once its inde-
pendence was assured. After establishment of the Air Force, defense offi-
cials procrastinated in defining responsibility for the antimissile function.
Thus the Army and Air Force continued separate research projects in
ICBM defense. 8

Air Force and Army research and development efforts came slowly.
In the early 1950s it was difficult to judge when the missile threat would
emerge in earnest. A RAND report issued in December 1953, on the eve
of development of the huge air defense system, urged continued efforts
not only to defend against the bomber but also to prepare more deter-
minedly to develop missile defenses. RAND predicted that Soviet
ICBMs would eventually "make obsolete nearly the entire air defense
system except for the lingering bomber capability." Hence, RAND pro-
posed a more intense study of missile defense concepts, continual reas-
sessment of intelligence information, and, later, a shift from the air de-
fense system toward an ICBM defense network. RAND guessed that the
missile threat would be real by 1960, although the bomber would contin-
ue to pose a threat in the foreseeable future. RAND therefore did not
oppose the air defense buildup just beginning; it urged starting no new
major weapon system solely for defense against the manned bomber.
RAND analysts presumed, mistakenly, that some primary components of
the air defense system, like SAGE, could also perform missile defense
functions. 9

The Defense Department did not adopt immediately the RAND rec-
ommendation for a gradual shift in emphasis to missile defense because
too little was known of Soviet ICBM plans. In the second half of the
1950s, however, improved electronic intelligence and high-altitude sur-
veillance overflights confirmed the Soviets' advancing offensive missile
programs. The United States was not prepared to meet this impending
danger, as Headquarters CONAD reminded the JCS in 1956:

Russian development of intercontinental and intermediate
range ballistic missiles, as well as earth orbiting satellites,
poses a threat which cannot be countered by the existing air
defense system. The weapons or ground environment now
or soon to be available to counter the air breathing threat
[is] of limited value against ballistic missiles or satellites op-
erating at very high speeds and altitudes. We therefore face
a requirement for developing, in an extremely short time, a
vast improvement in the detection and destruction capabili-
ties of the air defense system. 10

CONAD did not wait for a JCS response to its caveat before initiating
action. It assigned ADC, as a natural extension of ADC's bomber de-

257

The Emerging Shield

fense mission, responsibility for providing and operating an ICBM de-
fense system. 11

Responsibility for ICBM defense was not decided as easily. The
Army, adamantly opposed to the mission going to ADC, believed it was
the only service currently developing weapons (Nike and its variants)
that stood any reasonable chance of defeating ICBMs. In mid- 1956, Lt.
Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, head of Army Air Defense Command,
claimed that "NIKE is capable of killing any known guided missile and
will be effective against the intercontinental missile when it materializes."
Adding substance to Mickelsen's claim, in November 1956 the Army
began development of the Nike Zeus, designed specifically as a high-alti-
tude antimissile missile. 12

On November 26 Secretary Wilson ruled that principal responsibil-
ity for antimissile defense, unlike that for air defense, would not be as-
signed to just one service. The Army would assume responsibility for
point-defense missiles, "leaving to the Air Force missile defense develop-
ments other than the point defense portions specifically assigned to the
Army." 13

Wilson's directive was vague, but it appeared the Air Force would
concentrate on developing long-range (area) missile defenses. Further
clarification did not come until January 16, 1958 (after Sputnik), when
Wilson's successor, Neil McElroy, told the Air Force to continue "as a
matter of urgency" its Wizard program research in early-warning
radars, tracking and acquisition radars, communication links between
early-warning radars and the active defense system, and a SAGE data
link in a missile defense network. McElroy said these elements would all
be needed in a Nike-Zeus defense system. "The Air Force program,"
McElroy concluded, "will be limited at this time to work in [these]
areas." 14

McElroy's directive that the Air Force concentrate on ICBM sur-
veillance presaged the course of its missile defense activities for years to
come. Whereas the Air Force had made various attempts to work
toward an active missile defense system since the end of World War II,
its investigations indicated such systems infeasible. In 1959 Air Force As-
sistant Secretary for Research and Development Richard E. Horner told
a House Appropriations Committee that no active missile defense, includ-
ing Nike, was judged by the Air Force likely to work. Instead, said
Horner, the Air Force thought funds would be better spent on offensive
ICBMs. 15

In succeeding years, the Air Force did not neglect active ICBM de-
fense altogether, for the Defense Department charged it to examine ways
of destroying missiles during the boost and midcourse phases of flight. It
achieved no significant progress, however. Its most promising venture,
probably the dual-role Minuteman, envisioned the offensive ICBM used

258

Epilogue

as an interceptor missile, but the venture showed little progress. The
Army's Nike-Zeus and Nike-X Sentinel/Safeguard systems, originally in-
tended for point defense but developed into an area-defense network by
the late 1960s, overshadowed it. 16

Whereas Air Force active missile defense efforts were limited, Air
Force efforts to implement ICBM early-warning systems were not. As
early as June 10, 1955, U.S. Air Force General Operational Requirement
(GOR) 96, "A Ballistic Missile Detection Support System," called for
three northern radar sites to detect and track Soviet ICBMs launched
over the polar routes toward North America. Because a Soviet ICBM
would need thirty-three to forty-six minutes to fly to the United States
and fighter-interceptors and SAC bombers would need at least fifteen
minutes of tactical warning to become airborne, the three radar sites
would allow interceptors to meet an anticipated second-wave bomber
attack aimed at key forces and installations that the more destructive but
as yet less accurate missiles might be expected to miss. Most important,
early warning of ICBM attack would allow time to prepare U.S. strate-
gic bombers and, perhaps, ICBMs, for retaliatory strikes. 17

When issued in 1955, GOR 96 aroused little interest in the Defense
Department. Not surprisingly, the Air Force received a far more positive
response when in the weeks after Sputnik it submitted GOR 156, "Ballis-
tic Missile Defense System," closely resembling the earlier plan. GOR
156 called for a ballistic missile early-warning system (BMEWS) capable
of providing radar coverage over crucial northern points. This system
would have to be completely reliable, operate continuously in all weath-
er, incorporate electronic countermeasure devices, discriminate between
real and false alarms, and ensure overlapping radar coverage between
Canadian and Soviet portions of the Arctic perimeter for 2,600 miles.
The Air Force recommended that radar sites be placed in Great Britain,
Greenland, and Alaska to assure coverage above the Soviet land mass.
Radar sites would be equipped with communications to relay information
to the ADC/NORAD Combat Operations Center and the SAC Com-
mand Post at least fifteen minutes before Soviet ICBMs reached their
targets. 18

The decision to construct BMEWS was arrived at without the bitter
debate that preceded authorization of the DEW Line. The Air Force by
this time had embraced early warning as the major tenet of air— or mis-
sile—defense. Upon submission, the Defense Department and Congress
quickly endorsed GOR 156. Construction on the radars started in
summer 1958, and December 31, 1960, marked the initial operation of the
first radar in Thule, Greenland. Site II at Clear, Alaska, began operating
in June 1961; the last BMEWS site at Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire, Eng-
land, attained initial operational capability on September 15, 1963. The
Thule and Clear sites were oriented to cover the possible transpolar mis-

259

The Emerging Shield

sile trajectories and bomber routes out of the Soviet Union, whereas the
radars in England could provide data both on ICBMs fired over the pole
at the United States and on intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)
launched against Britain from the western Soviet Union or Eastern
Europe. Tests proved all three radar sites could transmit enemy ICBM
data to the NORAD Combat Operations Center. NORAD would then
simultaneously transfer information to display facilities in SAC Head-
quarters and to the three display facilities in the Pentagon: the Joint War
Room of the JCS, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force
Command Post. The Air Force believed the most reliable ICBM detec-
tors would ultimately be early-warning satellites. The Air Force finally
deployed the world's first active military satellites, called SAMOS (Sat-
ellite and Missile Observation System) and MIDAS (an infrared Missile
Defense Alarm System), in late I960. 19

Effects of the ICBM Threat on the Air Defenses

As the Air Force prepared to meet the Soviet missile challenge in
the late 1950s, Air Staff planners did not believe the danger of bomber
attack had disappeared. The Air Force thought the Soviet Union would
retain "a large and effective manned bomber force" until ICBM systems
could become more accurate and sophisticated and could be deployed in
force. As President Eisenhower had pointed out in the midst of the
public furor caused by Sputnik, Soviet missiles would not immediately
pose a deadly threat. Bombers would supplement a Soviet ICBM attack
upon North America until at least 1962 and maybe longer. 20

With the ICBM heralding a new age in warfare, some observers in
Congress and the Defense Department began to fear that funds spent on
bomber defense were funds wasted. Skepticism grew on the worth of the
still-expanding air defenses, and it motivated the Defense Department to
issue, on June 19, 1959, the Master Air Defense Plan. Key features of the
plan included a reduction in BOMARC squadrons, cancellation of plans
to upgrade the interceptor force, and a new austere SAGE program. In
addition, funds were deleted for gap-filler and frequency-agility radars. 21

In January 1960, during House Appropriations Committee hearings,
Representative George H. Mahon noted $30 billion had been spent on air
defense in the 1950s, and invoices were still coming in. General Nathan
Twining, Chairman of the JCS, told Mahon that, while air defenses had
to be continuously reappraised, he believed no wholesale reductions
were immediately indicated. He said that NORAD Commander in Chief
General Laurence S. Kuter (who had succeeded Partridge on August 1,
1959) "feels very strongly that we are not devoting enough of our time and

260

Epilogue

effort to air defense." 22 As the officer with primary responsibility for
North American air defense, Kuter fought hard for additional air defense
hardware and personnel. He believed that the Soviets could

place a force of about 200 bombers over North America
until at least 1970. All or part of these could be directed
against hardened ICBM sites [the first American offensive
ICBM squadrons became operational in I960]. The method
of attack will probably be in conjunction with, but follow-
ing a USSR missile attack. 23

In the early 1960s, the Air Force accepted the supposition that the
Soviets would follow an ICBM attack with waves of strategic bombers.
Therefore, the need seemed apparent to ensure survival of interceptors
through dispersal procedures and hardening of air defense command and
control facilities. Survival of these facilities became even more compel-
ling with the realization that the facilities might eventually be configured
to function as anti-ICBM warning and direction centers, both at the
headquarters and operational levels. Combat Operations Center (COC) in
Colorado Springs had direction of the air defense battle. When ADC had
moved to Ent Air Force Base in January 1951, COC facilities were lo-
cated in an office building and comprised of a latrine with the plumbing
removed and part of a hallway. A much improved 15,000-square-foot
concrete block COC became operational on Ent in May 1954. CONAD
commander General Partridge remained unsatisfied. In December 1956
he requested that the Air Staff consider an underground location for the
COC from which its personnel could, by using computers, oversee the
decentralized air defense battle and assume control of ICBM defense
when the threat developed (which he estimated would occur by 1960).
He envisioned the new COC would require a near one hundred percent
probability of surviving an attack from multimegaton weapons, large du-
plexed computers to provide simultaneous two-way data transmission for
both bomber and missile defense operations, communication and display
facilities, self-sufficiency in a 5-day battle for about 195 people, and an
independent water and power supply. 24

Although the Air Staff supported Partridge's requests, the JCS and
Defense Department considered them less than urgent and took no
action. In July 1958 Partridge reminded the JCS that the present com-
mand post was susceptible to dangers far less than a nuclear attack, but
which could render incalculable damage:

It has been recognized for several years that the facilities at
Ent are quite inadequate both from a point of view of avail-
ability of floor space as well as security. The Combat Oper-
ations Center is a concrete block building of extremely light
construction and is exposed to the traffic on the adjacent
street so that a man with a bazooka passing in a car could
put the establishment out of commission. 25

261

The Emerging Shield

NORAD, Cheyenne Mountain. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Army Chief
of Staff; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; Mr. Neil
McElroy, Secretary of Defense; General Earle E. Partridge, NORAD
Commander in Chief; and General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff,
take a telescopic look at the site of the new underground North American
Air Defense (NORAD) Command Operations Center (COC) (above). The
COC, under Cheyenne Mountain's protective shield of granite (below),
housed the defense of the North American continent.

On February 11, 1959, the JCS approved, in principle, the building
of a new COC and assigned its development and production management
to the Air Force. After much investigation, the Air Force accepted a
recommendation made by RAND that the new COC be placed outside
Colorado Springs, in Cheyenne Mountain. Before beginning to tunnel
out the granite mountain, the Air Force had to update and amplify its
concept of the COC to include an integrated air and space early-warning
mission. In August 1960, an Air Research and Development Command
study described the future COC as "a hardened center from which
CINCNORAD would supervise and direct operations against space
attack as well as air attack." The COC's function would thus evolve

262

Epilogue

NORAD Command Operations Center. ADC and NORAD personnel
dine within the completely self-sufficient NORAD Command Communica-
tions Center located underground in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in
Colorado.

from air defense to missile defense and control of space surveillance and
tracking systems. 26

Excavations for the hardened COC in 9,565-foot-high Cheyenne
Mountain ended on May 1, 1964, and its underground structures were
completed in December 1965. Built under 1,500 feet of rock, the center
could withstand effects of nuclear attack from weapons of up to 30
megatons where overpressure on the surface would be 600 pounds per
square inch. Eleven buildings, mounted on steel springs to protect elec-
tronic equipment, were built in a series of interconnecting chambers. In
an emergency, a sealed COC could operate for 30 days with only filtered
air recirculated inside the mountain. The COC had its own power plant,
heating and air conditioning systems, dining areas, sleeping facilities,
storage areas, and a dispensary. Southeast of the buildings, underground
reservoirs contained diesel fuel, drinking water, and water for industrial
uses. 27

The integrity of the control center, housed in the Cheyenne Moun-
tain complex, was critical. Also important to safeguard was the wide-
spread SAGE apparatus. Under ICBM attack, even if Air Force fighter-
interceptors managed through timely warning and dispersal procedures
to escape missiles, if SAGE blockhouses were destroyed, fighter-inter-
ceptors would have no regional command and control facilities to fight
the expected second-wave Soviet bomber attack.

The first SAGE regional battle post began operating in Syracuse,
New York, in early 1959. Called a combat center, an aboveground, win-
dowless, cement block structure housed it. SAGE regional commanders,

263

The Emerging Shield

usually major generals, supervised the air battle in subordinate sectors.
Use of the AN/FSQ-8 computer permitted these commanders to receive
nearly instantaneous pictures of operations in their sectors. Brigadier
generals usually commanded the sectors themselves, where the layout of
direction centers resembled that of regional combat centers. A major dif-
ference: direction centers used a different computer, the AN/FSQ-7, de-
signed especially for weapons control activities. The continental United
States had twenty-one direction centers and three regional combat cen-
ters. Most direction centers lay along the nation's perimeter, and the
combat centers were sited in Syracuse, New York; Madison, Wisconsin;
and Tacoma, Washington. By the end of 1961, when the number of cen-
ters had increased, the NORAD commander controlled eight regional
centers, including manually operated ones (those without computers), lo-
cated in Alaska and northeast Canada. 28

Thus in the early 1960s an air defense command and control system
existed in which air surveillance data flowed through battle centers with
speed and accuracy. The massive, confidence-inspiring concrete block-
houses, with their wondrous computers and consoles, quickly became the
pride of local communities and favorite inspection stops for dignitaries.
A disquieting concern, however, persisted. Because blockhouses were
hardened to withstand overpressures of only 5 pounds per square inch,
the Air Force feared that Soviet ICBMs could destroy all or part of
SAGE before the first enemy bombers had penetrated the DEW Line. 29

Protecting SAGE was not a new problem for the Air Force. The
original system planners abandoned their ideas of protecting under-
ground centers and communications as too costly. They sought survival
through dispersal and redundancy. First conceived as a large system, if
one SAGE direction or combat center was destroyed, another would
assume its defense area. Unfortunately, cutbacks in air defense, starting in
the late 1950s, adversely affected these plans. Although the Master Air
Defense Plan of 1959 was not complete, the SAGE design came to re-
semble more a perimeter defense system in contrast to offering defense in
depth. Complicating matters, eight direction centers existed on or near
SAC bomber bases and ICBM sites; another three shared bases with
SAGE combat centers. More than likely, these facilities would be de-
stroyed in first-strike ICBM attacks on SAC bases. Poor planning in the
pre-ICBM period and fiscal concerns had conspired against the safety-in-
numbers theory. 30

Under the circumstances, the Air Force decided to resurrect the
concept of underground regional combat centers, called Super Combat
Centers. As the Air Force considered means to safeguard the block-
houses, IBM announced development of a transistorized, or solid-state,
computer in spring 1958. The computer would be able to process 5 to 7
times more data than the vacuum tube computers used in SAGE. Just as

264

Epilogue

Semiautomatic ground environment. The first SAGE post to become
operational, this combined direction center-combat center was located at
Syracuse, New York.

important, the improved computer would not only do more, it would
occupy less space. Impressed by IBM claims, the Air Force wanted to
install new computers in the 300- to 500-foot deep Super Combat Cen-
ters, thus attaining an estimated hardness of 100 to 200 pounds per square
inch. Communications systems would be dispersed 14 or more miles from
the centers to provide an additional level of protection. Super Combat
Centers would replace present unhardened combat centers and, in criti-
cal locations, direction centers as well. In February 1960, these Air
Force designs became moot. A presidential committee decided that,
while it might be possible to harden the centers sufficiently, their com-
munications systems would still be highly susceptible to blast damage, es-
pecially to electromagnetic pulse, the emission and propagation of poten-
tially damaging electromagnetic radiation caused by nuclear weapons. 31
The Air Force finally adopted an alternative proposal designated
Backup Interceptor Control (BUIC). BUIC was devised by ADC and
Air Force Systems Command (previously Air Research and Develop-
ment Command) in response to limited funding for survivable control
centers. An aboveground, decentralized system, it relied on second-gen-
eration solid-state computer technology. It was conceived as a backup to
SAGE, which it closely resembled. BUIC centers, colocated with radar
stations, differed from SAGE regional combat and direction centers,
which were separated from their data sources. Even if communication
links failed or were destroyed, BUIC would continue functioning be-
cause its radars supplied its information. 32

265

The Emerging Shield

Exposed BUIC centers were not the best solution. As Soviet strate-
gic forces became more powerful and reliable, the Air Force believed
the only survivable command and control system would be an airborne
radar that was effective over land. As early as 1962 the Air Force began
exploring possibilities for an Airborne Warning and Control System
(AW ACS). The EC-121's airborne radars suffered from ground clutter —
radar impulses emanating from the terrain that masked reflections of air-
craft. Perfecting engineering solutions for early-warning devices over
land was expected to be a formidable undertaking in a period of re-
trenchment for air defense programs. 33

Aftermath: Deterioration of the Air Defenses

In 1957 Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev called the manned
bomber obsolete, believing its functions could be performed more effi-
ciently and lethally by missiles. In fact the powerful Soviet military es-
tablishment did not share Khrushchev's complete faith in ballistic missiles
as the sine qua non of modern weapons. (This controversy probably con-
tributed to the Soviet leader's downfall in 1964.) By the time of the

266

Epilogue

Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, developmental problems with the missile
program left the approximately 200-plane bomber force the largest inter-
continental component in the Soviet arsenal. 34

Reviewing Soviet defense spending patterns, a RAND analysis indi-
cated that from 1951 to 1961 Soviets spent more overall on medium-
range weapons, such as the Tu-16 Badger bomber, than on interconti-
nental weapons of any kind. The Badger, although possessing a combat
radius of less than 2,000 miles, could reach NATO targets and SAC
bases in Europe. During the first half of the 1950s, the Soviets spent less
than 2 percent of their total military budget on strategic weapons, in-
cluding Bear, Bison, and ICBM development programs. During this
period, even though the Soviets attained atomic capability, they adhered
to Stalin's primary post-World War II objective: consolidating their
gains in Europe. 35

In the second half of the 1950s, Soviet expenditures for interconti-
nental weapons increased. RAND estimated that by 1961 the Soviet
Union had invested twelve to thirteen percent of its defense budget for
long-range forces, in contrast to eight to nine percent for strategic re-
quirements in Europe. This trend, part of the so-called nuclear revolution
in Soviet military affairs, centered on ballistic missile research and devel-
opment, not on strategic bombers. 36

In the competition for funds, the long-range bomber force lost out
not only to the Red Army, to medium-range bomber and medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) forces, and to ICBMs, but also to air defense.
Because of their experiences in two world wars as well as their current
objectives, the Soviets chose to balance their offense and defense more
closely than the United States did. 37 Air defense ranked on Stalin's list of
postwar military objectives just behind consolidation of Soviet power in
Europe and ahead of gaining an intercontinental and atomic capability.
In the immediate years after World War II, the Soviet Union spent 3 to
4 times as much on air defense as on all its strategic aerospace programs.
By 1956 the Soviets committed about 550,000 military personnel to air
defense; the United States dedicated approximately 130,000 people from
all services to air defense operations. The pattern only started to change
markedly in the early 1960s with the growth of the Strategic Rocket
Force, awarded independent status in 1960. Yet even at that time, spend-
ing favored strategic defensive forces. In the United States, offensive
spending had dominated since the end of World War II; in the early
1960s, spending for strategic offensive forces exceeded by about 4 times
that for air defense. 38

Despite these comparisons, the U.S. investment in air defense had
not been paltry. Only by a comparison with strategic offensive forces do
air defense budgets in the 1950s appear small. Conventional forces suf-
fered the biggest losses in the Eisenhower administration. By 1960, as a

267

The Emerging Shield

result of the investment of billions of dollars in research, development,
and hardware, the nation reaped its reward: the most sophisticated air
defense system ever built. In December 1961, NOR AD controlled more
than 100 squadrons of F- 10 IB, F-102, and F-106 fighter-interceptors in
addition to BOMARC and Nike surface-to-air missiles. SAGE was tied
into 78 radar sites of the DEW Line, 98 radars were installed in the Mid-
Canada Line, and 256 were in the Pinetree Line. Navy picket ships and
dirigibles, Texas Tower radar platforms, and EC- 121 early-warning air-
craft represented the eyes of the vast system. 39

Twenty years later, 5 U.S. Air Force and 10 Air National Guard
squadrons, assigned to air defense duties, still had 1950-era F-106 and F-
10 IB interceptors. Only 66 long-range radars remained in the United
States and Canada; DEW Line radars had declined from 68 to 31; and
Texas Towers, the GOC, radar picket ships, Nike antiaircraft missiles,
and EC-121 early-warning aircraft had all been eliminated. Yet the
Soviet bomber threat had not changed significantly. Twenty years later,
the Soviet bomber force remained constant at about 200 aircraft.

The U.S. perception of the threat, however, changed drastically. Al-
though the Air Force envisioned a future Soviet intercontinental attack
featuring ICBMs and strategic bombers, it received only limited support
to counter this dual threat. After Sputnik, Congress and the public fo-
cused on the missile. Most defense officials in the 1960s agreed that,
since the nation was vulnerable to ICBMs, vulnerability to bombers had
little relevance. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara held that air
defense could not be separated from missile defense. Despairing of ever
seeing a truly effective ICBM defense, he reasoned that Soviet missiles
could eliminate air defense systems in a first strike, rendering them use-
less should subsequent bomber waves appear in North American skies. 40

Although McNamara and his assistants in the Defense Department
searched for more appealing strategies, the policy that emerged em-
braced the most extreme option: massive retaliation, popularly referred
to now as mutual assured destruction (MAD). This policy had fateful
consequences for air defense. The notion that both superpowers would
be deterred from starting a general war by the realization that any nucle-
ar missile or bomber attack would invite a devastating counterattack ac-
tually rested on the belief that no really effective defense remained possi-
ble. McNamara and his staff believed that attempts by either side to
deploy expensive and risky strategic defense systems would be countered
easily by modest additions to the offensive holdings of the other side. By
accepting that the offense in war had achieved an irreversible dominance
with atomic weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union could
avoid a never-ending arms race and save their defense outlays at the
same time. 41 According to one commentator, MAD became so decisive

268

Table 4. Comparison of Defense Department, Air Force, and ADC Budgets

Budget

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

Defense Dept

$46,029

$50,441

$51,208

$50,979

$50,866

$66,150

$73,436

$75,219

$79,432

$77,035

$72,941

Air Force

$19,887

$19,573

$20,430

$20,002

$19,402

$23,480

$24,708

$25,053

$26,126

$24,274

$22,729

ADC*

$2,719

$2,154

$1,775

$1,685

$1,496

$1,441

$1,394

$1,383

$1,353

$1,293

$1,291

Air Force, as a percent of Defense

Dept

0.4298

0.3880

0.3989

0.3923

0.3814

0.3549

0.3364

0.3330

0.3289

0.3151

0.3116

ADC, as a percent of Defense Dept

0.0617

0.0427

0.0346

0.0330

0.0294

0.0217

0.0189

0.0183

0.0170

0.0167

0.0176

ADC, as a percent of Air Force

0.1367

0.1100

0.0868

0.0842

0.0771

0.0613

0.0564

0.0552

0.0517

0.0532

0.0567

* This figure includes all monies allocated for the command or by other Air Force major commands for ADC programs.

Source: Figures for fiscal years 1961 and 1962 were obtained from hearings before the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee
on Appropriations and before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 9221, 1965, Pt 1, p 206, and from HQ ADC
DCS Comptroller, Directorate of Budget. Figures for fiscal years 1963 through 1969 were obtained from the Air Force's Force and Financial
Program, May 1970. Figures for fiscal years 1970 and 1971 were provided by HQ ADC DCS/Comptroller, Directorate of Budget.

Table 5. Air Defense Matrix

1 | s

5 £

Year — Event Q t

S3 g g o o "i s w « w

& . I I Ig 1 I ill 1^1^

I I § 1 I | 1 ! I*£§ . h <V lllllili

* * 8 1 ! I li |J |i I I ippKHrt!!

go".

1946-ADC established

30

4

4

1947— Independent Air Force established

2

50

7

7

1948-CONAC established; first RCAF
interceptor squadron

5

38

11

11

1949-NATO established; U.S.S.R. A-bomb

2

1

18

38

20

20

1950-Korean War

2

2

18

38

20

21

1951-ADC reestablished

5

2

58

16

41

41

1952— Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study
Group

1

27

2

81

16

40

43

1953-U.S.S.R. H-bomb

1

34

2

8

85

52

51

54

1954-CONAD established

11

32

2

25

86

83

70

55

57

1955

30

38

6

1

28

90

161

69

58

61

1956— New New Look

80

56

10

2

35

106

218

69

65

69

1957 -Sputnik; NORAD established

58

70

26

10

3

44

35

115

242

55

64

71

1958 -First SAGE center

58

90

9

1

11

3

75

32

135

232

41

3

58

60

1959— Master Air Defense Plan

64

90

5

11

3

114

32

157

80

172

2

42

3

56

56

1960— Kennedy-McNamara Administra-
tion; Khrushchev cancels bombers

64

90

13

10

3

90

34

153

99

162

5

40

3

41

41

1961— Tushino Airshow; Triangu-
lar/CADIN Agreements

68

91

19

10

2

95

31

147

128

82

8

29

3

41

41

1962

1— Cuban missile crisis

68

91

20

1963

i — Continental air defense study

40

71

i «

lO

1964

— Canadian White Paper

40

72

1 «

ID

1965

-Bombing of North Vietnam begins

40

83

15

1966

— AWACS/OTH-B/F-12 plan
presented

40

76

i j

1967

— F-12 Program ended

40

54

12

13

1968

— Tet offensive; Czech invasion

40

67

19

1 1
1 1

1969

—Nixon term begins

33

65

z

19

1A

1970

—Planned AWACS buy reduced to
42

33

37

2

12

6

1971

-Cuban plane at New Orleans

31

33

2

12

6

1972

-SALT (ABM) Treaty

31

27

2

12

6

1973

—Watergate; ADC mission change

31

28

9
L

19
1Z

o

1974

-AWACS buy reduced to 37

31

15

2

1

6

1975

-IBM Study

31

8

2

l

6

1976

-OTH-B cancelled, then restored

31

4

2

l

6

1977

-ADC reorganization planned

31

2

l

6

1978

-Danson-Brown letters lead to
JUSCADS

31

2

l

6

1979

-ADCOM reorganized; AWACS
reduced to 28

31

4

2

l

6

1980-

-PMD change making JSS primary
war C 2

31

7

2

l

6

1981-

-Air Defense Master Plan published

31

7

2

l

6

95

31

152

8

132

48

10

26

5

42

42

86

34

144

8

132

23

2

10

26

5

40

40

92

35

147

g

133

2

g

21

3

39

39

89

35

142

8

129

2

8

21

3

37

37

86

35

137

8

111

2

8

21

3

31

31

68

33

137

8

111

2

8

21

3

28

28

17

30

125

8

94

2

8

21

3

19

19

16

30

93

8

81

2

7

19

3

14

14

30

79

g

75

2

7

19

3

14

14

28

71

8

52

2

7

19

3

11

11

28

71

g

52

2

19

3

9

9

25

75

g

52

19

3

j

7

25

80

8

4

18

3

6

6

24

72

8

4

13

3

6

6

24

72

8

4

10

3

6

6

24

56

8

7

10

3

6

6

24

55

8

7

10

3

6

6

24

46

8

7

10

3

6

6

24 42
24 42

10 3 6 6
10 3 5 5

The Emerging Shield

"as to make those who supported] a capable air defense posture almost
shrug their shoulders and give up with the futility of it all." 42

MAD, in its implications for air defense, was not accepted by the
Soviet Union. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not consid-
er air and missile defense two sides of the same issue.

While the Soviets agreed to an antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty in
1972, they never stopped developing and refining their bomber defenses.
McNamara called the continued buildup of Soviet air defenses "fanati-
cism," best explained by "their strong emotional reaction to the need to
defend Mother Russia." 43 The Secretary of Defense did not believe that
the building of bomber defenses by one side while the other was disman-
tling its contributed to destablization, a process he fervently wished to
avoid.

The pattern established in the 1960s continued into the succeeding
decade. The Air Force failed to evaluate U.S. air defense and ICBM de-
fense independently, although it generally accepted the idea that bomber
defense without ABM defense was worthless. Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger expressed this view during testimony to the Senate in
1974:

Without an effective antimissile defense, precluded to both
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. by the ABM treaty of 1972, a defense
against' Soviet bombers is of little practical value. 44

Air defense, one of the least emphasized defense priorities in the
period of U.S. involvement in the war in Southeast Asia, rarely became
the public issue it had in the past. Occasional incidents occurred to
reveal inadequacies of the air defense and warning systems. On October
5, 1969, a defector from the Cuban Air Force piloted an armed MiG-17
undetected from Havana to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. 45 In Oc-
tober 1971 an unidentified plane carrying Cuban officials to a sugar cane
conference passed completely unseen until the pilot requested landing in-
structions from the New Orleans airport. This second occurrence
prompted a congressional investigation which revealed that deterioration
of the warning systems and active defenses had made the 1,500-mile
southern border between Florida and California practically defenseless.
The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, F. Edward
Hebert, demanded the situation be corrected. In May 1972 Secretary of
Defense Melvin R. Laird established the Southern Air Defense Network
consisting of ten radar sites and interceptors on alert at four bases along
the previously unprotected areas. 46 Although welcomed by ADC, these
additional radar sites fell well short of filling the gaps that had developed
in other approaches to North America.

Throughout the period that air defenses were reduced, the Air
Force protested the cutbacks, pointing out that the Soviet strategic

272

Epilogue

bomber force, while not increasing as had been foreseen in the 1950s,
had remained stable and still posed a threat. Air Force Magazine, a publi-
cation that could be relied upon to represent the Air Force view, con-
tinuously called for air defense improvements. In a July 1970 editorial
describing air defense as "The Forgotten Front" it reported that

it is outstanding that some members of Congress and so
many reporters and commentators have apparently written
off the Soviet bomber threat. Ten years ago, it was regard-
ed seriously. Yet since then, the Soviets haven't reduced
their bomber force much, if at all, while at the same time
the USAF Aerospace Defense Command has been cut to
the bone. It's hard to escape the conclusion that the United
States is more vulnerable to air attack today than it was a
decade ago, when we did worry about it. 47

Despite its concern, the Air Force was reluctant to make air defense
a cause celebre. As much as it wanted an improved defense, the Air
Force believed improvements should come from additions to its funding.
Following a historic pattern, the Air Force showed no willingness to re-
linquish anything in favor of air defense. The Air Staff did not weaken
offensive deterrent forces in the service of air defense; neither did it con-
sider reductions in other missions during the Vietnam conflict.

As the war in Southeast Asia declined, the Air Force reflected on
its approach to air defense in the wake of fifteen years of force reduc-
tions. In 1974 Air Force Chief of Staff General George S. Brown admit-
ted that the continental air defense forces had undergone considerable
transformation: "We are now maintaining an air defense posture to pro-
vide surveillance and warning — this differs from the earlier air defense
posture that was oriented to defending against a manned bomber
attack." 48

The Air Force had begun to move toward the air defense position
described by Brown as early as 1954 with the decision to build the DEW
Line. In earlier years, respective commanders of ADC/NORAD usually
objected to attempts to deemphasize the active defense mission. The shift
was evidenced by comments made by NORAD's commander, General
Lucius Clay, Jr., in February 1974, addressing the issue of Soviet options
for attack using either ICBMs or strategic bombers:

If you leave one open, why not leave the other open ....
For the past twenty years we have subscribed to an equa-
tion that deterrence is the sum of strategic offense and stra-
tegic defense .... Perhaps the equation should now read
deterrence is the sum of strategic offense plus strategic
warning. I think it should. 49

Judging from comments made by its Chief of Staff and commander of
the air defenses, the Air Force in the mid-1970s seemed on the verge of

273

The Emerging Shield

abandoning even the pretense of an active defense capability against the
manned bomber.

Administrative and organizational changes in the late 1970s and
early 1980s reinforced this trend. ADC (known since January 1968 as the
Aerospace Defense Command) gradually lost interceptors, radars, bases,
and personnel to TAC. ADC staff officers argued for the continued sep-
arate existence of a fighter element with its unique expertise and corpo-
rate knowledge in their command. Air Force Headquarters, unable to
countenance the existence of two fighter commands, ordered the creation
of a new subunit of the Tactical Air Command called Air Defense-TAC
(ADTAC) and planned to move it to TAC Headquarters at Langley Air
Force Base, Virginia. ADTAC stayed in Colorado Springs from October
1979 to June 1981. ADC, no longer a major command, retained its status
as a JCS-specified command for U.S. air defense forces. 50

In the early 1980s, several events signaled prospects for the first
major improvements in air defense in more than two decades. First the
Soviets decided to upgrade their strategic bomber force. 51 In addition,
the development in 1983 of President Ronald Reagan administration's
Strategic Defense Initiative focused attention within the Air Force on re-
quirements for both ballistic missile and bomber defense. Said General
Robert T. Herres, head of NORAD in 1985, "It doesn't make any sense
to build a house with a roof over our heads — such as ballistic missile de-
fense — while we forget to put walls around the sides," referring to the
need for bomber defense. 52

Planned improvements in the air defenses included replacing the
1950-era interceptor force with modern F-15 and F-16 fighters, modern-
izing the radar components in the far north and continental United
States, and extending the use of AWACS in home air defense oper-
ations.* The fates of many of these programs remain uncertain. The
future of homeland bomber defense will be decided in the context of

* The Air Force fought long and hard for AWACS, a Boeing E-3 that combined
functions of surveillance, early warning, and command and control. AWACS's predecessor,
the propeller-driven EC-121 Warning Star which saw much service in Southeast Asia, pro-
vided early warning and fighter direction against medium- and high-flying planes, but it
had problems detecting low-flying aircraft over land. Radar returns generated by beams
reflecting off the terrain (ground clutter) made detection of aircraft over land virtually im-
possible. In the early 1960s, however, the Air Force started in earnest to investigate means
to solve this problem. The solution was a radar capable of distinguishing moving objects
from the ground below them by using the doppler effect— the apparent change in frequen-
cy of vibrations, as of sound, light, or radar, when the observed and the observer are
moving relative to one another. According to one Air Staff appraisal, "the radar, not the
airframe, is the critical component in the AWACS program" [Lawrence R. Benson, Sen-
tries Over Europe: First Decade of the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System in Europe
(Office of History, H.Q., U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Feb 1983); Space Command/
ADCOM Hist, 1983].

274

Epilogue

overall U.S. nuclear strategy. That strategy has been overwhelmingly
dominated, with the exception of the years from 1954 to 1960, by con-
cepts of deterrence that emphasize offensive forces. A shift in policy
awarding equal importance to offensive and defensive systems would
mark a fundamental change in U.S. strategy.

275

Appendices

Appendix 1. Milestones in U.S. Air Defense to 1960 *

1921

Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief, Army Air Service, and Brig.
Gen. William Mitchell, Assistant Chief, Army Air Service, declared the
Army air arm should be responsible for frontier and coastal defense.

1922

Civilian scientists working with the Naval Aircraft Radio Laborato-
ry made the first radar observations when they used radio signals to
detect a steamer on the Potomac River.

1925

Scientists at the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., first em-
ployed the pulse-technique of radio signal emissions.

1929

The Air Corps experimented with a rudimentary early-warning net-
work at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

1933

In the wake of a joint Air Corps-Antiaircraft Artillery Corps exer-
cise at Fort Knox, Kentucky, Capt. Claire L. Chennault, Air Corps Tac-
tical School, wrote "The Role of Defensive Pursuit." The paper claimed
that fighters could successfully intercept bombers if equipped with an ef-
fective warning system. The Drum Board discounted the possibility of an
air attack against the United States.

1934

The Baker Board supported the Drum Board's findings.

• Primary source: A Chronology of Air Defense, 1914-1972 (ADC Hist Study 19, 1973).

277

The Emerging Shield

1935

A ground control interception (GCI) system was experimented with
in the United States for the first time in GHQ Air Force exercises con-
ducted in southern Florida.

1936

The Signal Corps performed the first experiments in radar detection.
1937

In GHQ Air Force maneuvers at Muroc Lake, California, military
personnel arranged with the Southern California Edison Company to use
its employees as civilian early warning observers.

1938

A joint Air Corps-Antiaircraft Artillery exercise in North Carolina
involved 302 observation posts— the most extensive early-warning experi-
ments in the United States to that time.

1940

The War Department created Air Defense Command (ADC) under
the command of Brig. Gen. James C. Chaney at Mitchel Field, New
York, to study air defense problems. Assigned to the command as plans
officer was Capt. Gordon Saville.

General Chaney and Captain Saville reported enthusiastically on
British air defenses after returning from an observation trip in England.

1941

A War Department directive gave the peacetime air defense mission
to GHQ Air Force.

Major Saville published the first substantive manual on air defense
doctrine.

When Pearl Harbor was attacked, eight early-warning stations oper-
ated in the United States. Six were in California, one was in Maine, and
one in New Jersey. Most available fighters were P-39s and P-40s, nei-
ther of which possessed target-seeking radar, making them nearly useless
in darkness or bad weather.

278

Appendices

1942

An experimental P-61 interceptor, designed specifically for all-
weather air defense use, made its first flight.

Fifteen early warning radar stations were completed on the west
coast, providing coverage of industrial areas from Maine to Virginia.

1943

The Ground Observer Corps (GOC) reached its peak World War II
strength, with approximately 1.5 million volunteers. Seventy-six radar
stations were fully operational by June.

The first active GCI site was established at Hicksville, Long Island.

The War Department published FM 100-20, "Command and Em-
ployment of Air Power," which stated that the normal composition of an
air force included an air defense command.

1944

The GOC and the Aircraft Warning Corps were inactivated. Fight-
er wings and regions disbanded as the United States deemphasized conti-
nental air defense.

1945

Bell Laboratories received the contract to develop a surface-to-air
missile for air defense. The project was named Nike.

The last U.S. early-warning radar stations were inactivated.

The Army Air Forces (AAF) authorized procurement of P-82s as
all-weather interceptors. Air Materiel Command asked manufacturers to
submit design proposals for a new all-weather interceptor. Proposals led
to the F-89.

1946

Boeing began design studies and field tests on the project that devel-
oped the BOMARC surface-to-air missile.

The AAF awarded a contract to study ballistic missile defense.

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer assumed command of ADC estab-
lished at Mitchel Field, New York.

The Army Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Center activated at Fort
Bliss, Texas.

279

The Emerging Shield

1947

Air Force Chief of Staff General Carl Spaatz approved the Radar
Fence Plan (Plan Supremacy) which called for the construction of an
elaborate air defense radar network.

Headquarters USAF granted ADC the authority to use fighter and
radar forces of the Strategic Air Command, the Tactical Air Command,
and the Air National Guard in an emergency. The Guard constituted the
major source of air defense augmentation units.

1948

The Air Force directed that radars in the northwest be placed on
twenty-four-hour-a-day operations because of international tension
caused by Soviet aggression in eastern Europe.

The Key West agreement formally invested the Air Force with pri-
mary responsibility for the air defense mission.

General Muir S. Fairchild became Air Force Vice Chief of Staff. He
called Maj. Gen. Gordon Saville to Washington to identify air defense
requirements and to take necessary action to begin work on temporary
systems.

Saville presented to Secretary of Defense James Forrestal an interim
plan that provided for the "permanent" air defense network.

The Air Force Board of Officers recommended a design competi-
tion for a new all-weather interceptor to be available in 1954. From this
recommendation came the F-102 and the F-106.

Continental Air Command (CONAC) was created. CONAC was as-
signed all air defense units and given the mission of air defense. General
Stratemeyer became CONAC Commander. ADC remained a planning
agency under General Saville.

1949

Upon Saville's recommendation, the Air Force Board of Officers
recommended development of a single-seat all-weather interceptor, re-
sulting in the F-86D.

Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead succeeded Stratemeyer as CONAC
Commander.

Congress passed Public Law 30 authorizing construction in Alaska
and the continental United States of a radar net costing $85.5 million.

Operation Blackjack, the first major air defense exercise in the
postwar era, took place in the northeast.

Saville was relieved as ADC Commander and transferred to Head-
quarters USAF.

280

Appendices

The first production model of the E-l fire control system was in-
stalled in the F-94A. This was the first postwar improvement over the
wartime SCR-270.

CONAC controlled twenty manned and equipped interceptor squad-
rons. Fifteen possessed jets — F-80s, F-84s, and F-86s — whereas five had
F-82s.

1950

Fairchild and Saville's invitation to electronic firms to submit bids
for a fire control system for the 1954 interceptor marked the beginning
of the weapons systems approach to procurement.

Construction of the Permanent Radar System began.

The Lashup radar network of fourty-four stations was completed.
The network operated with World War II-type equipment until the per-
manent system was constructed.

The Korean War started. Around-the-clock air defense operations
began in United States.

The three services issued regulations establishing Air Defense Identi-
fication Zones.

An agreement between Generals J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, gave Air Force air
defense commanders operational control of Army antiaircraft artillery
units.

The Air Force asked MIT to study the general problem of air de-
fense. Study became Project Charles.
General Fairchild died.

1951

ADC was reestablished. Under General Ennis Whitehead, it moved
from Mitchel AFB to Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado. The
Army's Antiaircraft Artillery Command also moved from Mitchel to
Ent.

The three services agreed to create Project Lincoln, a military-sup-
ported, MIT-managed study of the air defense program.
Project Charles submitted its report.

The United States and Canada ratified an agreement for construc-
tion of the Pinetree radar net in Canada.

Lt. Gen. Benjamin W. Chidlaw succeeded General Whitehead as
ADC commander.

Development of a data link, a method for presenting data on a ra-
darscope instead of through voice communications, began. The system

281

The Emerging Shield

came into use in the semiautomatic ground environment (SAGE) in
1956.

General Saville retired.
1952

Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith became Vice Commander of ADC. He
continued in that position until 1956.

For the first time on the basis of reported "unknowns," ADC de-
clared the command-wide condition Air Defense Readiness.

A group of scientists, representing MIT's Lincoln Laboratory and
other organizations, convened to discuss technical difficulties in air de-
fense. The committee became known as the Summer Study Group.

Operation Skywatch, a twenty-four-hour-a-day operation of the
GOC in selected areas, began.

The Air Force approved a two-base concept for airborne early-
warning and control aircraft, selecting for the bases Otis AFB, Massa-
chusetts, and McClellan AFB, California.

Project East River was completed. Its report concluded that civil
defense was essentially useless without a strong, active air defense.

The Kelly Committee was established to study air defense require-
ments.

President Truman approved a National Security Council statement
calling for strengthened air defenses.

1953

The Joint Air Defense Board of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) con-
cluded that nuclear weapons should be developed for air defense.

The Air Force decided to adopt the Lincoln Transition System,
later designated SAGE.

The Continental Defense Committee, under Maj. Gen. Harold R.
Bull, reported air defense inadequacies.

The National Security Council approved most of the Summer Study
Group's proposals, including its recommendation for the Distant Early-
Warning (DEW) Line.

The first Falcon missile was fired from an airborne platform — the
F-89D.

The Canadian-U.S. Military Study Group recommended establish-
ment of Mid-Canada Line for early warning along the 55th parallel.

General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Admiral
Robert Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, agreed that the Air Force
would provide early-warning aircraft and the Navy would provide
picket ships and lighter-than-air craft for air defense.

282

Appendices

1954

The Air Force approved construction of five Texas Towers (only
three were built).

The JCS agreed to establish a joint service command for air defense,
Continental Air Defense (CONAD).

The JCS approved the use of nuclear warheads in air-to-air rockets.

The Soviet Union displayed a jet bomber for the first time.

The last conventional-type interceptor aircraft was removed from
ADC inventory.

Airborne early-warning operations began off the United States' west
coast.

CONAD activated in Colorado Springs.
1955

The Air Force approved development of the F-101 as an intercep-
tor, designated the F-101B.

The Air Force regular force was, for the first time, completely
equipped with all-weather fighter-interceptors.

MIT's Project Lamplight report recommended that frequency-agil-
ity radars be installed in the air defense system.

ADC submitted the first SAGE operational plan to Headquarters
USAF.

General Chidlaw retired. General Frederic H. Smith served as
acting commander pending arrival of Chidlaw's successor, General Earle
E. Partridge.

The 4620th Air Defense Wing (experimental SAGE) was established
at Lincoln Laboratory. Its primary mission was computer programming.

General Operational Requirement (GOR) 96, A Ballistic Missile De-
tection Support System, outlined the requirement for three northern warn-
ing radar sites capable of detecting and tracking ICBMs launched from
the Soviet Union.

1956

The 327th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at George AFB, California,
received the first F-102A delivered to ADC. The F-102A, while in de-
velopment, was redesignated the F-106.

CONAD and ADC formally separated. General Partridge was re-
lieved as head of CONAD. Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson assumed com-
mand of ADC.

The first airborne test firing of an MB-1 rocket, fired from an F-
89D, occurred at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Also at Holloman, a
GAR-2A (infrared guidance) Falcon missile fired successfully.

283

The Emerging Shield

1957

The first fully automatic tactical launch of BOMARC occurred.
The Atlantic DEW Line sea barrier became fully operational.
ADC assumed control of Tyndall AFB as a weapons employment
center.

The DEW Line from Cape Dyer, Canada, to Cape Lisburne,
Alaska, was declared technically ready.

The Air Force fired its first and only armed air-to-air nuclear de-
fense rocket, the MB-1 Genie, from an F-89J over Yucca Flats, Nevada.

NORAD was established at Ent AFB, Colorado.

In July, the DEW Line was declared technically complete; in
August the Air Force took formal possession of it from Western Elec-
tric, the prime contractor.

The Soviet Union launched Sputnik I.

GOR 156, "Ballistic Missile Defense System," proposed a three-sta-
tion radar complex combined with computing, communications, and dis-
play facilities to generate at least a fifteen-minute warning of a missile
attack.

1958

All twenty-four-hour-a-day-staffed GOC posts and filter centers
were reduced to Ready Reserve status.

The Mid-Canada Line became fully operational.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense authorized the Air Force to
proceed immediately with development of a ballistic missile early-warn-
ing system (BMEWS).

Denmark approved extending the DEW Line into Greenland.

The Air Force approved inactivation of the GOC effective January
1, 1959.

A BOMARC missile successfully launched from Cape Canveral,
Florida, on signal from SAGE Control Center, Kingston, New York.

SAGE Combat Center No. 1, on Hancock Field, New York, 26th
Air Division, became operational.

The U.S. Air Force, in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Air
Force, embarked on a program called Continental Air Defense Integra-
tion, North (CADIN) to integrate U.S. and Canadian air defense sys-
tems.

1959

All ground observer units were discontinued.

Texas Tower No. 4 became operational, completing the Texas
Tower program.

284

Appendices

The Department of Defense Master Air Defense Plan reduced
BOMARC deployment to eighteen sites, two in Canada. Manned inter-
ceptor units dropped to forty-four squadrons.

General Lawrence S. Kuter replaced General Partridge as Com-
mander in Chief of the CONAD and the North American Air Defense
commands.

The Air Force canceled deployment of the F-108 long-range inter-
ceptor.

The 46th Air Defense Missile Squadron on McGuire AFB, New
Jersey — the first BOMARC squadron — became operational.

1960

USAF Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, testifying before
the House Appropriations Committee, agreed with compromise solutions
in the Master Air Defense Plan of 1959 that cut, among other things,
BOMARC and SAGE programs.

BMEWS Site I, at Thule, Greenland, reached initial operational ca-
pability. This was the first operation of the BMEWS system.

The Air Force transition to century series all-weather interceptors
(F-101B, F-102A, and F-106A) was completed.

285

The Emerging Shield

Appendix 2. ADC Assigned Personnel Strength and
Commanders, to 1960

Date

Personnel strength

Officers

/iirrnen

Civilians

1 (Jill I

Mar ~K 1 1 QA.(\

1,546

5,672

NA

NA

Tier "?1 1Q4f»

3,541

22,365

NA

NA

Dpf % 1 1 QAl
UCky J If 1 yH- 1

3,963

25,124

NA

NA

Tim \C\ 1Q48
j uii jv/, lyto

3,857

20,974

7,349

32,180

Tan 1QS1
Jail 1:7.31

3,913

33,713

4,863

42,489

Dec 31, 1951

8,237

56,992

5,874

71,103

-L-'CL/ J 1, 1 7 JZ

7,818

54,137

9,070

71,025

Dec 31, 1953

8,163

57,883

8,519

74,565

Dec 31, 1954

9,641

63,442

9,264

82,347

Dec 31, 1955

10,394

65,711

10,397

86,502

Dec 31, 1956

10,832

77,836

11,817

99,485

Dec 31, 1957

12,908

92,543

11,466

116,917

Dec 31, 1958

13,553

92,042

11,703

117,298

Dec 31, 1959

12,663

83,511

NA

NA

Dec 31, 1960

12,432

79,426

NA

NA

286

Appendices

Appendix 3. ADC Commanders

Name Dates

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer
Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville
Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead
General Benjamin W. Chidlaw
Maj. Gen. Frederic H. Smith
General Earle E. Partridge
Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson

Mar 27, 1946-Nov 30, 1948
Dec 1, 1948-Sep 1949
Jan 8, 1951 -Aug 24, 1951
Aug 25, 1951-May 31, 1955
Jun 1, 1955-July 1955 (acting)
Jul 20, 1955-Sep 16, 1956
Sep 17, 1956-Feb 28, 1961

287

Notes

Chapter 1. Genesis of the Air Defense Mission

1. Basil Collier, A History of Air Power
(New York, 1974), p 7; Denys Volan, "Air
Defense," undated manuscript in AF/CHO;
Ian V. Hogg, Anti-Aircraft: A History of Air
Defence (London, 1978), pp 11-12.

2. F. S. Haydon, Aeronautics in the
Union and Confederate Armies (Baltimore,
1941), passim.

3. John R. Cuneo, Winged Mars: The
German Air Weapon, 1870-1914 (Harris-
burg, Pa., 1942), Vol I, The German Air
Weapon, p 5; Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, pp 13-14.

4. Gavin Hall, "Marshal of the Royal
Air Force, the Viscount Trenchard," in Mi-
chael Carver, ed, The War Lords: Military
Commanders of the Twentieth Century,
(London, 1976), p 179; Sholto Douglass,
Combat and Command: The Story of an
Airman in Two World Wars (New York,
1966), pp 87, 91-92; Richard P. Hallion,
Rise of the Fighter Aircraft, 1914-1918 (An-
napolis, Md., 1984), pp 14-26.

5. Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (New
York, 1962), p 156.

6. Hall, "Viscount Trenchard," pp
180, 187; Harry M. Ransom, "Lord Tren-
chard, Architect of Air Power," The Air-
power Historian 8 (Sep 1956).

7. Alfred Gollin, "Anticipating Air
Attack, in Defence of Great Britain," Aero-
space Historian 23, no. 4 (winter/Dec 1976):
197-201.

8. For example, H. G. Wells, The
War in the Air (London, 1908).

9. Winston Churchill, "Air Defence
Memorandum of 1914," cited in Churchill,
The World Crisis, 1911-1914 (New York,
1928), pp 328-34.

10. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter, p 119.

11. Barry D. Powers, Strategy With-
out Slide-Rule: British Air Strategy, 1914-
1939 (London, 1976), pp 28-30; John
Bushby, Air Defence of Great Britain
(London, 1973), p 22.

12. E. B. Ashmore, Air Defence
(London, 1929), p 11; Hallion, Rise of the
Fighter, p 119.

13. Hogg, Anti-Aircraft, p 52.

14. Bushby, Air Defence of Great Brit-
ain, p 28.

15. Hallion, Rise of the Fighter, p 121.

16. Malcolm Smith, British Air Strate-
gy Between the Wars (Oxford, 1984), p 17.

17. Raymond J. Fredette, The Sky on
Fire: The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918,
and the Birth of the Royal Air Force (New
York, 1976), pp 37-38.

18. Ibid.

19. Ashmore, Air Defence, pp 92-94;
Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule, p 68;
Hallion, Rise of the Fighter, pp 122-25;
Hogg, Anti- Aircraft, pp 53-63.

20. Collier, History of Air Power, pp
70-71; Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule,
p 68.

21. Fredette, Sky on Fire, p 8.

22. Smith, British Air Strategy, p 54;
Ashmore, Air Defence, pp 168-73.

23. Alexander Graham Bell, "Pre-
paredness for Aerial Defense," in Eugene
M. Emme, ed, The Impact of Air Power: Na-
tional Security and World Politics (Princeton,
N.J., 1959), pp 30-33.

24. William Mitchell, Memoirs of
World War I: From Start to Finish of Our
Greatest War (New York, 1960), p 218.

25. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (USAF
Hist Study 139, 1971), pp 44-92.

26. Cited in Alfred F. Hurley, Billy
Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power (Blooming-
ton, Ind., 1975), p 26.

27. Thomas H. Greer, The Develop-
ment of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm,
1917-1941 (USAF Hist Study 89, 1953), pp
33-36. Hurley's Billy Mitchell is the best bi-
ography. See also Isaac D. Levine, Mitchell,
Pioneer of Air Power, rev. ed. (New York,
1972). An outspoken advocate for the
bomber, Mitchell never lost sight of the
need for a balanced air force. He main-
tained that fighters would be needed to
control the skies to ensure successful bom-
bardment.

28. Sherman's early death cost the air
arm the services of one of its most pro-
found theorists, probably at least on the
scale of Mitchell [William C. Sherman, Air
Warfare (New York, 1926)].

29. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
pp 28-29.

289

The Emerging Shield

30. Wesley Frank Craven and James
Lea Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in
World War II [hereafter cited as AAF in
WW II] (Chicago, 1948; Washington, D.C.,
1983), Vol I, Plans and Early Operations:
January 1939 to August 1942, p 62.

31. Ibid.; Martin Claussen, "Alleged
100-Mile Limitation in Army Aviation in
Coast Defense, 1931-1939," undated manu-
script in USAFHRC.

32. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol I, p 62.

33. Annual Report of the Chief of the
Air Corps, Aug 17, 1934.

34. Final Report of the War Depart-
ment Special Committee on Army Air Corps
(Washington, D.C., Jul 18, 1934) [hereafter
cited as Baker Board], p 15. The best ap-
praisal of the Air Corps' role in coast de-
fense is John F. Shiner's Foulois and the
U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 [(Washing-
ton, D.C., 1983), esp pp 54-56, 228, 262-
63].

35. Baker Board, p 15; Ltr, AGO to
CG, First Army, subj: Antiaircraft Defense
of the Continental U.S. [n.d.], USAFHRC
microfilm.

36. The Joint Board, Joint Action of the
Army and Navy (Washington, D.C., 1935);
Alan Bliss, "Air Defense of the Continental
United States, 1935-1942" [hereafter cited
as "Continental Air Defense"], draft manu-
script in AF/CHO, ch II, pp 60-81; see also
Shiner, Foulois, pp 54-56, 228, 262-63.

37. Baker Board, p 15; Shiner, Foulois,
pp 54-56, 228, 262-63; Ltr, AGO to CG
[n.d.].

38. Raymond Richard Flugel,
"United States Air Power Doctrine: A
Study of the Influence of William Mitchell
and Giulio Douhet at the Air Corps Tacti-
cal School, 1921-1935" (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Oklahoma, 1965); Robert T.
Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical
School, 1920-1940 (USAF Hist Study 100,
1955), p 27; Perry M. Smith, "Douhet and
Mitchell: Some Reappraisals," Air University
Review 18 (Sep-Oct 1967): 97-101. Histori-
ans differ on the extent of Douhet's influ-
ence in ACTS. Although few Air Corps of-
ficers apparently read Douhet's works, most
were familiar with his ideas.

39. Giulio Douhet, The Command of
the Air, translated by Dino Ferrari and
edited by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P.
Harahan (New York, 1942; Washington,
D.C., 1983), esp "Book Two: The Probable
Aspects of the War of the Future," pp 143-
208, 235-43; Edward Warner, "Douhet,

Mitchell, Seversky: Theorists of Air War-
fare," in Edward Mead Earle, ed, Makers of
Modern Strategy: Military Thought from
Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, N.J., 1943),
p 485; Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Mis-
sile Age (Princeton, N.J., 1959), p 85.

40. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol I, p 58.

41. Lloyd S. Jones, U.S. Fighters
(Fallbrook, Calif., 1975), pp 68-70.

42. Ibid.

43. Irving Brinton Holley, Jr., Buying
Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army
Air Forces (Washington, D.C., 1964), p 20;
Martin P. Claussen, Comparative History of
Research and Development Policies Affecting
Air Materiel, 1915-1944 (USAF Hist Study
20, 1945).

44. Technical advances in commercial
and military aircraft in the period can be
followed in Ronald E. Miller and David
Sawers's The Technical Development of
Modern Aviation (New York, 1970), Roger
E. Bilstein's Flight in America, 1900-1983:
From the Wrights to the Astronauts (Balti-
more, 1984), Thomas Foxworth's The Speed
Seekers (New York, 1976), Douglas J. In-
gell's The Plane That Changed the World: A
Biography of the DC-3 (Fallbrook, Calif.,
1966), and Kenneth G. Munson's Airliners
Between the Wars, 1919-1939 (New York,
1972) and his Bombers Between the Wars,
1919-1939 (New York, 1970).

45. Robert F. Futrell, "Commentary,"
in Lt Col William Geffen, ed, Command
and Commanders in Modern Warfare (Pro-
ceedings of the Second Military History
Symposium, USAF Academy, May 23,
1968) (Washington, D.C., 1969), p 278.

46. Finney, History of the Tactical
School, pp 31-32.

47. The Coast Artillery Journal 80
(1930): 299-301.

48. Capt Claire L. Chennault, "The
Role of Defensive Pursuit," 1933, copy in
AF/CHO, pp 24-29.

49. Rept, Lt Col H. H. Arnold to
Brig Gen B. D. Foulois, March Field Exer-
cises, Nov 26, 1934, AAF Central Decimal
Files, 1917-1938, Bulky File 321.9 Box 485,
RG 18, NA.

50. Jones, U.S. Fighters, pp 85-99.

51. Mike Spick, Fighter Pilot Tactics:
The Techniques of Daylight Air Combat
(New York, 1983), p 41.

52. Capt John R. Lovell, "Antiair-
craft Preparedness," The Coast Artillery
Journal 82 (Jul-Aug 1939): 340.

290

Notes

53. Intvw, Thomas A. Sturm with
Maj Gen Gordon P. Saville (USAF, ret),
Sun City, Ariz., Mar 26-30, 1973; Biographi-
cal Study of USAF General Officers, 1917-
1952, (USAF Hist Study 91, 1953); Kenneth
Schaffel, "A Minority of One: Major Gen-
eral Gordon P. Saville," American Aviation
Historical Society Journal 32, no. 2 (summer
1987):104-09.

54. "Selfridge Planes Return from
Miami," Air Corps News Letter [hereafter
cited as ACNL] 19 (Jan 1, 1936): 15; unti-
tled news item on Lt Col Ralph Royce,
ACNL 19 (Jan 1, 1936), 22; "The GHQ Air
Force Concentration in Florida," ACNL 19
(Jan 15, 1936), 11-15; "Barksdale Field Per-
sonnel in Florida Maneuvers," ACNL 19
(Jan 15, 1936), 22; "The Work of the 59th
Service Squadron in the Florida Maneu-
vers," ACNL 19 (Feb 1, 1936), 19-22.

55. Saville intvw; Brig Gen Henry C.
Pratt, "Comments on G.H.Q. Air Force
Exercise, December 12, 1935," in Confer-
ence rept on the Florida maneuvers, Dec
12-13, 1935, HQ AFCC, 1935-1942, Re-
ports, Studies, Manuals, AG Section, Box 8,
Entry 248, RG 18, NA; Thomas A. Sturm,
"Henry Conger Pratt: First Air Corps Per-
manent General Officer," Aerospace Histori-
an 22 (Jun 1975): 22.

56. Pratt, "Comments on G.H.Q. Air
Force Exercise."

57. Maj Gen Gordon P. Saville,
Comments on "The GHQ Air Force Con-
centration in Florida" [ca. Apr 1, 1973].

58. Bliss, "Continental Air Defense,"
ch 2, pp 15-16.

59. Final Rept, Joint Antiaircraft-Air
Corps Exercises, Fort Bragg, N.C., 1938,
Anx 2, "Pursuit Aviation," Box 1, RG 18,
NA; Col J. B. Bennett, "The Joint AA-Air
Corps Exercise," The Coast Artillery Jour-
nal, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1938): 442-46. In 1940
approximately 1 of every 2,500 artillery
shots would hit an aircraft. World War II
meant increased funding for antiaircraft ar-
tillery, and research and development pro-

duced superior guns, fire control, and track-
ing devices [Constance McLaughlin Green,
Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots,
The Ordnance Department: Planning Muni-
tions for War (Washington, D.C., 1955), pp
401-21]. For a brief historical overview of
the organization of Coast Artillery and its
evolving mission, see Larry H. Addington's
"The U.S. Coast Artillery and the Problem
of Artillery Organization, 1907-1954" [Mili-
tary Affairs 40, no. 1 (1976): 1-6].

60. Maj Muir S. Fairchild, "Foreign
Developments in Antiaircraft Defense"
(Lecture at ACTS), Nov 8, 1939, Fairchild
Papers, Box 5, LC.

61. Bliss, "Continental Air Defense,"
ch 2, pp 15-16.

62. Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,
"The Historical Perspective of Air Power"
(Lecture at Air Command and General
Staff College), 1976, USAFHRC microfilm.

63. Ltr, Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews,
CG, GHQ Air Force, to AG, subj: Report
of Annual Tactical Inspection, G.H.Q. Air
Force (May 12-18, 1938), Sep 29, 1938,
USAFHRC microfilm.

64. Memo, Lt Col Carl A. Spaatz,
Air Corps Plans Branch, to CAC, subj:
Aviation in National Defense, Mar 30, 1939,
AAF Central Decimal Files, 1939-1942,
Bulky File 334.7, RG 18, NA.

65. Memo, Maj Gen H. H. Arnold,
CAC, to Maj Gen Delos C. Emmons, CG,
GHQ Air Force, subj: Pursuit Training and
Pursuit Plane Tactical Development, Nov
14, 1939, quoted in Bernard L. Boylan, De-
velopment of the Long-Range Escort Fighter
(USAF Hist Study 136, 1955), pp 30, 255 n.
119.

66. Hearings before the Committee on
Military Affairs, House of Representatives,
Air Defense Base Hearings, 74th Cong, 1st
sess (Washington, D.C., 1935), p 55; Victor
B. Anthony, "Congress and the Concept of
Strategic Aerial Warfare, 1919-1939" (M.A.
thesis, Duke University, 1964), p 127.

Chapter 2. Air Defense in World War II

1. J. D. Scott, "The Development of
Radar," in M. M. Postan, et al, eds, Design
and Development of Weapons: Studies in Gov-
ernment and Industrial Organization
(London, 1964), part 3, ch 15, pp 373-74;
Robert M. Page, The Origins of Radar
(Garden City, N.Y., 1962); Ronald W.

Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London,
1962); Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1965); Sir Robert Watson-
Watt, Three Steps to Victory (London, 1957).

2. Scott, "Development of Radar";
Page, Origins of Radar; Clark, Rise of the
Boffins; Clark, Tizard; Watson-Watt, Three

291

The Emerging Shield

Steps to Victory. Accessible explanations of
how radar systems work are in Lt Col John
B. McKinney's "Radar: A Case History of
an Invention" (Term report, Research
Center in Technological Innovation, Har-
vard Business School, Jan 16, 1961).

3. Scott, "Development of Radar";
Page, Origins of Radar; Clark, Rise of the
Boffins; Clark, Tizard; Watson- Watt, Three
Steps to Victory; McKinney, "Radar: Case
History of an Invention."

4. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of
Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Ger-
many Between Two World Wars (Ithaca,
1984), pp 160-78.

5. Robert W. Ackerman, "The Use of
Radio and Radar Equipment by the AAF,
1939-1945," May 1949, USAFHRC micro-
film; Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The
Emergency (to December 1941) (Washington,
D.C., 1956), pp 35-38; Futrell, Ideas, Con-
cepts, Doctrine, p 54; David Kite Allison,
New Eye for the Navy: The Origin of Radar
at the Naval Research Laboratory (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1981).

6. Maj F. W. Hopkins, "Foreign De-
velopments in Antiaircraft Defense" (Lec-
ture at ACTS), ca. 1939, Papers of Lt Col
Fenton C. Epling, Entry 273, RG 18, NA.

7. Haywood S. Hansell, "Pre-World
War II Evaluation of the Air Weapon"
(Lecture at Air War College), Nov 16,
1953, cited in Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doc-
trine, p 54.

8. Ltr, Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild to
Dr. Bruce Hopper, Sep 26, 1946, Fairchild
Collection, USAFHRC microfilm.

9. Saville intvw; Biographical Study,
General Officers.

10. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, Men and Planes, p 84; Saville
intvw.

11. Saville intvw. An Air Corps study
conducted in August 1939, however, con-
cluded that an air attack against either the
east or west coast was extremely unlikely
[War Plans Division Rept, WPD-4078-11,
Guiding Principles for Study of Basic AA
Requirements for Installations and Metro-
politan Areas in the U.S., Aug 1939, Env
23, RG 18, NA].

12. Craven and Cate, AAF in WWII,
Vol VI, p 84; Saville intvw.

13. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940;
Saville intvw.

14. Ltr, AG to CG of Armies, Corps
Areas, and Departments et al, subj: Cre-
ation of Air Defense Command, Feb 26,
1940; Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940, App

8; Biographical Study, General Officers; Sa-
ville intvw.

15. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940.

16. Ibid.

17. Terrett, Signal Corps: Emergency,
p 125; "Outline of Continental U.S. Air De-
fense in World War II" (ADC Comd Hist,
1945).

18. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940,
App I; Ltr, ADC to CG, First Army Air-
craft Warning Service, CONUS, May 23,
1940.

19. Saville intvw.

20. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940.

21. Ibid, App II; Brig Gen J. E.
Chaney, "Final Report on Participation in
First Army Maneuvers," Aug 26, 1940,
Fiscal Env, Entry 273, RG 18, NA.

22. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940,
App II; Chaney, "Final Report."

23. Clark, Tizard, pp 248-71.

24. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission
(New York, 1949), p 219.

25. Rept, ADC Comdrs, Observations
on Trip to England, Dec 15, 1940, Env 23,
Box 4, Entry 245, RG 18, NA; Saville
intvw.

26. Rept ADC Comdrs, Dec 15, 1940;
Saville intvw.

27. Terrett, Signal Corps: Emergency,
pp 151-74.

28. Saville intvw; Hist, ADC, Feb
26-Jun 2, 1940.

29. Rept, Air Defense Exercise in the
Test Sector, Jan 21-24, 1941, Box 5, Entry
270, RG 18, NA (copy also in Box 185,
Entry 293B, RG 18, NA).

30. "Conclusions," in Air Defense
Exercise rept.

31. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol I, p 151.

32. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert
R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organiza-
tion of Ground Combat Troops (Washington,
D.C., 1947), pp 150-51.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid, p 117.

35. WD Order, Mar 17, 1941, cited in
ibid, pp 117-18, 122.

36. Memo, Maj Gen William Bryden,
DCS, to AC/S, WPD, subj: Defense Com-
mands and Air Defense Set-up, Feb 28,
1941; AG320.2, subj: Air Defense, Mar 7,
1941, both in AG Central Decimal Files,
RG 407, NA.

37. "Defense Plans and Operations in
the Fourth Air Force Through 1941" (4AF
Hist Study), Vol I, p 7, USAFHRC micro-
film.

292

Notes

38. Hist, ADC, Feb 26-Jun 2, 1940.

39. Bliss, "Continental Air Defense,"
ch 2, pp 81-82, and ch 3, p 1; Col Craw-
ford, Air Defense Records, Entries 269-75,
RG 18, NA.

40. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, p 87.

41. Emmons was not happy about the
new name for his command. He feared his
relief as Commanding General, Air Force
Combat Command, would prevent his serv-
ing the full four-year tour as Commanding
General, GHQ Air Force, prescribed by
statute for retirement in his temporary
three-star grade [Ltr, Lt Gen Delos C.
Emmons to CAC, Jun 24, 1941, Chief of
the Air Corps and Adjutant General
Folder, Box 3, Entry 241A, RG 18, NA],

42. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, p 771.

43. Hist, ADC, 1940-1941; Ltr, GHQ
Air Force to AG, subj: Inactivation of
Headquarters and Headquarters Detach-
ment, ADC, Jun 2, 1941.

44. Terrett, Signal Corps: Emergency,
p 270.

45. Ibid, pp 286-92; George Raynor
Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M.
Oakes, and Dulaney Terrett, The Signal
Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July
1943) (Washington, D.C., 1957), pp 23-24,
54.

46. Richard F. McMullen, Aircraft in
Air Defense, 1946-1960 (ADC Hist Study
12, 1960).

47. "Defense Plans and Operations"
(4AF Hist Study), Vol I, pp 125-27; Bliss,
"Continental Air Defense," ch 3, pp 98-
112.

48. Gordon P. Saville, "Air Defense
Doctrine" (Draft manual), Oct 27, 1941,
AAF Central Decimal Files, 1939-1942,
Bulky Box 181, Entry 293B, RG 18, NA.
This manuscript was eventually published
as FM 1-25, Air Defense, Dec 24, 1942.

49. Ltr, Lt Gen H. H. Arnold to Col
William E. Kepner, subj: Directive for
Board of Officers on the Study of Air De-
fense Problems, Oct 30, 1940, Box 183,
Entry 293B, RG 18, NA.

50. Saville, "Air Defense Doctrine."
See also FM 1-25, Dec 24, 1942.

51. Saville, "Air Defense Doctrine";
FM 1-25, Dec. 24, 1942; Saville intv;
Gordon P. Saville, "Orientation Concerning
Controlled Interception" (Lecture), in doc-
ument volume, "History of Fighter Com-
mand School, March 28-November 5,
1942"; "Air Force Antiaircraft Defense"

(ACTS text), Oct 15, 1938, pp 13-14, Box
2, Entry 248, RG 18, NA.

52. Maj Gen Kenneth P. Bergquist
(Historical documentation), Oct 1965, copy
in AF/CHO.

53. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We
Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor
(New York, 1981), pp 499-501.

54. Bergquist documentation; Col
Flint O. DuPre, U.S. Air Force Biographical
Dictionary (New York, 1965), p 17.

55. Intvw, Hugh N. Ahmann and
Thomas A. Sturm with Maj Gen Howard
C. Davidson, Tulip Hill, Md, Dec 5-8,
1974, p 442.

56. Prange, At Dawn We Slept, pp
730-31.

57. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol I, p 198. See also Roberta Wohlstetter,
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stan-
ford, Calif., 1962); Stetson Conn, Rose C.
Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding
the United States and Its Outposts (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1964), pp 174-96; Richard K.
Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense
Planning (Washington, D.C., 1982), pp 42-
50. In the Philippines, 7 radar sets were
available in the islands but only 2 were in
operation at the time of the attack. As was
the case in Hawaii, there was no way of
telling friend from foe. Providing air de-
fense in the Philippines were 107 P-40E
fighters and 16 obsolete P-26As and 52 P-
35As. On duty in Hawaii were 138 P-40Bs,
P-40Cs, and P-40Es along with 14 P-36A
fighters. Details of the air defense situation
in the Philippines are given in Louis Mor-
ton's The Fall of the Philippines [(Washing-
ton, D.C., 1953), pp 37-45].

58. Immediately after Pearl Harbor,
and for a few months thereafter, tensions
ran high as major American cities on the
east and west coasts readied (with blackouts
in such unlikely targets as Kansas) for
enemy air attacks. Some often chaotic situa-
tions resulted when false alerts were report-
ed. Perhaps the extreme example of phan-
tom attack was the so-called Battle of Los
Angeles that occurred during the night of
February 24-25, 1942. Faulty information
and disorganized reporting procedures led
many panicky citizens and military forces
to believe the city was being attacked by
bombers. Antiaircraft artillery was expend-
ed at the rate of 1,440 rounds on reported
sightings of enemy aircraft. Reports indicat-
ed that four enemy planes had been
downed; one was said to have landed in
flames in a Hollywood intersection [Craven

293

The Emerging Shield

and Cate, AAF in WW II, Vol I, pp 283-
84],

59. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol I, p 42, and Vol VI, pp 78-79.

60. Ibid.; Memo, Arnold [ca. Dec 10,
1941]. (Arnold wrote the memo before
Marshall activated theaters of operation on
the east and west coasts.)

61. Ltr, Maj Gen M. F. Harmon to
Lt Gen H. H. Arnold, subj: Change of Mis-
sion of Air Force Combat Command, Dec
23, 1941, Chief of AAF (DC/S for Air)
Folder, Box 4, Entry 241 A, RG 18, NA.
(Harmon personally delivered the letter to
Arnold.)

62. Conn et al, Guarding the United
States, pp 35-36.

63. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, pp 92-93; Bliss, "Continental Air
Defense," ch 6, pp 55-56.

64. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, pp 26-30.

65. Saville intvw.

66. Rept, R. A. Watson-Watt, Report
on the Air Defense System of the Pacific
Coast of the United States, Jan 1942, H. H.
Arnold Papers, Box 1 12, LC.

67. Saville intvw.

68. Conn et al, Guarding the United
States, pp 26-44, 80-105.

69. Ltr, AG to CG, AAF, and
Comdr, 3AF, subj: Establishment of the
Fighter Command School, USAFHRC
microfilm; Craven and Cate, AAF in WW
II, Vol VI, pp 72-74.

70. Ltr, Lt Gen H. H. Arnold, CG,
AAF, to All Volunteers, Aircraft Warning
Service, Sep 24, 1943, USAFHRC micro-
film; Intvw, Dr. Murray Green with Maj
Gen Barney M. Giles, San Antonio, Tex.,
May 12-13, 1970, transcript in AF/CHO

(Giles was Chief of the Air Staff under Gen
Arnold).

71. Air Defense Wing Folder, AAF-
CDF 1939-1942, Box 651, RG 18, NA; Sa-
ville intvw.

72. Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II,
Vol VI, pp 92-94; Saville intvw.

73. Memo, Maj Gen Follet Bradley,
Air Inspector, to Arnold, subj: Proposed
Decrease in Air Defense Establishments,
Apr 2, 1943, AAF-CDF Oct 1942-May
1944, 322, Observations-Miscellaneous, RG
18, NA.

74. Note, Gen Arnold to Col Jacob
E. Smart, Apr 5, 1943, AAF-CDF 1942-
1944, 322, Observations-Miscellaneous, RG
18, NA (Smart was a member of the Advi-
sory Council to the CG, AAF).

75. Memo, Maj Gen Barney M. Giles,
C/AS, to C/S, subj: Elimination of Practice
Air Raid Alerts, Dec 15, 1943, with at-
tached report by the Joint Intelligence
Staff, AAF-CDF 1939-1942, 384, 5B,
Aerial Attacks and Raids, RG 18, NA.

76. Robert C. Mikesh, Balloon Bomb
Attacks on North America: Japan's World
War II Assaults (Fallbrook, Calif., 1982);
Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II, Vol VI,
pp 116-18.

77. Intvw, Thomas A. Sturm and Dr.
Murray Green with Brig Gen Hume Pea-
body, Chaptico, Md., Nov 16, 1972; Joseph
R. Reither, The Development of Tactical
Doctrines at AAFSAT and AAFTAC (USAF
Hist Study 13, 1944).

78. Clement L. Grant, AAF Air De-
fense Activities in the Mediterranean, 1942-20
September, 1944 (USAF Hist Study 66,
1954), pp 50-52; Richard H. Kohn and
Joseph P. Harahan, eds, Condensed Analysis
of the Ninth Air Force in the European Thea-
ter of Operations (Washington, D.C., 1946;
1984), pp 76-79.

Chapter 3. Planning for Air

1. WD FM 100-20, Command and
Employment of Air Power, Jul 21, 1943;
Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II, Vol VII,
Services Around the World, pp 548-54.

2. Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Or-
ganizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947
(Washington, D.C., 1984), pp 46-47, 50-51,
100-103; Perry M. Smith, The Air Force
Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore and
London, 1970), pp 5-14.

Defense in the Postwar Era

3. George R. Thompson and Dixie R.
Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (mid-
1943 Through 1945) (Washington, D.C.,
1966), pp 449-57.

4. Maj Gen Francis L. Ankenbrandt,
Presentation at USAF Commanders' Confer-
ence, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Dec 6-8, 1948,
transcript in "Operation Dualism," Vol III,
pp 384-85, USAFHRC.

294

Notes

5. WD FM 100-20, Jul 21, 1943;
Craven and Cate, AAF in WW II, Vol VIl'
pp 548-54.

6. Ltr, Lt Gen Carl A. Spaatz to Gen
H. H. Arnold, Dec 3, 1944, Spaatz Papers,
Box 58, LC.

7. Memo, Maj Gen H. R. Oldfield,
AAF Sp Asst for AAA, subj: Assignment
of Antiaircraft Units to the Air Forces in
Defense of the Philippine Islands, May 30,
1945, cited in Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doc-
trine, pp 102, 447 n. 48.

8. Ltr, Gen H. H. Arnold to WDGS,
subj: Integration of the AAA into the
AAF, Aug 4, 1945, A AG Central Decimal
File 381, Box 189, RG 18, NA; Chase C.
Mooney and Edward C. Williamson, Orga-
nization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1945
(USAF Hist Study 10, 1956), pp 55-56.

9. Memo, Lt Gen Barney M. Giles,
Dep Comdr and C/AS, to Air Staff, subj:
Principles for Future AAF Action, Jan 28,
1945, cited in Hist, Continental Air Forces,
Dec 15, 1944-Mar 21, 1946.

10. Ltr, Arnold to WDGS, Aug 4,
1945; Mooney and Williamson, Organization
of the Army Air Arm, pp 55-56.

11. Routing and Referral Slip, Maj
Gen Earle E. Partridge, AC/AS-3, to AC/
AS-5, subj: AAF Policy As to the Organi-
zation of AAA If Integrated into the AAF,
Feb 1, 1946. The incumbent of the Air Staff
post referred to by Partridge would serve
as "a friend at court who would look after
... the interests of the AA" [Partridge
Collection, USAFHRC].

12. Intvw, Col George S. Walborn
with Lt Gen Harold W. Grant, 1959, tran-
script in AF/CHO.

13. AAF 20-9, Activation of HQ
Continental Air Forces, Dec 16, 1944; Hist,
Continental Air Forces, Dec 15, 1944-Mar
21, 1946. In effect, Arnold returned to the
organizational structure he had discarded in
early 1942 when he abolished the Air Force
Combat Command (formerly GHQ Air
Force).

14. Intvw, T. A. Sturm and H. S.
Wolk with Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Washing-
ton, D.C., Nov 27, 1972.

15. Ltr, Maj Gen Samuel E. Ander-
son, C/S, CAF, to CG, AAF, subj: Interim
Air Force, Jun 20, 1945, USAFHRC.

16. Memo, Maj Gen L. S. Kuter to
Gen H. H. Arnold, subj: Status of Plans for
the Postwar Air Force, Jan 17, 1945, A AG
Central File, Box 189, RG 18, NA.

17. Eaker intvw.

18. Rept, Special War Department
Committee on the Permanent Military Es-

tablishment (Bessell Committee), subj: Inter-
im Plan for the Permanent Military Estab-
lishment of the United States, Sep 1945.

19. Ray S. Cline, The War Depart-
ment, Washington Command Post: The Oper-
ations Division (Washington, D.C., 1951) p
353.

20. Memo, Col Joseph J. Ladd, Ch,
Org Div, to Lt Gen H. S. Vandenberg,
AC/AS-3, HQ AAF, subj: Bessell Commit-
tee Recommends 165,000 Post War AAF
Troop Basis, Nov 7, 1945, USAFHRC.

21. MR, Col Jacob E. Smart, S/AS,
subj: Decision Reached at Staff Meeting in
Gen Eaker's Office, Aug 29, 1945, cited in
Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p 458 n.
58; Eaker intvw; Wolk, Planning the Post-
war Air Force, pp 101-02; Intvw, T. A.
Sturm with Gen Jacob E. Smart, Washing-
ton, D.C., Feb 16, 1973.

22. Memo, Brig Gen Glen C. Ja-
mison, Dep AC/AS-5, to Maj Gen Lauris
Norstad, subj: The Simpson Board Recom-
mendation for the Reorganization of the
War Department, May 3, 1946 [the Patch
Board had become the Simpson Board];
Memo, Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes, Asst
DC/S, to WD, subj: Statement of Ap-
proved Policies to Effect Increased Auton-
omy of the AAF Within the War Depart-
ment Structure, Apr 4, 1946; Cline, Wash-
ington Command Post, pp 353-56.

23. Intvw, William R. Perretto with
Lt Gen Barney M. Giles, San Antonio,
Tex., Oct 1966, copy of transcript in AF/
CHO.

24. Rept, Board of Officers on Orga-
nization of the War Department (Patch
Board), Dec 28, 1945.

25. Memo, Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes,
Asst DC/S, to WD Agencies, Jan 23, 1946.

26. Giles intvw.

27. WD Cir 138, Reorganization of
the War Department, May 14, 1946; Hist,
ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947; Cline, Washing-
ton Command Post, p 359.

28. ADC was constituted March 21,

1946, activated March 27, and organized ef-
fective May 1 [Hist, ADC, Mar 1946-Jun

1947, with appended supporting document
HQ ADC GO 1, Mar 27, 1946]. On March
31 ADC had a personnel strength of ap-
proximately 7,000 compared to 26,000 for
TAC and 84,231 for SAC.

29. WD AG 322, Establishment of
Air Defense Strategic Air and Tactical Air
Commands, Redesignation of HQ Continen-
tal Air Command, Mar 21, 1946.

295

The Emerging Shield

30. DuPre, Biographical Dictionary, pp
225-26; Biographical Study, General Officers.

31. Ltr, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG,
AAF, to CG, ADC, subj: Interim Mission,
Mar 12, 1946; Ltr, Maj Gen C. C. Chaun-
cey, DC/AS, to CG, ADC, subj: Interim
Mission, Jun 5, 1946; Ltr, HQ ADC to CG,
AAF, subj: Mission of ADC, Jul 31, 1946;
Ltr, Lt Gen George E. Stratemeyer, CG,
ADC, to Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep Comdr,
AAF, subj: Mission of ADC, Nov 13, 1946,
all in USAFHRC.

32. Intvw, Alfred Goldberg with Gen
Carl A. Spaatz, Washington ,D.C, 1945.

33. Hist, ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947.

34. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Lt Gen Ennis
C. Whitehead, Mar 21, 1946; Memo, Stuart
Symington, Asst SecWar/Air, to Spaatz,
Aug 10, 1946; Memo, Spaatz to Symington,
Aug 14, 1946, all in Spaatz Papers, Box 126,
LC. See also the Stratemeyer speech to the
Aviation Writer's Association [New York
Times, Jul 11, 1946] in which he said that
the AAF could not "push our way out of a
wet paper bag." Symington was upset be-
cause he feared such remarks would hurt
efforts to create an independent Air Force.
Spaatz counseled Stratemeyer that "our
public relations emphasis must be on the
rate of buildup and our eventual plans for
the future."

35. Lt Gen Eaker, "The AAF: Its
Status, Plans, and Policies" (Remarks made
while representing Gen Spaatz at the Na-
tional War College), Jun 5, 1947, transcript
in USAFHRC.

36. Memo, Lt Gen Eaker to Gen
Spaatz, subj: Fighter Group for ADC, Jul
19, 1946, Spaatz Papers, Box 262, LC.

37. Air Intel Rept 100-45-34, An
Analysis of the Soviet Air Force, Jun 1946,
Spaatz Papers, Box 21, LC.

38. Ibid.; Joseph B. Mastro, "The
Lessons of World War II and the Cold
War," in Robin Higham and Jacob W.
Kipp, eds, Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A
Historical View (Boulder, Colo., 1977), p
197.

39. John C. Baker, "The Long-Range
Bomber in Soviet Military Planning," and
Norman Friedman, "The Soviet Bomber
Force: Two Revolutions in Military Af-
fairs," in Paul J. Murphy, ed, The Soviet Air
Forces (London, 1984), pp 177-87 and 157-
76, respectively.

40. Ibid.

41. Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air
Force Since 1918 (New York, 1977), pp 215-
16.

42. Stuart Symington, "We've Scut-
tled Our Air Defense," American Magazine
45, no. 2 (Feb 1948): 56.

43. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to All Com-
mands, subj: Current AAF Plans and Pro-
grams, Oct 24, 1946, Spaatz Papers, Box
262, LC.

44. Memo, Col Charles R. Bond,
AC/AS-3, to Air Staff, Mar 12, 1946,
AAG Central File 322, Box 605, RG 18,
NA. (This memo summarizes Air Staff
planning begun in early February on direc-
tion of General Eaker.)

45. Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Re-
lations Between the United States and
Canada: 1939-1945 (Washington, D.C.,
1959), p 336. The committee was estab-
lished in Feb 1946, composed of representa-
tives of service departments, the Depart-
ments of State and External Affairs, and the
Secretary of the Canadian Defence Com-
mittee.

46. Gen Spaatz, Presentation at War
Council meeting in OSW, Feb 21, 1946,
Spaatz Papers, Box 25, LC.

47. Ltr, HQ ADC to Numbered AF
Comdrs, Jul 18, 1946, USAFHRC.

48. Memo,""Ch, GMs and Air Def
Div, to AC/AS-3, HQ AAF, subj: Status of
Air Defense, Jan 15, 1947, USAFHRC.

49. Ibid.

50. Hist, 1AF, Mar-Dec 1947.

51. Hist, 4AF, Jan- Jun 1947.

52. Hist, 505th Aircraft Control and
Warning Gp, Jul-Dec 1947.

53. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Lt Gen Strate-
meyer, subj: Interim Mission, Mar 12, 1946,
USAFHRC.

54. Spaatz, Testimony in House Hear-
ings on the Military Establishment Appropria-
tions Bill for Fiscal Year 1947, p 414.

55. Ltr, Lt Gen Eaker on behalf of
Gen Spaatz to CG, ADC, subj: Investment
of Command Responsibilities of the Land,
Sea, and Air Forces in Event of Air Inva-
sion, USAFHRC. On the Guard's role in
air defense, see Charles Joseph Gross's Prel-
ude to the Total Force: The Air National
Guard, 1943-1969 (Washington, D.C., 1985)
[hereafter cited as Air National Guard],
Richard F. McMullen's The Air National
Guard in Air Defense, 1946-1971 (ADC Hist
Study 38, 1971), and Thomas W. Ray's The
Air National Guard Manned Interceptor
Force, 1946-1964 (ADC Hist Study 23,
1964).

56. Ltr, Eaker to CG, ADC.

57. Ibid.; Gross, Air National Guard;
McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy,

296

Notes

McMullen, Air National Guard in Air De-
fense; Ray, Air National Guard Manned In-
terceptor Force.

58. HQ ADC A-5, Presentation at
AF Comdrs meeting, Brooks Field, Tex.,
Mar 11, 1947, USAFHRC microfilm.

59. HQ AAF issued new mission
statements to SAC and TAC on Oct 10,
1946, replacing the interim statements of
Mar 1946. Spaatz recognized that Strate-
meyer also wanted to have an updated and
more comprehensive statement of the ADC
mission, but he felt that "in view of present
budget discussions and the possibility of
some reorganization in the near future, it
would be the better course to withhold
action at this time" [Ltr, Spaatz to Strate-
meyer, Mar 14, 1947, USAFHRC micro-
film]. The U.S. stockpile included only 13
nuclear weapons in Jul 1947 and 50 in 1948.
These weapons were large and heavy, and
none were assembled [David A. Rosenberg,
"The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons
and American Strategy, 1945-1960," Inter-
national Security 7 (spring 1983), p 14].

60. Hist, ADC, Mar 1946-Jun 1947.

61. HQ ADC, Plan for the Air De-
fense of the Continental U.S. (Short Term)
Oct 18, 1946, USAFHRC microfilm.

62. Memo, Col Jacob E. Smart, Dep.
Ops ADC, subj: Summary of Actions to
Effect Establishment of Air Defense of the
United States, Jun 16, 1949, Whitehead Col-
lection, USAFHRC microfilm.

63. Ltr, Gen Stratemeyer to Gen
Spaatz, subj: Establishment of an Air De-
fense in Being, Nov 22, 1946, USAFHRC
microfilm. ,

64. Ltr, Get Stratemeyer to^Geo
Spaat2i, subj: Air Defense 'Plan (Long
Term), Apr 8, 1947; Intvw, T. A. Sturm
with Maj Gen John B. Cary, Washington,
D.C., Jan 15, 1972.

65. ADC, Air Defense Plan (Long
Term), Apr 8, 1947.

66. Ltr, Stratemeyer to Spaatz, Apr 8
1947. V

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Memo, Ch, GMs and Air Def
Div, to AC/AS-3, HQ AAF, Jan 15, 1947
USAFHRC microfilm.

70. Ltr, CG, ADC, to CSAF, subj:
Air Defense of the Continental U.S., Jun 2
1947, USAFHRC microfilm.

71. Memo, AC/AS-3 to AC/AS-4,
HQ AAF, subj: Proposed Air Defense
Policy, Mar 13, 1947, USAFHRC micro-
film.

72. Memo, AC/AS-5 to AC/AS-3,
HQ AAF, subj: Proposed Air Defense
Policy, Mar 17, 1947, USAFHRC micro-
film. On Weyland's support of Patton in
World War II, see Alan F. Witt's "Coming
of Age: XIX TAC's Role During the 1944
Dash Across France" [Air University Review
36, no. 3 (Mar-Apr 1985), pp 71-87].

73. Rept, Air Def Policy Panel to
CSAF, Aug 14, 1947, USAFHRC micro-
film.

74. Memo, Maj Gen Earle E. Par-
tridge to Lt Gen Eaker, subj: Mission of
ADC, Aug 24, 1946, USAFHRC microfilm.

75. Memo, Stuart Symington to Gen
Carl Spaatz, n.d. [ca. Sep 18, 1946], Spaatz
Papers, Box 256, LC.

76. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Dr. Theodore
von Karman, Dec 17, 1946, USAFHRC
microfilm.

77. Preliminary RAND Report, subj:
Active Defense of the United States
Against Air Attack, Jul 10, 1947 (revised
and reissued Feb 5, 1948).

78. Ltr, CSAF to ADC, subj: Active
Defense of the United States Against Air
Attack (comments on RAND Report), Oct
22, 1947, USAFHRC microfilm.

79. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Comdr,
APGC, subj: Evaluation of Potential Air
Defense Capabilities of the AAF, Jun 24,
1947, AAF Central Files 381, War Plans
Miscellaneous, National Defense 1946-1947,
Vol I, Box 642, RG 18, NA.

80. Ltr, David E. Lilienthal to
Sec War, Jun 4, 1947, AAF Central Files
381, Box 642, RG 18, NA.

81. Ltr, Sec War Robert P. Patterson
to Lilienthal, Jun 18, 1947, AAF Central
Files 381, Box 642, RG 18, NA.

82. DuPre, Biographical Dictionary, pp
179-80; Biographical information, in Nor-
stad Papers, NA (microfilm copies in AF/
CHO).

83. Memo, Maj Gen Norstad to Gen
Spaatz, subj: Security of Atomic Energy
Commission Facilities, Jul 8, 1947, AAF
Central Files 381, Box 642, RG 18, NA.

84. EO 9877, Jul 26, 1947.

85. Letter of Appointment, Pres
Harry S. Truman to Thomas K. Finletter,
Jul 18, 1947, cited in Air Policy Commis-
sion, Survival in the Air Age (Washington,
D.C., Jan 1, 1948) [hereafter cited as Finlet-
ter Commission Rept].

86. Intvw, T. A. Sturm with Maj Gen
Francis L. Ankenbrandt, Naples, Fla., Apr
17, 1973.

297

The Emerging Shield

87. Maj Gen Ankenbrandt, Opening
remarks at presentation of Aircraft Control
and Warning System for Alaska and the
United States, Nov 19, 1947, transcript in
USAFHRC microfilm.

88. Memo, Maj Gen Ankenbrandt to
Gen Carl Spaatz, subj: Aircraft Control and
Warning Plan for Alaska and the Continen-
tal U.S. [n.d.], USAFHRC microfilm.

89. Ltr, Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg to
Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chmn, R&D Bd, Dec
9, 1947, Vandenberg Papers, LC.

90. Memo, Ankenbrandt to Spaatz

[n.d.].

91. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, "A Progress
Report" (Script presentation to House
Armed Services Committee), USAFHRC
microfilm.

92. Ltr, Gen Vandenberg to Lt Gen
Stratemeyer, subj: Aircraft Control and
Warning for the U.S., Jan 19, 1948.

93. Ltr, Symington to Gen George C.
Kenney, CG, SAC, May 30, 1947, Spaatz
Papers, Box 28, LC. Symington told SAC
to ease up on B-50 mock bombing and
long-distance missions until unification was
achieved. "Hundreds of thousands of Amer-
icans," he noted, "opposed . . . dropping
atomic bombs . . . from a humanitarian
standpoint."

94. Tpcon, Gen Vandenberg to Lt
Gen Stratemeyer, Nov 13, 1947, rec con in
Vandenberg Papers, Box 1, LC; Ltr, DAF
to CG, ADC, Dec 14, 1947, subj: Reorgani-
zation of ADC, USAFHRC microfilm.

95. Lt Gen Stratemeyer, "Require-
ments for an Air Defense of the U.S."
(Presentation to Secy Symington and Gen
Spaatz), Oct 23, 1947, transcript in Vanden-
berg Papers, Box 32, LC.

96. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Comdr, APG,
subj: Evaluation of Potential Air Defense
Capabilities of the AAF [n.d.], AAF Cen-
tral Files 381, Box 642, RG 18, NA.

97. Ibid.

98. Finletter Commission Rept.

99. Hearings before the Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives,
Testimony by Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vanden-
berg, Mar 18, 1948, transcript in Vanden-
berg Papers, Box 48, LC.

100. Spaatz, Testimony before Com-
mittee on Civilian Components (the Gray
Board). This panel, chaired by Assistant
Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray,
sought "to make a comprehensive, objec-
tive, and impartial study of the type and
character of civilian components that
should be maintained [in the new military
establishment] . . . ." [First Report of the

Secretary of Defense (Washington, 1948), pp
23, 45, 154].

101. AFR 20-13 (advance copy), Or-
ganization of ADC, Dec 19, 1947.

102. Memo, Gen Muir S. Fairchild to
AS, subj: Mission of the Air National
Guard, Nov 16, 1949, Fairchild Papers, Box
2, LC.

103. Ltr, Lt Gen Stratemeyer to Maj
Gen Partridge, subj: Current Status and Or-
ganization of the Air National Guard and
Air Reserve, Nov 20, 1947, Spaatz Papers,
Box 265, LC.

104. Ltr, Gen Spaatz to Lt Gen Stra-
temeyer, Mar 12, 1946, subj: Interim Mis-
sion, USAFHRC microfilm.

105. Ltr, Lt Gen Stratemeyer to Maj
Gen Butler B. Miltonberger, CNGB, Apr
15, 1946, cited in Hist, ADC, Mar 1946-Jun
1947.

106. Ltr, HQ ADC to CGs, All Air
Forces, subj: Mission of ADC, Jun 11,

1946, USAFHRC microfilm.

107. Ltr, Lt Gen Stratemeyer to Gen
Spaatz, Sep 25, 1946, cited in Hist, ADC,
Mar 1946-Jun 1947.

108. Ltr, Brig Gen John P. McCon-
nell to Maj Gen Partridge, Jun 9, 1949, Par-
tridge Collection, USAFHRC microfilm;
Gross, Air National Guard, ch 1.

109. Stratemeyer presentation, Oct 23,

1947.

110. AFR 20-13.

111. Ltr, DAF to CG, ADC, Dec 17,

1947, subj: Air Defense, USAFHRC micro-
film.

112. Ltr, Lt Gen Stratemeyer to All
ADC AF Comdrs, Dec 17, 1947,
USAFHRC microfilm.

113. Finletter Commission Rept, p 10.

114. Ibid., p 20.

115. Hist, 4AF, Jan-Nov 1948.

116. Hist, 505th Aircraft Control and
Warning Group, Jul-Dec 1947; ibid., Jan-
Mar 1948; Hist, 4AF, Jan-Nov 1948.

117. Hist, 1AF, Jan- Jun 1948.

118. Hist, 505th Aircraft Control and
Warning Group, Jan-Mar 1948.

119. Hist, 1AF, Jan-Jun 1948.

120. HQ USAF Interstaff Memo, Brig
Gen Edward J. Timberlake to Maj Gen
Samuel E. Anderson, Mar 25, 1948,
USAFHRC microfilm.

121. Ibid.

122. Msg, CG, ADC, to 4AF, Mar
27, 1948; Ltr, HQ ADC to CG, 4AF, Mar
31, 1948, subj: Air Defense System, USAF-
HRC microfilm.

298

Notes

123. Memo, Timberlake to Anderson,
Mar 25, 1948.

124. Ltr, Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead,
CG, FEAF, to Gen Spaatz, Dec 9, 1947,
Spaatz Papers, Box 28, LC.

125. Msg, Gen Lucius D. Clay to Lt
Gen Stephen J. Chamberlain, Mar 5, 1948,
cited in Jean Edward Smith, ed, The Papers
of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945-
1949 (Bloomington, Ind., 1974), Vol II, p
568.

126. Daniel H. Yergin, Shattered
Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the
National Security State (Boston, 1977), pp
350-53; Walter Millis, ed, The Forrestal Dia-
ries (New York, 1951), p 387.

127. AF Bui 1, Functions of the Armed
Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff May 21,
1948, p 8.

128. Robert J. Watson, History of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.,
1986), Vol V, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and
National Policy, 1953-1954, [hereafter cited
as JCS and National Policy], p 208.

129. 1AF Interstaff Memo, Col G. G.
Gibbs to C/S, subj: Aircraft Control and
Warning Groups, Mar 30, 1948, in Hist,
1AF, Jan-Jun 1948, App A-l; Ltr, Lt Gen
Stratemeyer to CG, 1AF, subj: Air Defense
Activities, Apr 6, 1948; AS Summary
Sheet, Maj Gen S. E. Anderson for CSAF,
subj: Withdrawal of Personnel from the
530th Aircraft Control and Warning Group,
May 19, 1948, AAF Central Files 322, Box
800, RG 18, NA.

130. Ltr, Stratemeyer to CG, 1AF,
Apr 6, 1948.

131. Hist, 505th Aircraft Control and
Warning Group, Mar-Jun 1948; HQ ADC
Ltr, Mar 31, 1948.

132. Memo, Gen Vandenberg to Secy
Symington, subj: Comments on the Forres-
tal Memo to the JCS, Jul 1, 1948, with App
A, Status of Air Warning and Control
Screen for Alaska and U.S., Jul 30, 1948,
USAFHRC microfilm.

133. Msg, HQ USAF to Joint Brazil-
U.S. Military Commission, Apr 30, 1948,
Saville Collection, USAFHRC microfilm.

Chapter 4. Saville Takes Charge

1. Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome
Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in
Chief (Baton Rouge, La., 1973), p 137.

2. Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow
Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment
Before Korea (Westport, Conn., 1982); Ste-
phen M. Millett, "The Capabilities of the
American Nuclear Deterrent, 1945-1950,"
Aerospace Historian (Mar 1980); Rosenberg,
"Origins of Overkill"; Gregg Herken, The
Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the
Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), pp
196-97; Walton S. Moody, "Building a
Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953," (draft
manuscript in AF/CHO), chaps 2-5.

3. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate:
U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Mili-
tary Strength (New York, 1982), p 39.

4. Ltr, Maj Gen Saville to Gen Fair-
child, Jun 1, 1948, Fairchild Papers, Box 2,
LC.

5. Intvw, Lt Col Vaughn H. Gal-
lacher with Gen Bruce K. Holloway, Or-
lando, Fla., Aug 16-18, 1977.

6. Cline, Washington Command Post,
p 173; Mark A. Stoler, "From Continenta-
lism to Globalism: General Stanley D.
Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Com-
mittee, and the Military View of American

National Policy During the Second World
War," Diplomatic History 6, no. 3 (summer
1982): 303-21; Ronald Schaffer, "Stanley D.
Embick: Military Dissenter," Military Af-
fairs 37, no. 3 (Oct 1973): 89-95.

7. Kenneth Schaffel, "General Muir
S. Fairchild: Philosopher of Air Power,"
Aerospace Historian 33, no. 3 (fall/Sep
1986): 165-71.

8. Saville intvw.

9. HQ ADC SO 150, Aug 2, 1948,
Saville Collection, USAFHRC microfilm;
Saville intvw.

10. Hist, 505th Aircraft Control and
Warning Group, Mar-Jan 1948.

11. Hist, 4AF, Jan 1-Nov 30, 1948;
Ltr, Maj Gen John E. Upston, CG, 4AF, to
CG, ADC, subj: Report of Maneuvers,
May 27, 1948; HQ 505th Aircraft Control
and Warning Group Analysis of Maneuvers
Conducted in the Northwest Air Defense
Area, Mar 28-May 17, 1948 (App to Hist,
4AF, Jan 1-Nov 30, 1948); Hist, 505th Air-
craft Control and Warning Group, Mar- Jan
1948.

12. Clement L. Grant, Development of
Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954

299

The Emerging Shield

(USAF Hist Study 126, 1957), pp 12-13;
Saville intvw.

13. Memo, Bur Budget to OSD, subj:
USAF Radar Fence Program, May 24,
1948, USAFHRC microfilm.

14. Memo, Barrow to Forrestal, May
28, 1948, USAFHRC microfilm.

15. Memo, Pres Harry S. Truman to
Forrestal, Jun 3, 1948, Vandenberg Papers,
Box 40, LC.

16. Memo, Forrestal to JCS, Jul 1,
1948, USAFHRC microfilm.

17. Saville intvw.

18. Saville, "Interim Program for Air-
craft Control and Warning System in the
Continental U.S. and Alaska" (Presentation
to Forrestal), Sep 9, 1948, USAFHRC
microfilm.

19. Saville intvw.

20. Saville presentation, Sep 9, 1948.

21. Ibid.; Vandenberg, Journal, Aug
24, 1948, Vandenberg Papers, Box 3, LC.

22. Memo, Dr. Vannevar Bush to
Vandenberg, subj: Air Defense System,
May 18, 1948, USAFHRC microfilm.

23. Ltr, Charles A. Lindbergh to Sy-
mington, Aug 2, 1948; Ltr, Symington to
Lindbergh, Aug 26, 1948, USAFHRC
microfilm.

24. Ltr, HQ USAF to CG, ADC,
subj: Interim Program for the Employment
of Aircraft Control and Warning Radar;
Ltr, Saville to CSAF, Jan 26, 1949,
USAFHRC microfilm.

25. HQ USAF Interstaff Memo, Maj
Gen S. E. Anderson to Gen Lauris Nor-
stad, subj: Proposed Aircraft Control and
Warning Systems, May 17, 1949,
USAFHRC microfilm.

26. Ltr, Anderson to CG, ADC, subj:
Implementation of Emergency Aircraft
Control and Warning System in the North-
eastern U.S., USAFHRC microfilm.

27. "Operation Dualism."

28. Stratemeyer presentation, in "Op-
eration Dualism"; EO 10007, Oct 15, 1948.

29. HQ CONAC, Press Release, Feb
1, 1949; AFR 23-1, Organization of Conti-
nental Air Command, Jan 11, 1949;
CONAC Reg 25-1, Organization and Mis-
sion of ADC, Jan 31, 1949, USAFHRC
microfilm.

30. Hist, CONAC, Dec 1, 1948-Dec
31, 1949; Saville intvw.

31. Rept of Air Def Ex Blackjack,
Jan 1-30, 1949 (in Apps, Hist, ADC, Jan-
Jun 1951).

32. Saville presentation, Sep 9, 1948.

33. Denys Volan, The History of the
Ground Observer Corps (ADC Hist Study

36, 1968) [hereafter cited as GOC], pp 100-
102.

34. Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, 81st Cong, 1st
sess, 1949, pp 329, 333-34.

35. Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives, Feb 10-12, 1949,
cited in Grant, Continental Air Defense, p
25.

36. Holloway intvw.

37. Col Keith K. Compton, Presenta-
tion, in "Operation Dualism."

38. HQ USAF Interstaff Memo, Brig
Gen Jack W. Wood to Compt, subj: Pend-
ing Inspection Visit to Eglin Field, Jun 3,

1948, Fairchild Papers, Box 2, LC; Comp-
ton presentation, in "Operation Dualism";
Col Bruce K. Holloway, Presentation, in
ibid.

39. Holloway presentation, in "Oper-
ation Dualism"; Saville presentation, in ibid;
Lt Col Edwin F. Carey, HQ ADC, Presen-
tation at Air Command and Staff College,
Maxwell AFB, Ala., Mar 25, 1949.

40. Case History of the F-89 All-
Weather Fighter Airplane (HQ AMC Hist
Study 37), appended docs 1, 8, and 9.

41. Richard F. McMullen, History of
Air Defense Weapons, 1946-1962 (ADC Hist
Study 14, 1962), pp 38-40. For specifica-
tions on the F-87, F-89, and F-94, see
Marcelle Size Knaack's Encyclopedia of U.S.
Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems
(Washington, D.C., 1978), Vol I, Post-
World War II Fighters, 1945-1973 [hereafter
cited as Post-WW II Fighters], pp 82-111.

42. Memo, Gen Joseph T. McNarney
to SAF, subj: Final Report of Board of Of-
ficers, Jan 1949, OSAF 334, RG 340, NA.

43. Ibid.

44. Fairchild, Remarks at Air Force-
Industry Conference, May 20, 1949, Fair-
child Papers, Box 4, LC.

45. Hist, ARDC, Jan 1-Dec 31, 1953;
McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense, pp 50-
55; Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, p 159;
Grant, Continental Air Defense, p 53.

46. Ltr, Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge,
CG, 5AF, to Maj Gen William E. Kepner,
CG, APG, Mar 31, 1949, Partridge Collec-
tion, USAFHRC microfilm; Ltr, Brig Gen
John P. McConnell, Dep Sp Asst for Re-
serve Forces, HQ USAF, to Partridge, Mar
11, 1949, Partridge Collection, USAFHRC
microfilm; DuPre, Biographical Dictionary,
pp 259-60.

47. HQ CONAC GO 94, Aug 31,

1949, cited in Hist, Western Air Defense

300

Notes

Force, Sep-Dec 1949, App; Hist, Eastern
Air Defense Force, Sep-Dec 1949.

48. Intvw, Dr. James C. Hasdorff
with Lt Gen Herbert B. Thatcher, Central
Harbor, N.H., Aug 9-10, 1977; Saville
intvw.

49. Memo, Col J. E. Smart, Dep Ops,
AS, to Lt Gen Whitehead, subj: Reorgani-
zation of CON AC, Jan 21, 1949, Whitehead
Collection, USAFHRC microfilm.

50. Saville intvw.

Chapter 5. Broadening Dimensions: Air Defense as a Public

Issue

1. Memo, Maj Gen Thomas D.
White, Dir, Leg Liaison, HQ USAF, to Sy-
mington, Aug 22, 1949, USAFHRC micro-
film.

2. Memo, Vandenberg to Symington,
Aug 22, 1949, Vandenberg Papers, Box 34,
LC.

3. Ernest Gruening, Many Battles: The
Autobiography of Ernest Gruening (New
York, 1973), p 361.

4. Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers
and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strate-
gy, and Politics," in Harold Stein, ed,
American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of
Case Studies (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 1963), p 516.
An informative discussion of the B-36 con-
troversy is in Steven L. Rearden's The
Formative Years, 1947-1950 [(Washington,
D.C., 1984), Vol I in History of the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, pp 410-22].

5. Dean C. Allard, "An Era of Tran-
sition, 1945-1953," in Kenneth J. Hagen,
ed, In Peace and War: Interpretations of
American Naval History, 1775-1978 (West-
port, Conn., 1978), pp 290-303.

6. Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed. From Pearl
Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral
Arthur W. Radford (Stanford, Calif., 1980)
[hereafter cited as Memoirs of Admiral Rad-
ford], pp 189-90; Semiannual Report of the
Secretary of the Air Force, Jul-Dec 1949, pp
230-31; Hammond, "Super Carriers," p 517.

7. Hearings before the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives,
U.S. Congress National Defense Program:
Unification and Strategy, 81st Cong, 1st sess
(Washington, D.C., 1949), pp 2-3.

8. Hammond, "Super Carriers," p
517; Memoirs of Admiral Radford, p 187.

9. Paolo E. Coletta, The United States
Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953
(Newark, Del., 1981), p 66; Lydus H. Buss,
Seaward Extension of Radar, 1946-1956
(ADC Hist Study 10, 1956), passim;
Thomas W. Ray, The ADC Airborne Early

Warning and Control Program, 1946-1964
(ADC Hist Study 28, 1965), p 2.

10. Ltr, Dr. Bruce Hopper to Lt Gen
Lauris Norstad, Apr 1949, Norstad Papers,
NA, microfilm in AF/CHO.

11. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis
Duncan, Atomic Shield, 1947-1952 (Penn
State University Press, 1962), Vol II, p 362;
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Garden City,
N.Y., 1956), Vol II, Years of Trial and
Hope, pp 306-08; Margaret Truman, Harry
S. Truman (New York, 1973), pp 415-16.

12. Public Papers of the Presidents:
Harry S. Truman, 1949 (Washington, D.C.,
1964), p 485; Beverly Smith, "This Way
Lies Peace," The Saturday Evening Post,
Oct 13, 1949.

13. Ltr, Warren Magnuson to Sy-
mington, Oct 11, 1950, Vandenberg Papers,
Box 60, LC; Richard F. McMullen, Radar
Programs for Air Defense, 1946-1966 (ADC
Hist Study 34, 1966), pp 23-24.

14. Memo, Fairchild to DCS/P, subj:
Senior Officer Assignments, Nov 16, 1949,
Fairchild Papers, Box 2, LC.

15. MR, subj: Conference Held to
Discuss the Announcement of the Russian
Atomic Bomb Explosion, Sep 30, 1949,
Fairchild Papers, Box 1, LC.

16. Memo, Symington to Johnson,
subj: Atomic Explosion in Russia and Fac-
tors Bearing on the Problem, OSAF Special
Interest File 9, 1949, Box 36, RG 340, NA.

17. Cited in Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Doctrine, pp 257-58.

18. Ltr, Symington to Magnuson,
Nov 28, 1949, Vandenberg Papers, Box 60,
LC.

19. MR, Fairchild, Sep 30, 1949;
Memo, Fairchild to Vandenberg, Sep 30,
1949, Fairchild Papers, Box 1, LC.

20. MR, Fairchild, Sep 30, 1949;
Memo, Fairchild to Vandenberg, Sep 30,
1949.

21. Hist, Directorate of Plans and
Ops, HQ USAF, Jul 1949- Jan 1950; Robert

301

The Emerging Shield

D. Little, Organizing for Strategic Planning,
1945-1950 (HQ USAF Hist Div Liaison
Ofc, Apr 1964), p 61.

22. Gen Cabell, Presentation at
Ramey Commanders' Conference, Apr 25-
27, 1950; "Attainment and Maintenance of
an Operational Air Defense System in the
Continental U.S. and Alaska" (USAF pres-
entation to JCS), Mar 2, 1950, Numerical
Subject File 1950, War Plans, OSAF, RG
340, NA.

23. Gen S. E. Anderson, Presentation
at Ramey Conference.

24. PL 434, 81st Cong, Oct 29, 1949;
Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air
Force, Jul-Dec 1949, p 193; Memo, Syming-
ton to Vandenberg, Oct 31, 1949; HQ
CONAC, Brief Fiscal History of the Air-
craft Control and Warning Facilities Con-
struction Program, Jun 26, 1950.

25. Anderson presentation, Ramey
Conference.

26. Blue Book Plan, p 11; Memo,
Whitehead to Brig Gen Herbert B. Thatch-
er, DCS/O, HQ CONAC, subj: Number of
Combat Crews Required in Fighter Squad-
rons for Air Defense Mission, Feb 17, 1950;
Memo, Col Joseph D. Lee, Ch, Rqrs Div,
HQ CONAC, to Whitehead, subj: The Effi-
cient Employment of Combat Aircraft in
Air Defense [ca. Feb 25, 1950]; Air Defense
Briefing, Jan 1, 1951, Vandenberg Papers,
Box 88, LC.

27. Anderson presentation, Ramey
Conference.

28. Ltr, HQ CONAC to CG, EADF,
Oct 10, 1950.

29. Anderson presentation, Ramey
Conference.

30. Roy S. Barnard, The History of
ARADCOM (Washington, D.C., 1972), Vol
I, The Gun Era, 1950-1955 [hereafter cited
as ARADCOM: The Gun Era], p 37.

31. Robert L. Kelley, Army Antiair-
craft in Air Defense, 1946-1954 (ADC Hist
Study 4, 1954), pp 3-17; Barnard, ARAD-
COM: The Gun Era, pp 18-21.

32. McMullen, History of Air Defense
Weapons, pp 47-52, 89-91; Barnard, ARAD-
COM: The Gun Era, pp 25-28. The
BOMARC program is explained in further
detail in Chapter 8.

33. Kelley, Army Antiaircraft in Air
Defense, pp 15-20; Barnard, ARADCOM:
The Gun Era, pp 44-46, 50-54.

34. AF Bui 1, May 21, 1948; Saville
intvw.

35. Memo, Vandenberg to JCS, subj:
Air Defense of the U.S., Fairchild Papers,
Box 1, LC.

36. NSC-68, United States Objectives
and Programs for National Security, Apr 7,
1950; Joseph M. Siracusa, "NSC 68: A Re-
appraisal," Naval War College Review 33,
no. 6 (Nov-Dec 1980): 4-14; Samuel J.
Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68
and the Soviet Threat," International Securi-
ty 4, no. 2 (fall, 1979): 116-58.

37. Ltr, Ch Nav Ops to Maj Nav
Comds and Marine Corps, subj: Responsi-
bilities and Functions of Naval Command-
ers with Regard to Air Defense of the Con-
tinental U.S., Feb 16, 1950, USAFHRC
microfilm; Maj George H. Lowes, "Double
Decade of Air Defence," [Canadian Forces]
Sentinel, Jun 1951; Seventeen Years of Air
Defense (HQ NORAD Hist Ref Paper 9),
pp 1-5.

38. New York Times, Oct 13, 1949;
Time, Oct 3, 1949; Ltr, Vannevar Bush to
Gen Omar Bradley, Apr 13, 1950, Vanden-
berg Papers, Box 83, LC; Memo, unsigned
to Vandenberg, Mar 20, 1950, Vandenberg
Papers, Box 53, LC.

39. Ltr, Carl Vinson to Symington,
Feb 13, 1950, USAFHRC microfilm.

40. Hist, ADC, thru Jan 1951.

41. Volan, GOC, pp 102-10; Hist,
ADC, thru June 1951; Herbert B. Thatcher,
Presentation at Ramey Conference.

42. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jul-Dec 1950.

43. Memo, Maj Gen Roger Ramey,
HQ USAF, to DCS/O, subj: Status of the
Aircraft Control and Warning Group Pro-
gram, Jan 5, 1952, OSAF, RG 340, NA;
Lowes, "Double Decade of Air Defense";
Seventeen Years of Air Defense, p 2; Hist,
ADC, thru June 1951.

44. Memo, von Karman to Fairchild,
subj: Air Defense of the U.S., Nov 29,
1949; Ltr, Fairchild to Whitehead, subj: Air
Defense System Engineering Committee,
Jan 27, 1950, Fairchild Papers, Box 1, LC;
Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scientific Ad-
visory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-
1964 (Washington, D.C., 1967), pp 39-40.

45. Alfred Goldberg and Robert D.
Little, History of Headquarters USAF, 1 July
1949 to 30 June 1950 (USAF Hist Study,
Dec 1954), p 25. The Air Research and De-
velopment Command was established under
Maj Gen David M. Schlatter on Jan 23,
1950. Instrumental in the command's estab-
lishment were Ridenour's suggestions, sec-
onded by an Air University study headed
by Maj Gen Orvil A. Anderson. Anderson's
group believed that technology would
prove crucial in the future if the United

302

Notes

States was to maintain an edge over the
Soviet Union.

46. Ivan A. Getting, "Recollections
of the USAF in 1950-1951," copy in AF/
CHO

47. Futrell, Ideas. Concepts, Doctrine,
pp 142-43.

48. Thatcher intvw.

49. Intvw, Lt Col Vaughn H. Gal-
lacher and Dr. James C. Hasdorff with Maj
Gen Hugh A. Parker, San Antonio, Tex.,
Jun 21, 1972.

50. MR, Fairchild, Sep 30, 1949;
Memo, Fairchild to Vandenberg, Sep 30,
1949; Thatcher intvw.

51. Hist, CON AC, Vol III, Jan-Jun
1950; Hist, ADC, thru Jan 1951; Memo,
Fairchild to Norstad, subj: Acceleration of
Air Defense Programs, Nov 19, 1949, Fair-
child Papers, Box 1, LC.

52. Thatcher inteviw; Hist, ADC,
thru Jun 1951.

53. Hist, ADC, thru Jun 1951.

54. Sp rept, HQ USAF, Observation
on Exercise Drummer Boy (Nov 4-14),
Dec 2, 1949; HQ ADC, A Decade of Conti-
nental Air Defense, 1946-1956 (1956).

55. Observation on Exercise Drum-
mer Boy; Decade of Continental Air De-
fense.

56. Observation on Exercise Drum-
mer Boy; Decade of Continental Air De-
fense.

57. Hist, 25th Air Div, Apr-Jun 1950.

58. Rept, HQ 25th Air Div, Exercise
Whipstock, Jun 18-24, 1950, cited in 25th
Air Div Hist, Apps.

59. Ops analysis rept 3, HQ CONAC,
Outcome of Northwest Air Defense Exer-
cise (Jun 18-24, 1950), Sep 20, 1950,
USAFHRC microfilm.

60. Col George S. Brown, Presenta-
tion at Ramey Conference.

Chapter 6. Continental Air Defense in the Korean War Period

1. Msg, Vandenberg to Twining, Jun
25, 1950, Twining Papers, Box 19, LC;
Msg, Vandenberg to Whitehead, Jun 26*
1950, cited in Hist, Directorate of Plans,
HQ USAF, Jul-Dec 1950; Hist, 26th Air
Div, Apr-Jun 1950; Unidentified news clip-
ping, Twining Papers, Box 19, LC.

2. The Air Force's worldwide re-
sponse to the start of the Korean crisis is
explained in detail in Robert F. Futrell's
The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-
1953 [rev ed (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp
1-37].

3. Dr. Edward Barlow, "Develop-
ment Objective: Air Defense" (Lecture at
Air War College), Apr 1, 1952.

4. Gordon P. Saville, "The Philoso-
phy of Air Defense" (Lecture at Air War
College), Jun 7, 1950.

5. Col L. A. Hall, "The Aircraft In-
dustry of the USSR" (Lecture at Air War
College) [ca. 1950].

6. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate:
U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Mili-
tary Strength (New York, 1982), pp 24-26;
Ernest Volkman, Warriors of the Night:
Spies, Soldiers, and the American Military
(New York, 1985), chaps 2-4 (uncorrected
proofs).

7. Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic
Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiori-
ty (Miami, Fla., 1982), p 16; Thomas W.

Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970
(Baltimore, 1970), passim.

8. NSC 68, printed in Naval War Col-
lege Review 27, no. 6 (May- Jun 1975). Wells
gives an excellent analysis of NSC 68 in his
"Sounding the Tocsin." Wells points out
that the Soviets possessed more military
power than they needed to protect their
own territory and consolidate their gains in
Eastern Europe. They did not, in the early
1950s, use their land forces to annex West-
ern territory or demand concessions.

9. Jack H. Nunn, The Soviet First
Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective (New
York, 1982), pp 95-96; "Attainment and
Maintenance of an Operational Air Defense
System in the Continental U.S. and Alaska"
(USAF presentation to JCS), Numerical
Subject File 1950, War Plans, OSAF, RG
340, NA; Joint Intelligence Committee
report JCS 208111, Implications of Soviet
Possession of Atomic Weapons, Encl B,
Nov 8, 1948, RG 218, NA.

10. Cases for and against preemptive
and preventive war are presented in Bro-
die's insightful Strategy in the Missile Age
(pp 223-63), Rosenberg's "Origins of Over-
kill" (pp 25-26), and Moody's "Building a
Strategic Air Force" (ch 7).

11. Nunn, Soviet First Strike Threat, p
96; Moody, "Building a Strategic Air
Force," ch 7.

303

The Emerging Shield

12. Ltr, HQ CONAC to 1AF, subj:
F-82 Maintenance Spares, Feb 28, 1950,
USAFHRC microfilm.

13. Ltr, Maj Gen Frank A. Arm-
strong to Vandenberg, Aug 4, 1950, Van-
denberg Papers, Box 33, LC; Thomas A.
Sturm, Air Defense of Alaska, 1940-1957
(NORAD Hist Ref Paper, 1957), pp 12-14.

14. McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense,
pp 32-40; Bill Gunston, Fighters of the Fif-
ties (Cambridge, England, 1981), pp 116-20.

15. Rept, HQ AAC, Exercise Stop-
gap, Nov 25-27, 1950.

16. Hist, CONAC, Jul-Dec 1950.

17. Ibid.

18. Hist, 26th Air Div, Jul-Aug 1950.

19. Ltr, 52d FW Gp CO to 52d FW
CO, subj: Authentication and Identification,
Nov 6, 1950, USAFHRC microfilm.

20. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jul-Dec 1950.

21. Hist, ADC, thru Jan 1951.

22. Ibid.

23. Memo, Vandenberg to SecDef,
n.d. [ca. Aug 20, 1950], Box 33, Vanden-
berg Papers, LC; Hist, Directorate of Plans,
HQ USAF, Jul-Dec 1950.

24. Barnard, ARADCOM: The Gun
Era, Vol I, pp 50-52.

25. Memo of Agreement, Vandenberg
and Collins, Aug 1, 1950, USAFHRC
microfilm.

26. Barnard, ARADCOM: The Gun
Era, Vol I, pp 63-66.

27. McMullen, Radar Programs, pp
28-29, 39; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
pp 278-79. The Korean War proved an
enormous impetus to increasing military
programs, especially those of the Air Force.
In fiscal year 1952 the Air Force received a
third more funds (in a total defense budget
of $43.9 billion) than the Army or Navy. In
2 years SAC doubled its personnel and air-
craft; its bases increased from 19 to 30 in
the CONUS, and from 1 to 11 overseas.

28. Carl Spaatz, "Air Defense Meas-
ures Are Urgent," Newsweek, Aug 21, 1950.

29. Saville intvw.

30. Biographical information in Twin-
ing Papers, LC.

31. On Finletter's views, see Thomas
K. Finletter's Power and Policy: U.S. Foreign
Power and Policy in the Hydrogen Age [(New
York, 1954), pp 206-11, 214-18].

32. Memo, Lt Gen Edwin M. Rawl-
ings, Compt, to DCS/M, HQ USAF, subj:
Expediting Completion of the Radar Fence,
Jul 27, 1950; Memo, Dir Comms, HQ
USAF, to CSAF, subj: Acceleration of
Construction Program for First 24 Aircraft

Control and Warning Sites of CONAC,
Aug 16, 1950; Note, n.d., Vandenberg
Papers, Box 88, LC; Ltr, OSAF to Lt Gen
Benjamin Chidlaw, CG, AMC, subj: Size
and Composition of USAF, 1950, Aug 28,
1950, Box 12, RG 340, NA.

33. Ltr, Rawlings to ASAF Eugene
M. Zuckert, subj: Progress of the Perma-
nent Radar Net, Oct 2, 1950, USAFHRC
microfilm.

34. Memo, Lt Col A. J. Evans,
AExO, to Vandenberg, subj: Permanent
Radar Net, Vandenberg Papers, Box 53,
LC; HQ CONAC, Min stf mtg, Dec 6,
1950, USAFHRC microfilm.

35. Memo, Col Wallace C. Barnett,
Directorate of Plans, to Asst for Progs, HQ
USAF, subj: Replanning for Aircraft Con-
trol and Warning Gap Filler Program, Mar
11, 1952; MR, DCS/O, HQ USAF, Sep 21,
1950, Twining Papers, Box 55, LC; Memo,
Maj Gen Ramey, Dir Ops, HQ USAF,
subj: Status of the Aircraft Control and
Warning and Tactical Group Programs, Jan
5, 1952, Box 1031, RG 340, NA.

36. Ltr, HQ CONAC to HQ WADF,
subj: Canadian Long Range Early Warning,
Oct 16, 1950.

37. Air def briefing, n.d., Vandenberg
Papers, Box 88, LC.

38. Rept, Eastern Air Defense Force
Exercise, Nov 4-5, 1950, USAFHRC
microfilm.

39. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
pp 159-60.

40. Ltr, HQ CONAC to CSAF, subj:
Establishment of a Central Air Defense
Force, Jul 27, 1950; Ltr, Whitehead to Van-
denberg, Sep 12, 1950; Ltr, HQ USAF to
CG CONAC, subj: Establishment of a Cen-
tral Air Defense Force, Oct 5, 1950, with
1st Ind, HQ CONAC to CSAF, Oct 11,
1950, all in USAFHRC microfilm.

41. Ltr, HQ USAF to CGs, CONAC,
TAC, and ADC, subj: Designation of Tac-
tical Air Command and Air Defense Com-
mand as Major Commands, Nov 10, 1950;
Ltr, Whitehead to Vandenberg, Oct 24,
1950, USAFHRC microfilm.

42. Msg, Vandenberg to Cannon, Sep
28, 1950, Vandenberg Papers, Box 68, LC;
Ltr, HQ USAF to CGs, CONAC, TAC,
and ADC, Nov 10, 1950.

43. Memo, Col James F. Whisenand,
Asst Dep Dir Plans, HQ USAF, to Maj
Gen Thomas D. White, DCS/Plans, subj:
Data on 95-Wing and 143 Programs, Feb 4,
1950, Box 423, RG 341, NA; Little, Orga-
nizing for Strategic Planning, p 63.

304

Notes

44. Public Papers of the Presidents:
Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, D.C.,
1965), p 741.

45. Msg, Vandenberg to All USAF
Comdrs, Dec 6, 1950, Vandenberg Papers,
Box 86, LC.

46. Ibid.

47. Edward A. Kolodziej, The Un-
common Defense and Congress, 1945-1963
(Columbus, Ohio, 1963), pp 140-50.

48. EO 10197, Dec 20, 1950; CAA
Regs, pt 620, Dec 27, 1950; U.S. Dept
Commerce, "Flight Plans to Be Mandatory
in Defense Identification Zones" (Press re-
lease), Dec 21, 1950; Hist, ADC, thru Jun
1951.

49. PL 920, 81st Cong, Jan 12, 1951.

50. Memo, Finletter to Vandenberg,
subj: Offensive and Defensive Plans for
War, 1951, Mar 23, 1951, Box 16, RG 340,
NA.

51. Ltr, Whitehead to Twining, Jan
10, 1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

52. Memo, Twining to Ch, NGB, Jan
22, 1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

53. Memo, Finletter to Vandenberg,
Mar 23, 1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

54. Memo, Lt Col A. J. Evans,
AExO, to CSAF, subj: Permanent Radar
Net, Dec 6, 1950, Vandenberg Papers, Box
53, LC.

55. Memo, Lt Gen Idwal H. Ed-
wards, DCS/O, HQ USAF, to Whitehead,
subj: Aircraft Control and Warning System
Within the Zone of the Interior, Dec 15,
1950, USAFHRC microfilm.

56. McMullen, Radar Programs, p 37.

57. Ltr, John A. McCone to Carl
Vinson, Chmn, House Comm Armed Serv-
ices, Dec 14, 1950, Box 641, RG 340, NA.

58. Congressional Record, 82d Cong,
1st sess, Apr 30, 1951, pp 4521-24.

59. Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg,
Statement before the Committee on Appro-
priations, Third Supplemental Estimates,
FY 1951, Vandenberg Papers, Box 41, LC.

60. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, "The Truth
About Our Air Power," The Saturday
Evening Post, Feb 17, 1951.

61. Qtr prog rept, Lincoln Laborato-
ry, Memo on Activities of the Air Defense
System Engineering Committee, Jun 1952,
with End for Apr 7, 1950; Rept, AD Secy,
Air Defense System, Oct 24, 1950, append-
ed to HQ ARDC Case Hist, Project Lin-
coln, Dec 10, 1952.

62. Robert D. Little, A History of the
Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-
1953 (HQ USAF Hist Div Liaison Office,
1959), Vol III, Building an Atomic Air

Force, 1949-1953, pt 1, p 216; HQ ARDC
Case Hist, Project Lincoln.

63. Ltr, Ivan A. Getting, Pres, Aero-
space Corp, to John L. McLucas, SAF,
subj: Recollections of USAF, 1950-1951,
Mar 12, 1974, copy in AF/CHO.

64. James R. Killian, Jr., Pres, MIT,
Statement on the Lincoln Laboratory, Oct

16, 1953.

65. Lt Col O. T. Halley, HQ ADC
Liaison Off, Lincoln Lab, Briefing present-
ed to Gen Chidlaw, Jan 23, 1953, written
record in USAFHRC microfilm.

66. Ltr, Vandenberg to Killian, Dec
15, 1950, RG 340, NA.

67. Ltr, Twining to Whitehead, Jan
13, 1951, Twining Papers, Box 54, LC;
Thomas A. Sturm, Organization and Respon-
sibility for Air Defense, 1946-1955 (ADC
Hist Study 9, 1963), pp 45-46.

68. Barnard, ARADCOM: The Gun
Era, Vol 1, pp 67, 74-75.

69. Sturm, Organization for Air De-
fense, pp 50-53.

70. Ltr, Whitehead to Vandenberg,
subj: Proper Utilization of Resources, Jul
24, 1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

71. Biographical Study, General Offi-
cers; DuPre, Biographical Dictionary, pp 39-
40.

72. USAF Commanders' Conference,
Colorado Springs, Colo., Oct 30-Nov 1,
1951.

73. RAND Stf Rept F-225 (Air De-
fense Study), appended to Ltr, Brownlee
Haydon, RAND Corp., to Col R. H. Mar-
shall, Mil Exec to USofAF, Oct 12, 1951,
RG 340, NA.

74. Final Rept, Project Charles,
Aug 1, 1951, RG 340, NA; Project Lin-
coln.

75. Ltr, Loomis to Killian, Dec 21,
1951, RG 340, NA.

76. Quotes in Clyde R. Littlefield,
"History of the Semiautomated Ground En-
vironment" [hereafter cited as "History of
SAGE"], unpublished draft manuscript in
AF/CHO, p 12; Richard F. McMullen, The
Birth of SAGE, 1951-1958 (ADC Hist
Study 33, 1965), passim.

11. Littlefield, "History of SAGE,"
pp 5-6.

78. Ibid., pp 8-9; Thomas M. Smith,
"Project Whirlwind: An Unorthodox De-
velopment Project," Technology and Culture

17, no. 3 (Jul 1976): 447-64. Navy support
was eventually reduced, and Whirlwind
became, in effect, an Air Force project.

305

The Emerging Shield

79. Ltr, Finletter to Killian, Feb 5,

1952.

80. McMullen, Radar Programs,
passim; Mildred Wiley, Statistical Data
Book, Vol III, Radar, 1946-1973 (HQ ADC
Hist Office, 1973).

81. Grant, Continental Air Defense, pp
40-41.

82. McMullen, Radar Programs,
passim; Wiley, Statistical Data Book, Vol
III.

83. Memo, USAF Compt to DCS/O,
HQ USAF, subj: Air Force Actions in Con-
nection with Air Defense, Feb 10, 1953,
USAFHRC microfilm.

84. MR, DCS/O, HQ USAF, Sep 21,
1955, Twining Papers, Box 55, LC.

85. Ltr, Chidlaw to Maj Gen George
R. Anderson, CG, CADF, subj: Site Sur-
veys for Additional Aircraft Control and
Warning Stations, Jul 11, 1951; Ltr, DCS/
M, HQ USAF, to Chidlaw, subj: Site Re-
quirements for Semi-Permanent but Mova-
ble Installations, Jul 30, 1951, with 1st Ind,
Chidlaw to Dir Instls, HQ USAF, Aug 22,

1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

86. Ltr, Maj Gen Frederic H. Smith
to Twining, May 22, 1953, subj: Study of
Aircraft Control and Warning Functions,
May 22, 1953, USAFHRC microfilm.

87. 1st Ind, Ramey to Chidlaw, Mar
21, 1952, to Ltr, Chidlaw to DCS/O, HQ
USAF, Jan 19, 1952; Hist, Plans, HQ
USAF.

88. Ltr, HQ ADC to DCS/O, HQ
USAF, subj: Third Phase Radar Program,
Oct 20, 1953; Ltr, DCS/O, HQ USAF, to
Chidlaw, subj: Third Phase Radar Program,
Jan 11, 1954; McMullen, Radar Programs, p
45.

89. Ltr, Maj Gen Smith to Dir Rqrs,
HQ USAF, with 1st Ind, HQ USAF to HQ
ADC, Mar 17, 1953; Ltr, HQ ADC to
DCS/O, HQ USAF, subj: Small, Automatic
Radar Program, Sep 4, 1953, USAFHRC
microfilm.

90. Ltr, Whitehead to Twining, subj:
Radar Picket Vessel Utilization in Air De-
fense, Dec 13, 1950.

91. Memo, DCS/O, HQ USAF, Oct
1, 1951; Ltr, Dir Rqrs, HQ USAF, to Chid-
law, subj: Picket Vessels, Oct 29, 1951; Ltr,
Ch Nav Ops to All Concerned, subj: Naval
Picket Forces, Atlantic and Pacific, Sep 23,

1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

92. Memo, Maj Gen Morris R.
Nelson, Dir Rqrs, HQ USAF, to Twining,
subj: Airborne Early Warning and Control
Equipment, May 2, 1951, Twining Papers,
Box 54, LC; Ray, Early Warning.

93. Ltr, Whitehead to Twining, subj:
Requirement for Airborne Early Warning
and Control Equipment, Apr 9, 1951, Twin-
ing Papers, Box 54, LC; Ray, Early Warn-
ing, pp 8-9.

94. Ray, Early Warning, pp 19-20, 27.

95. Volan, GOC, pp 119-22.

96. Rept, HQ EADF, Air def ex, Jun
22-24, 1951.

97. Final Rept, Project Charles, Vol
I, pp 76-86, 131-32; Memo, J. Parker Van
Zandt, Dep Civ Avn, OSAF, to DCS/O,
HQ USAF, subj: Ground Observer Corps,
Oct 16, 1951, and reply, Brig Gen John K.
Gerhart, Dep Dir Ops, HQ USAF, to Van
Zandt, Oct 26, 1951, RG 340, NA.

98. ADC Commanders' Conference,
Colorado Springs, Colo., Oct 15-16, 1951,
proceedings cited in Volan, GOC, pp 132—
34.

99. Ltr, Smith to Chidlaw, subj: Acti-
vation of the Ground Observer Corps, Dec
3, 1951, USAFHRC microfilm.

100. Ibid.

101. Ltr, Chidlaw to Ramey, Nov 20,
1951; Ltr, Ramey to Chidlaw, Dec 5, 1951,
USAFHRC microfilm.

102. Ltr, HQ ADC to HQ USAF,
subj: 24-Hour Operation of Ground Observ-
er Corps, Jan 22, 1952, USAFHRC micro-
film.

103. Ltr, Gen Thomas D. White,
DCS/O, HQ USAF, to Chidlaw, subj: 24-
Hour Operation of Ground Observer
Corps, Mar 28, 1952, USAFHRC micro-
film.

104. Msg, HQ ADC to Air Def
Forces, Apr 24, 1952, USAFHRC micro-
film.

105. Memo, Col John F. Fletcher,
Dir, Civ Air Def, to Maj Gen Kenneth P.
Bergquist, HQ ADC, subj: Resolution by
State Civil Defense Officials, May 2, 1952,
USAFHRC microfilm.

106. Millard Caldwell, Remarks at the
Conference of State Civil Defense Direc-
tors on the Ground Observer Corps, Penta-
gon, Jun 16, 1953, transcript in USAFHRC
microfilm.

107. DOD Press Release, "Air De-
fense Ground Observers Start 24-Hour
Duty July 14," Jun 17, 1952.

108. Ltr, Twining to Prog Dir, subj:
Suggested Spot Radio Announcements, Sep
21, 1953, Twining Papers, Box 62, LC.

109. Memo, Finletter to Twining, Jul
16, 1952, Box 1011, RG 340, NA.

306

Notes

110. Quoted in Lydus H. Buss, Fifteen
Years of Air Defense, 1946-1961, NORAD
Hist Ref Paper 3, 1960), p 16.

111. Ibid.; Lydus H. Buss, U.S. Air
Defense in the Northeast, 1940-1957 (ADC
Hist Study 37, 1957).

112. Hist, ADC, thru 1951; Memo,
Maj Gen Raymond C. Maude, Dir Comms,
HQ USAF, to CSAF, subj: Authority for
Establishment of a Joint USAF-Canadian
Project Office, Sep 23, 1952, with End,
subj: Discussion of Project Pinetree Office,
Box 10, RG 340, NA.

113. Lowes, "Double Decade of Air
Defense," pp 6-7.

114. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jan-Jun 1951; Canadian Emb Note
454, Hume J. Wrong, Canadian Amb to
U.S., to Dean Acheson, U.S. SecState, Aug
1, 1951; Memo, Maj Gen Roger M. Ramey,
to DCS/O, HQ USAF, subj: Status of the
Aircraft Control and Warning Tactical
Control Group Program, Jan 5, 1952, Box
1031, RG 340, NA.

115. Ltr, HQ USAF, to HQ ADC,
subj: Terms of Reference for the USAF
Section of the Project Pinetree Office, Jun
13, 1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

116. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jan-Jun 1951; MR, OSAF, Nov 5,
1951, Box 937, RG 340, NA; Hist, Director-
ate of Ops, HQ USAF, Jan-Jun 1951; Air
Stf Summary Sheet, Ramey to DCS/D, Jan
5, 1952.

117. Intvw, Denys Volan, Dir Comd
Hist, HQ ADC, with Lt Gen Arthur C.
Agan, Comdr, ADC, Colorado Springs,
Colo., Nov 2, 1970, transcript p 32.

118. McMullen, Aircraft in Air De-
fense, pp 38-40; McMullen, Air Defense

Weapons, pp 110-12.

119. McMullen, Aircraft in Air De-
fense, pp 8-27.

120. Ibid.; Knaack, Post-WW II Fight-
ers, pp 83-100.

121. McMullen, Aircraft in Air De-
fense, pp 8-27; Knaack, Post-WW II Fight-
ers, pp 83-100; Hist, AMC, Jan-Jun 1953;
Agan intvw, p 32.

122. Gunston, Fighters of the Fifties, p
9; Thomas W. Ray, Nuclear Armament: Its
Acquisition, Control, and Application to
Manned Interceptors, 1951-1963 (ADC Hist
Study 20, 1963), passim.

123. Gunston, Fighters of the Fifties,

p5.

124. Ibid., p 184.

125. Ltr, Chidlaw to Vandenberg,
May 5, 1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

126. General Daniel James, Jr.,
"Keeping Up Our Defenses Against Aero-
space Attacks," Grumman Aerospace Hori-
zons 12, no. 4, p 3.

127. Ltr, Chidlaw to White, Aug 25,
1953, Twining Papers, Box 61, LC.

128. Ltr, Gen Earle E. Partridge,
CG, ADC, to Twining, Nov 7, 1955, Twin-
ing Papers Box 75, LC.

Chapter 7. An Integrated, Efficient, Highly Potent Air
Defense System

1. Ltr, Col Barney Oldfield (USAF,
ret), to the author, Jun 12, 1985.

2. Information on the April 1952 inci-
dent came from Chidlaw's letter and its en-
closure to Vandenberg [subj: Next to the
Real Thing (rept on Apr 17 Air Defense
Exercise), Box 1001, RG 340, NA] and Old-
field's letter (cited above).

3. Interim Rept, Project East River,
Apr 7, 1952, SAF File, RG 341, NA.

4. Ltr, Robert A. Lovett to Maj Gen
Otto L. Nelson, Dir Proj East River, May
14, 1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

5. Ltr, HQ ADC to Dir Ops, HQ
USAF, subj: Project East River Interim
Report, Military Measures Precedent to a
Manageable Civil Defense, Nov 28, 1952,
USAFHRC microfilm.

6. "Night Fighters Over New York,"
The Saturday Evening Post, Feb 2, 1952;
Hist, ADC, Jan-Jun 1952.

7. Con, author with Joseph Alsop,
Washington, D.C., Jan 17, 1984.

8. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Matter
of Fact: Air Defense Ignored in Political
Shuffle," Washington Post, May 9, 1952.

9. Ibid.

10. James R. Killian, Jr., Pres, MIT,
"Statement on the Lincoln Laboratory,"
Oct 16, 1953, RG 340, 000.8-12926-50, NA;
Memo, Maj Gen Joseph F. Carroll, Dep
IG, to DCS/D, HQ USAF, subj: Lincoln
Summer Study Group, Jan 16, 1953, RG
340, 000.8-12926-50, NA.

307

The Emerging Shield

11. Ltr, Lt Gen Laurence C. Craigie,
DCS/D, to Chidlaw, Jul 23, 1952,
USAFHRC microfilm.

12. Ltr, Dr. Albert G. Hill, Dir Lin-
coln Lab, to Brig Gen Kenneth P. Berg-
quist, HQ ADC, Jul 31, 1952, USAFHRC
microfilm.

13. Operational Rsch Memo 22, Dept
National Def, Canada, subj: An Operational
Assessment of a Northern Radar Alerting
Chain Employing Equipment Now in Proc-
ess of Development, Aug 1952.

14. Memo, Carroll to DCS/D, Jan
16, 1953.

15. Final Rept, Summer Study
Group, Feb 1, 1953, copy in AF/CHO.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Philip M. Stern, The Oppenheimer
Case: Security on Trial (New York, 1969), p
194. The evolution of Air Force thought on
the need for a distant early-warning line is
traced in Thomas W. Ray's A History of the
DEW Line, 1946-1964 (ADC Hist Study
31, 1965).

20. NSC, Public Policies of the Govern-
ment of the United States Relating to Nation-
al Security, RG 341, OPD 381.02, NA.

21. Joseph T. Jockel, "No Boundaries
Upstairs: Canada and North American Air
Defense," draft manuscript, ch 4, p 18.
[Later published as No Boundaries Upstairs:
Canada, the United States and the Origins of
North American Air Defence, 1945-1958
(University of British Columbia Press, Van-
couver, 1987).]

22. Zacharias's testimony, in In the
Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript
of Hearings Before Personnel Security Board
(Washington, D.C., Apr 12-May 6, 1954)
[hereafter cited as Oppenheimer Hearings].

23. Griggs's testimony, in Oppen-
heimer Hearings; James W. Kuneta, Oppen-
heimer: The Years of Risk (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1982), p 182; Gregg Herken,
Counsels of War (New York, 1985), pp 65-
67.

24. Griggs's testimony, in Oppen-
heimer Hearings; Kuneta, Years of Risk, pp
184, 350.

25. Wilson's testimony, in Oppen-
heimer Hearings.

26. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "We
Accuse," Harper's Magazine, Oct 1954, pp
25-45.

27. Ltr, Whitehead to White, Dec 14,
1953, White Papers, Box 1, LC.

28. "See It Now," TV broadcast of
Oct 5, 1952, transcript in Vandenberg
Papers, Box 91, LC.

29. Vandenberg, Remarks before Bd
Dir, Advertising Council of America, Jan
15, 1953, transcript in Vandenberg Papers,
Box 91, LC.

30. Saville intvw.

31. Gordon P. Saville, "The Air De-
fense Dilemma," Air Force Magazine 36, no.
3 (Mar 1953).

32. Ltr, Whitehead to White, Oct 6,
1953, White Papers, Box 1, LC.

33. History of Strategic Arms Competi-
tion: USAF Supporting Studies First Interim
Report, 1945-1950, AF/CHO.

34. Vandenberg remarks, Jan 15,

1953.

35. A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman,
R. J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and
Use of Strategic Air Bases (RAND Study,
Apr 1954); A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoff-
man, H. S. Rowen, Protecting U.S. Power to
Strike Back in the 1950's and 1960's (RAND
Study, Sep 1956); E. J. Barlow, Distant
Early Warning in the Defense of the United
States (RAND Study, Nov 1952); Herken,
Counsels of War, pp 88-101; Bernard
Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear
Strategy," International Security 2, no. 4
(spring 1978).

36. "The Hidden Struggle for the H-
Bomb: The Story of Dr. Oppenheimer's
Persistent Campaign to Reverse U.S. Mili-
tary Strategy," Fortune, May 1953.

37. Griggs's testimony, in Oppen-
heimer Hearings.

38. J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic
Weapons and American Policy," Foreign
Affairs, Jul 1953.

39. Brodie, "Development of Nuclear
Strategy"; Herken, Counsels of War, pp 88-
101. Many of the civilian analysts at RAND
did not share the Air Force belief that a
completely unexpected Soviet attack was
unlikely; they believed the Air Force was
not doing enough to protect and shelter
SAC bombers. In 1959, Brodie [Strategy in
the Missile Age, p 185] wrote,

A conspicuous inability or un-
readiness to defend our retaliato-
ry force must tend to provoke
the opponent to destroy it; in
other words, it tempts him to an
aggression he might not other-
wise contemplate. How can he
permit our SAC to live and con-
stantly threaten his existence, if
he believes he can destroy it with
impunity?

308

Notes

The strongest case for a Soviet surprise
attack was made by Albert Wohlstetter in
"The Delicate Balance of Terror" [Foreign
Affairs (Jan 1959)]. By then, the develop-
ment of the ICBM had made the strategic
situation more perilous. By 1978 Brodie had
come to support the Air Force position
"that some kind of political warning will
always be available," although the Air
Force did not necessarily hold that position
anymore ["Development of Nuclear Strate-
gy," pp 68-69]. Said Brodie:

Attack out of the blue, which is
to say without a condition of
crisis, is one of those worst-case
fantasies that we have to cope
with as a starting point for our
security planning, but there are
very good reasons why it has
never happened historically, at
least in modern times, and for
comparable reasons, I regard it as
so improbable for a nuclear age
as to approach virtual certainty
that it will not happen, which is
to say it is not a possibility worth
spending much money on.
The change in Brodie's thought is explained
in Lt Col Barry D. Watts's The Foundations
of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction
in War [(Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1984), pp 89-
93].

40. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jun-Dec 1952; NSC, Public Policies
of the Government of the United States Relat-
ing to National Security.

41. Hist, DCS/D, HQ USAF, Jul-
Dec 1952.

42. Ltr, Lovett to C. F. Craig, Pres.
AT&T, Dec 1, 1952, RG 340, 676-9-11323,
NA.

43. DOD Public Information Release,
Jan 3, 1953, Vandenberg Papers, Box 48,
LC; Ltr, Finletter to Killian, Jan 15, 1953,
RG 340, 000.8-12926-50, NA.

44. E. J. Barlow, Distant Early Warn-
ing in the Defense of the U.S. (RAND, Santa
Monica, Calif., Nov 1952).

45. Chidlaw, Presentation to AF
Comdrs, Eglin AFB, Fla., Oct 15-17, 1952,
transcript in USAFHRC microfilm.

46. Memo, Brig Gen John K. Ger-
hart, Dep Dir Ops, HQ USAF, Nov 5,
1952, quoted in Richard F. McMullen, Air
Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957
(ADC Hist Study 24, 1964), p 25.

47. Memo, JCS to SecDef, subj: An
Early Warning System, Dec 19, 1952,
USAFHRC microfilm.

48. NSC-141, A Report to NSC by the
Secretaries of Defense and State and the Di-

rector for Mutual Security Reexaminations of
U.S. Programs for National Security, Jan
1953, RG 341, OPD 381.02, NA.

49. Memo, JCS to SecDef, subj:
Status of U.S. Programs for National Secu-
rity as of Dec 31, 1952, Feb 12, 1953, cited
in Watson, JCS and National Policy, p 213.

50. Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jan-Jun 1953, pp 20-22; Grant,
Continental Air Defense, p 66.

51. Grant, Continental Air Defense, p

67.

52. Memo, Twining to DCS/O and
DCS/D, HQ USAF, subj: Objective Plan
for Air Defense of the U.S., Mar 17, 1953,
USAFHRC microfilm.

53. Ibid.

54. Hist, Directorate of Plans, Jan-
Jun 1953.

55. Air Force plan for defense of the
CONUS against air attack, Jun 8, 1953,
cited in Watson, JCS and National Policy,
pp 122-23.

56. Ibid.

57. Getting, "Recollections."

58. Ray, Nuclear Armament; Air
Force Plan, in Watson, JCS and National
Policy, pp 122-23.

59. Ltr, Maj Gen Robert W. Burns,
Actg Asst VCS, USAF, to DCS/O, HQ
USAF, Apr 30, 1953, USAFHRC micro-
film.

60. Memo, Army C/S, subj: Depart-
ment of the Army Plan for Defense of the
CONUS, Jan 16, 1955, cited in Watson,
JCS and National Policy, p 226.

61. Memo, Chief Nav Ops, subj: U.S.
Naval Basic Defense Plans for CONUS,
Mar 30, 1953, cited in ibid., p 226.

62. Memo, JCS to SecDef, subj: Serv-
ice Divergencies with Respect to the Joint
Outline Plan for Early Warning, Jul 29,
1953, cited in ibid., p 232.

63. Stewart and Joseph Alsop, New
York Herald Tribune, May 29, 1953.

64. Charles J. V. Murphy, "Kelly
Versus the Summer Study Group," Fortune,
July 1953.

65. DOD Ad Hoc Study Gp, "A
Report on the Defense of North America
Against Atomic or Other Airborne Attack"
[hereafter cited as Kelly Rept], May 11,
1953, Files of the OSD; Office of Public In-
formation, Press release, Vandenberg
Papers, Box 48, LC; Watson, JCS and Na-
tional Policy, pp 221-22.

66. Kelly Rept.

67. Memo, Maj Gen Herbert B.
Thatcher, Dir Plans, DCS/O, HQ USAF,

309

The Emerging Shield

to SAF, subj: Continental Defense, Feb 15,
1954, RG 341, OPD 667, NA.

68. NSC Paper 153/1, Jan 1, 1953,
RG 341, OPD 381.02, NA. On Eisenhow-
er's defense initiatives and policies see
Douglas Kinnard's President Eisenhower and
Strategy Management: A Study in Defense
Politics (Lexington, Ky., 1977) and Richard
A. Aliano's American Defense Policy from
Eisenhower to Kennedy (Athens, Ohio,
1975).

69. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root
to McNamara: Army Organization and Ad-
ministration, 1900-1963 (Washington, D.C
1975), p 223.

70. Ltr, Twining to Lt Gen Ira C.
Eaker (USAF, ret), Jan 17, 1953, Twining
Papers, Box 21, LC; Matthew B. Ridgway,
Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway
(New York, 1956), pp 266-67.

71. Ltr, Eisenhower to Wilson, Aug
6, 1953, Vandenberg Papers, Box 31, LC.

72. NSC 159, Jul 22, 1953, as amend-
ed in NSC 159/4, Sep 25, 1953, RG 341,
OPD 667, NA.

73. Ibid.

74. Memo, JCS to SecDef, subj: Con-
tinental Defense, Aug 28, 1953, cited in
Watson, JCS and National Policy, p 239.

75. The Collected Writings of Arthur
W. Radford; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ,
2 vols (Washington, D.C, 1957), Vol I, The
First Term, 15 August 1953 to 15 August
1955, p 221; David Holloway, "Soviet
Thermonuclear Development," Internation-
al Security 4, no. 3 (winter 1979-1980).

76. NSC 159, Jul 22, 1953, as amend-
ed in NSC 159/4, Sep 25, 1953.

77. Ltr, HQ USAF to Chidlaw, subj:
Planning Guide for the Third Phase Aug-
mentation Radar Program, Apr 5, 1954;
Memo, Thomas D. White, USAF VC/S, to
USofAF, subj: Lincoln Transition System,
Nov 18, 1953, RG 341, OPD 667, NA.

78. Ltr, HQ USAF to Chidlaw, Apr
5, 1954.

79. Ltr, HQ ADC to Comdrs,
WADF and CADF, subj: Siting Directive

for Third Phase Semi-Mobile Radar Pro-
gram, Apr 1954, USAFHRC microfilm.

80. Memo, Lyle S. Garlock, ASAF,
to Asst Compt, OSD, subj: Apportionment
Request for Texas Towers, Nov 1, 1954,
USAFHRC microfilm.

81. Memo, John W. Abrams and
Charles M. Motley, Chmn, Canadian and
U.S. Scientific Advisory teams, to Chmn,
Mil Study Gp, subj: Report on Canada-U.S.
Scientific Advisory Team Evaluation of the
Mid-Canada Segment of an Early Warning
System, n.d., RG 341, OPD 667, NA.

82. Memo, Brig Gen Joe W. Kelly,
HQ USAF, to Harold E. Talbott, SAF,
subj: Cooperation Between Canada and the
U.S. on an Early Warning Line for North
American Air Defense, May 5, 1954, RG
340, 311-2074-52, NA.

83. Memo, Arthur W. Radford,
Chmn, JCS, to SecDef, subj: Military Strat-
egy and Posture, Dec 9, 1953, RG 340,
OPD 381.02, NA. Continental defense was
not treated extensively in NSC 162/2 be-
cause it was the subject of NSC 159/4.

84. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolu-
tion of Nuclear Strategy (London, 1981), pp
88-90.

85. Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill."

86. Quoted in Memoirs of Admiral
Radford, p 318.

87. Gen Thomas D. White, "The
Scope of United States Air Strategy," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 299 (May 1955): 25-26
(reprint for the Air Force entitled Air Power
and National Security).

88. Memo, SecDef to JCS, Aug 13,

1954.

89. Watson, JCS and National Policy,

p 246.

90. MR, Col Woodward B. Carpen-
ter, HQ USAF, subj: Evaluation of Our
Actual and Potential Military Power in Re-
lation to Current Military Committments,
Apr 16, 1954, RG 341, OPD 381.02, NA.

91. Ltr, Maj Gen Frederic H. Smith
to Lt Gen Laurence Kuter, CG, Air Uni-
versity, Mar 1, 1954, USAFHRC microfilm.

Chapter 8. Defensive Systems Become Operational

1. William P. Vogel, "SAGE: Elec-
tronic Sentinel," The Air Force Blue Book
(Military Publications Institute, 1959).

2. John B. Jacobs, "SAGE Over-

view," Annals of the History of Computing 5,
no. 4 (Oct 1983).

3. Qtr Prog Rept, Lincoln Laborato-
ry, Jun 1952.

310

Notes

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Briefing, Lt Col O. T. Halley, HQ
ADC, to Gen Chidlaw, Jan 23, 1953;
McMullen, Birth of SAGE.

7. Ltr, Whitehead to Dir Rqr, HQ
USAF, subj: British Comprehensive Dis-
play System, Jul 22, 1950, USAFHRC
microfilm.

8. Briefing, Halley to Chidlaw, Jan
23, 1953; Ltr, Maj Gen Morris R. Nelson to
HQ ADC, subj: Employment of an Ameri-
can Version of CDS, Jun 12, 1950,
USAFHRC microfilm.

9. Lincoln Laboratory Tech Memo,
subj: A Proposal for Air Defense System
Evolution: The Transition Phase, Jun 2,
1953.

10. Ltr, Chidlaw to Vandenberg, Oct
13, 1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

11. Ltr, Twining to Chidlaw, Nov 13,

1952, USAFHRC microfilm.

12. Ltr, Lloyd A. Young, Ch, Elct
Div, RAND, to Maj Gen F. H. Smith, subj:
Discussion of Relationship Between Lin-
coln Laboratory's Proposed Transition
System and the Willow Run Research Cen-
ter's Air Defense Integrated System, Feb

10, 1953.

13. Ibid.

14. Ltr, Killian to Finletter, Jan 9,

1953, RG 340, SAF 000.8-12926-50, Vol
III, NA.

15. Getting, "Recollections."

16. Ltr, Finletter to Killian, Jan 9,
1953, RG 340, SAF 000.8-12926-50, Vol
III, NA.

17. Ltr, Partridge to Killian, Jan 28,
1953, USAFHRC microfilm.

18. Ltr, Partridge to Chidlaw, Feb

11, 1953, USAFHRC microfilm.

19. Ltr, Col Gilbert L. Myers, Dep
Dir Rqr, HQ USAF, to Chidlaw, subj: Lin-
coln Laboratory Technical Memorandum
no 20, Aug 4, 1953, UASFHRC microfilm.

20. Ltr, Albert G. Hill, Dir, Lincoln
Lab, to Trevor Gardner, Apr 6, 1953, RG
340, SAF 000.8-12926-50, Vol III, NA.

21. Memo, Gen Earle E. Partridge,
Comdr, ARDC, subj: Visit to the Universi-
ty of Michigan, Mar 13, 1953, USAFHRC
microfilm.

22. Ltr, Smith to Dir Rqr, HQ
USAF, subj: Improvements for the Ground
Environment of the CONUS Air Defense
Systems, Sep 5, 1953, with Encl, subj:
Operational Improvements for ADC
Needed by 1956, USAFHRC microfilm.

23. Ltr, Partridge to Killian, May 6,
1953, USAFHRC microfilm.

24. Robert R. Everett, in "Perspec-
tives on SAGE: Discussion," Annals of
Computing, p 384. Said one Air Force offi-
cer [Lt Col Peter J. Schenk, "Problems in
Air Defense," Air University Quarterly
Review 5, no. 2 (spring 1952): 39-53] who
worked closely with the scientists:

We must violate the deepest prej-
udices of the "military mind" by
giving this group of civilian sci-
entists complete access to our
problems and weaknesses and let-
ting them eventually prescribe a
cure. We must by-pass and vio-
late normal channels of all sorts
by allowing unheard-of liberties
in accounting and dealing with
public property. In giving inor-
dinary support and credit to our
select group of experts [the scien-
tists] we must expect to alienate
established technical groups [mili-
tary?] charged with the drab and
thankless task of maintaining the
existing systems and making small
improvements in them. Private
industry has recognized this prin-
ciple long ago and pays seeming-
ly exorbitant fees for expert con-
sultants, but they find the results
well worth the costs.

25. Morton M. Astrahan and John F.
Jacobs, "History of the Design of the
SAGE Computer, the AN-FSQ-7," Annals
of Computing, p 341; Kent C. Richmond
and Thomas M. Smith, Project Whirlwind:
The History of a Pioneer Computer (Bedford,
Mass., 1980).

26. "SAGE: The New Aerial Defense
System of the United States," The Military
Engineer (Mar- Apr 1956), pp 115-16; "The
Emerging Shield: The Air Defense Ground
Environment," Air University Quarterly
Review 8, no. 2 (spring 1956): 49-69.

27. C. Robert Wieser, "The Cape
Cod System," Annals of Computing, pp 362-
69.

28. McMullen, Birth of SAGE, p 35.

29. Clyde A. Littlefield, "The History
of SAGE," draft manuscript in AF/CHO, p
101; C. Baum, The Systems Builders: The
Story of SDC (Santa Monica, Calif, 1981),
pp 23-24.

30. Memo, HQ ARAACOM to HQ
CONAD, subj: Integration of SAGE into
CONAD Operation, Dec 20, 1955, cited in
McMullen, Birth of SAGE, pp 44-45.

31. ARAACOM Comd Hist, Jul-Dec

1957.

32. Cited in McMullen, Birth of
SAGE, p 47.

311

The Emerging Shield

33. Ibid., p 52.

34. Ibid., p 57.

35. N. F. Kristy, Man in a Large In-
formation-Processing Center: His Changing
Role in SAGE (RM-3206-PR, Santa
Monica, Feb 1963).

36. Ibid.

37. On Canadian-American coopera-
tion in early warning and other aspects of
air defense see JockePs No Boundaries Up-
stairs, Melvin Conant's The Long Polar
Watch: Canada and the Defense of North
America (New York, 1962), and Jon B.
McLin's Canada's Changing Defense Policy,
1957-1963: The Problem of a Middle Power
in Alliance (Baltimore, 1967).

38. Ray, DEW Line, p 13.

39. ADC DEW Line Sys Ofc, The
DEW System (brochure), pp 13-17; Richard
Morenus, DEW Line (New York, 1957), ch
3; Ray, DEW Line, pp 12-28.

40. ADC DEW Line Sys Ofc, DEW
System, pp 13-17; Morenus, DEW Line, ch
3; Ray, DEW Line, pp 12-28.

41. Memo, Kelly to Talbott, May 5,

1954.

42. Memo, Maj Gen Richard C.
Lindsay, Dir Plans, HQ USAF, to DCS/O,
HQ USAF, subj: Proposed Non- Agenda
Item for Operations Deputies Meeting, Jan
30, 1950, RO 341, OPD 667, NA; Ltr,
Chrmn, Canadian Chiefs of Staff, to Chrmn,
JCS, Jun 30, 1954, cited in Watson, JCS
and National Policy, p 266.

43. Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Mili-
tary Independence in the Age of the Super-
powers (Toronto, 1977), p 45.

44. Jockel, "No Boundaries Upstairs,"
ch 3, pp 41-45.

45. First Rept, Location Study Gp,
Nov 12, 1954, cited in Watson, JCS and
National Policy, p 269.

46. Memo, SecDef to SAF, subj: Dis-
tant Early Warning System for CONUS,
Oct 5, 1954, RG 340, SAF 676.9-11323-49,
NA.

47. Memo, Lyle S. Garlock, ASAF,
subj: Revision of Charter for Air Force
Management Fund Project Account no. 8,
Distant Early Warning System, n.d., RG
340, SAF 676.9-11323-49, NA.

48. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on the Air Force of the Committee on
Armed Services, Senate, Testimony of Maj
Gen Partridge, 84th Cong, 2d sess, pt 3.

49. Ltr, HQ USAF to HQ ADC,
subj: Implementation of the DEW Line, Jan
21, 1955; Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1954.

50. Ltr, HQ USAF to HQ ADC, Jan
21, 1955; Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1954.

51. Conant, Long Polar Watch, p 40.

52. Ray, DEW Line, p 30.

53. Ibid., pp 33-34.

54. Thomas W. Ray, A History of
Texas Towers in Air Defense, 1952-1964
(ADC Hist Study 29, 1965), pp 1-2.

55. Ibid.; Hist, ADC, Jan-Jun 1955.

56. Ray, Texas Towers, pp 21-22;
Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1955; Hist, EADF,
Jul-Dec 1956.

57. Rept, Preparedness Investigating
Subcom, Com Armed Services, Senate, The
Collapse of Texas Tower no. 4, Jun 15,
1961; Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1960; Ray, Texas
Towers, pp 27-28.

58. Ray, Early Warning, pp 5-6.

59. Hist, ADC, Jan-Jun 1951; Hist,
ADC, Jul-Dec 1951; Hist, WADF, Jul-
Dec 1951; Ray, Early Warning, pp 8-9.

60. Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1951; Hist,
ADC, Jan-Jun 1952; Frederick G. Swan-
borough and Peter Bowers, United States
Military Aircraft Since 1909 (New York,
1963), pp 298-301; Ray, Early Warning, pp
10-11.

61. Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1956; Hist,
WADF, Jul-Dec 1956; Ray, Early Warning,
pp 32-33.

62. Hist, ADC, Jan-Jun 1956; Hist,
ADC, 1958; Ray, Early Warning, pp 47-48.

63. Quote in Volan, GOC, p 243.

64. Ltr, HQ ADC to HQ USAF,
subj: Deactivation of the Ground Observer
Corps, Mar 17, 1958; Volan, GOC, p 245.

65. Hist, ADC, Jun-Dec 1957.

66. Final Rept, Project Lamplight,
1955, copy in AF/CHO; McMullen, Radar
Programs, p 101.

67. Ltr, Lt Gen J. H. Atkinson, HQ
ADC, to CSAF, subj: Vulnerability of Our
Ground Environment System to ECM, Jan
22, 1957; Ltr, HQ ADC to HQ USAF,
subj: Proposed Electronic Countermeasure
Fixes for ADC Radars, Jul 15, 1957; Hist,
ADC, 1958; McMullen, Radar Programs, pp
105-06.

68. McMullen, Radar Programs, p

228.

69. Hist, ADC, 1958; George H.
Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The
Airpower Background of Modern Strategy
(New York, 1966), p 132.

70. CIA NIE 11-3-55, Soviet Capa-
bilities and Probable Courses of Action
Through 1960, May 17, 1950; John Prados,
The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analy-
sis and Russian Military Strength (New
York, 1982), pp 38-50.

312

Notes

71. Charles A. Cannon, "The Politics
of Interest and Ideology: The Senate Air-
power Hearings of 1956," Armed Forces and
Society 3, no. 4 (Aug 1977): 595-605.

72. McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense.

73. Ltr, Chidlaw to Gen Thomas
Power, CG, ARDC, Aug 19, 1954, cited in
Hist, CONAD-ADC, Jul-Dec 1954.

74. McMullen, Air Defense Weapons,
pp 250-51; Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters,
pp 159-73.

75. Bruce Robertson, U.S. Army and
Air Force Fighters 1916-1961 (London,
1961), pp 120-21; Richard P. Hallion, On
the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden,
1946-1981 (NASA Hist Series, 1984), pp
202-07; Jones, U.S. Fighters, pp 273-74; Fu-
trell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, pp 268-69;
McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense, pp 63-
65; Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, p 159.

76. Jones, U.S. Fighters, p 285;
McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense, p 92;
Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, pp 209-21.

77. McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense,
pp 75-84; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
p 269; Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, pp
179-80.

78. McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense,
pp 84-91; Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, pp
135-57.

79. McMullen, Aircraft in Air Defense,
pp 99-122.

80. Knaack, Post-WW II Fighters, pp
330-31; Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p
272.

81. Quoted in Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Doctrine, p 273.

82. McMullen, Air Defense Weapons,

p 277.

83. Ibid, pp 157-58.

84. Ray, Nuclear Armament, pp 3-4.

85. Ibid, pp 4-5.

86. Arthur K. Marmor, The Search for
New USAF Weapons, 1958-1959 (USAF
Hist Div Liaison Off., 1961), pp 15-20;
George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The
First Twenty-Five Years (New York, 1970), p
183. During the July 1957 test, five officers
and a cameraman stood directly under the
detonation as a public reassurance act. The
officers were Col Sydney Bruce, Lt Col
Frank Ball, and Majors Norman Bodinger,
John Hughes, and Don Luttrell. They con-
tributed to the ease with which nuclear
weapons were accommodated on bases with
no public outcry [Ltr, Col Barney Oldfield
(USAF, ret) to the author, Jun 12, 1985].

87. Hist, ADC, Jul-Dec 1953.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Cited in ibid.

91. Richard F. McMullen, Interceptor
Missiles in Air Defense (ADC Hist Study 30,
1965), pp 2-3.

92. Ibid, p 17.

93. McMullen, Air Defense Weapons,
p 326.

94. McMullen, Interceptor Missiles, pp
125-26.

Chapter 9. Organizing to Meet the Threat

1. Ltr, HQ USAF to HQ ADC, subj:
Army Air Force Agreements Concerning
Air Defense, May 10, 1951; Memo, Maj
Gen T. D. White, Act DCS/O, to Gen
Twining, Jul 17, 1951, Twining Papers, Box
55, LC.

2. Ltr, HQ USAF to HQ ADC, May
10, 1951; Memo, White to Twining, Jul 17,
1951.

3. ARDC Case Hist, Project Lin-
coln, p 6; DuPre, Biographical Dictionary,
pp 81-82.

4. "Reports of Boards and Commit-
tees," Feb 16-Sep 30, 1952, OSAF 334,
Joint Air Defense Board, Box 1011, RG
340, NA; Hist, Directorate of Plans, HQ
USAF, Jan-Jun 1953.

5. JCS Paper 1899/89, Dec 16, 1953.

6. Watson, JCS and National Policy, p

259.

7. Cited in ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Memo, Lt Gen Partridge, DCS/O,
to Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF, subj:
Continental Air Defense, Jan 11, 1954,
OPD 667, RG 341, NA; Ltr, HQ USAF to
HQ ADC, subj: Command Arrangements
for Air Defense of the U.S., Apr 7, 1954,
US- AFHRC microfilm.

10. Ltr, Chidlaw to Twining, subj:
Command Arrangements for the Air De-
fense of the U.S., May 11, 1954,
USAFHRC microfilm.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Memo, HQ ARAACOM, subj:
Command Arrangements for the Air De-

313

The Emerging Shield

fense of the U.S., May 10, 1954, cited in
Barnard, ARADCOM: The Gun Era, Vol I,
pp 159-62.

14. Memo, SecDef Wilson to SA, SN,
SAF, and JCS, subj: New Command for
Continental Air Defense, Jul 30, 1954, Box
1490, RG 340, NA.

15. HQ CONAD GO 1, Sep 1, 1954.
The Air Force mission regulations for
ADC (AFR 23-9) were not revised until
August 24, 1955. Whereas former editions
of the directive stated "The Air Defense
Command is organized primarily to provide
for and conduct the air defense of the
United States. . . ," the new one read
". . . is organized primarily to discharge
Air Force responsibilities for the air defense
of the United States."

16. Hearings before the Subcommittee
on the Air Force of the Committee on
Armed Services, Senate, Testimony of Gen-
eral Partridge, 84th Cong, 2d sess, Apr 30-
May 1, 1956, pt 3, p 306.

17. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,
pp 203-06.

18. Seventeen Years of Air Defense, pp
53-54.

19. Ltr, Lt Gen S. R. Mickelsen to
Partridge, subj: Proposed Reorganization of
CONAD Headquarters, Apr 11, 1956.

20. NORAD Hist Summary, Jan-Jun

1958.

21. Gen Charles Foulkes, "Canadian
Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age," Behind
the Headlines 21 (May 1961).

22. Jockel, "No Boundaries Upstairs,"
ch 3, pp 48-49, ch 5, pp 2-5.

23. Lt Col P. J. Goodspeed, ed, The
Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 (Ot-
tawa, 1967), pp 219-29.

24. For the decision to equip the
Arrow with the most up-todate missile and
fire control systems, see Murray Penden's
"Fall of the Arrow" [Wings 9, no. 1 (Feb
1979)].

25. Quoted in McLin, Canada's
Changing Defense Policy, p 45.

26. Bill Gunston, Early Supersonic
Fighters of the West (New York, 1975), pp
120-37. See James Dow's The Arrow (To-
ronto, 1979) for the engineering history of
the plane and the political controversy its
development engendered in Canada.

27. CSAF Rept CSAFM 336-55 to
JCS, Combined Canada-U.S. North Ameri-
can Air Defense Command, Dec 1, 1955,
OPD 667, Box 669, RG 341, NA; Jockel,
"No Boundaries Upstairs," ch 5, p 9.

28. Jockel, "No Boundaries Upstairs,"
ch 5, p 11; McLin, Canada's Changing De-
fense Policy, pp 54-57. The Canada-U.S. Re-
gional Planning Group was recognized by
NATO to have responsibility for defense of
North America, but it had no assigned
forces nor command functions as did geo-
graphical divisions in NATO.

29. Canadian House of Commons
Debate, Jul 18, 1956, p 6135, cited in
Jockel, "No Boundaries Upstairs," ch 4, p
50.

30. NORAD Hist Summary, Jan-Jun
1958. The best overview for the Canadian
decision to enter NORAD is JockePs "No
Boundaries Upstairs"; also excellent are
McLin's Canada's Changing Defense Policy,
Cuthbertson's Canadian Military Independ-
ence, and James Eayres's In Defence of
Canada: Growing Up Allied (Toronto, 1980).

31. McLin, Canada's Changing De-
fense Policy, pp 45-47.

32. Ibid.

33. NORAD Hist Summary, Jan-Jun

1958.

34. Intvws, Author with Gen Par-
tridge, Lt Gen Marshall S. Carter, and Air
Marshal C. R. Slemon, Colorado Springs,
Colo., Apr 15, 1973, personal files.

35. Ibid.

36. Cuthbertson, Canadian Military
Independence, pp 50-51.

37. The Air Defense Command in the
Cuban Crisis, October-December 1962 (ADC
Hist Study 15, 1962), pp 163-66.

38. McLin, Canada's Changing De-
fense Policy, p 156; Jockel, "No Boundaries
Upstairs," ch 5.

Chapter 10. Epilogue: Impact of a New Threat

1. Sputnik was probably launched by
an intermediate-range ballistic missile, gen-
erally designated "T-2" [Wernher von
Braun and Frederick I. Ordway III, History
of Rocketry and Space Travel, 3d rev ed

(New York, 1975), p 158, and Prados, Soviet
Estimate, pp 56-57]. For the American re-
action to Sputnik see Walter A. McDou-
gall's . . . The Heavens and the Earth: A Po-
litical History of the Space Age (New York,

314

Notes

1985), James R. Killian's Sputniks, Scientists,
and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Spe-
cial Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), Kin-
nard's President Eisenhower and Strategy
Management, and Stephen E. Ambrose's
Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Es-
tablishment (New York, 1981). On the de-
velopment of Soviet missile technology,
McDougall's Heavens and Earth (esp pp 20-
40) is superb. See also Bruce Parrot's Poli-
tics and Technology in the Soviet Union
(Cambridge, Mass., 1983), Kendall E. Bai-
les's Technology and Science Under Lenin
and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical In-
telligensia, 1917-1941 (Princeton, N.J.,
1978), and G. A. Tokaty's "Soviet Rocket
Technology" [Technology and Culture (fall
1963), pp 516-17].

2. 1st Ind, HQ AAF to CG, Air Tech
Serv Comd, Feb 14, 1946, USAFHRC
microfilm.

3. R&R, AC/AS-3, GMs Div, to
AC/AS-4, R&E Div, subj: Military Char-
acteristics of an Air Defense System, DRB
381, War Plans Miscellaneous, National De-
fense, 1946-1947, NA.

4. AMC Case Hist, Aircraft Control
and Warning Systems, doc 29; Memo, AC/
AS-3, GMs and Air Def Div, to AC/AS-4,
R&E Div, subj: Development of Radar
Equipment for Detecting and Countering
Missiles of the German A-4 type, Dec 27,
1946, USAFHRC microfilm.

5. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p

238.

6. Ltr, DAC/AS-3 to CG, Air Univ,
subj: Preparation of AAF Concept and
Outline Strategy for War, Apr, 11, 1947,
DRB 381, War Plans Miscellaneous, Na-
tional Defense, 1946-1947, NA.

7. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, p

251.

8. Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile De-
fense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and
Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington, Ky., 1972),
passim.

9. The Active Air Defense of the United
States, 1954-1960 (RAND Study R-250,
Santa Monica, Calif, Dec 1953), pp 7-8.

10. Memo, HQ CONAD to CSAF as
Exec Agt for JCS, subj: Assignment of
ICBM and IRBM Defense Responsibility in
CONAD, Apr 3, 1956, USAFHRC micro-
film.

11. Memo, Gen Partridge, CINC-
CONAD, to Comdr ADC, Apr 3, 1956,
USAFHRC microfilm.

12. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine,

p 251.

13. Hist, CONAD, 1956-1957.

14. Cited in Benson D. Adams, Ballis-
tic Missile Defense (New York, 1971), p 27.

15. Ibid., p 33; NORAD's Quest for
Nike-Zeus and a Long-Range Interceptor
(NORAD Hist Ref Paper 6, 1962).

16. Hist, ADC, 1971.

17. Thomas W. Ray, History of
BMEWS, 1957-1964 (ADC Hist Study 32,
1965); Thomas W. Ray, Interceptor Disper-
sal, 1961-1964 (ADC Hist Study 25, 1964).

18. Ray, BMEWS.

19. Ibid.; "Samos . . . was a Polaroid
wonder that developed its own film,
scanned it electronically, and radioed the
pictures to ground stations" [McDougall,
Heavens and Earth, p 329]. MIDAS was de-
signed to watch for Soviet first-strike mis-
sile attacks. Both satellites were instrumen-
tal in dispelling the missile-gap myth. A
good account of programs leading to
SAMOS and MIDAS is in David Baker's
The Shape of Wars to Come [(New York,
1984), pp 45-55].

20. Hist, ADC, Jan-Jun 1959.

21. Ibid.

22. Hearings on DOD appropriations
for FY 1961, House of Representatives, pt
1, Jan 1960, p 54; Richard F. McMullen,
The Aerospace Defense Command and Anti-
Bomber Defense, 1946-1972 (ADC Hist
Study 39, 1973).

23. Ltr, CINCNORAD (Kuter) to
JCS, subj: Defense of Northern Perimeter
and ICBM sites, Apr 16, 1962, USAFHRC
microfilm.

24. NORAD's Underground Combat
Operations Center, 1956-1966 (NORAD
Hist Ref Paper 12, 1966), pp 3-6.

25. NORAD Hist Summary, 1958.

26. NORAD's Underground COC, p

18.

27. Ibid., pp 22-23.

28. Thomas A. Sturm, Command and
Control for North American Air Defense,
1959-1963 (USAF Hist Div Liaison Ofc,
Jan 1965), pp 11-15.

29. Ibid., pp 14-17.

30. Ibid.

31. Richard F. McMullen, Command
and Control Planning, 1958-1965 (ADC Hist
Study 35, 1965), pp 1-12.

32. Ibid.; Baum, Systems Builders, p

77.

33. McMullen, Command and Control,
pp 59-63.

34. Freedman, Evolution of Nuclear
Strategy, p 216; James E. Dornan, Jr., "Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces," in Ray Bonds, ed,

315

The Emerging Shield

The Soviet War Machine: An Encyclopedia of
Russian Military Equipment and Strategy
(New York, 1976), pp 204-08.

35. Soviet priorities in Europe are ex-
plained in Thomas Wolfe's Soviet Power and
Europe, 1945-1970. (Baltimore, 1970) and in
RM-3506-PR.

36. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe;
RM-3506-PR; Harriet Fast Scott and Wil-
liam F. Scott, The Soviet Art of War: Doc-
trine, Strategy, and Tactics (Boulder, Colo.,
1982), pp 123-27.

37. RM-3506-PR.

38. Ibid.

39. R. D. M. Furlong, "NORAD— A
Study in Evolution," International Defense
Review 1, no. 3 (Jun 1974): 317-19.

40. McMullen, Anti-Bomber Defense,

p 140.

41. A good discussion of MAD's im-
plications for overall U.S. defense strategy
is in Freedman's Evolution of Nuclear Strate-
gy (pp 245-46).

42. Owen E. Jensen, "Air Defense of
North America, Historical Imperatives for
Change" (thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Calif., Dec 1982), p 116.

43. Quoted in Freedman, Evolution of
Nuclear Strategy, p 258.

44. Hist, ADC, 1973-1974; Jensen,
"Air Defense of North America," p 169.

45. Hist, ADC, 1973-1974.

46. McMullen, Anti-Bomber Defense,
pp 221-22.

47. John L. Frisbee, "Air Defense—
The Forgotten Front," Air Force 53, no. 7
(July 1970).

48. Hist, ADC, 1973-1974.

49. Ibid.

50. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., and Mil-
dred W. Johnson, A Handbook of Aerospace
Defense Command Organization, 1946-1980,
rev ed (ADC Hist Ofc, Dec 1980), pp 15-
16; Jensen, "Air Defense of North Amer-
ica," pp 184-85; Hist, ADC, 1979.

51. Soviet Military Power (Washington,
D.C., 1984), p 29.

52. Quoted in Lt Col Richard S.
Cammarota, "Defensive Watch," Air Force
68, no. 2 (Feb 1985), p 84; Lt Col Donald
D. Carson, "New Look in Air Defense,"
Air Force 67, no. 6 (Jun 1984): 80-82; Mari-
lyn Silcox, "Southeast ROCC Marks Begin-
ning of New Air Defense Era," National
Defense 69, no. 399 (Jul- Aug 1984): 42-46;
Rick Atkinson, "Air Defense for Continen-
tal U.S. Is Coming Back into Vogue,"
Washington Post, Aug 25, 1984; Space Com-
mand/ADCOM Hist, 1983.

316

Glossary

of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA

AAA

antiaircraft artillery

A AC

AAr

Army Air .rorces

A A Z™ 1

AALr

Air Adjutant General

A T"> A X

ABM

antiballistic missile

A /AO

AC/AS

Assistant Chief, Air staff

AC/S

Assistant Cruet ot Man

act

acting

AC 1 a

Air Corps Tactical School

ADC

Air Defense Command (now the Aerospace De-

fense Command)

ADES

Air Defense Engineering Service

AJJla

Air Defense Integrated System

AD1 AC

Air Defense-Tactical Air Command

AEC

Atomic Energy Commission

AEF

American Expeditionary Forces

AExO

Assistant Executive Officer

1AF, 2AF, etc.

First Air Force, Second Air Force, etc.

AFB

Air Force Base

AFCC

Air Force Combat Command

AF/CHO

Office of Air Force History, Boiling AFB, Wash-

ington, D.C.

AFR

Air Force Regulation

AG

Adjutant General

AGF

Army Ground Forces

AGO

Adjutant General's Office

agt

agent

Amb

Ambassador

AMC

Air Materiel Command

Anx

annex

APG

Air Proving Ground

APGC

Air Proving Ground Command

App

appendix

ARADCOM

Army Air Defense Command

ARDC

Air Research and Development Command

AS

Air Staff

317

The Emerging Shield

ASA

Assistant Secretary of the Army

ASAF

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Asst

Assistant

AWACS

Airhornf* Vitamin (r nnrl Cr\ntm\ ^\/ctem

nuuuiiiv wauling dllU V^JIlllUl OyalCIIl

J_>L1

tjoara

BMEWS

Ballistic Missile Early- Warning System

BOMARC

Boeing-Michiean Aeronautical Research Center

BUIC

Backup Interceptor Control

Bui

bulletin

Bur

Bureau

CAA

Civil Aeronautics Administration (formerly Civil

Aeronautics Authority)

CAC

Chief of Air Corps

CADF

Central Air Defense Force

CADIN

Continental Air Defense Integration, North

CAF

Continental Air Forces

C/AS

Chief, Air Staff

CDS

comprehensive display system

CG

Commanding General

Ch

Chief [of]

Chmn

chairman/chairmen

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CINCCONAD

Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense

CINCNORAD

Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense

Command

Cir

Circular

CNGB

Chief, National Guard Bureau

CO

Commanding Officer

coc

Combat Operations Center

com

committee

Comd

Command

Comdr

Commander

Comm

communication

Compt

Comptroller

con

conversation

CONAC

Continental Air Command

CONAD

Continental Air Defense Command

Cong

Congress

CONUS

continental United States

C/S

Chief of Staff

CSAF

Chief of Staff, Air Force

318

Glossary

DAF Department of the Air Force

DBA Soviet long-range aviation command

DC/AS Deputy Chief, Air Staff

DC/S Deputy Chief of Staff

DCS/D, /M, /O, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development; Materiel; Op-

/P, /Plans erations; Personnel; and Plans, respectively

Def Defense

Dep Deputy [for]

DEW Distant Early Warning

Dir Director/Directors

Div Division

doc document

DOD Department of Defense

EADF Eastern Air Defense Force

ECM electronic countermeasure

elct electronics

Emb Embassy

env envelope

EO Executive Order

Ex exercise

exec executive

FEAF Far East Air Forces

FFAR folding-fin air-to-air rocket

FM Field Manual

FW Fighter Wing

FY fiscal year

GAPA ground-to-air pilotless aircraft

GO ground-controlled interception

GHQ General Headquarters

GM guided missile

GO General Order

GOC Ground Observer Corps

GOR General Operational Requirement

Gp group

Hist History/Historical

HQ Headquarters

IBM International Business Machines Corporation

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IFF identification, friend or foe

IG Inspector General

319

The Emerging Shield

Instl installation

Intvw interview

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missiles

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSS Joint Strategic Survey

KISS "keep it simple, stupid"

Lab Laboratory

LADA London Air Defense Area

LC Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Leg legislative

Ltr letter

MAD mutual assured destruction

Memo memorandum

MIDAS Missile Defense Alarm System

min minutes

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MR memo for the record

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

Msg message

mtg meeting

n. note

NA National Archives, Washington, D.C.

NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

NASA National Air and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Nav Naval

NGB National Guard Bureau

NIE national intelligence estimate

no. number

NORAD North American Air Defense Command

NSC National Security Council

ofc office

off officer

Ops Operations

Org Organization

OSAF Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSW Office of the Secretary of War

PL Public Law

320

Glossary

Pres

President

prog

program/progress

proj

project

Pt

part

ntr
qir

qilal ICI xy

R&E

research and engineering

rec

record

Ref

reference

Reg

Regulation

Rept

report

JN.VJ

Record Group

Rqrs

requirements

routing and record set

rsch

research

SA

Secretary of the Army

SAC

Strategic Air Command

SAF

Secretary of the Air Force

SAGE

semiautomatic ground environment

SAMOS

Satellite and Missile Observation Systi

S/AS

Secretary, Air Staff

SDC

Systems Development Corporation

SecDef

Secretary of Defense

SecState

Secretary of State

SecWar

Secretary of War

SecWar/Air

Secretary of War for Air

Secy

Secretary

serv

service

sess

session

SN

Secretary of the Navy

SO

Special Order

Sp

special

otavka

Supreme High Command (U.S.S.R.)

sti

start

sudgoto

subcommittee

sys

«v<itf*m

TAP

Tactical Air Command

tech

technical

Tp

telephone

TV

television

UHF

ultrahigh frequency

321

The Emerging Shield

USAFHRC USAF Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB,

Montgomery, Ala.
USofAF Undersecretary of the Air Force

VC/S Vice Chief of Staff

Vol volume

WADF Western Air Defense Force

WD War Department

WDGS War Department General Staff

WPD War Plans Division

WSEG Weapons Systems Evaluation Group

ZORC Informal group of civilian scientists (Jerrold R.

Zacharias, J Robert Oppenheimer, Isidor I. Rabi,
and Charles Lauritsen)

322

Bibliographic Note

Governmental Sources

Documents contained in the Air Force's Historical Research Center
(USAFHRC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, offer a wealth of information on
matters dealing with air defense from the 1930s to the present. Most of
the documents in Maxwell are reproduced on microfilm available in the
Office of Air Force History (AF/CHO), Boiling AFB, Washington,
D.C. Other Air Force air defense documents are stored in the USAF
Space Command History Office, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Also available at USAFHRC are a number of important interviews.
Thomas A. Sturm's interview with Maj. Gen. Gordon P. Saville, dated
March 26-30, 1973, is of immense importance. Saville's reminiscences
add much information to the store of knowledge in continental air de-
fense and open new vistas and paths for further research. Other valuable
interviews include those with Generals Earle E. Partridge, Bruce K.
Holloway, Laurence S. Kuter, Samuel E. Anderson, Frederic H. Smith,
Arthur C. Agan, and Herbert Thatcher.

Governmental holdings used in air defense history include those at
the National Archives (NA) in Washington, D.C, and the Library of
Congress (LC), also in Washington. Especially useful NA holdings are
Record Group (RG) 18, Records of HQ, Army Air Forces; RG 218,
Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; RG 340, Records of the Office of
the Secretary of the Air Force; and RG 341, Records of HQ USAF.

The papers of the Air Force Chiefs of Staff are collected in the Li-
brary of Congress. Collections used in this study include those of Gener-
als Muir S. Fairchild, H. H. Arnold, Carl A. Spaatz, Hoyt S. Vanden-
berg, Nathan N. Twining, and Thomas D. White.

Books

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oratory. Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1981.

Barnard, Roy S. The History of ARADCOM. Vol 1, The Gun Era, 1950-1955. Washington:
Army Air Defense Command, 1972.

Cline, Ray S. Washington Command Post: The Operations Division [U.S. Army in World
War II: The War Department]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, 1951.

Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild. Guarding the United States and Its
Outposts [U.S. Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere]. Washington: Office
of Military History, 1964.

323

The Emerging Shield

Cooling, B. Franklin. The Army Support of Civil Defense, 1945-1966: Plans and Policy.
Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1967.

Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World War II. 7
vols. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958; Washington: Office of Air
Force History, 1983. Vol I: Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942.
Vol VI: Men and Planes. Vol VII: Services Around the World.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air [USAF Warrior Studies], Translated by Dino
Ferrari and edited by Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harahan. New York: Coward-
McCann, 1942; Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Dziuban, Stanley W. Military Relations Between the United States and Canada: 1939-1945
[U.S. Army in World War II: Special Studies]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili-
tary History, 1959.

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. Rev. ed. Washington:
Office of Air Force History, 1983.

Goodspeed, Lt. Col. P. J., ed. The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967. Ottawa: Director-
ate of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1967.

Green, Constance McLaughlin, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots. The Ordnance De-
partment: Planning Munitions for War [U.S. Army in World War II: The Technical
Services]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955.

Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. The Organization of Ground
Combat Troops [U.S. Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces]. Washington:
Office of Military History, 1947.

Gross, Charles Joseph. Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969.
Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1985.

Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946-1981 [NASA History
Series]. Washington: NASA, 1984.

Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,
1900-1963 [Special Studies Series]. Washington: United States Army Center of Military
History, 1975.

Holley, Irving Brinton, Jr. Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces
[U.S. Army in World War II: Special Studies]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili-
tary History, Department of the Army, 1964.

Knaack, Marcelle Size. Post-World War II Fighters, 1945-1973. Vol I of Encyclopedia of
U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems. Washington: Office of Air Force History,
1978.

Kohn, Richard H., and Joseph P. Harahan, eds. Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force
in the European Theater of Operations [USAF Warrior Studies]. Washington: HQ AAF
Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, 1946; Washington: Office of Air Force Histo-
ry, 1984.

Morton, Louis. The Fall of the Philippines [U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the
Pacific]. Washington: Office of Military History, 1953.

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961-.

Rearden, Steven L. The Formative Years, 1947-1950. Vol I of History of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Washington: History Office, Secretary of Defense, 1984.

Shiner, John F. Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935. Washington: Office of Air
Force History, 1983.

Terrett, Dulaney. The Signal Corps: The Emergency (to December 1941) [U.S. Army in
World War II: The Technical Services]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1956.

Thompson, George Raynor, and Dixie R. Harris. The Signal Corps: The Outcome (mid-1943
Through 1945) [U.S. Army in World War II: The Technical Services]. Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966.

Thompson, George Raynor, et al. The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943)
[U.S. Army in World War II: The Technical Services]. Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, 1957.

Watson, Robert J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954. Vol V of Histo-
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1986.

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Interceptor Missiles in Air Defense. ADC Hist Study 30, 1965.

Radar Programs for Air Defense, 1946-1966. ADC Hist Study 34, 1966.

Mooney, Chase C, and Edward C. Williamson, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-

1945. USAF Hist Study 10, 1956.

NORAD's Quest for Nike-Zeus and a Long-Range Interceptor. NORAD Hist Ref Paper 6,
1962.

325

The Emerging Shield

NORAD's Underground Combat Operations Center, 1956-1966. NORAD Hist Ref Paper 12
1966.

Ray, Thomas W. The ADC Airborne Early Warning and Control Program, 1946-1964. ADC
Hist Study 28, 1965.

The Air National Guard Manned Interceptor Force, 1946-1964. ADC Hist

Study 23, 1964.

History of BMEWS, 1957-1964. ADC Hist Study 32, 1965.

A History of the DEW Line, 1946-1964. ADC Hist Study 31, 1965.

A History of Texas Towers in Air Defense, 1952-1964. ADC Hist Study 29,

1965.

Interceptor Dispersal, 1961-1964. ADC Hist Study 25, 1964.

Nuclear Armament: Its Acquisition, Control, and Application to Manned Inter-
ceptors, 1951-1963. ADC Hist Study 20, 1963.

Reither, Joseph R. The Development of Tactical Doctrines at AAFSAT and AAFTAC USAF
Hist Study 13, 1944.

Sturm, Thomas A. Air Defense of Alaska, 1940-1957. NORAD Hist Ref Paper, 1957.

Command and Control for North American Air Defense, 1959-1963. USAF

Hist Div Liaison Ofc, Jan 1965.

Organization and Responsibility for Air Defense, 1946-1955. ADC Hist Studv

9, 1963. 3

The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-1964

USAF Hist Study, 1967.
Volan, Denys. The History of the Ground Observer Corps. ADC Hist Study 36, 1968.
Wiley, Mildred. Statistical Data Book. Vol III, Radar, 1946-1973. HQ ADC Hist Office

1973.

Manuscript Histories

Indispensible to this study have been the historical monographs pro-
duced by the major Air Force commands, especially the histories pro-
duced by the Air Defense Command (ADC) and by the Continental Air
Defense (CONAD) and the North American Air Defense (NORAD)
commands. Especially insightful were works written by ADC historians
Thomas A. Sturm, Richard F. McMullen, Denys Volan, and Thomas W.
Ray. In addition, wing and interceptor command histories offer vivid
portrayals of duties performed by air defense forces "on the line" and
add perspective to that of the command histories.

Nongovernmental Sources

Because many of the primary documents dealing with air defense
remain classified, the publications cited here will be those easily accessi-
ble to the interested reader.

The best general accounts of American military history that to some
degree access the U.S. military's preference for offensive warfare are
Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from
Washington to Marshall (New York, 1962); Walter Millis, Arms and Men:
A Study in American Military History (New York, 1956); Robert S.
Browning III, Two If by Sea: The Development of American Coastal De-

326

Bibliography

fense Policy (Westport, Conn. 1983); Allan R. Millett and Peter Mas-
lowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States
of America (London, 1984); and Weigley, The American Way of War: A
History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York, 1973).
Millett and Maslowski's study is judicious and comprehensive. Weigley's
works are most insightful and provocative.

General and special studies in the development of nuclear strategy
are legion, and the list of books, articles, and special reports is growing.
Cited below are works that are particularly helpful in fitting air defense
into the context and evolution of post- World War II strategy.

An excellent survey is Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nucle-
ar Strategy (London, 1981); also see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Mis-
sile Age (Princeton, 1959), and "The Development of Nuclear Strategy"
[International Security (spring 1978)]; George H. Quester, Deterrence
Before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy (New
York, 1966); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in
the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980), and Counsels of War (New
York, 1985) (Herken interviewed many of the scientists who participated
in air defense studies and laboratory experiments in the early 1950s);
Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of the U.S. Strategic Doctrine, 1945 to
1980" [Journal of Strategic Studies (Dec 1980)]; David A. Rosenberg
(who produced the ground-breaking work in the field of early postwar
American plans and capabilities for nuclear war), "American Atomic
Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision" [Journal of American History
(May 1979)], "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American
Strategy, 1945-1960" [International Security (spring 1983)], and "A
Smoking, Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours: Documents on
American War Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-
1955" [International Security (winter 1981/1982)]; Samuel F. Wells, Jr.,
"Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat" [International Se-
curity (fall 1979)], and "The Origins of Massive Retaliation" [Political Sci-
ence Quarterly (spring 1981)]; and Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Per-
ception" [International Security (winter 1982/1983)]. These citations can
only serve as a small, although important, sample of books and articles
published on strategic issues with overtones for air defense.

Threat assessment and air defense are closely related issues. See Jack
H. Nunn, The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective (New York,
1982); Mark E. Miller, Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for
Superiority (Miami, Fla., 1982); John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. In-
telligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York, 1982); and
Jonathan S. Lockwood, The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine: Impli-
cations for Decision Making (London, 1983).

Background on why military institutions favor offensive doctrines
and on advantages and disadvantages of the strategic defensive are

327

The Emerging Shield

touched on in Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France,
Britain, and Germany Between Two Wars (Ithaca, 1984) (Posen's section
on the British decision to move ahead in air defense in the 1930s is espe-
cially valuable); see also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the
International System (New York, 1977); Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Re-
lations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984" [International Secu-
rity (summer 1984)]; Charles L. Glaser, "Why Even Good Defenses May
Be Bad" [International Security (fall 1984)] (Glaser's article is not histori-
cal, but nevertheless invites comparisons between the decision to build an
extensive air defense network in the 1950s and the debates of the 1960s
and 1980s on missile defense); and Maj. Owen E. Jensen, "Classical Mili-
tary Strategy and Ballistic Missile Defense" [Air University Review, (May-
June 1984)].

Daniel H. Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and
the National Security State (Boston, 1977), and John Lewis Gaddis, Strat-
egies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National
Security Policy (New York, 1982), present the national security backdrop
to the years covered in this book.

Books

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Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington: Brookings In-
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Borowski, Harry R. A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment Before Korea.
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Boyle, Andrew. Trenchard. New York: Norton, 1962.

Braun, Wernher von, and Frederick I. Ordway III. History of Rocketry and Space Travel. 3d

rev ed. New York: Crowell, 1975.
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1959.

Browing, Robert S., III. Two If by Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy.

Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983.
Bushby, John. Air Defence of Great Britain. London: Allan, 1973.

Carver, Michael, ed. The War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century.
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976.

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The Emerging Shield

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333

Index

Aberdeen, Md.

Chennault's interest in testing at: 14
early warning exercises: 12
Acheson, Dean

on Chinese attack in Korea: 141
on distant early-warning line: 186
on joint defense with Canada: 159-60
on Summer Study Group: 177-78
Advertising Council, Inc.: 158, 180
Aerospace Defense Command: See Air

Defense Command
Agan, Arthur C: 161
Airborne Early Warning and Control
System (AWACS): 221, 274-75
Air Corps (See also Army Air Forces;

United States Air Force; United States
Air Service): 13-19, 24
abolished: 40
Chief of: 8, 9, 18, 33
coastal air defense: 23
combat readiness: 23
creation of: 8
defense studies: 30
development of aircraft: 12
responsibility for air defense: 31
on strategic bombing: 21
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS): 10, 11,
13, 14, 25, 30, 36, 41
air defense objectives: 18
and radar: 22

on strategic bombing: 22-23
Aircraft, ADC: 162, 163, 165, 166, 227,
231

Aircraft, British

Camel (Sopwith): 5

Morane-Saulnier Bullet: 4

SE-5 (RAF): 5
Aircraft, Canadian

CF-100 (Avro) Canuck: 230, 247, 248,
249

CF-101: 254

CF-105 (Avro) Arrow: 247, 248

F-86 (Canadair) Sabre: 247
Aircraft, German

Gotha: 4
Aircraft, Soviet

11-14 (Ilyushin): 57

MiG-17 (Mikoyan-Gurevich): 272

Mya-4 (Myasishchev): 181

TB-3 (Tupolev): 56-57

Tu-4 (Tupolev) Bull: 57, 84, 85, 99,

104, 113, 130-32, 149, 167, 181, 182
Tu-16 (Tupolev) Badger: 181, 182
Tu-20 (Tupolev) Bear: 181
Tu-95 (Tupolev) Bear: 181, 182, 224
Aircraft, U.S.
A-12 (Curtiss) Shrike: 15
A-20 (Douglas) Havoc: 34
B-9 (Boeing): 10
B-10 (Martin): 10, 15, 17
B-12 (Martin): 15

B-17 (Boeing) Flying Fortress: 11, 17,

37, 220
B-18 (Douglas): 17
B-25 (North American) Mitchell: 57
B-29 (Boeing) Superfortress: xiii, 57,

87, 88, 99, 111, 130
B-36 (Convair) Peacemaker: 107,

108-10, 111, 127, 182, 191
B-47 (Boeing) Srratojet: 107, 119, 112,

205

B-50 (Boeing) Superfortress 99, 130,
182

B-52 (Boeing) Stratofortress: 225

C-46 (Curtiss) Commando: 216

C-47 (Douglas) Skytrain: 216

C-69 (Lockheed) Constellation: 155

C-124 (Douglas) Globemaster: 216

E-3 (Boeing) Sentry: 274

EC-121 (Lockheed) Warning Star: 155-

56, 220-22, 268, 274
F2H (McDonnell) Banshee: 110
F-15 (McDonnell-Douglas) Eagle: 274
F-16 (General Dynamics) Fighting

Falcon: 274
F-51 (North American) Mustang: 161
F-61 (Northrop) Black Widow: 87
F-80 (Lockheed) Shooting Star: 87, 88,

99, 131, 161, 225
F-82 (North American) Twin Mustang:

76, 99, 131-32, 133, 161
F-84 (Republic) Thunderjet: 99, 161,

225

F-86 (North American) Sabre: 100-101,

124, 142, 161, 162, 188, 204, 225,

226, 230, 233, 249
F-87 (Curtiss) Blackhawk: 100
F-89 (Northrop) Scorpion: 100, 132,

142, 161, 162, 163, 164, 188, 230,

233, 249

F-94 (Lockheed) Starfire: 124, 125, 132,
142, 161, 164, 225

335

INDEX

F-100 (North American) Super Sabre:
231-32

F-101 (McDonnell) Voodoo: 230, 231,

232, 249, 268
F-102 (Convair) Delta Dagger: 102,

164, 188, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231,

249, 268

F-104 (Lockheed) Starfighter: 229, 230,
231, 249

F-106 (Convair) Delta Dart: 228, 229,

230, 231, 249, 268
F-108 (North American) Rapier: 232,

249

MB-2 (Martin): 10
P-6 (Curtiss) Hawk: 10
P-12 (Boeing): 10
P-26 (Boeing) Peashooter: 11
P-30 (Consolidated): 13
P-35 (Seversky): 13, 17
P-36 (Curtiss) Hawk: 13, 37
P-38 (Lockheed) Lightning: 13
P-39 (Bell) Airacobra: 13
P-40 (Curtiss) Warhawk: 13, 37
P-51 (North American) Mustang: 76,
78 80

P-61* (Northrop) Black Widow: 34, 55,

59, 60, 76, 77
P-70 (Douglas) Havoc: 34
P-82 (North American) Twin Mustang:

55, 78

P-84 (Republic) Thunderjet: 59
PB-1W (converted Boeing B-17): 220
TBM-3W (Grumman): 220
U-2 (Lockheed): 225, 255
XF-88 (McDonnell) Vodoo: 230
XF-92A (Convair): 228
Aircraft Production Program: 100-101
Air Defence Command (Canadian): 160
Air Defense Board: 242
Air (later Aerospace) Defense Command
(ADC) (See also Chaney, James
E.; Chidlaw, Benjamin W.;
Saville, Gordon P.; Stratemeyer,
George E.; Twining, Nathan F.;
Whitehead, Ennis C): 35, 90-91, 103,
118, 183, 184, 226, 242, 243
activated: 23, 50

ADIS vs. Lincoln Transition System:

199-200, 202-3
air defense capability: 148, 188, 224
on alert: 169-71

assumes responsibility for ICBM

defense: 257-58
bomber gap with Soviets: 224, 225, 228
and civilian specialists: 152
Colorado Springs: 147
communications failure in: 171

on development of aircraft: 233
devises BUIC: 265-66
directed to complete Lashup: 95
on distant early-warning line: 185
and double perimeter concept: 153-56
and East River project: 172
exercises: 27-28, 221, 223, 239-40
expansion, 1955 budget: 193, 195
fighters in: 161, 166, 187
on GOC: 157-59, 173, 222-23
inactivated: 33
initial accomplishments: 25
loses command status: 274 '
loss of resources to TAC: 274
merges with CONAC: 95-97
mission of: 59-67, 73-76, 186, 215, 274
observers in: 25
operational: 76-77
on personnel policies: 167
postwar organization of: 53-56
on proposed changes for: 72-73
regulations regarding alert: 164-65
request for atomic weapons: 233-36
role in CONAD: 244-46
role in NORAD: 352
test sector operational: 29-30, 32
on transfer of Texas Towers to Navy:
218, 221

Air Defense Direction Center: 208
Air Defense Directorate: 41
"Air Defense Doctrine": 35-36, 44
Air Defense Engineering Service: 207
Air Defense Integrated System (ADIS):
199

Air Defense Operational Training Unit

(later Fighter Command School): 42
Air Defense Plan (Short Term): 62
Air Defense Readiness alert: 170-71
Air Defense Systems Engineering

Committee: 197
Air Defense-Tactical Air Command

(ADTAQ: 274
Air Districts: See Air Forces (numbered)
Air Divisions (numbered)

25th: 111, 120, 125-26, 139, 147, 152,

266

26th: 14, 133, 139, 147, 266
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratory:
204

Air Force Combat Command
abolished: 40

defense section of headquarters: 41
initiated: 33

reaction to Pearl Harbor: 39
Air Force Communications Directorate: 69
Air Force Council: 154n, 193
Air Force Depot Facility: 77

336

Index

Air Force Directorate of Requirements: 199

Air Force Magazine: 180-81, 273

Air Force Operations Staff: 133

Air Force Scientific Advisory Board: 121

Air Forces (numbered)

First: 33, 39, 54, 77-78, 89, 97

Second: 39-40, 54

Third: 40, 42, 54

Fourth: 48, 54, 56, 76-77, 89

Fifth: 103

Tenth: 54, 89

Eleventh: 54

Fourteenth: 54, 89

Twentieth: 50
Air Materiel Command

all-weather interceptor studies: 99-101

on developing all-weather fighters: 161

evaluates SAGE: 203

seeks long-range supersonic missile:
236-37

studies missile defense system: 256

Air National Guard
on air defense duties: 113, 126, 268
called to active duty, Korea: 141-42
control of by regular forces: 76-77
participation in exercises: 77
training for active duty: 60-61
transfer of aircraft to: 131-32, 230

Air Policy Commission: 137
appointed by Truman: 69

Air Proving Ground Command: 68, 73,
199

and early warning aircraft: 155

in emergency posture: 170

in tests for improved interceptor: 99
Air Research and Development Command
(ARDC): 199, 262

on assignment of interceptors: 229

in emergency posture: 170

established: 121

evaluates SAGE: 203
Air Reserve: 54-55

on active duty, Korea: 141-42

under CONAC: 140

training for active duty: 60-61, 72-73
Air Service: See United States Air Service
Airships: 4, 7

Air Staff (See also Eaker, Ira C; United
States Air Force): 43, 52, 107
Air Defense Division of: 86
on atomic weapons: 178
augments Lashup stations: 123-25
Budget Advisory Committee of: 193
and civilian consultants: 152
on control of aircraft artillery: 48
defines Air Reserve functions: 55
delays in completing radar system: 142

Deputy Chief of Staff for Development:

121-22
Directorate of Plans: 187
on distant early warning: 185
in emergency contingency: 79-80, 170-

71

Personnel Advisory Council: 50
Post War Division: 50-51
reacts to grounding Scorpions: 161
reviews USAF posture: 113-15
role in air defense: 61-73, 91, 112
Special Projects Office: 50
Air Training Command: 161
electronic graduates of: 126
in emergency posture: 170
expands scholarships for radar training:
142

Air Transport Command: 78, 84
Air War College: 73, 129
Alaska: 211

aircraft control centers in: 92

defense of: 63-64, 116, 129, 131

and DEW Line: 211

early-warning network zones in: 176,
212

emergency air plan for: 77-78

ground-based radar in: 132, 188

and Mid-Canada Line: 188

SAGE facilities in: 264

Soviet threat to: 107-8

strategic position of: 58-59
Alaskan Air Command

and aircraft warning: 59, 78

on air defense needs: 67

squadrons in: 161
Albuquerque, N. Mex.: 95, 134, 139
Aleutian Islands: 108
Alsop, Joseph

as aide to Chennault: 173

on air defense: 173-74, 187, 189

on Oppenheimer: 179
Alsop, Stewart

on air defense: 173-74, 187, 189

on Oppenheimer: 179
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.:
207

The American Way of War. xii-xiii

Anderson, Samuel E.: 86
on goals for Lashup: 95
on revising U.S. defenses: 113-15

Andrews, Frank M.: 18, 21

as Commander, Army forces in Panama:
29

as Commander, GHQ Air Force: 15
Ankenbrandt, Francis L.: 86

prepares air defense plans: 69-71
on training cadre: 87

337

Index

Antiaircraft artillery: 9, 27, 35, 39, 40,
43-44, 48, 61, 113, 116-17, 144,
180, 181

battalions: 63, 147

in defense of Hawaii: 37

equipment: 17

interservice conflict over: 135, 243-45
and SAGE: 206

Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: 272

Arctic Circle: 176, 214, 259

Arctic theater: 63

Armstrong, Frank A.: 132

Army Air Forces (AAF) (See also Air
Corps; Arnold, Henry H.; United
States Air Force; United States Air
Service)

acquires expertise in air defense: 34

artillerymen and AAF: 49

assumes responsibility against surprise

attack: 61
becomes coequal with Army Ground

Forces: 47
consolidates air defense forces: 43
created: 33-35

deemphasizes home air defense: 42
in defense of polar regions: 58-59, 62
Guided Missiles Division: 255-56
initiates study of GAPA: 236
on minimum air defense: 68-73
and nonrated officers: 49
in postwar planning: 47-59, 64-67
reaction -to V-2 missile: 255-57
reaction to Pearl Harbor: 39
on role of Air National Guard: 74
School of Applied Tactics: 41
Scientific Advisory Board: 67

Army Antiaircraft Artillery Command
consolidated air defense forces: 43
in emergency posture: 170
expansion of: 188
formation of: 40, 116-17
in interservice conflict: 135
move to Colorado: 147
role in CONAD: 243, 244
and SAGE: 206

Army Corps of Engineers: 94

Army General Staff: 48

Army Ground Forces (AGF): 69
coequality with AAF: 47
in reaction to Pearl Harbor: 39
replaces Army GHQ: 40
seeks control over antiaircraft artillery:
61

and Simpson Board: 52
Army Service Forces, replaces Services of
Supply: 40

Arnold, Henry H. (See also Army Air
Forces): 12-13, 18, 23, 32, 48, 51
advocates limited air defense: 21
and alert requirements: 43-44
on British scientific accomplishments:
28-29

as Chief of Air Corps: 26, 30
in command of Continental Air Force:
50

as Commander, March Field: 12
as Commanding General, Army Air

Forces: 33-34, 40-41, 53-54
as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air: 30-33
on maneuvers, 1935: 17
on nonrated officers in AAF: 49
proposes independent air defense role

for AAF: 39
Ashmore, Edward B.: 5, 16
Assistant Chief of Air Staff

for Operations, Commitments, and

Requirements: 65
for Plans: 65
Assistant Secretary of War for Air (See

also Davison, F. Trubee; Lovett,

Robert A.; Symington, W. Stuart): 53,

62

on air defense needs: 67
office established: 8
Association of Civil Defense Directors:
157

Atkinson, Joseph H.

as Commander, ADC: 222, 246

on criticism of GOC: 222

seeks antijamming fixes: 223
Atlantic Fleet: 189
Atlantic Ocean

Air Defense Identification Zone: 134

GOC along coast of: 156

picket vessel operations proposed for:
189

Texas Towers in: 217-20
Atomic Energy Commission

develops atomic weapons: 234

guarding facilities of: 69, 153

hearings on Oppenheimer: 178

reviews military protection: 68

and Soviet atomic tests: 111
Atomic weapons: 118

in conventional warfare: 178-79

effect on Soviet Union: 83-84, 130

in postwar strategy: 56-57

requested by ADC: 233

Soviet possession of: 111-15, 116, 119,
144

tested: 233-36
Austria: 1

338

Index

Backup Interceptor Control (BUIC):

265-66
Baffin Island: 215
Baker Board: 9

"Ballistic Missile Defense System": See

General Operational Requirement 156
"A Ballistic Missile Detection Support
System": See General Operational
Requirement 96
Ballistic Missile Early-Waming System
(BMEWS) (See also General
Operational Requirement 156): 259
Balloons

barrage, in air defense: 33n, 34

Japanese bomb-carrying: 44

L' Entreprenant: 1
Barrows, Arthur S.: 89
Barter Island, Alaska: 211, 214
Battle of Britain

World War I: 3, 4

World War II: 22, 28
Beam: 39
Belgium: 3, 4
Bell, Alexander Graham: 7
Bell Telephone Co.: 30, 98

assists GOC: 121
Bell Telephone Laboratories

in air defense study: 185-86

and SAGE: 207
Bergquist, Kenneth P.: 36-38

on warning of Soviet military moves:
169-71
Bering Strait 212
Berkner, Lloyd: 184

in Summer Study Group: 174-75
Berlin, Germany

Soviet provocation in: 79

and Soviet threats: 130, 135
Bessell, William W., Jr.: 52
Blue Book plan

air defense concepts in: 113-16

on Navy picket vessels: 126
Bly, Ore., attacked by Japanese balloon

bombs: 44
Boeing Aircraft Co.

experience in long-range aircraft 11

participation in BOMARC: 236-37

plan to move production plant: 107

produces AWACS: 221
Boiling Field, Washington, D.C.

Continental Air Force Headquarters: 50

GHQ Headquarters: 32

Strategic Air Command Headquarters:
53

Bolte, Charles L.: 135
BOMARC: See Missiles
Boston, Mass.

antiaircraft battalion assigned: 147

information center in: 40

National Guard Armory in: 30

NORAD force: 248
Bradley, Omar

as Chairman, JCS: 111, 119, 187

on defense mission: 187

estimate of Soviet Union: 158

urges faster action on radar sites: 119
Brandt, Carl A.

as Commander, Air Proving Ground
Command: 68, 73

on F-87 and F-89 test performance: 100
Brett, George H.: 33
Briggs, James E.: 185
Brown, George S.: 126-27, 273
Bull, Harold R.: 190
Bull Committee: 190
Bureau of the Budget funds Radar Fence:

71, 87-89, 114-15
Burgess, Woodbury M.: 169-70
Burroughs Corp. Research Center: 207
Bush, Vannevar

on condition of air defense: 119

on future of air defense: 92

on radar capabilities: 88

Cabell, Charles P.: 113-15
Caldwell, Millard: 157
California air defenses: 152-53
Cambridge, Mass.: 256
Canada

air defense of: 40, 58-59, 63-64, 88,
119-22

American cooperation with: 125, 138,
159-60, 193-94, 209-16, 238, 244,
246-54
defense project: 188-89
friction with U.S. over Cuban Missile

Crisis: 253
Joint Board of Defence: 58
missile sites in: 236
radar coverage in: 114, 121, 259
radar studies in: 175-76
SAGE facilities in: 264
Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group: 250
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee: 246
agree on joint air defense with U.S.:
247

Cannon, John K.: 140
Cape Canaveral, Fla.: 197
Cape Cod, Mass.: 204-5, 218
Cape Dyer, Alaska: 215
Cape Lisburne, Alaska: 214, 215
Carey, John B.: 62-63
Carney, Robert W.: 191

339

Index

Carroll, Franklin O.: 99-100
Central Air Defense Force: 140, 146

activated: 148

alerted for emergency: 170

on Skywatch: 157
Central Defense Command: 31, 42
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 180

established: 78

estimate of Soviet aircraft production:
224

Chaney, James E.: 32

as Commander, ADC: 24, 25
establishes first information center: 30
formulates rules of engagement: 27
studies British air defense system: 29,
36

Charleston, S.C.: 40
Chennault, Claire L.: 14, 173

as pursuit instructor, ACTS: 12
Cheyenne Mountain, Colo.: 262-63
Chicago, 111.: 18, 147, 248
Chidlaw, Benjamin W.: 149, 167, 169,
187, 226, 242

on ADIS and Lincoln Transition:
199-201

on air defense needs: 195

on Air Force role in CONAD: 244-45

assesses ADC: 148-50, 167

on bomber gap with Soviets: 225

as Commander, ADC: 148, 152, 185-86

describes life on alert: 165

on double perimeter concept: 156

on East River study: 172

on "feeble" air defense: 173

on GOC: 157-58

reaction to alert: 170-71

revises mobile program: 152-55
Chief of Naval Operations (See also
Carney, Robert W.; United States
Navy)

on coastal air defense: 110

on Naval cooperation in air defense: 119

on radar picket ships: 155

on study requirements of NSC: 68
Chief Signal Officer: 33

and British radar: 29
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (See also

Air Staff): 144, 145
China-Burma-India Theater: 54
Chinese Communists

accession to power: 136

attack United Nations forces in Korea:
139, 141, 145, 160
Chinese Nationalist Government: 136
Churchill, Winston: 3
Civil Aeronautics Administration: 125

on civilian control of air traffic: 134

Civil Defense Administration: 190

created: 141-42

on Skywatch: 157, 159
Clausewitz, Carl von: xiii
Clay, Lucius D.: 79, 273
Clear, Alaska: 259
Coastal defense mission: 40

Army-Navy controversy oven 8-9

in California: 35

diminished role of: 42
Coast Artillery

and close-in defense role: 9, 33

and joint Air Corps exercises: 17, 27

mission rivalry with Air Corps: 14, 40
Cold War: 130, 136, 144n
Collins, J. Lawton: 135, 243
Collins- Vandenberg agreement: 243, 246
Colorado Springs, Colo. (See also Air
Defense Command; North American
Air Defense Command): 141, 147,
157, 169, 244, 245

ADC commanders' conference at: 156

Combat Operations Center at 261-62

control of air defense from: 152, 238-40

RCAF officers in: 246-47
Combat Operations Center (COC), ADC
(later NORAD): 152, 238, 259, 260,
261-62, 263
"Command and Employment of Air

Power": See Field Manual 100-2
Commands (numbered)

I Fighter: 43

I Interceptor: 33, 40

4th Antiaircraft Artillery: 48

IV Fighter: 43

IV Interceptor: 35

VII Fighter 37

IX Air Defense: 45, 48

XII Tactical Air: 44, 84

XIX Tactical Air: 65
Communists (See also Chinese

Communists; Korea; North Korea;
Republic of Korea)

attack on Korea: 129, 130, 178

coup in Czechoslovakia: 79, 83
Comprehensive Display System (CDS)

as British centralized surveillance: 199

gains credence in United States:
199-200
Computer types: 153

AN/FSQ-7: 205, 264

AN/FSQ-8: 264

Whirlwind I: 150-51, 198, 203-4
Whirlwind II: 204
Continental Air Command (CONAC) (See

also Stratemeyer, George E.;

Whitehead, Ennis C): 199

340

index

created from ADC and TAC: 95-97

faces operational problems: 122-27, 132

on observer corps: 120-21

organization of: 103
Continental Air Defense Command
(CONAD): 223, 261

assumes responsibility for all air
defense: 245-46, 253

created: 206, 245

under jurisdiction of JCS: 245

on Russian missile threat: 257
Continental Air Defense Integration, North

(CADIN): 253
Continental Air Forces

established: 50

disestablished: 53
Continental United States Defense Planning

Group (JCS): 79
Convair

tests delta wing: 228

wins contract to build interceptor: 226
Craigie, Laurence C: 175
Crawford, David McL.: 32
Cuban Air Force: 272
Cuban Missile Crisis: 230, 267

friction with Canada oven 253-54
Curtis, Wilfred A.: 160
Czechoslovakia: 79, 83

Davidson, Howard C: 38
Davison, F. Trubee: 8

as Director, Special Projects Office: 47
Defence Research Board (Canadian): 175
Defense budget list for 1961-1971: 269
Defense Department: See Department of

Defense; Secretary of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency: 260
Denmark: 58
Department of Defense

budget under Eisenhower 191-92

on defense strategy: 257, 260, 272

on early-warning line: 176, 186

endorses GOR 156: 259

on lack of support for new COC: 261

on missile defense: 258

on national security: 118

and the Navy: 109

and the permanent radar program: 114
reorganization of: 191
on Summer Study Group: 176
Department of State (See also Acheson,

Dean; Dulles, John Foster): 118
Deterrence: 144n
Devers, Jacob L.
as Commander, Army Ground Forces:
69

as commander of continental armies: 54
DEW Line: See Distant Early Warning

Line
DeWitt, John L.

on air defense in U.S.: 43
as Commander, Western Theater of
Operations: 39-40
Diefenbaker, John F.: 248, 251-52
Ding Dong (atomic rocket) tested: 234-36
Directorate of Air Defense formed: 41
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line (See
also Canada; Mid-Canada Line;
Pinetree Line; United States): 213-16,
259

capability of: 215, 238-39
constructed: 210-12
radar sites along: 268
responsibility for: 210, 214
revises air defense position: 273-74
security expected of: 224, 264
stations: 211
Douglas Aircraft Co.

on construction of long-range aircraft:
11

research and development project of:
67-68

wins contract for atomic rocket: 234
Douhet, Giulio: 11

on power of bombers: 10, 56
Dowding, Sir Hugh: 22
Dow Field, Maine: 59
Drew Field, Ha.: 34
Dreyfus, Emile: 179
Drum, Hugh A.

as Commander, Eastern Theater of
Operations: 39, 40

as Commander, First Army Area: 23

establishes first information center: 30

and First Army maneuvers: 27

on U.S. air defense: 43
Drum Board: 9
Dulles, John Foster: 194
Dunkirk, France: 3

Eaker, Ira C: 51-53

Early-warning system (See also Distant
Early Warning Line; Mid-Canada
Line; Pinetree Line; Radar): 13,
32-34
in ADC: 25

analysis, research, and development for
185-90

based on ground observation: 12, 18
civilian participation in: 97
and COC: 262

constructed in Canada: 209-16

341

Index

demand for specialists in: 59, 73

exercises and tests of: 15, 17, 77-78

failure in Hawaii: 37-38

Finletter Committee proposals for: 76

preparation for: 70-73

and radar: 22, 48, 70-73

realistic incident in: 169-71

revisions to: 91-94

and SAC: 183-84

and SAGE: 204

and Summer Study Group: 174-77

supplemented: 217-24

task forces in: 36
Eastern Air Defense Force: 103, 139, 146,
148, 195

alerted for emergency: 170

operations of during Korean War: 133

and report of suspicious flight: 170, 171

training tests in: 156-57
Eastern Antiaircraft Artillery Command:
135

Eastern Defense Command: 40

Eastern Theater of Operations activated: 39

East River project

final report of: 172-73

membership of: 174

perspective on air defense: 172
Edwards, Idwal H.: 142
Eglin Field (later Air Force Base), Fla.:
68, 99

Eindecker [monoplane]: 2
Eisenhower, Dwight D.

on air defense buildup: 169, 197, 203,
238

as Army Chief of Staff: 52, 53

on buildup of SAC: 203

emphasizes research and development:

267-68
perception of Soviets: 207
on preemptive attack against Soviets:

194-95

reaction to Sputnik: 255, 260
reappraises military program: 191
reliance on JCS: 191
on Soviet explosion of nuclear device:
192-93

as U.S. president: 190, 202, 243
Electronics Training Group: 34
Elmendorf, Alaska: 170-71, 248, 266
Emmons, Delos C: 18, 33

as Commander, Air Force Combat

Command: 39
as Commander, Army Forces in Hawaii:
39

as Commanding General, GHQ Air
Force: 31-32
England (See also Royal Air Force; Royal

Flying Corps; Royal Navy)
aircraft in: 2

air defense procedures in: 28, 36

commercial aircraft of: 171

and Luftwaffe menace: 22

reaction to Soviet atom test in: 111

in World War I: 3
Ent Air Force Base, Colo.: 140, 141, 147,
152, 170, 250

Combat Operations Center at: 261-62
Europe

Cold War Tension in: 136

Soviet postwar policy in: 83, 130

in World War II: 53
Everest, Frank F.: 135

Fairchild, Muir S.: 11, 18, 22-23, 42, 103,

104, 136-37, 164, 188
on air defense mission: 123, 127
as Assistant Chief of the Air Corps: 41
as Commander, Air University: 81, 85
as Director of Military Requirements: 41
on early-warning system: 98
on priority of resources for SAC: 95-97
reacts to Soviet atomic explosion: 111-

15

revises radar modernization plans: 90-92
searches for improved interceptor: 99-
102

style of: 84-86

as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF: 80-81,
83, 84, 85, 95, 98-101, 111-15
Far East Air Forces: 102-3, 133
Federal Communications Commission: 207
Field Manual (FM) 100-20, "Command
and

Employment of Air Power": 47-48,
53

Fighter Command School: 42

activated: 44
Finletter, Thomas K.: 178, 183

as Chairman, Air Policy Commission:
69

on funds for Canadian radar stations:

160
on GOC: 158

on Lincoln program: 201-2

as Secretary of the Air Force: 137, 151

on Summer Study Group: 177
Finletter Commission: 69, 72

on defense tasks of the Air Force: 73

recommendations of: 76, 79

report of: 75
First Air Defense Command

activated: 24

civilian volunteers in: 25

342

Index

test sector exercises in: 25-26
First Army Area

air defense laboratory in: 26

in maneuvers, 1940: 27-30
First Augmentation: 97
Flight Command, RAF: 22, 29, 32, 34
Florida exercises, 1935: 15, 16, 27, 162
Flying Tigers: 12
Fokker, Anthony: 2
Folkestone, England, bomber raid: 4
Foreign Affairs: 183
Forrestal, James V.

on radar modernization: 88-90, 93

on roles and missions of defense: 79

as Secretary of Defense: 79, 92
Forrester, Jay W.: 150-51, 198, 203-4
Fort Bragg, N.C., maneuvers, 1938: 17, 27
Fort Knox, Ky.

exercises, 1933: 12

testing programs at: 14
Fort Monmouth, N.J.

research and development facility at: 26

Signal Center at: 34
Fort Shafter, Hawaii: 37
Fortune magazine: 183
Foulkes, Charles: 251

as Chairman, Canadian Chiefs of
Staff Committee: 246
Foulois, Benjamin D.: 14
France

aircraft in: 2

Army in: 1

commercial aircraft of: 171

invasion of southern: 84

success of air defense in: 48
Frank, Walter H.

as ACTS Assistant Commandant: 11

and value of defense air forces: 12
Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire, England: 259

Gardner, Fulton Q. C: 40
Gardner, Grandison: 242, 244
Gardner, Trevor: 202
Garlock, Lyle S.: 215
Gelling, Ivan A.: 122, 201
General Electric Corp.
receives Army contract for Thumper:
256

receives contract for DEW line: 215
strike at: 138
General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force
(See also Air Force Combat
Command): 9-10, 18, 40
Air Districts of: 30
exercises: 15, 17, 29-30
redesignated Air Force Combat

Command: 33
General Operational Requirements (GOR),

USAF (numbered)
96, "A Ballistic Missile Detection

Support System": 259
156, "Ballistic Missile Defense System":

259

George, Harold L.: 11, 19
Gerhart, John K.: 186
Germany

aircraft in: 2, 228

air defense operations in: 59

Army Air Service in: 4

balloons in: 3

develops V-2 missile: 117, 236
intelligence material from: 130
Navy: 4

submarine threat against U.S.: 39

threat against continental U.S.: 23

in World War I: 4-5
GHQ Air Force: See General Headquarters

(GHQ) Air Force
Giles, Barney M.: 49
Gorrie, Jack: 184
Gothaer Waggonfabrik; 4
Great Britain: See England
Greenland: 159, 214

air defense in: 58, 63

and DEW Line: 211

early-warning network zone of: 176
Griggs, David T.

as Chief Scientist of the Air Force:
178-79

at Oppenheimer hearings: 183
Ground controlled interception (GCI): 16,

17, 27, 32, 35, 37, 162, 198, 204
Ground Observer Corps (GOC): 92, 238

civilian volunteers in: 120-21, 173

connection with SAGE: 204

effect of Korean War on: 138-39

inactivated: 222-23

nationwide exercise of: 156-59
Ground-to-air pilotless aircraft (GAP A):
236

Groups (numbered)
16th Pursuit: 25
27th Fighter: 80

505th Aircraft Control and Warning: 77-
78, 80, 87
Gruening, Ernest: 107-8
Guam: 59
Gulf of Mexico: 42

radar system coverage for: 193

Haig, Douglas: 5
Hamilton, Pierpont M.: 47

343

index

Hamilton Field (later Air Force Base),
Calif.: 76, 135, 169
nuclear rockets at: 234
Hanford, Wash.

atomic energy facility at: 115, 125
plutonium production plant in: 44, 78,
117

protection for: 126, 147, 248

radar coverage for 91, 123
Hansell, Haywood S., Jr.: 11, 22
Harmon, Millard: 39-40
Harpers Magazine: 179
Harvard University: 34
Hatcher, Harlan: 202
Hawaii: 36-38
Hawaiian Air Force: 38
Headquarters, USAF: See United States Air
Force

Hebert, F. Edward: 272

Herres, Robert T.: 274

Herter, Christian A.: 252

Hill, Albert

as Director, Lincoln Project: 202
in Summer Study Group: 174-76

Hodes, Henry I.: 52

Holloway, Bruce K.

as Commander, SAC: 85

on F-87 and F-89 test performance: 100

on need for all-weather night interceptor:

98-102
on Saville: 85

as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF: 85
Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.: 272
Horner, Richard E.: 258
Hostage Europe policy: 56
House Appropriations Committee (See also
United States Congress): 258

hearings on air defense, 1950s: 260

Vandenberg testimony before: 73, 143
House Aimed Services Committee (See
also United States Congress): 272

on Air Force goals: 136

on B-36: 110

on displeasure with air defense: 139-40
on radar construction in progress: 138,

142-43, 152
testimony on air and ground defense:

109-10

House of Commons (Canadian): 251
House of Representatives: See United

States Congress
Hughes Aircraft Co.

APG-32 radar: 132

E-6 radar: 163, 226

on missile defense: 188

radar development: 161-63
Hurricane Donna: 219

IBM (International Business Machines

Corp.): 204-5
Iceland
air defense in: 58, 63
and DEW Line: 211
negotiations for bases in: 160n
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF): 29, 37,
41

Ilya Mourometz: 4
Interdepartmental Committee on

Intelligence and Security: 190
Irvine, Willard W.: 135, 147

Jacksonville, Fla.: 40

James, Daniel ("Chappie"): 165

Japan: 130

air defense operations in: 59

attack on: xiii, 57

attacks Pearl Harbor: 36-37, 61

launches bombs from balloons on U.S.:
44

and possibility of attack from Pacific:
23

strange incidents oven 79
and suicide attacks in World War II:
110

Jarman, Sanderford: 40

Jockel, Joseph T.: 250

Johnson, Louis A.: 112

and cancellation of aircraft carrier: 109
on Soviet atomic threat: 137
on support of permanent radar stations:
118

Joint Action Army-Navy (later Joint Action

Armed Services) publication: 241
Joint Air Defense Board: 245
Joint Brazil-United States Military

Commission: 84
Joint Canadian-U.S. Military Group: 251
Joint Chiefs of Staff (See also Radford,
Arthur W.): 53, 61, 158, 159, 236
approves installation of DEW Line: 215
assigns missile roles: 117
assigns responsibility for ICBM defense:
257-58

on augmenting U.S. air defense: 113-15
on Communist attack on Korea: 129,
141

creates CONAD: 206, 244-45

on defense mission: 187

on delivering first strike: 84n

on differences between Air Force and

Navy: 189
on distant warning system: 185-86
on Eisenhower's military objectives:

191, 193

344

Index

establishes Air Defense Board: 242
instructed to shore up reserves: 96
on interservice coordination: 241-45
on joint air defense with Canada: 1 19-

21, 159-60, 193-94, 246-47, 250-

52

on mandatory filing of military flight

plans: 134
on nuclear weapons: 234
on operations over polar regions: 57-58
opposes extension of air defense: 172
on peacetime army: 51-52
on Radar Fence Han: 71, 90, 94
on roles and missions of military: 75,

79, 118

view on COC for ADC: 261-62
Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 115, 243
Joint War Room, JCS: 260
Jourdan, Jean Baptiste: 1

Kamchatka Peninsula, Soviet Union: 111
Kansas City, Mo.: 63, 148
Karman, Theodore von: 67, 121
Kelly, Mervin J.: 185-86
Kelly Committee report: 189-90
Kenney, George C: 102

as Commander, Strategic Air Command:
53-55

in Pacific Theater: 93 n
Kepner, William E.

as Commander, Air Proving Ground: 99

as Executive Officer, ADC: 24, 27, 35
36

tests air defenses: 132

Key West, Fla.
JCS meeting in: 79, 109, 241
roles and missions conference: 109-10

Khrushchev, Nikita S.: 266

Killian, James R., Jr.: 146
on air defense: 174-75
as President, MIT: 145, 150, 200
on Summer Study Group: 177
threatens to withdraw from project:
201-2

Kingston, N.Y.: 197

Korea: 152

air defense operations in: 59

Chinese forces move into: 139, 143, 145

radar units in: 132

U.S. commitments in: 141

Korean War: 127, 131, 133, 135, 171,
178, 184
Chinese intervention in: 139, 143
effect on air defense: 129-51, 155, 156,

159, 160, 164, 167
effect on GOC program: 138

effect on military expenditures: 136-37,
207, 223

effect on radar control and warning:
138, 152, 159, 160
Krupp antiballoon rifle: 1
Kuter, Laurence S.: 48-49

as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans: 47,
51

as Commander-in-Chief, NORAD: 260
and development of strategic daylight

bombing: 11
on Soviet threat: 261

Labrador: 159

defense bases in: 119
Laird, Melvin R.: 272
Langley Field, Va.: 27

Headquarters, Tactical Air Command: 53
Lashup project: 94-95, 120, 121

limitations of: 142-43

stations installed for: 93, 123-25, 223

tested: 97-98
Lauritsen, Charles: 183
LeMay, Curtis E.

analyzes emergency alert: 170

as Commander, SAC: 83, 136

on Soviet threat: 224-25
L' Entreprenant: 1
Lewis, John T.: 244
Lilienthal, David E.: 68
Lincoln Laboratory {See also Lincoln
Project; Semiautomatic Ground
Environment; Computer types):
150-51, 152, 174-75, 177, 187, 191,
211, 212

develops automated system: 193, 205
on distant warning line: 185, 198-99,
203-4

ground control development at: 190,
201-2

proposes Lincoln Transition system:

199-202
to study ICBM defenses: 256
threatens withdrawal from air defense
program: 202-3
Lincoln Project (See also Lincoln

Laboratory; Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; Valley Committee): 150
51, 152, 175
Lincoln Transition System: See Semiau-
tomatic Ground Environment
Lindbergh, Charles A.: 93, 93n
Location Study Group: 214
Lockheed Corp.: 155, 220
labor difficulties at: 156
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 143

345

index

London, England: 36

World War I defense in: 5
London Air Defense Area (LADA): 16

established: 5
Loo mis, Wheeler F.: 145
Los Alamos, N. Mex.: 125
Los Angeles, Calif.

Air Defense Identification Zone: 134

regional defense headquarters in: 40,
147, 248

temporary radar warning and control in:
123

Lovett, Robert A.

on early-warning line: 177, 184-86
on East River project: 172-73
as Secretary of Defense: 172

Luftwcffe: 22, 23

MacArthur, Douglas: 9
McChord Field (later Air Force Base),
Wash.: 170, 266

night-fighter squadron at: 59

operations from: 80

squadron moved from: 76
McClellan Air Force Base, Calif.: 220
McCone, John A.: 137-38, 160
McDonnell, John C: 35
McElroy, Neil: 258
McGill Device: See Mid-Canada Line
McGill University: 175
McGuire Air Force Base, N.J.: 133, 205,
236

McMullen, Clements: 58 n
McNair, Lesley J.

as Commander, Army Ground Forces:
39-40

as GHQ Army Chief of Staff: 31
McNamara, Robert S.: 268, 268
McNarney, Joseph T.
on 48-group program: 100-101
reprograms funds for permanent radar:
114

Madison, Wis.: 264

Maginot Line mentality: 68, 71, 76, 81,

176-77, 179
Magnuson, Warren: 111
Mahon, George H.: 260
Manhattan District Project: 175, 179
develops atomic bomb, World War II:

118

Manual Air Defense System: 209

March Field (later Air Force Base), Calif.:

12, 56, 147, 266
Marshall, George C: 24
as Army Chief of Staff: 22, 30, 32-34,
39-40, 47, 52

increases air reserves: 141-42
on joint defenses with Canada: 159-60
on postwar air forces: 50-52
as Secretary of State: 141
sends first signal units to Panama Canal:
26

Martin, Frederick L.: 38
Martin Aircraft Co.: 11
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT): 174, 177, 180
designs Whirlwind computer: 150-

51, 203
electronic training at: 34
establishes laboratory to develop radar:
29

on improvement of air defense: 145,

198-201
on more effective radar: 122
relationship with U.S. Air Force: 202-3
Master Air Defense Plan: 260, 264
Mauborgne, Joseph O.: 25-26, 29, 34
Maxwell Field, Ala.: 10
Mexican border: 40, 193
Miami, Fla.: 18

information center at: 40
Mickelsen, Stanley R.

on capability of Nike: 258
as Commander, Army Antiaircraft
Artillery Command: 246
Mid-Canada Line (See also Canada;

Distant Early Warning Line; Pinetree
Line;United States): 188-89, 193-94,
238

capability of: 210, 212
constructed: 209
radars along: 268
responsibility for: 213-14
Mighty Mouse rockets: 163
Military Characteristics Committee: 214
Military Cooperation Committee (See also
Permanent Joint Board on Defense):
58, 250n, 251
Military Flight Service: 125
Military Study Group, U.S.-Canadian: 193-
94

Milling, Thomas DeWitt: 8
Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS):
260

Missile Master: 206-7
Missiles

Atlas: 238

ballistic: 255

BOMARC (Canadian): 254
BOMARC: 117, 188, 197, 199, 236-38,

249, 260
early development of: 188
extensive buildup of: 197

346

Index

Falcon: 233, 249
GAR-1 (Falcon): 233
GAR-2: 233

guided: 49, 63, 255-56, 258
ICBM: 175, 197-201, 223, 232, 238,

247, 248, 254, 256-61, 264, 267,

268
IRBM: 260
Minuteman: 238, 258
MRBM: 267

Nike: 116, 174, 185, 188-89 206, 248,

256, 258, 268
Nike X: 259
Nike Zeus: 258, 259
in SAGE system: 197
Talos: 188-89
Titan: 238

V-2: 117, 236, 255, 256
Mitchel Field (later Air Force Base), N.Y.:
33, 53, 75, 86, 90, 91, 96, 141, 147
ADC cadre at: 36

Antiaircraft Artillery Command at: 135
movement of ADC Headquarters from:
63

in test-sector exercise, 1941: 28

training at: 32, 59
Mitchell, William ("Billy"): 11

as advocate of bomber: 10, 56

in fight for separate air force: 7-8
Mobile, Ala.: 7-8
Moffat, Reuben C: 47, 48
Montgolfier brothers (Jacques Etienne and

Joseph-Michel): 1
Morehouse, Albert K.: 245
Muroc Lake

aircraft performance tests at, 1948: 100

exercises at, 1937: 17, 18, 27
Murphy, Charles J. V.: 183, 189
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) policy:
268

Myasischev, V.M.: 181

National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA): 228

National Defence Council (Canadian): 175

National Military Establishment (See also
Department of Defense): 71

National Security Council (NSC): 192
on defense: 193
on distant warning: 185
policy paper NSC 68: 118, 130
policy paper NSC 139: 186, 187
policy paper NSC 159: 191, 193, 194
policy paper NSC 162: 194
under Eisenhower: 190

National Security Resource Board: 172-73

Naval Research Laboratory: 22
Navy League of the United States: 7
Nazis: 22

Nelson, Morris R.: 199
Nelson, Otto L., Jr.: 184

as Director, East River project: 172-73
Nevada test site: 234
Newfoundland: 159

defense of: 63, 119

early-warning task forces at: 36

Mid-Canada Line site at: 188
New Look: 194-95
New Orleans, La.: 272
Newsweek magazine: 136
New York, N.Y.: 18, 147, 219, 248

information center at: 30, 31, 40
New York Air Defense Wing: 65
Ninth Army: 52
Nitze, Paul

on distant early-warning line: 186

in support of Summer Study Group
report 177-78
Norfolk, Va.: 40

Normandy landing site, World War II: 45
Norstad, Lauris: 86, 137

as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans: 49

on atomic weapons: 178

as Deputy Chief of Air Staff,

Operations: 68
on proposed changes for ADC: 72-73
North Africa

air defense in: 45
wartime collaboration in: 53
North America (See also Canada; North
American Air Defense Command;
United States)
defense of: 58-59, 241, 246-54
threat to: 175, 259-61
North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD) (See also Army Antiaircraft
Artillery Command; Canada;
Partridge, Earle E.; United States):
186, 246-54, 263
conduct of operations in: 253, 260
facing Soviet threat: 254
mission assigned to: 252, 253
The North American Co.: 100
North Atlantic attack routes: 57-58
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO): 249, 252
link to North American defense: 250-51
Northeast Air Command: See Pinetree Line
Northeastern Defense Command: 31
North Korea (See also Chinese

Communists; Korea; Korean War):
127, 129-30
Nunivak Island: 170

347

Index

Oak Ridge, Tenn.

atomic energy plant at: 117, 125

radar coverage for 123
Office of Defense Mobilization: 190
Office of Naval Research: 150
Office of the Secretary of Defense: See

Secretary of Defense
Office of the Secretary of War: See

Secretary of War
Ohio maneuvers, 1925: 11-12
Okinawa: 59

Oldfield, Homer R.: 48-50
Olmstead, Dawson: 34
On War: xiii

Opana Mobile Radar Station, Hawaii: 37
Operation Skywatch: 222

tests GOC capability: 157-59
Oppenheimer, Robert J.: 183

on air defense: 184

loses security clearance: 178-79

on Project Vista: 178-79

in Summer Study Group: 174-75
Orlando, Fla.: 41, 44
Otis Air Force Base, Mass.: 220
Ottoman, William: 27
Ottawa, Canada: 160

Pacific

Air Defense Identification Zone: 134

GOC on coast of: 156

Northwest emergency air defense for:
77-78, 124-25

war games in, Northwest: 86
Panama Canal Zone

air defense of: 65, 79

early warning in: 26
Pan American Airlines: 171
Parker, Hugh: 222
Partridge, Earle E.

on air defense: 65-66, 215

on Air National Guard: 75

assesses promotion system in ADC: 167

as Assistant Chief of Air Staff,
Operations: 49-50, 243

as Commander-in-Chief, CONAD: 245-
46, 261

role in NORAD: 252-53

seeks antijamming fixes: 223

seeks support for ADIS: 199, 201-3
Patch, Alexander M.: 52
Patch Board: 52

Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.: 256

Patterson, Robert: 68

Patton, George S.: 65

Patuxent, Md.: 156

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii: 39, 43

attack on: 36-37, 61
disaster at: 38
lessons of attack on: 181
Pearson, Lester: 248
Permanent Joint Board on Defense: 58
coordination with Canadian defense

plans: 250
on defense of leased bases: 119, 159-60
on Mid-Canada Line: 193-94
Personal Advisory Council: 50
Philco Corp.: 152
Philippines: 37, 59
Pinetree Line (See also Distant Early
Warning Line; Canada; United
States): 238
as agency for North American defense:
160

capability of: 210

constructed: 209

radar stations along: 223, 268
Point Barrow, Alaska: 212
Polar concept: 58-59, 62, 131

difficulties with: 58 n
Portland, Maine: 18
Portland, Ore.: 212

regional defense headquarters at: 40, 91
Post War Division, AAF: 47, 50
Pratt, Henry Conger 15-16
Pratt, William V.: 9
"Pregnant Goose": 20
Presque Isle, Maine: 170-71
Project Charles: 145, 150
Project Lamplight: 223
Project Supremacy: See Radar Fence
Plan

Project Thumper: 256
Project Vista: 178-79
Puerto Rico: 63
Puget Sound, Wash.: 108
Putt, Donald L.: 202

Quesada, El wood R.: 53-55

Rabi, Isidor I.: 83

in Summer Study Group: 174-75
Radar (See also Alaska; Ballistic Missile
Early-Warning System; Distant Early
Warning Line; Greenland; Mid-
Canada Line; Newfoundland; Pinetree
Line; Semiautomatic Ground
Environment; Radar types): 16, 19

advances in: 38

airborne: 34, 132, 162-63

assigned to geographic areas: 199, 204

control stations: 124-27

348

Index

and defense solutions: 91-93
delays in construction of: 137-38
detection of high-altitude aircraft: 146,
155

and DEW Line: 212

and double perimeter concept: 155-56

in early warning: 22, 48, 63, 114-15,

123-27, 155-56, 187
in England: 21-22, 28-29
enhances SAGE: 204, 207
equipment: 29-30, 175
extensive buildup of: 197-98
and fence concept 68-73, 76-77, 79,

86, 93
in Hawaii: 37, 63

increased emphasis on: 119—22, 152
and missiles: 199
mobile stations: 152-54, 193
in Panama Canal Zone: 79
poor state of: 83, 87, 132
shortage of: 33, 132
Skywatch: 157-59
specialists: 56

temporary system: 94, 97-98, 123, 160

testing: 22, 27

on Texas Towers: 217-20

in tracking Soviet ICBM: 259-60

units in Alaska: 78

vulnerability to ECM: 223

and Wizard 3: 256, 258

in World War II: 204
Radar Extension Program: 120-21, 159-60
Radar Fence Plan (Project Supremacy):

70-77, 79-80, 86-91, 98
Radar types

AN/APS-20B (search): 220

AN/APS-45 (height finder): 220

AN/CPS-5 (long-range): 94, 142

AN/CPS-6B: 97, 142, 143, 152

AN/FPS-3 (search): 152

AN/FPS-19 (search): 212

AN/FPS-20A (search): 218

AN/FPS-23 (gap-filler): 212

APG-32: 132

E-6: 163

SCR-70: 26, 27, 30

defect in: 41

in Hawaii: 37
SCR-271: 26
Radford, Arthur W.

as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: 191,

243, 344, 245
criticizes USAF: 109
on U.S. defenses: 193, 195
Radiation Laboratory (See also

Massachusetts Institute of

Technology): 29

Radio Corporation of America: 152
Ramey, Roger: 157

Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico: 114

USAF Commanders' Conference at: 113
RAND Project: 76

on air defense: 67-68, 71, 149

analysis of SAGE: 208-9

analysis of Soviet strategy: 129, 257,
267

develops software for Lincoln: 205
on DEW Line: 211
on distant early warning: 182, 185
on double perimeter: 152-56
on Lincoln-USAF controversy: 203
on missile defense: 257
monitors ADIS and Lincoln Transition:
200

on Soviet defense budget 267
Rawlings, Edwin W.

advises Zuckert of scheduling problems:

137-38
as Air Comptroller 71
Reagan, Ronald: 274
Reckord, Milton A.: 142
Red Army (See also Soviet Union)
in postwar Europe: 56-57
threat posed by: 130
"Red" attack code: 134
Republic of Korea (See also Chinese
Communists; Korea; Korean War;
South Korea): 127
Research and Development Board: 88
Research and Development Program: 101
Revolt of the Admirals: 108-10
Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Kans.:
148

Richville, N.Y.: 27
Ridenour, Louis N.

on dangers of attack: 201

as head, Scientific Advisory Board: 121
Ridgway, Matthew B.: 191
Robertson, Norman: 252
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 39
Royal Air Force (RAF) (See also
England): 41

air defense system in: 21-22

in Battle of Britain: 28

intercept techniques: 29
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) (See
also Canada): 119, 170, 246-47

in defense of air routes: 58

on ground observer system: 138

on joint defense of North America: 159—
60, 194, 247, 252

on Radar Extension Program: 120-21
Royal Flying Corps: 5

commander of: 2

349

index

and home defense: 3
Royal Garrison Artillery: 3
Royal Naval Air Service: 3
Royal Navy: 199
Royce, Ralph A.: 16
Russia: 4

St. Mihiel offensive: 7

San Diego, Calif,
early-warning schools for training at: 56
regional defense headquarters in: 40

San Francisco, Calif.
Air Defense Identification Zone: 134
radar warning and control station at: 123
regional defense headquarters in: 40,
147, 248

San Joaquin Light and Power Co.: 17
Santa Monica, Calif.: 205

joint signatory in creating NORAD: 252
Satellite and Missile Observation System

(SAMOS): 260
Saturday Evening Post: 173
Saulte Ste. Marie, Mich.: 42, 147, 248
Saville, Gordon P.: 49, 70, 113, 118, 151,
154, 161, 162, 164, 175, 188, 225
in Air Defense Command: 24-26, 32,
86

on air defense during Korean War: 129,

180-81
on air defense goals: 127
as Commander, Air Defense Command:

96-98

as Commnder, XII Tactical Air Com-
mand: 44, 84
on death of Fairchild: 136
as defense authority: 84, 137, 201
as Director of Military Requirements:
103-5

as Executive Officer, I Interceptor

Command: 35-36
on MIT: 180

in Plans Division, Office of Chief of

Air Corps: 23
revises radar modifications: 89-92,

94-95

role in developing air defense: 13-16,

45, 81, 137, 198
on science in air defense: 122
searching for improved aircraft: 99-101
sets up air defense on east coast: 26-27,

125

studies British air defenses: 29, 41
style of: 84-86, 103-4, 122, 137
testimony before Congress: 98
urges congressional approval of radar
screen: 112

on use of ground observers: 120
Schlesinger, James: 272
Scientific Advisory Board: 121, 198
Scotland: 176
Seattle, Wash.: 212

Air Defense Identification Zone: 134

Boeing facility in: 107

Chamber of Commerce: 107

protection for: 78, 126

radar coverage at: 123

regional defense headquarters in: 40,
147, 248

Secretary of the Air Force (See also

Finletter, Thomas K.; Lovett, Robert
A.; Symington, W. Stuart): 92, 107,
109, 137, 151, 158
Secretary of Defense (See also Forrestal,
James V.; McNamara, Robert S.;
Wilson, Charles E.): 71, 88, 109,
112, 159, 172, 184-85, 186, 215,
242, 244, 251, 258
on ABM Treaty: 272
approves GOC: 120
on continental air defense: 193, 268
on Missile Master and SAGE: 206-7
organizes WSEG: 145
Secretary of the Navy: 88-89
Secretary of State (See also Acheson,

Dean; Dulles, John Foster): 141, 159,
177, 194
Secretary of War: 80, 88-89
Selfridge Field, Mich.: 27
Semiautomatic Ground Environment

(SAGE, formerly Lincoln Transition
System) (See also Lincoln Laboratory;
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology): 221, 235, 258
capabilities of: 209-10, 239
cut back: 260

design: 198, 203-5, 264, 265
operational: 208-9
programmed with diverse weapon
systems: 205-6, 226, 229, 230, 238,
253, 268
protection for: 263, 264,
redesignated: 201
regional centers of: 264
U.S. Air Force-Army dispute over:
206-7
Services of Supply: 40
Sherman, Forrest P.
as Chief of Naval Operations: 110, 155
drafts legislation for National Security
Act: 69
Sherman, William T.: 8
Shorncliffe, England, bomber raid: 4
Short, Walter C: 37

350

index

Siege of Paris, 1870: 1

Signal Corps: 41

administering the air arm: 7n
assumes major defense role: 26, 33
in consolidated air defense forces: 43
with early-warning radar: 22
loses responsibility over electronic

equipment: 47
urged to duplicate British radar: 29, 34

Sikorsky, Igor: 4

Simpson, William H.: 52

Simpson Board: 52-53

Slemon, C. R.: 252-53

Smart, Jacob E.: 103-4

Smith, Frederic H.: 154

comments on emergency alert: 169-70
on GOC: 158, 222

on need to sophisticate ADC: 195-96,
202

as Vice Commander, ADC: 153, 156-58
Southeast Asia, war in: 272-73, 274n
Southern Air Defense Network: 272
Southern California Edison Co.: 17
Southern Defense Command: 31

institutes coastal warning system: 42
South Korea (See also Chinese

Communists; Korean War, North
Korea, Republic of Korea): 129
South Truro, Mass.: 204-5
Soviet Union: 107-8, 158, 228, 232
atomic testing by: 111-15, 116, 192-93
defectors from: 84, 130
defense spending analyzed: 267
displays aggressive policy in Europe: 83
emphasis on ICBMs: 207, 266-67
improves air defenses: 93
launches Sputnik: 223, 254, 255
May Day air show, 1954: 224, 226
missile testing by: 255
moratorium on nuclear testing: 234
postwar assessment of: 62-63, 65
postwar strategy of: 56-57, 83-84, 267
Supreme High Command (Stavka): 57
threat to United States: 90, 118-20, 129,
135, 144, 171, 190, 193, 217,
223-25, 238-39, 248, 260-61, 268,
272, 274

U.S. intelligence estimates of: 78-79,
104, 113-15, 129-31, 133, 156, 167,
181, 256, 266
World War II aviation in: 57
Spaatz, Carl A.

advocates limited air defense: 21
and Air Force reorganization: 53-56
as Chief, Plans Division, Office Chief of

Air Corps: 18
as Commander, U.S. Strategic Forces in

Europe: 48
and control over Air National Guard:
74-76

on development of radar fence: 68-73

initiates emergency defense measures: 78

as military analyst: 136

on polar concept: 58-59, 67

on postwar planning: 50, 59-63, 67

on proposed changes for ADC: 72-73

retires: 80

Special Projects Office, AAF: 47, 50

Spokane, Wash.: 87, 91

Sputnik

impact of on United States: 255, 260
launched: 223, 254, 255
Stalin, Josef (See also Soviet Union)
on American and European military
power. 56-57, 130
State Secretary of the Admiralty (British):
3

Stewart Air Force Base, N.Y.: 135, 208
Strategic Air Command (SAC) (See also

LeMay, Curtis E.): xiii, 53, 167, 209,

250, 264

air defense capability of: 38, 177, 259
Alsop's view of: 179, 187
bombers vs. Soviet ICBMs: 259
Canadian view of: 251, 252
Command Post: 240, 259
deficiencies assessed by Lindbergh: 93
and DEW Line: 211, 238
effect of air defense on: 143, 177, 187
in Eisenhower administration: 203, 204
emergency air deployment of: 78
on emergency alert: 170
exercises: 77, 126, 208, 223, 239
mission of: 60, 73, 176, 187
modernization of: 120, 122
organization of: 54-55
and preemptive strike: 131
as primary deterrent force: 80, 104, 112,
179

priority of resources: 95-97, 123, 211

requirement for defense of bases: 1 16,
126, 152-53, 181-84, 185, 215, 224

and retaliatory strikes against Soviets by:
156, 259

transfer of units to CONAC: 96

weak postwar posture of: 83, 90

weapon storage sites: 115
Strategic bombing: 21, 38, 259, 260

and air defense mission: 72

assessed in reaction to Soviet atomic
explosion: 112

concepts of at ACTS: 22

after World War II: 56-57
Strategic Defense Initiative: 274

351

Index

Stratemeyer, George E.: 140
on air defense procedures: 96
as Commander, ADC: 53-56, 77
as Commander, CONAC: 96-97
as Commander, FEAF: 102
on funding for radar defense: 80
and problems with Air National Guard:
74-76

on proposed changes for ADC: 72-73

and reorganization of ADC: 58-64
Streett, St Clair: 50
Summer Study Group: 189

on air defense: 174-80, 183, 203

on Mid-Canada Line: 210

report of: 177

on Soviet threat: 176
Super Combat Center: 265
Symington, W. Stuart: 111, 137

on air defense mission: 72

as Assistant Secretary of War for Air:
53, 62, 67

authorizes conversion of F-86 as
interceptor: 101

on B-36 production: 109

on Boeing move to Kansas: 107

on retaliatory attacks: 112-13

as Secretary of the Air Force: 70, 92,
107, 109

supports bill to fund Radar Fence: 89
Syracuse, N.Y.

General Electric plant in: 138

maneuvers at, 1940: 27

SAGE facility at: 263, 264, 265
Systems Development Corporation: 205

Tacoma, Wash.: 264
Tactical Air Command (TAC)

in emergency posture: 170

exercises: 77

mission of: 60, 75

organization of: 53-55

radar units of: 78

reestablished: 140

resources absorbed by CONAC: 95-97
subunit of fighter units created: 274

Talbot, Harold E.: 202

Talbot, William: 30

Tampa, Fla.: 40

Texas Towers: 187, 193, 217-21, 223,
238, 268

connection with SAGE: 204

operations aboard: 218
Thatcher, Herbert B.: 122
Third Army: 65

Thule, Greenland, BMEWS site: 259
Time magazine: 119

Tizard, Henry: 28
Tokayev, G. A.: 84
Tollefson, Thor C: 119
Trenchard, Hugh: 5

advocate of bombers for air power: 10,
56

as Commander, Royal Flying Corps: 2
on concept of strategic daylight

bombing: 11
promotes air offensive: 7-8
Truman, Harry S.: 109

announces Soviet atomic tests: 111, 116
approves Lashup project: 98
assigns responsibility for air defense: 69
on control over aircraft traffic: 134, 141
on defense spending: 95-96, 104, 112
defers radar modernization: 89
on early warning: 177-78, 184—86
installs direct line to Pentagon: 133
on peacetime army: 51-52
reaction to Chinese attack on Korea:
141-42

releases funds for Canadian radar sites:
160

on starting atomic war: 131
supports Skywatch: 158
on U.S. atomic monopoly: 119-20
warns Congress of Soviet threat: 79, 83,
190

Tupolev, Andrei W.: 56-57
Turner, Howard M.: 86
Twining, Nathan F.

on ADIS and Lincoln Transition: 200

as Chief of Staff, USAF: 187, 191, 192,
194, 242

on completion of permanent radar
system: 152

on creating ADC: 140

on defense assignments: 187

earmarks Guard squadron for ADC: 142

on GOC: 158

opposes extension of air defense: 172
opposes unified command for air

defense: 242—43
as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF: 137-38
Tyler, Kermit: 37

Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla.: 235, 266

United Nations forces in Korea: 141
United States (See also Eisenhower,
Dwight D.; Truman, Harry S.)
air defense, early post-World War II:

56-57, 60-67
air defense for 73-76, 96, 104, 116-22,

172, 174, 181, 209-10, 223, 255
air defense in Korean War: 129-35, 187

352

INDEX

air defense system completed: 131
air defense, World War I: 6-7
in Civil War: 1

combined air defense with Canada: 246-
54

defense against missiles: 175, 267
defense spending in: 267
divided into defense regions and centers:
207, 264

early-warning cooperation with Canada:
159-60, 193-94, 209-16, 238

faces Soviet missile threat: 257, 259

and first strike: 181, 224, 259

isolationism in: 7

Joint Board of Defense: 58

and Mid-Canada Line: 188, 193, 209-
10, 238

missile gap: 255

missile sites in: 238

moratorium on nuclear weapon testing:
234

radar stations proposed for: 91-94, 114
reaction to Cuban Missile Crisis: 253-
54

scientific developments in: 21, 22, 175
scientists react to Soviet atomic bomb:
111

Soviet air threat against: 84, 104, 112-

15, 118-20, 144, 156, 181, 190, 224,

243, 255, 60-268, 272-73
on use of nuclear striking force: 194,

268, 275
United States aircraft carrier 109
United States Air Force (See also Air

Corps; Air Staff; Army Air Forces;

Spaatz, Carl A.; Symington, W.

Stuart; Vandenberg, Hoyt S.)
advocates powerful strategic forces: 176

79, 184

on air defense automation: 199, 204-5
and air defense deficiencies: 202, 224
on air raid warning system: 133
in air war games: 77-79, 86-87
on airborne control and warning

(Skywatch): 159
on aircraft development: 226, 228-33
allowed to upgrade defense technology:

167

approach to postwar defense: 104-5,
255, 257

approves mobile radar program: 154-55
on atomic bomb tests: 83-84
on Boeing's projected move to Kansas:
107-8

on civil defense: 157-58, 172n
Commanders' Conference: 113-15
on completing radar system: 143, 152

on computerization of air defense: 152,

180, 203-9
in CONAD: 206, 247^t8
on control over civilian air traffic: 134
on cooperation with Army and Navy:

113, 115-19, 155, 188-89, 206-7,

220, 241^16
on creating ADC: 140-42, 148
defense mission of: 78-81, 84, 180, 186

87

on DEW Line: 210-17, 224
disappointment with BOMARC: 236
in dispute over Army missile control:
206-7

disputes control over antiaircraft

artillery: 244
disputes control over ICBM: 256, 258
on distant warning line: 185, 188
effects of Korean War on: 129-31, 136,

138, 141-43, 152, 155, 160
equips aircraft with rockets: 161—62,

188-89
established: 69

establishes Texas Towers: 187, 193,
217-20

faith in scientists: 147, 151, 177, 203
on GOC: 120, 138-39, 156-58, 222-23
improves radar stations: 93
installs radar on fighters: 163
intelligence estimates of Soviet Union:
78-79, 83-84, 104, 113-15, 130, 167,
169, 181, 193, 195, 224, 226,
241-46, 248, 256, 259, 268, 272
Lindbergh's assessment of: 93
on missile development: 257-60
on mission performance: 109-10,

122-27, 180
observes British CDS: 199
on procurement of B-36: 108-10
on radar capabilities: 88-91
radar developments in: 162
reaction to Soviet atomic bomb

explosion: 111-15, 197
reaction to Sputnik: 255, 258
receives supplemental appropriations:
137

redesignates fighter squadrons: 160
on reorganizing CONAC: 140-41
in search of mission: 73-76, 115-21
searches for atomic weapons: 233-36
searches for more efficient aircraft: 98,
100-101

seeks secure Combat Operations Center

for CONAD: 261-62
in Southeast Asia: 273-74
sponsors East River project: 172-73
suggests abolishing all joint boards: 242

353

index

on Super Combat Centers: 265
supplements warning system: 217-24
supports Lincoln Laboratory: 198, 201
tests Lashup radar network: 97-98, 121
under Truman's spending constraints:
95-97

on vulnerability of SAC bases: 181
United States Air Forces in Europe: 140
United States Air Service: 7, 7n
United States Army: 113, 190

air defense of Hawaii: 38

Chief of Staff: 9, 118, 135

on civil defense responsibilities: 172n

controversies with the Air Force: 1 15-
19, 188-89, 206-7

controversy over ICBM: 256

defense of continental U.S.: 43, 97, 115

failure in Hawaii: 37

on funding obligations, 1949: 80

intelligence estimates of Soviet Union:
78-79

missile tests: 236

on MIT: 145

observation team in Britain: 36
problems with antiaircraft defense: 132,
135

requirements of NSC 68: 118
role in CONAC: 241^16
United States Coast Guard: 126
United States Congress: 112, 113, 143-44
apprised of Soviet threat: 79, 83, 104,

224-25, 268, 273
approves permanent radar 114-15
on Chinese attack in Korea: 141
on defense spending: 98, 104-5, 297,

223, 238, 260
empowers Truman to impose control

over flights: 134
endorses GOC: 259

increased concern over air defense: 120
passes National Security Act: 69
receives interim radar plan: 95, 97-98
on reduction of military forces: 7
rejects funding early warning system:
87, 89

on supplemental appropriations: 71
United States Marine Corps: 140

role in CONAD: 242
United States Naval Forces, CONAD: 252
United States Navy: 201, 203

and air defense of Hawaii: 38-39

and cancellation of aircraft carrier
United States: 109-10

Chief of Naval Operations: 9

on cooperation with Air Force: 113,
115-19, 155, 188-89, 206-7, 220

in defense of continental U.S.: 43, 61

develops early warning for fleet

operations: 220
early-warning aircraft in World War II:

155

early-warning training: 156, 220
failure in Hawaii: 37
on funding obligations, 1949: 80-81
intelligence estimates of Soviet Union:

78-79
missile tests: 236
on MIT: 145, 151
opposes separate air force: 8
radar picket vessels: 63, 110, 115, 126,

146, 155, 187, 193, 204, 217-18,

221, 238, 241, 268
role in CONAC: 241-46
role in CONAD: 252
on superiority of naval aircraft: 110
supports Texas Towers: 210
testimony criticizing air defense: 109
tests CDS: 199
United States Northeast Command: 159
"United States Objectives and Programs for

National Security": See National

Security Council policy paper NSC

68

United States Senate: See United States

Congress
Units (numbered)

2d Operations Company (Aircraft

Warning): 30
425th Night Fighter Squadron: 55-56,
59

University of Michigan: 199-203
Air Research Center of: 236
on development of BOMARC: 236
on missile defense: 256

Utica, N.Y.: 27

Valley, George E.

in air defense study group: 197-98
on more effective radar: 122
on peak efficiency in the Air Force:
144-45, 150
Valley Committee

on Air Force capability: 144-45, 150
on problems with GCI: 198
Vandenberg, Hoyt S.: 108, 111, 119, 135,
136, 137, 138, 191, 199
on air defense: 109-10, 113, 143-44,
180-83

on air defense of Alaska: 131-32
appoints Lindbergh as special counsel:
93

on assessment of Soviet atomic
capability: 118

354

Index

assigns SAC priority for resources: 95-
97

on Boeing move to Kansas: 107

as Chief of Staff, USAF: 80, 83, 197-

98, 242, 243
as Commander, Ninth Air Force: 45
on correcting deficiencies in air defense:

145^7

as Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF: 69-71

on deterrence: 144

on double perimeter system: 154

initiates Skywatch: 157

on Navy radar picket ships: 155

opposes extension of air defense: 172

on proposed changes for ADC: 72, 73

on radar and early warning: 91-92

reaction to North Korean attack: 129

on relations with Soviet Union: 90

retires: 187

on separate ADC: 140

on Soviet threat of attack: 182-83

Vietnam War: 273

Vincent, Clinton D.: 126

Vinson, Carl: 142

on lack of efficiency in tactical forces:
140

on radar construction problems: 138
in support of Air Force goals: 136
supports stronger air defense: 120

Walker, Kenneth N.: 11

War Department (U.S.): 23, 47
on air defense plans: 69
and Air National Guard: 60, 74
on control of antiaircraft artillery:
117

on creation of ADC: 54
General Staff of: 9, 31, 49, 50, 52,
68, 69

postwar requirements of: 51

reorganization of: 31-33, 40
War ministry (British): 5
Warneford, R. A. J.: 4
Watertown, N.Y.: 26, 27, 28
Watson-Watt, Robert: 41
Weapon Systems Evaluation Group
(WSEG): 149-50

on double perimeter: 152-56

organized: 145
Weigley, Russell F.: xii-xiii
Wells, H. G.: 3

Western Air Defense Force: 103, 139, 146,
148, 222
alerted for emergency: 170
operations during Korean War: 133
vapor sightings by: 169-70

Western Antiaircraft Artillery Command:
135

Western Defense Command: 31, 40

Western Electric Co.

on DEW Line: 211-12, 214, 215-17
experimental projects in early warning:
185

and SAGE: 207
Western Hemisphere defense: 8
Western Theater of Operations: 39
Weyland, Otto P.

on air defense proposals: 65-66
as Assistant Chief of Air Staff for
Plans: 65
Wheeler Field, Hawaii: 37
Whirlwind I and II: See Computer
types

Whitcomb, Richard: 228

White, Thomas D.: 140, 181
as Chief of Staff, USAF: 232
as Vice Chief of Staff, USAF: 179-80,
187

"White" all-clear code: 134
Whitehead, Ennis C: 121, 123, 126, 134,
135, 170, 179-80, 181
assessment of: 102-3
as Commander, ADC: 140-42, 147, 148,
199

as Commander, CONAC: 102
as Commander, Far East Air Forces:
78-79

on efficiency of radar systems: 132
on Lashup: 143

on observers in air defense: 120
on reorganizing ADC: 140-42, 148
requests picket ships for air defense:

155
retires: 148

style in mission performance: 122-25
on threat of war with Soviet Union: 79,
159

White House direct line to Pentagon: 133

Wichita, Kans.: 107

Willow Run Research Center (See also
University of Michigan)
defense study against missiles: 256
proposes to study CDS: 199-203

Wilmington, Del.: 40

Wilson, Charles E.

on defense mission: 187
divides responsibility for missile

development: 258
on Missile Master and SAGE: 206-7
as Secretary of Defense: 186, 191-92,
215, 242, 244, 250

Wilson, Donald: 11

Wilson, Roscoe Charles: 179

355

index

Wings (numbered)
2d: 15

14th Pursuit: 36
52d: 133

Wizard research program: 256, 258
Wolfe, Kenneth B.: 99-100
World War I

air-to-air combat in: 2-3

balloons in: 1

combat formations in: 16-17
Soviet weapons of: 65
World War II: 116, 117, 134, 151, 155,
173

aerial photography of Soviet industry

during: 130
air defense in: 21-45, 64-65, 115
air defenses dismantled: 47
atomic bomb in: 118
Canadian bases obtained in: 159-60
defense strategy in: 21
defensive ties with Canada during:

58-59

doctrine in: 19, 21-24
equipment for defense in: 65-66
Japanese suicide attacks in: 109
radars during: 92, 95, 142-43
Soviet air power in: 57
strategic and tactical units in: 74

Wright brothers: 2

Wrong, Hume: 160

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Mich.: 234

"Yellow" attack code: 134

Zacharias, Jerrold R.

as Director, Summer Study Group: 174,

176, 178
supports air defense buildup: 183
Zeppelin balloons: 3-5
ZORC, predecessor to Summer Study

Group: 183-84
Zuckert, Eugene M: 138

356

ir U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1990 - 249-184